challenges he is addressing (p. 187). In particular, he notes that, for democratic processes to be future-regarding, the corrosive effects of global capitalism on them must be constrained (pp. 186–90). He discusses several strategies for doing this, such as worker-owned cooperatives. Although these strategies might not be sufficient, this widening of the book's aperture to include economic systems is welcome. It is also exemplary of MacKenzie's willingness to elucidate immensely challenging problems and propose concrete solutions, without pretending that the solutions will be enough to solve the problems. Although some readers might find this excessively optimistic, I view it as an admirable commitment to starting somewhere.

MacKenzie's thorough, careful, and selective takedown of the DMT, together with his constructive proposals for reform, provides an excellent framework for thinking about the problem of incorporating future publics into present decision-making and the potential for deliberation to contribute to this task. But even though MacKenzie avoids the messiness that comes with deep engagement with specific examples, the end result is sometimes a bit stylized. For example, he emphasizes that deliberation can help people make better decisions by engaging their analytic ("system 2") brains, rather than their intuitive ("system 1") brains (p. 99). But as the example of QAnon aficionados who "do their research" suggests, it's not clear that system 2 thinking avoids deliberative dead ends. Future scholarship building on MacKenzie's framework might confront these and other complexities.

Although deliberative systems theory has a broader purview, the beating heart of deliberative democracy remains the use of reasoned argument to persuade others. Especially in the context of international development, I worry that putatively deliberative procedures can serve as a distraction, delay tactic, faux-legitimating cover, or techno-procedural escape hatch from the laborious work of forging broad political coalitions that fight for justice not only by offering reasons but also by exerting political (and economic and social) pressure. Nonetheless, these two books make a persuasive case that democratic deliberation is alive and—if not exactly kicking—then at least offering good reasons why we should grant it a prominent place in efforts to address pressing global problems.

In the Street: Democratic Action, Theatricality, and Political Friendship. By Çiğdem Çıdam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. 264p. $74.00 cloth.
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Çiğdem Çidam's recent book, *In the Street*, takes on one of the most challenging problems of modern political theory: the relationship between political action and political outcomes. Specifically, the book's central puzzle is how to account for political failures of popular movements and their efforts to change existing conditions of inequality and injustice. Çidam's investigation strikes at the heart of contemporary theories of political judgment and asks whether extant criteria for assessing the success of a political movement are legitimate. But more than this, the book asks whether our expectations of success in outcomes are not, in themselves, part of the problem that contemporary political theory must take on. As I understand and interpret her work, Çidam is centrally concerned with the relationship between political judgment and concrete change. In this respect the book is situated within the modernist, avant-garde strain of radical democratic thought and action that treats change in existing conditions as the apotheosis of political and aesthetic life.

Çidam's book positions the reader in the midst of some recent popular political uprisings: the 2013 Gezi protests in Turkey, Occupy Wall Street, Tahrir Square, the month-long protests in the United States after George Floyd's execution by police in 2020, and the January 19, 2017, Women's March. Each shares certain characteristics that become important themes of theoretical and political reflection throughout Çidam's study: these were events that poured bodies into the street (hence the title of the book), they were spontaneous, and they were all deemed ineffective spectacles that offered no real path to political change. Therein lies Çidam's concern, which structures the theoretical crux of the book: Do we—must we—expect spontaneous forms of political action to produce verifiable outcomes? And is political change only articulable in terms of a strategic rationality that establishes a measurable trajectory of effects that leads from protest to policy outcome? In short, is there only one way to judge political action?

To address these questions Çidam outlines what she finds to be the problematic view of political judgment that the book wishes to redress; namely, the Rousseauvian ideal of unmediated (and immediate) communion of wills as the basis of popular sovereignty. Her discussion of Rousseau's "dream of immediacy" is the central focus of the second chapter, which provides a close reading of the interrelationship between aesthetics and politics in Rousseau's ideal. Çidam's analysis brings to light the importance of the shift in Rousseau's aesthetics from the theatrical to the plastic arts that, as we also know from Joshua Foa Dienstag's work, is central to Rousseau's commitment to moral, political, and aesthetic authenticity. If I were to fault the research in this chapter, I would say that Çidam missed an opportunity to engage Dienstag's defense of Rousseau in his critique of Stanley Cavell's work on film (see *Cinema, Democracy and Perfectionism*, 2016). The reason why I think such an engagement might have proved fruitful to Çidam's analysis is her insistence throughout the book that there is a difference in thinking about collective

formations and their political value in terms of immediacy (and thus authenticity of will; that is, Rousseau) and a political ethos of spontaneity. That difference is in the account Çidam gives of theatricality as a practice of participation, rather than as an effect of spectatorship (Rousseau/Dienstag). For Çidam (and here she is closest to Rancière), the theatricality of spontaneity does not present the threat that Rousseau claims for political reciprocity and equality. The spontaneous theatricality of emergent collectivities, on her argument, generates *intermediating practices* of radical democratic participation in and through which strangers become political friends (in the Aristotelian sense of the term that she elaborates in the last chapter of her book).

Among many other things, Çidam's book is an intricate and intelligent study on the political metaphysics of spontaneity, which is the central temporal thematic that structures her readings of Antonio Negri, Jürgen Habermas, and Jacques Rancière. Needless to say, these are diverse and distinct authors that the inattentive hermeneut would be challenged to imagine as keeping company with one another. But Çidam's elegant readings explicate the unforeseen intellectual mutualities of seemingly disparate thinkers and texts with clarity and sophistication.

I will not detail each of the three chapters that deal with these three thinkers other than to reiterate that Çidam's analyses are compelling and invigorating. They show us not only how and why it makes sense to read these thinkers in company with one another but also how and why each of these thinkers contributes to our rethinking of the relationship between theatricality and spontaneity (and thus a rethinking of the relationship between democratic action and political outcomes) for radical democratic politics.

One thread that ties these authors together is that each writes in response to the 1968 revolts that took place throughout Europe, which have been considered political failures by standard liberal political histories. Part of the thrust of Çidam's arguments and readings is to show how each of the post-Marxist thinkers of her study refuses a political historiography of victors and thus the easy judgment of political failure. In addition, Çidam wants to show how the discourse of victory as the basis of political effectivity and change available in liberal accounts of popular revolt, *as well as* contemporary Marxist-Leninist accounts of party formation, rely too comfortably on an ideal of heroic political action, one whose strategic task is to overcome conditions of domination so as not to be deemed a political failure. To be sure, Çidam argues that such analyses are not to be overlooked or dismissed. But, she argues further, one must take stock of the teleological idealism inherent in a dialectics of overcoming whose focus takes attention away from an analysis of the actually existing forms and practices of political action on the ground, as these moments of radical democratic spontaneity concretize. To reduce the judgment of political action to the successful overcoming of domination, where anything otherwise is deemed a political failure, risks "ignoring the lived experiences and varied and innovative practices of ordinary people who brought those events into being at all costs" (p. 17)

The book's coda comprises both a chapter that theorizes political friendship as emerging from participation in intermediate practices of radical democratic action and an epilogue on the need to rethink political hope in light of "the messiness and impurity of democratic moments" (p. 193). It is in these final pages of the book that the reader is rewarded with Çidam's nuanced and compelling theorization and empirical studies of political action. The preceding chapters had noted the virtues of each of Negri's, Habermas's, and Rancière's analyses of radical democratic events, but they also note the limit in each thinker's "surprisingly thin and flattened accounts which lose sight of the on-the-ground efforts of the political actors" (p. 192).

Chapter 6 (especially) redresses this flattening via an analysis not only of the 2013 Gezi Park uprising but also of the critical commentary that emerged out of these events. Here Çidam's work as a redoubtable theorist of political participation shows its strength and its acumen. She relies on Aristotle to help her theorize a politics of friendship in the moment of spontaneity, but she moves well beyond that philosopher's articulations by elaborating, describing, and theorizing diverse moments of "forcing oneself onto the realm of meaning by making visible what had no business to be seen" (p. 179.) This part of the book is both exhilarating and intellectually compelling. Though Çidam's expository style is consistently clear throughout the book, she makes the smart choice to alter her writerly style in these concluding pages of her study. Part journalism, part critical analysis, part political theorizing, and at every step of the way masterful storytelling, her writing places the reader in the conceptual fuzziness of the moment of spontaneity where we really do discover a bevy of diverse forms of participation that recall comparative histories of past struggles, past actions, and future hopes nested in the activities of political participation she recounts.

Most significantly, however, the closing pages of the book pose a challenge that I will continue to ponder in my own work. It is the challenge of letting go of the pictures of political emancipation that have held us theoretically and politically captive. The book begins with a reflection of a Gezi protest poster (figured in the cover image) and its invocation of May '68. As Çidam shows us, it is wholly anachronistic, and the relationship between the image and the caption requires a great deal of the imagination to be able to coordinate the relations of Gezi and May '68, and indeed to reconstruct the political imaginary of the artist(s) who designed the poster. But this, as it turns out, is the

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task of Çidam's political theorizing in *In the Street:* to investigate and reflect on the intermediating practices of participation in contemporary theaters of political emancipation and to ask whether the political theory pictures that hold us captive are adequate to the tasks of thinking, theorizing, and judging political action in the street. In this regard, the book is an achievement not only in its effort to theorize aesthetic and political judgment but also in rethinking the relation between political action and the catharsis of successful outcomes.

Liberalism in Dark Times: The Liberal Ethos in the Twentieth Century. By Joshua L. Cherniss. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021. 328p. $35.00 cloth.
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Liberals are theoretically bound by their own principles not to act like their more ruthless opponents, even though a failure to do so may significantly hamper their ability to successfully counter antiliberal movements. Where opponents of liberalism, unimpeded by such self-imposed constraints, may be more than willing to override individual rights or liberties in the pursuit of their goals, possibly even at the expense of inflicting untold suffering on others, liberals cannot follow suit without betraying their principled commitments to those same rights and liberties. This creates what Joshua L. Cherniss calls liberalism's "predicament." Either liberals stop being so squeamish and match the ruthlessness of their opponents—running the risk that they will need to act in ways that leave them no longer liberals at all—or they hold onto their principles, despite the disadvantages this puts them at. What is a liberal to do?

There is not anything peculiarly liberal to this predicament, of course. Any political agent with principles may find themselves in a position where they must choose between sacrificing those principles for political efficacy or holding onto them when it would be advantageous not to. It is a general issue of political integrity. But it is a familiar predicament for liberals, given their strong self-professed commitments to the rule of law, individual rights, mutual respect, and the tolerance of a diversity of views and ways of life. The paraphrase of Robert Frost's famous definition of the liberal as someone unable to take their own side in an argument is almost endearing were it not for the possibility that it potentially leaves liberals unable to act when they need to in the defense of liberal values or principles.

In this terrifically rich, scholarly, and stimulating book, Cherniss seeks to recover a way of thinking about liberalism as a response to the problem of ruthlessness. Being a liberal is not so much about the values or principles one holds, the institutions one supports, or the ideals thought worthy of pursuit, although it is about those. It is ultimately about developing and sustaining a particular sort of ethos, one that enables liberals to find ways of living with the liberal predicament, rather than coming down on either horn of the dilemma. This "tempered liberalism," exemplified in the thinkers Cherniss explores—Weber, Aron, Camus, Niebuhr, and Berlin—puts front and center questions of the appropriate dispositions, sensibility, and attitudes toward others that liberals should cultivate at both the individual and social level. It is a question of character, how one faces up to the liberal predicament, and the sort of social spirit that nurtures the right sort of individual characters and is, in turn, strengthened by them. It is an ethos in which individuals recognize the temptations of ruthlessness in the pursuit of their ideals but are imbued with the fortitude to resist them.

The recovery of this ethos- and character-focused liberalism is timely. The suspicion that we may have an impoverished, if not deeply mistaken and distorted understanding, of our own liberal tradition, as explored in recent years by the likes of Helena Rosenblatt, Edmund Fawcett, Samuel Moyn, Greg Conti, and others, has obvious practical implications for those engaged in the endeavor of defending liberalism against its contemporary detractors. Cherniss makes a valuable contribution to aiding a better self-understanding, and although he sensibly leaves the reader to make the connections themselves, few are likely to finish the book without a clear sense that our societies lack the ethos of tempered liberalism and are all the worse for it.

The notion that liberals should refocus their attention on the political ethics of ethos and character is an exciting and provocative one. Liberals would do well to take it very seriously, and one can see several potentially fruitful lines of inquiry that could be developed from Cherniss's work, either in terms of exploring additional "tempered liberals" —regular mentions of the likes of Trilling, Shklar, and Williams, for instance, suggest this category plausibly includes thinkers beyond those explored here—the nature of a liberal ethos, and the individual characters and social practices or institutions that support it. The contrast between a liberal and ruthless ethos is another such area. How far we should go, how ruthless we must be, in the pursuit of our ideals and values cannot be separated from the question of the place of those ideals and values in our sense of the sort of lives we think worth living. This is likely an issue of ethos also. But insofar as it is, recognizing it as such means that drawing the relevant distinction between a ruthless and tempered ethos might not quite identify the right contrast—or at least not the contrast in all its complexity. Cherniss rightly notes, "Liberalism regards politics as important, but not all-important. Politics should be pursued in such a way that allows participants to do other things; indeed, the goals of politics include