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Race or Politics? Henry Cabot Lodge and the Origins of the Immigration Restriction Movement in the United States

Abstract: This article addresses the origins of the immigration restriction movement in the late 19th century United States, a movement that realized its aims in the early 20th. It critiques the dominant scholarly interpretation, which holds that the movement sprang from a racism that viewed the new immigrants of this period as biologically inferior. It argues first that activists did not have at hand a biological theory sufficient to this characterization and did not employ one. It argues second that the movement arose as an adroit political response to labor market competition. The Republican Party recognized the discontent of resident workers (including those of older immigrant origin) with competition from new immigrants. The Party discerned ethnic differences among new and old immigrants and capitalized on these conditions in order to win elections. Ethnocentrism and middle-class anxiety over mass immigrant added to a movement that depended on bringing working class voters into the Party.

Keywords: Racism, Nativism, immigration restriction, Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican Party

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> "You are a historian, but today you are helping to make history that future historians will be forced to deplore."—William Lloyd Garrison (Jr.) 1898

In the late nineteenth century, campaigns against immigration from Europe emerged in nations long dependent on that region for settlers and workers. In the United States, the leading figure in the movement was Henry Cabot Lodge, a descendant of New England colonists and a Republican politician of extraordinary influence. Lodge receives considerable though narrow attention in the literature. Scholars fix upon his role in the seemingly abrupt ascendancy of the restrictionist idea in the mid-1890s. They claim that racism generated his and others' opposition to new immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. Scholarship dating from John Higham's *Strangers in the Land* has stressed an irrational, racialized nativism as the driving force in the movement.[1]

A reassessment of the Republican Party's position on immigration, as revealed in the political career of Lodge, demonstrates that racist nativism cannot satisfactorily explain the origins or success of anti-immigrant legislation. Lodge and his fellow Republican politicians surely possessed prejudices, but it was votes that remained their compass. The currency of politics—winning elections—is the place to begin thinking about the success of anti-immigrant movements in democratic states.

Lodge's Republican Party shifted from promoting immigration in the 1860s to opposing it in the 1880s in order to gain working-class votes. The selection of particular ethnicities for exclusion appeared well before a coherent racial ideology about white Europeans was at hand. The literacy test that targeted the new immigrants evolved not out of racial principles but political ones: its selection criteria appealed to workers who feared wage competition from newcomers. It attracted workers of native origin as well as those of old immigrant origin without insulting their ethnicity or threatening their kin's access to the United States. Rather than racist politicians or eugenics experts, working-class voters and their ethnic distinctions provided the political strategy for immigration restriction.

WHY DID THE RESTRICTIONIST MOVEMENT ARISE?

The dominant scholarly interpretation of the *fin de siècle* movement to restrict immigration is that it was a product of nineteenth-century racism. Emerging in the 1990s, this view has become hegemonic, as suggested by the *Journal of American Ethnic History*'s Winter 2017 special issue, "The Racial Turn in

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Immigration and Ethnic History." Matthew Jacobson discovers racism as early as the Know Nothing movement before the Civil War—by the late nineteenth century, Americans recognized "innate, biological differences" among European groups. He cites Lodge's restrictionist efforts as rooted in a "eugenic standpoint" in which new immigrants were no longer considered white. Erika Lee argues that Chinese exclusion led Lodge and his colleagues to embrace "racial ideas that marked southern and eastern Europeans as . . . a threat to the nation." Aristide Zolberg asserts that "explicitly racialist arguments on behalf of restriction" emerged as the prime motivation in U.S. policy, linking Lodge directly to that conviction. David Fitzgerald and David Cook-Martin contend that in the United States "scientific racism played a dominant role in forming the literacy test." So too, Daniel Tichenor finds "southern and eastern Europeans . . . distinguished in biological, evolutionary terms" and considers eugenics well established in American intellectual circles before 1900. Thomas Leonard maintains that the progressive social scientists "at the forefront" of the movement in the 1880s and 1890s believed in the "hereditary inferiority" of immigrants.[2]

Academic opinions are a dubious source for policy in democratic societies. Even if they were formidable, making racism a major factor distorts biological theory before the advent of Mendelian genetics. Ethnocentrism was common, but belief in the controlling influence of heredity was rare. The late nineteenth century lacked a biological theory sufficient to characterize European ethnic groups as racially distinct. Scientific racism and eugenics had as yet no purchase in the United States. As George Stocking's careful studies demonstrate, Neo-Lamarckianism dominated thinking among American social scientists. The inheritance of acquired characteristics made culture dominant over biology: race was more the product of cultural characteristics than their cause.[3]

Lodge's supposed racism is said to have emerged from his affection for a "Teutonic" historical theory that glorified Anglo-Saxon traditions. According to Barbara Miller Solomon, that theory led Lodge to conclude that "the essence of the immigration problem was racial." Leonard judges Lodge by this measuring stick: in the 1880s, "Anglo-Saxonism . . . implied that the capacity for democratic government was hereditary, a race trait unique to the Anglo-Saxon people." Indeed, Lodge "joined the anti-immigrant cause in the name of preserving Anglo-Saxon race integrity."[4] Richmond Mayo-Smith, Francis Walker, John Fiske, Henry Adams, and other academics did at times argue that ancient Anglo-Saxon customs lay at the root of the admirable institutions found in the United States. Yet elitist Teutonism was widely discredited by scholars in the 1890s; Mayo-Smith himself heaped contempt upon it. Most critically, it was not a racial theory, but a cultural one, a triumphantly

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assimilationist proposition. Academics like Fiske and popularizers like Josiah Strong proclaimed that the English-speaking peoples would absorb, assimilate, and dominate all other groups.[5] Historians intent on race as an explanation must ignore an ardent American belief in the power of the nation to assimilate foreigners, a conviction extending to the academics featured in most texts.

Stocking concludes that "American social scientists did not for the most part attribute to race a major role as an independent causal variable in the explanation of social phenomena." Racial heredity "was itself ultimately the implicitly Lamarckian *product* of social and environmental forces." "The men who established the social sciences as academic disciplines in the United States at the turn of the century were for the most part environmentalists . . . reacting against biological determinism."[6] The potential for a biological racism existed within Lamarckianism, as Lodge's career will attest, but hereditary arguments were rare. Mayo-Smith expressed the inadequacy and confusion of racial thinking and the dominance of environmentalism in his 1894 essays, "The Assimilation of Nationalities in the United States": "Anthropologists have as yet reached no satisfactory definition of race, tribe or people." Mayo-Smith rejected the notion of pure races, discounted hereditary traits in the rapid process of assimilation of immigrants in the United States, and stressed that the primary force had been "the social environment."[7] As Jeanne Pettit remarks, "In the 1890s, no language existed to demarcate European 'races.'" William Ripley's *Races of Europe*, published in 1899, provided that language, but Ripley himself had no clear understanding of the processes of inheritance and resisted using race as an explanatory factor.[8] Mendelian genetics and eugenics lay ahead, in a different period, for another generation.

The lack of a coherent theory of biological inferiority before the twentieth century should caution against assigning racism a primary role in the restrictionist movement. Even had such been available, it begs the question. Could an elite ideological belief have inspired a movement made up of voters from a wide variety of ethnic and class backgrounds? If that seems unlikely, what might explain the vast appeal of immigration restriction in the late nineteenth century and the avid interest of politicians in espousing it?

FROM PROMOTION TO RESTRICTION: THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

In the 1850s, the Republican Party was the refuge for hundreds of thousands of nativists appalled by Catholic Irish immigration but still more offended by the slave South. The party continued to be, as ethnocultural political history has demonstrated, the affiliation chosen by most Northern Protestants,

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whether of native or foreign origin. As Lodge's fellow Senator George F. Hoar remarked, "The Methodist denomination" was "always large in Massachusetts and powerful in her Republican councils."[9] Pressured by pietistic constituencies, local Republican organizations regularly, and often disastrously, took up liquor, language, and public school positions that went down poorly with nineteenth-century immigrants. Still, by the 1860s, the national party had broken free from blatant anti-immigrant and anti-Catholic views. In Charles Sumner's words, it would not be a party that "interferes with religious belief, and founds a discrimination on the accident of birth."[10] Success with largely Protestant Scandinavian, Canadian, German, and British origin voters proved the utility of rejecting unqualified nativism. The party depended on ethnic votes for success and readily incorporated immigrant origin men into its party machinery.[11]

As befit a party seeking immigrants' votes, and one in which employers reliant on immigrant workers played a critical role, the party began as an avid promoter of immigration. The 1864 "Act to Encourage Immigration" responded to President Lincoln's 1863 message to Congress. Party stalwart Senator John Sherman presented the Report of the Committee on Agriculture. It lauded the contribution of European immigrants to the nation's economy and celebrated a population that had blended European nationalities: "we are all immigrants." The senator urged land policies benefiting immigrants, political rights for aliens, their exemption from military service, and an Immigration Bureau that would encourage foreigners to emigrate.[12]

While neither the 1864 Act, nor any other, exhibited the level of promotion seen in other host countries, it had a striking feature. It specifically "validated labor contracts made by immigrants before arrival": "Emigrants [could] pledge the wages of their labor," to pay for their transportation and other costs. A Commissioner of Immigration would oversee contracts and prosecute emigrants who failed to fulfill them, a bracing stance for the party of free labor.[13] Quietly repealed in 1868 in Congress, states maintained contract labor statutes. The party's 1868 and 1872 platforms called for immigration to be "fostered and encouraged by a liberal and just policy."[14] The 1873 Ohio platform made the Republican position clear: "We cordially welcome to our shores the oppressed of all countries, and remembering with pleasure that adopted fellow citizens have always proved loyal to the Republic, we favor such modifications of the naturalization laws as to materially shorten the time before voting."[15]

Such advocacy did not endure. Contract labor undercut American wages, the criterion the party professed that it protected with its main domestic policy, the tariff. Workers' opposition to immigration became evident, often veiled by rhetoric targeting contract labor only. State platforms began to eliminate

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the plank. Republican congressmen strongly condemned contract labor in 1884 congressional debates, and voted for the putatively prohibitive Alien Contract Labor Law in 1885. Calling on the antislavery tradition they had ignored in 1864, the 1884 national platform repudiated contract labor: "The Republican Party, having its birth in a hatred of slave labor, and in a desire that all men may be free and equal, is unalterably opposed to placing our workingmen in competition with any form of servile labor, whether at home or abroad. In this spirit, we denounce the importation of contract labor."

According to James L. Huston, retreat from the aggressive promotion of immigration meant that "by the 1870s . . . the Republicans rested all their hopes for a contented working class upon the operation of a high tariff wall."[16] Protectionism was a near religious principle in the party, but its only devout congregants were businessmen. Republicans on the stump tried, with fading success, to persuade working-class voters that tariff walls protected jobs and high wages. Without the tariff, as the 1883 Ohio platform attested, "American workingmen [would have] to accept the unremunerative wages which are paid their foreign rivals."[17] Workers in protected industries did support specific duties, but they also viewed tariffs as taxes that increased the price of goods they bought. A letter sent in 1878 to Senator Hoar by an officer of the Compton Iron Works reveals the Republican conundrum: it conveyed "a remonstrance from the Workmen in my employ against the increase of duty on tea & coffee, & also against the reduction of duties on articles manufactured in which their labor is interested."[18]

As the tariff became increasingly difficult to defend, Republicans experimented with alternative labor-friendly positions. The one they came most earnestly to promote was restriction of immigration. It spoke more directly than the tariff to the American worker's fundamental desire to reduce wage competition. Still, Republicans could not attack resident immigrants or their children who voted. A politically viable restrictionist policy needed to discriminate among foreigners. Congressional debate on contract labor exposed the ethnic rift upon which a useful political strategy might be built. In 1883, John Jarrett, born in Wales and president of the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers, testified that "demoralized" foreigners, "Hungarians, Poles, Italians, Bohemians," had begun to fill the steel mills.[19] Martin Foran, the chief advocate of anticontract labor legislation in the House, son of Irish immigrants, and once president of the cooper's union, represented a working-class district in Cleveland. Foran described new arrivals in equally harsh terms: "American capitalists and corporations have imported and shipped into this country, as so many cattle, large numbers of degraded, ignorant, brutal Italians and Hungarian laborers."[20]

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While union leaders such as these, many foreign born, would come to be a principal force in restrictionism, it was the mass of workers, not the few in unions, who mattered in elections.[21] Surveys taken by state bureaus of labor in the 1880s and 1890s resolve debate about where the working class stood on restriction. In the 1885–86 report of the Wisconsin Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics, Commissioner Frank A. Flower—a prominent Republican in the state—remarked on the "practical unanimity of the sentiment in Wisconsin in favor of restricting, suspending for a time, or totally prohibiting immigration from foreign countries."[22] In the report for 1887–88, when the bureau asked workers whether immigration injured their trade, 60 percent of respondents reported that it did. Labor-market wage competition lay at the core of these responses. A carpenter remarked: "Stop immigration. Enforce the school laws; stop child labor in shops and factories."[23] An 1895 Michigan survey of 1,250 teamsters found that 62 percent thought their occupation was directly injured by immigration. More than 90 percent called for reduction or an outright end of "foreign immigration."[24]

Remarkably, opposition to immigration barely declined in responses confined to workers of immigrant origin. But these were respondents from long-settled immigrant-origin communities. In three Kansas samples, taken in 1895, 1896, and 1897, fewer than 20 percent of respondents were foreign born, but nearly half had a foreign-born parent, and nearly all reported origins in Ireland, Germany, and Scotland. In 1897, only 45 men had been born in Germany, but 162 had a mother born there. In the survey of Michigan drivers, the near 30 percent of foreign birth were principally Canadian, German, or Irish. In March 1887, *The Nation* remarked on Flower's survey, noting that Wisconsin had abolished a state board that had promoted immigration: "Such unanimity in the reversal of a long-established policy would be striking in any State, but it is peculiarly impressive in Wisconsin, which has more foreign-born than native voters. . . . Evidently a change in the American attitude towards immigration has begun."[25]

The division among those of immigrant origin was equally visible in the foreign-language press. On April 18, 1896, the Norwegian *Scandinaven* supported a Republican candidate who favored the restriction of immigration, rejecting the notion that "adopted citizens are indiscriminately opposed to any restriction of immigration." Across decades, the Swedish paper *Svenska Tribunen-Nybeter* favored laws that would "limit the number of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, and . . . encourage immigration from northwestern Europe." The Norwegian paper *Scandia* argued that the "great immigration from Southern European countries" was a "menace to the U. S. A."[26]

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German-American and Irish-American organizations at times opposed restriction, but there is little evidence these positions reflected the opinion of German and Irish Americans. *Radnicka Straza,* a Croatian paper, adamantly opposed to restriction, found it ironic that "the greatest enemies of immigration are immigrants themselves or sons of immigrants." Even German papers consistently opposed to restriction, such as the German *Abendpost,* admitted in 1915 that the "German-American element" regarded "the fate of the [restriction] bill with complacency," since it would not affect them. On the eve of the great 1896 debate, the *Washington Post* commented on the "hearty support" given restriction legislation by "adopted citizens."[27]

Foreign-origin witnesses were equally frank in congressional testimony. In 1890, while some German societies opposed any change in immigration law, editors representing "a very large majority of the German press of this country" saw the merits of the literacy test. Paul Wolff, correspondent for the *Staats-Zeitung*, strongly endorsed the "educational test," precisely because it would not affect Germans but would keep out Italians and Poles. Emil Praetorius, editor of the St. Louis *Westliche Post*, observed that "the only thing that we, in the German-American Press, are looking favorably upon is this test of intelligence (*sic*)," given that it would not affect Germans but would bar the new immigrants. Leaders of Czech and other older immigrant-origin communities also described new immigrants as inferior. While not all concurred, contempt for Hungarians, Italians, and Jews was tangible in the remarks of foreign-origin witnesses favoring the literacy test.[28]

The same ethnic differentiation explains the support given by immigrant-origin politicians. In Minnesota, Swedish-born John Lind, Republican representative (and governor as a Democrat) favored restriction. Knute Nelson, a Norwegian-born governor and senator, built his career on the tendencies of Scandinavians in his state to vote Republican and the eagerness of Republican Party officials to cement that relationship through his political career.[29] Nelson's first term as senator coincided with the literacy bill of 1896, which he supported.

HENRY CABOT LODGE, ETHNIC DIVISIONS, AND THE WORKING-CLASS VOTE IN MASSACHUSETTS

Reviewing Lodge's career in 1906, H. W. Boynton remarked that the senator from Massachusetts "has made of himself not an eminent statesman, but a prominent 'practical' politician."[30] Lodge's state was solidly Republican after the Civil War, but the party's future rested on its capacity to capture immigrant-origin, working-class voters. His senatorial colleague Hoar presciently recognized

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that retaining sovereignty required that there be no "threatening shadow of a solid alien vote." Hoar warned Lodge that, unless his strategy was followed, "we are gone, and the grand chapter of the old Massachusetts history is closed." Republican manufacturers should establish papers to influence French Canadian and Irish voters; the party should give "no cause for jealousy or opposition to the Catholic clergy," and should voice mild support for Irish rights in Ireland. Hoar's objective was to "break this compact foreign vote."[31] Attentive to this advice, Lodge directed the successful Republican campaign in 1883 against Democratic governor Benjamin Butler, a man "quite popular with the poorer class of foreign immigrants who gathered in manufacturing towns and cities like Lowell."[32] Celebrating Republican victory, Governor-elect George D. Robinson gave credit to voters "born in other countries, or of other parentage than American," [who] cast their lot with us."[33]

Stiffer challenges were yet to come, as Hoar foresaw. Samples of the United States Census profile the ethnic constituencies that Massachusetts politicians faced.[34] In 1880, there were about 500,000 males age twenty-one and older in the Commonwealth. More than half, 276,000, were native born with native-born parents, largely stout Republicans. There were 171,000 foreign born, and 53,000 native born with at least one foreign-born parent. That census did not ask citizenship status, but in 1870, 36 percent of foreign-born men in Massachusetts had naturalized.[35] Presuming an increase to 40 percent by 1880, the total electorate was 397,400. Foreign-origin voters thus made up 31 percent. The most adamantly Democratic group, the Irish, counted no more than 55,000 voters in the first generation and 36,000 in the second—even if Irish naturalization reached 50 percent, Irish-origin voters represented only about 17 percent of the electorate in 1880.

Other ethnic groups in the state included Scandinavian, English-Canadian, and British-born voters and their children. Ethnocultural political theory and archival evidence from the papers of Hoar and Lodge indicate that these groups supported the Republican Party.[36] On September 23, 1887, Joseph McCready, editor of the *American Protestant* and the *British American*, called Hoar's attention to "the British-American movement." McCready claimed that British-origin immigrants were "becoming American citizens by hundreds in all parts of state and particularly in the large cities."[37] E. B. Glasgow reported to Hoar that "citizens of Swedish, British and French origin" should lead to "a large increase in the Republican vote."[38] In the same year, W. W. Thomas wrote the senator (with considerable exaggeration) on a "tide of Swedish immigration" arriving in New England, adding "a fresh, sound element of good Northern blood . . . to Mass. & to your own good city."[39]

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Writing Mr. Doering in 1892, Lodge remarked: "I fully appreciate the good character and quality of the Scandinavian vote in this country and I know that it is a vote almost always cast for the Republican party." He urged that those in Massachusetts "become citizens without delay."[40] If these largely Protestant groups are combined, they made up about 10 percent of the potential electorate in 1880, making Republican success quite likely.

Still, as Hoar had foreseen, by 1900 the share of immigrant-origin voters in Massachusetts had grown to more than half the electorate. Moreover, in contrast to other states, Massachusetts' districts afforded urban and immigrant voting districts largely proportional power in elections.[41] In 1900, the potential electorate in the Commonwealth had reached 661,365. Of these, 167,000 were naturalized foreigners and 168,000 were native born with at least one foreign parent, making the foreign-origin vote 51 percent of the electorate. Those of Irish origin, with a 75 percent naturalization rate among the foreign born, made up nearly 30 percent of all potential voters. French Canadians rose to only 4 percent and other foreign-origin groups, largely from the new sources in Southern and Eastern Europe, constituted less than 3 percent. But these did not comprise all immigrant-origin voters. Ethnic groups likely to vote Republican constituted 122,246 or 18 percent of the electorate, providing the margin Republicans needed.

Immigrant-origin voters in Massachusetts were quite likely to be working-class voters. The party, and Lodge himself, needed to win a constituency that might vote on class as well as ethnic lines. For all his patrician ways, Lodge began his political career running for a seat in the General Court in the heavily industrialized 10th Massachusetts House district. In his first successful campaign in 1879, the other two men elected from the district were "workers in the Lynn shoe shops."[42] Lodge later competed in the 6th Congressional district, which included the shoemaking center of Lynn, the working-class suburbs of Boston, and various factory towns. In 1886, he defeated H. B. Lovering, formerly mayor of Lynn. Lovering was popular with working-class voters, but, in this election, as George H. Breed, a Lynn politician, remarked, "Men in the shops, as a rule voted against him."[43] Lodge, standing "on the steps of the factory in Lynn facing the great crowd in the square," offered his constituents the Civil War pension, an effective tool with Northern working men, and conventionally ballyhooed the tariff as the guarantee of good wages in protected industries.[44]

The tariff nonetheless sparked continual negative reaction among working-class voters. What might inspire them to vote Republican? Campaigning in working-class districts had once required celebrating immigration. In 1882, Lodge applauded the arrival "in ever-increasing numbers,

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[of] the best elements, both mentally and physically, of the laboring population of Europe."[45] He soon had a different view. By 1888, immigration restriction appeared in his speeches. Openly advocating a general reduction, he easily won three more terms in this district before entering the Senate in 1893. Lodge linked the new policy to the protectionist warhorse. From the stance that tariffs kept out goods made with cheap labor, it was but a step to argue that cheap labor might "come on two legs down the gang-plank of an emigrant ship." On August 28, 1888, under the heading "The Tariff Question," he explicitly endorsed "a movement toward restricting immigration by excluding its undesirable elements."[46] The language he used became standard copy, reflecting the self-conscious attempt by Lodge and other Republicans to defend the tariff while presenting a more direct appeal. In the December 15, 1888, issue of the Lynn newspaper, *The Laster,* Lodge laid out the argument to a working-class readership:

> The great value of the protective principle . . . lies in the fact that it maintains the rate of wages by shutting out in a large measure the competition of foreign labor coming in the form of the manufactured product. . . . But this undue competition of foreign labor can be felt in another way—by the introduction of the laborer himself. The necessary accompaniment of the reestablishment of the tariff therefore will be measures of protection against the introduction of foreign labor itself in the human form. . . . New legislation must be enacted to restrict to a very considerable degree the present rush of immigration."[47]

He argued that "immigration should not only not be stimulated, but that it should be restricted. . . . Cheap labor can come packed up in the manufactured article as well as in the human form. If it is well to exclude the one it is wise to exclude the other."[48] In a political speech in Everett, Massachusetts, in October 1890, he received sustained applause for his insistence that "we must have laws on the same line as the protective tariff to restrict and sift the immigration that comes to this country. . . . Bear it in mind when you go to vote on the fourth of November . . . that the protective principle is just as applicable in one case as it is in the other."[49]

Other major Republicans shifted at the same time and for the same reasons. Lodge's close friend in the House, the great tariff advocate and future president, William McKinley, had turned to a restrictionist strategy even before Lodge. In a speech given in his working-class district in Canton, Ohio, on October 18, 1887, McKinley reported that "on the subject of foreign immigration the Republican party of Ohio is fearless and outspoken. . . . Iowa,

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Pennsylvania, and New York have all pronounced against indiscriminate immigration."[50] In 1887, the state platform committee, upon which McKinley sat, laid a plank that broke completely with past policy of the Republican Party:

> We view with alarm the unrestricted emigration from foreign lands as dangerous to the peace and good order of the country and the integrity and character of its citizenship. We urge Congress to pass such laws and establish such regulations as shall protect us from [those] who come among us to make war upon society to diminish the dignity and rewards of American workingmen and to degrade our labor to their level. Against all these our gates should be closed."

Historians have repeatedly confused McKinley's pro-labor gestures as expressions of an ethnic pluralism designed to bring new immigrant constituencies to the party.[51] In fact, he proved his labor credentials by calling for bars against new immigration. His shift, like that of Lodge and other Republicans, grew out of the need to win elections in districts dominated by working-class voters.[52] Benjamin Harrison's letter of acceptance of the Republican Party's nomination for president in 1888 similarly called for limitation of immigration to protect American wages, closing connecting this policy "with the subject of the tariff."[53]

> In the earlier years of our history, public agencies to promote immigration were common. . . . But the day of the immigration bureau has gone by. While our doors will continue to be open to proper immigration, we do not need to issue special invitations to the inhabitants of other countries to come to our shores or to share our citizenship. Indeed, the necessity of some inspection and limitation is obvious."

In 1888, the Republican-dominated House appointed a "Select Committee on Investigation of Foreign Immigration." By 1889, there were standing committees in both houses. In the 52nd Congress (1891–93), "a flood of petitions call[ed] almost unanimously for restriction of immigration." Hutchinson estimates these at more than five hundred, submitted by labor organizations, patriotic or nativist societies, and agricultural leagues.[54] A survey of the "English-American press" in 1888 by the German-language newspaper *Illinois Staats-Zeitung* found most Republican papers supported the reduction of immigration.[55] In 1889, Republican senator William E. Chandler of New Hampshire, chair of the Senate committee, argued forcefully for restriction; in 1892, he introduced a bill calling for a one-year suspension of immigration.[56] The simultaneity

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of these conversions reveals that an ascendant faction of the Republican Party had begun to view immigration restriction as a useful strategy to gain working-class votes, well before the depression years of the mid-1890s.

ETHNIC DIVISIONS AND THE INDISPENSABLE TOOL

It was nonetheless risky to be broadly anti-immigrant in front of men and women proud of their immigrant origins, hostile to nativism directed toward their kind, and in contact with kith and kin who might want to emigrate. Indiscriminate exclusion offended persons from earlier immigration streams, an affront Republicans eager to expand support among working-class voters could ill afford. Restriction lacked a device that could distinguish efficiently between those of immigrant origin who could vote and those who could not. The answer lay in the divisions revealed in contract labor debates and worker surveys, and vividly expressed in the foreign-language press.

The economist and progressive reformer Edward W. Bemis provided the indispensable tool to effect this political strategy. In 1887–88, he proposed: "Admit no single person over sixteen, and no man over that age who cannot read and write in his own language." Bemis saw that a literacy test would not much affect "Swedes, Germans, English, Scotch, and most of the Irish . . . and we do not want to exclude them" but would vastly reduce "the Italian, Hungarian, and Polish emigration." Like other progressive reformers, and like Lodge and McKinley, Bemis devoted most of his attention to the positive effect of restriction on American workers' wages. Unskilled laborers in the new immigration lowered the American "standard of living and wages" and caused an "incalculable injury to our wage-earners."[57]

Lodge quickly adopted Bemis's approach, one that let him appeal to certain workers by offering to exclude others. In "The Restriction of Immigration," in the January 1891 issue of *The North American Review*, he called for a "definite test which will discriminate against illiteracy if we desire any intelligent restriction or sifting of the total mass of immigration." A literacy test would be "a help to our workingmen, who are more directly interested in this great question than any one else can possibly be."[58] In the 1890 hearings before the Joint Congressional Committee on Immigration, the "educational test" made its way into congressional debate, and in 1893 the House Select Committee recommended the exclusion of those who could not read or write in their own language.[59]

Aversion to immigration had begun among workers competing for wages, but the literacy test had the further merit of appealing to the middle class. Bemis had argued that the new immigrants were "ignorant of our institutions"

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and "conceptions of government."[60] Bemis's comments reflected widespread unease over the civic consequences of mass immigration, perhaps best reflected in the rapid shift of Protestant congregations from approval of immigration to outright opposition. On July 10, 1884, *The Congregationalist* reminded its readers that "'we are all immigrants or their descendants. . . . Every responsible immigrant should be admitted here.'" Seven years later, the editors argued for "Guarding the Doors": "This country is coming to be overburdened with multitudes who are in no sense patriotic, who are ignorant and clannish . . . [who find] their way into our asylums, poorhouses and prisons . . . [and who are often] unfit to be American citizens."[61] In 1887, the editors of *The Nation* expressed these anxieties forthrightly, lamenting the arrival of:

> Hungarians, Poles, and Italians, only partially civilized, and ignorant not only of the laws but of the language of the country, and with very low standards of living. . . . The serious troubles, both industrial and political, which these importations have been causing during the past year, have made a deep impression on the public mind. A measure, therefore, directed against importations *en masse* of unskilled and ignorant labor, and fortified with some tests of character or education, would, we think, meet with general approval.[62]

The literacy test thus also responded to a political opportunity embedded in middle-class anxiety. Lodge's speeches began to add to its working-class themes the threat illiterate immigrants posed not simply to wages but to civic institutions, a motif already taken up by McKinley.[63] In his 1891 article, like Bemis, Mayo-Smith, Francis Walker, and other prominent restrictionists, Lodge advanced a theory of political capital, fixed on the undercapitalization of certain immigrant groups for citizenship, an argument appealing to a middle class anxious about the visible effects of mass immigration. Lodge, conveniently forgetting the Know Nothing era, and repressing his true sentiments about the Irish, lamented the decline of "community of race or language" that had "facilitated the work of assimilation" of previous immigrants. References to the dangers southern and eastern Europeans posed to "free government" soon joined his original emphasis upon costs for the American workingman:

> This tendency to constantly lower wages by the competition of an increasing and deteriorating immigration is a danger to the people of the United States the gravity of which can hardly be overestimated. Moreover, the shifting of the sources of the immigration is unfavorable, and is bringing to the country people whom it is very

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> difficult to assimilate and who do not promise well for the standard of civilization in the United States, a matter as serious as the effect on the labor market.[64]

These two arguments are entwined in his cynical response to the lynching of Italian immigrants by a mob in New Orleans in March 1891. Lodge recognized the political value of an atrocity he had condemned when African Americans were its targets. He transformed its victims into agents of corruption, members of the Mafia, "mere birds of passage . . . which [regard] as home a foreign country, instead of that in which they live and earn money. They have no interest or stake in the country, and they never become American citizens." Lodge specifically distanced himself from race: undesirable traits "come not from race peculiarities, but from the quality of certain classes of immigrants of all races."[65] The "maintenance of good wages among American workingmen" was essential, but so was "the quality of its people."[66] In an 1891 newspaper interview, Lodge tiptoed gingerly around the tariff, arguing that it ought to be supplemented "by proper restriction of immigration," by "adding to the excluded classes those who are unable to read and write their own or the English language, in the hope that thus the standard of American living and the quality of American citizenship may be preserved."[67]

Representative Lodge's dual message of the literacy test—better wages, better citizens—proved immediately popular and received sustained applause in his public addresses. He pushed the Massachusetts party toward immigration restriction, sponsoring the formation in 1890 of a new "Republican Club for Young Men," made up of Lodge's associates. The club made immigration restriction a primary objective. As senator and chief leader of the party in Massachusetts after 1893, he promoted commitment to "protecting the quality of our citizenship and the wages of our workingmen by a proper restriction of immigration."[68]

That public concern and political opportunity had arisen before the depression of 1893–96 is manifest in leading Republican politicians' attention to restriction. Still, that economic collapse, and ensuing rising unemployment, strengthened Lodge's hand. As the depression deepened, the utility he found in highlighting immigration restriction waxed. By 1893, he cited a "strong public sentiment in favor" of "the great decision before us."[69] The Massachusetts party platform of 1891 had openly supported immigration restriction and, in 1896, a plank called for "rigid enforcement of existing laws in restriction of immigration, and their extension by adding to the excluded classes those who are unable to read and write their own or the English language, in the hope

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that thus the standard of American living and the quality of American citizenship may be preserved."[70] The Boston-based Immigration Restriction League, formed in 1894, chose the literacy test as the best device to reduce immigration, and to reduce it most from the countries whose inhabitants they did not favor. The language they used mirrored the language that Lodge had begun to employ in the early 1890s.[71]

Lodge's correspondence in this period expresses no belief in innate racial differences. He maintained, in line with Republican rhetoric and his congressional efforts for African Americans, that "it is this discrimination against a man on account of his color which is repugnant to justice and honesty." His letters point to labor competition and the poor prospects for citizenship among new immigrants: pauperism, criminality, return migration, and illiteracy. Counsel to fellow party members emphasized the political opportunity before them. Writing Bernard O'Kane on May 1, 1892, Lodge remarked that he is "utterly opposed to any discrimination on the ground of race or religion" and "heartily in favor of honest and thrifty immigrants coming here and becoming American citizens." He repeated his themes that dangerous and "undesirable" immigration "is certain to affect . . . the quality of our citizenship and I know that" it will injure "the wages of our workingmen." Professing his admiration for the "intellectual powers" of Italians, whose artistic achievement often exceeded that "of any country," he reserved judgment on their capacity to assimilate as good citizens.[72]

The Republican shift toward restriction was complete by the mid-1890s, when the depression muted the opposition of employers in the party. Massachusetts Lt. Governor Roger Wolcott managed adroitly to attack anti-Catholic bigotry, denouncing the introduction of "bitter feelings of race and religious animosity" into elections, while simultaneously calling for "wise and careful legislation" to keep out unworthy immigrants.[73] Republican state delegations to the 1896 national convention brought demands for restrictionist legislation. Massachusetts, where Lodge was chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, stipulated that "immigration should be restricted, and the Republican Party should pledge itself to pass at once a law to exclude at least the totally ignorant and illiterate."[74]

The 1896 national platform called for the literacy test, and the party nominee, McKinley, long an advocate of restriction, pointed to the "declaration of the platform touching foreign immigration [as] one of peculiar importance at this time, when our own laboring people are in such great distress." McKinley had declared that "we want no immigrants who do not seek our shores to become citizens."[75] He put Terence Powderly, the son of Irish immigrants,

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a union leader, and well-known restrictionist, on his campaign team, and appointed him Commissioner General of Immigration after his election. The currency question swept all before it and McKinley rarely mentioned immigration in his campaign, but the issue arose regularly at local events. Contemporaries credited the Republican position with contributing to McKinley's resounding majority of the working-class vote, though this was more surely won on the silver issue. Lodge reported from the campaign trail that McKinley was receiving the avid support of immigrants and their children, a claim borne out by his resounding victory in working-class districts in American cities.[76] While workers had other reasons to fear Bryan and his populist program (also averse to immigration), they had inspired the Republican Party's position on immigration and it was one they approved.

TOWARD THE HEREDITARIAN VIEW: 1896

The battle was joined in Congress in 1896. House Report No. 1079, from the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, cited "public sentiment" against "certain classes" of immigrants and noted the high levels of illiteracy in countries like Italy and Poland.[77] Lodge and other restrictionists entered bills based on the literacy test in the House and the Senate. Lodge had done so before without much effect, but the bill he put forth in the Senate in late 1895, as chair of the Committee on Immigration, had more likelihood of success.[78] He argued that "there can be no doubt that there is a general and very earnest desire among the people of the United States to restrict, by proper measures, foreign immigration."[79]

As would be the case in subsequent congressional bills, voting reflected considerable popular support for restriction.[80] In early 1897, the Senate passed the bill 52 to 10, though with 27 abstentions. The House, arguably closer to the American public's wishes, approved the literacy test by overwhelming margins (e.g., by 195 to 26 on May 20, 1896, and 217 to 36 on the 1897 conference report); the Senate vote on the conference report was a narrow 34 to 31. The House easily overrode Cleveland's March 3, 1897, veto on March 3, voting 194 to 37; Democrat representatives split or abstained, Populists voted to override, and the Republican votes were also near unanimously in favor. Ayes included those of members from heavily immigrant-origin states like Illinois, Ohio, South Dakota, and New Jersey. As Lodge recognized, Cleveland was nonetheless emboldened to veto the bill since he "sees it cannot pass the Senate by two-thirds."[81] The narrow Senate approval of the conference bill made an override unlikely and the bill died.

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Lodge's celebrated speech advocating the literacy test, given in Congress on March 16, 1896, stood on the two foundations that he and other Republicans had set down: wage effects and political character. He argued that the literacy test efficiently addressed the problems new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe presented the nation. He and his supporters in Congress repeatedly voiced the threat for American workingmen: "This low, unskilled labor is the most deadly enemy of the American wage earner, and does more than anything else toward lowering his wages." His speech displayed in fully realized form the political strategy that had guided Republicans to a restrictionist position: the literacy test would affect "lightly, or not at all" the "English-speaking emigrants, or Germans, Scandinavians, and French." The appeal to the middle class was also the standard one, linking illiteracy to declining standards of living, the congestion and degradation of American cities, criminality, and pauperism. The deficiency of political capital in the new immigrants was manifest in their tendency to return to Europe.[82]

What was new in his argument was that Lodge took a decided step toward a racial view, employing a Neo-Lamarckian proposition that acquired cultural traits might have permanence akin to that of biological traits. He relied on a French pseudoscientific gadfly, Gustave Le Bon. Le Bon's *Lois Psychologiques de l'Évolution des Peuples* maintained that a people or race possessed *"une constitution mentale aussi fixe que ses caractéres anatomiques" [a mental constitution almost as fixed as its anatomical characteristics].*[83]

As Stocking recognizes, Lodge's use of Le Bon indicates a shift toward an essentialist view of race.[84] Centuries of association gave persons of kindred background "an indestructible stock of ideas, traditions, sentiments . . . an unconscious inheritance," an inheritance another American Neo-Lamarckian, Lester Frank Ward, called an enduring transmission of culture. Thomas Carlyle served in Lodge's speech to celebrate an amalgam in England of Germans and Normans and Celts, a fusion that facilitated Lodge's uneasy embrace of the Irish as a kindred people in the United States.[85]

The idea that acquired characteristics might, through long historical experience, find permanent roots in "artificial races" resonated with the Teutonic historical school of which Lodge was an avid member. But it stepped beyond it, arguing that it was unlikely that even so capacious a group as the Anglo-Saxons might absorb others. The result was an abandonment of triumphant assimilation and its replacement with a fear of contagion and degradation. While assimilation might still occur, its probability had become remote in the face of mass immigration of persons distant from those ethnic groups long associated with the nation. Lodge introduced the notion—drawn from Le

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Bon—that racial mixing tended to favor the traits of the inferior group rather than the superior one, a radical turn from muscular Teutonism. "In other words, there is a limit to the capacity of any race for assimilating and elevating an inferior race; and when you begin to pour in unlimited numbers people of alien or lower races of less social efficiency and less moral force, you are running the most frightful risk that a people can run." The "kindred races" now present in the United States were gravely endangered by immigrants whose "traditions and inheritances, whose thoughts and whose beliefs are wholly alien to ours and with whom we have never assimilated or even been associated in the past."[86]

Lodge claimed no brief for mental superiority: the core challenge "does not rest upon the intellect," but "above all, upon [the new immigrants'] moral characteristics," likely to be unequal to "the moral qualities of the English speaking race." That genius lay in discipline and will power, Anglo-Saxon attributes Lodge was pleased to find that Le Bon celebrated. Poles and Italians, peoples enmeshed in near unchangeable and quite different cultures, would pass their deficient moral characteristics on to their descendants, and they onto theirs. It was the civic nationalist's duty to deny them entry into the body politic.[87]

An argument based in immutable distinctions is just being born in this grand oration, but the political strategy that lay at the heart of the restrictionist movement was mature. Lodge and other Republicans brought it to bear on its intended audience. In October 1898, the senator spoke directly to operatives in the great textile center of Lawrence, Massachusetts. He and the Republican congressman from the Lawrence district, William S. Knox, had been asked to answer provocative questions about the immigration bill vetoed by Cleveland in 1896. They did so in front of a working-class audience by no means made up of stalwart Republicans. As recounted in newspaper coverage, Lodge replied to a question about the bill:

> [We] . . . cannot attempt to shut out by name, race or creed. That is not American (Great applause.). You can undertake to shut out ignorance and vice. You can undertake to shut out a class of labor that is lower than the American standard. Now how does the educational test affect immigration? The question says, "The English, French and Germans would be excluded under that bill." They would not be excluded because they can read and write. Only one half of one per cent. of the Scandinavians who come into this country are unable to read or write; only one per cent. of the Germans; two per cent. of the English and the Scotch; less than nine per cent. of the

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> Irish; the French about the same. On those which I have mentioned the immigration bill would have practically no effect. Of the Russians 48 per cent. are unable to read or write; 50 per cent. of the Italians and nearly all of those who come from Eastern Europe.

Lodge's mention of Cleveland's veto evoked applause, but the senator's next line, saying that a new restrictionist bill had now passed the Senate and should soon pass the House, was greeted with "Prolonged applause and cheers."[88] William Lloyd Garrison [Jr.]'s bitter attacks on Lodge that same year captured the electoral opportunity Lodge and other Republicans had seen and exploited:

> The Irish, the German, and Scandinavian have conquered their position. They have acquired wealth and power, and are safe from anti-immigration threats because no politician dare proscribe them or do without their votes. . . . The Celtic stranger . . . has joined the capitalistic class, and now objects to the immigration of aliens, barring those from the Emerald Isle, with a native American zeal difficult to exceed."[89]

CONCLUSION

Racial views did not govern the Republican Party's shift toward restrictionism in the 1880s. Anti-immigrant policy emerged from a party that was, by the standards of its time, notably antiracist. In 1882, Hoar voiced the not insincere Republican position that one could not "justly deny to the Chinese what you might not justly deny to the Irish. . . . Every human soul has its rights, dependent upon its individual personal worth and not dependent upon color or race, and that all races, all colors, all nationalities contain persons entitled to be recognized everywhere they go on the face of the earth as the equals of every other man."[90] Like Lodge a noted defender of African American rights, Hoar sponsored in the Senate Lodge's 1892 "Force Bill" to defend their voting rights in the South. Yet the senator voted for the immigration restriction bill that his colleague brought forth in 1896.[91]

In a letter sent to Hoar in December of that year, Garrison vilified him for this vote: he was once a "noble" man whose "humanity and moral sensibility [had] been unfaltering," but was now merely a "United States Senator who forgets the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man." In his temperate reply, Hoar confessed that "the decision I cast with more reluctance than I ever felt, I think, in regard to any other act of my life." Still, "it seemed to me necessary to do something for the preservation of American

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citizenship," harkening back to election after election in which "ignorant and venal" foreign voters had corrupted politics, which he considered an "intolerable evil."[92]

Hoar voiced the considerable anxiety of the middle class about mass immigration, but the initial impulse and enduring political energy in the movement lay elsewhere, in loud complaints from voters in working-class districts about competition from the new immigrants. Lodge, McKinley, and other Republicans converted to restrictionism because they were good politicians, not because they were Teutonists or believed in hereditary defects. Faced with an unpopular tariff, discerning Republicans recognized working-class dissatisfaction and understood the ethnic divisions between old and new immigrants. The political strategy they devised—embodied in the literacy test—allowed them to attract votes from the first by proposing to block the entry of the second. Rather than a contest between tolerance and racism, immigration restriction evolved out of labor market wage competition and the political opportunity it offered to politicians in the many immigrant-based countries that enacted such policies. [93]

This perspective can unravel an obdurate knot in American political history. How did a business-friendly party become so attractive to working-class voters? After crushing defeat in 1892, the party's fortunes underwent "a complete reversal" in the mid-1890s, ushering in a dominance that endured for four decades. The historian Carl Degler puzzled over Republican ascendancy in cities in which immigrant voters were at least 30 percent of the population: "the paradox of urban support for a Republican party . . . [that] pushed for restrictions on immigration."[94] The paradox resolves when one realizes that immigrants do not constitute a single entity, and their interests are not identical. Republicans bound persons of immigrant origin to their party by promoting immigration restriction, rather than by attacking it, and Democrats lost immigrant, working-class votes when they opposed closure of the gates.

Such was empirically the case, as can be demonstrated even after many more new immigrants and their children had become voters. Restrictionists secured their two greatest triumphs in 1917 and 1921: overturning Wilson's veto of the Literacy Act and passing the Emergency Quota Law. Analysis of the votes of members of the House in this era reveals that having a large percentage of immigrant-origin voters from mid-nineteenth-century ethnicities in the district did not deter a representative from supporting restriction. Only the relatively few districts with substantial new immigrant-origin constituencies made a yes vote less likely.[95] The Republican Party competed well in heavily immigrant-origin districts by arguing for restriction, and they forced

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local Democrats into restrictionist votes. Such legislation garnered majorities of both parties in Congress from 1896 on. As the political scientist Eileen McDonagh shows, Democrats lost working-class votes if they supported an open door.[96]

The roots of restrictionism lay in working-class opposition to immigrant competition; the roots of ethnic distinctions lay in divisions among workers competing for jobs and wages. The Neo-Lamarckianism with which Lodge flirted had no lasting influence, as Mendelian genetics soon disposed of it. Eugenics proved more attractive, inspiring bombast in the early twentieth century and historiography in the late twentieth. The mass of American voters had long had other reasons for demanding that their leaders stop these strangers from coming down the gangplank.

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NOTES

Epigraph: Garrison (son of the abolitionist) vilified John B. Fiske, indicting Lodge for the same crime. Garrison, "Condemns the Lodge Bill," *Boston Herald*, 17 January 1898, George F. Hoar Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston (hereafter Hoar Papers, MHS).

1. John Higham's *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925* (New Brunswick, N.J., 2007), first published in 1956. In the Epilogue to the 2007 edition, Higham repented of his dismissal of demographic and social factors (342–43). Barbara Miller Solomon's still valuable book, *Ancestors and Immigrants* (Cambridge, 1956) first featured explicit racial prejudice as the source of restrictionism, especially among elite figures like Lodge.

2. The special issue featured David Roediger and others who assert that the nineteenth century witnessed the "turn" toward race but they offer no new evidence for that argument. Matthew Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color* (Cambridge, 1999), 14, 77–78. As to the antebellum period, Hidetaka Hirota dismisses racism as a source of nativism, finding welfare costs and economic concerns the central concerns. *Expelling the Poor* (New York, 2017). Jacobson also charges Lodge with anti-Semitism, relying on a secondary source that relies on a secondary source. He may have been anti-Semitic, but in this case Lodge was referring to Poles rather than Jews (183–4). Erika Lee, "The Chinese Exclusion Example: Race, Immigration, and American Gatekeeping, 1882–1924," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 21, no. 3 (Spring 2002): 47. Aristide Zolberg, *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America* (Cambridge, 2006), here 213, 214. David Fitzgerald and David Cook-Martin, *Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist Immigration Policy in the America*, (Cambridge, 2014), here 137; Daniel Tichenor *Dividing Lines* (Princeton, 2002), 79. Thomas C. Leonard, *Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics, and American Economics in the Progressive Era* (Princeton, 2016), 126–27, 130, 143–46. In marked contrast, neither Higham, *Strangers* (157), nor Mae Ngai find racial views significant in the late nineteenth century, noting the primacy of "cultural

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nationalism" and a persistent belief in assimilation. *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, 2004), 23.

3. On the necessary distinction between racism and ethnocentrism, see George Frederickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton, 2002), 5–7, 54; and Higham, *Strangers*, 134, 335. George Ward Stocking Jr., "Lamarckianism in American Social Science, 1890–1915," in Stocking, *Race, Culture, and Evolution: Essays in the History of Anthropology* (New York, 1968); and "The Turn-of-the-Century Concept of Race," in *Delimiting Anthropology: Occasional Essays and Reflections* (Madison, 2001). See also Thomas F. Gossett, *Race: The History of an Idea in America* (New York, 1997 [1963]); and Ivan Hannaford, *Race: The History of an Idea in the West* (Washington, D.C., 1996).

4. Solomon, *Ancestors*, 116; Leonard, *Illiberal Reformers,* 126–27. For extended treatments of Anglo-Saxonism, see Solomon, *Ancestors,* chap. 4, and Edward N. Saveth, *American Historians and European Immigrants, 1875–1925* (New York, 1948), chaps. 1 and 2. The best account is Bluford Adams, "World Conquerors or a Defeated People? Racial Theory, Regional Anxiety, and the Brahmin Anglo-Saxonists," *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 8, no. 2 (April 2009): 189–215. Solomon, Jacobson, and other race theorists also employ Lodge's 1891 article, "The Distribution of Ability in the United States," to prove his belief in immutable, biological characteristics. Though he concludes that Americans of English background dominated most fields of achievement, Lodge does not mention hereditary traits. Rather than a racial argument, he endeavored to demonstrate the governing effects of environment: Southerners, men of "the same race-stocks and of like traditions" as Northerners, had achieved less because slavery "warped the community in which it flourished." Henry Cabot Lodge, "The Distribution . . . ," *The Century,* September 1891, 687–94 (693–94). For a conventional interpretation of the essay as a racist exercise, see David Roediger and James Barrett, "Making New Immigrants . . . ," in *Not Just Black and White: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives on Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States*, ed. Nancy Foner and George M. Frederickson (New York, 2004).

5. Mayo-Smith derides the "vague generalities" that ascribe "institutions and national characteristics to the influence of race," satirizing Herbert Bancroft's reliance on "inherited Anglo-Saxon traits." "Theories of Mixtures of Races and Nationalities," *Yale Review* III (1894): 166–86 (166); Adams, "World Conquerors," describes the decline of Teutonist theory in the 1890s, even among erstwhile advocates. For Strong's persistent environmentalism, see his *The Challenge of the City* (New York, 1907), 165; for that of Fiske, see Solomon, *Ancestors*, 130–31.

6. Stocking, "Lamarckianism," 244, 255–56.

7. "Assimilation of Nationalities in the United States. I," *Political Science Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (September 1894): 426–44 (428–29), and "Assimilation. II," *Political Science Quarterly* 9, no. 4 (December 1894): 649–70 (670).

8. Petit, *The Men and Women We Want* (Rochester, 2010), 35; Hannaford, *Race*. On Ripley's continued confusion about heredity, see Stocking, "The Critique of Racial Formalism." In *Race* (2001), 163–65.

9. John Gerring, *Party Ideologies in America, 1828–1996* (Cambridge, 2001); Richard Jensen, *The Winning of the Midwest: Social and Political Conflict, 1888–1896* (Chicago, 1971), chap. 5. Paul Kleppner, *Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Midwestern Politics, 1850–1900* (New York, 1970). Robert J. Ulrich, *The Bennett Law of Eighteen Eighty-Nine: Education*

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and Politics in Wisconsin (Manchester, N.H., 1981). For a summary and critique of the ethnocultural model, see Richard Oestreicher, "Urban Working-Class Political Behavior and Theories of American Electoral Politics, 1870–1940," *Journal of American History* 74, no. 4 (March 1988): 1257–86. Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years,* vol. 1 (New York, 1903), 386.

10. George H. Haynes, *Charles Sumner* (Philadelphia, 1909), 186.

11. For efforts, often successful, to lure immigrant voters, see Lavern J. Rippley, *The Immigrant Experience in Wisconsin* (Boston, 1985), and Robert W. Cherney, *Populism, Progressivism, and the Transformation of Nebraska Politics, 1885–1915* (Lincoln, 1981), 28–34. Biographical sketches indicate that numerous mid-level party leaders were of British, Canadian, Scandinavian, and German origin. Joseph Patterson Smith, *History of the Republican Party of Ohio*, vols. 1 and 2 (Chicago, 1898); Green Berry Raum, *History of Illinois Republicanism* (Chicago, 1900).

12. "Third Annual Message," 8 December 1863. Senate Report No. 15, 18 February, 1864. Thirty-eighth Congress, First Session. All references to presidential statements, national party platforms, etc., are drawn from "The American Presidency Project," ed. John Woolley and Gerhard Peters, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php (accessed 20 June 2016). "An Act to Encourage Immigration," c. 246, 13 Stat. 385 (1864); *Congressional Globe,* 38th Cong., 1st sess., app., 1–2. Charlotte Erickson, *American Industry and the European Immigrant* (Cambridge, 1957), 7–8, 10, 25.

13. For the act's provisions, see Erickson, *American Industry,* and Morrell Heald, "Business Attitudes Toward European Immigration, 1861–1914" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1951), chap. 2.

14. Subject to extreme criticism for the law's indenture provisions, employers did little to defend it in Congress. Heald, "Business Attitudes," and Erickson, *American Industry*. Zeidel reports that twenty-five of thirty-eight states had contract labor provisions in the 1860s and 1870s. Robert Fredric Zeidel, "The Literacy Test for Immigrants: A Question of Progress" (Ph.D. diss., Marquette University, 1986), 17.

15. Smith, *Ohio,* 1: 175 and 317.

16. James L. Huston, "A Political Response to Industrialism: The Republican Embrace of Protectionist Labor Doctrines," *Journal of American History* 70, no. 1 (June 1983): 35–57 (55).

17. Business leaders brazenly demanded specific duties; in exchange, they gave the party cash. Fred Chester Shoemaker, "Mark Hanna and the Transformation of the Republican Party" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1992), 124, 156. Richard Krooth, *A Century Passing: Carnegie, Steel, and the Fate of Homestead* (Lanham, Md., 2004), 100. Smith, *Ohio*, 1: 468.

18. Gen. Conftor (? illegible) letter to Hoar, 15 January 1878, Hoar Papers, Folder "January 15–20," Carton 20, MHS. "Duties" on coffee and tea were in fact excise taxes. For intermittent working-class support of the tariff, see Lyle W. Cooper, "The Tariff and Organized Labor," *American Economic Review* 20, no. 2 (June 1930): 210–25, and Krooth, *A Century Passing*.

19. Senate Committee on Education and Labor, *Relations between Capital and Labor* (1885), vol. 1, 1139–40, and *The Pittsburgh Press,* 18 December 1918.

20. *Congressional Record*, 48th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 15, 5349. See also "Foran, Martin Ambrose (1844–1921)," *Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774–Present*, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=F000254 (accessed 25 May 2016); Elroy McKendree Avery, *A History of Cleveland and Its Environs*, vol. 2 (New York, 1918),

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270; and M. A. Foran, *The Other Side: A Social Study Based on Fact* (Cleveland, 1886), iii. Ethnocentric conflict in the working class is well documented in David Montgomery, *The Fall of the House of Labor* (Cambridge, 1987), 81–87. For an example familiar to Foran, see Henry B. Leonard, "Ethnic Cleavage and Industrial Conflict in Late Nineteenth-Century America: The Cleveland Rolling Mill Company Strikes of 1882 and 1885," *Labor History* 20, no. 4 (1979): 524–48.

21. Union leaders were quite likely to be foreign born or of immigrant origin. David Brody, *In Labor's Cause: Main Themes on the History of the American Worker* (Oxford, 1993) 106–10. Gwendolyn Mink, *Old Labor and New Immigrants in American Political Development, 1875–1920* (Ithaca, 1986), is most emphatic that the conflict between immigrant groups had racial tones. See, for example, 45–46. In contrast, Andrew Lane, *Survival or Solidarity: American Labor and European Immigrants, 1830–1924* (Westport, Conn., 1987), attributes little of the struggle for immigration restriction to union leaders' racist views of new immigrants.

22. Frank A. Flower, "Second Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics, 1885–1886" (Madison, 1886), xxv, xxviii, 416–21. Flower was a prominent Republican journalist, author, and officeholder in Wisconsin; Evelyn O. Koepke, "The Self-Styled Greeley of Wisconsin: Frank Abial Flower" (Master's thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1967).

23. Flower, "Third Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor and Industrial Statistics, 1887–1888" (Madison, 1888), xxvi–vii, 69, and 52.

24. Gary Richardson examined these surveys in "The Origins of Anti-Immigrant Sentiments: Evidence from the Heartland in the Age of Mass Migration," *Topics in Economic Analysis & Policy* 5, no. 1 (June 2005): 1–46. The additional analyses presented here used data available through the University of California Historical Labor Statistics Project Series, http://eh.net/databases/labor/ (accessed 21 January 2016).

25. *The Nation* 44, no. 1131 (3 March 1887), 181. See also 44, no. 1134 (24 March 1887), 240.

26. Translations of foreign-language newspapers are available through the Newberry Library's online version of the Chicago Foreign Language Press Survey, a project carried out by the Works Project Administration (hereafter FLP, WPA), issued in 1942: *flps.newberry.org* (accessed July 5, 2016). *Scandinaven,* 18 April 1896; *Svenska Tribunen-Nybeter,* 10 January 1923, and see 23 January 1924 and 6 June 1923; *Scandia,* 22 February 1913, and see 28 January 1911.

27. FLP, WPA: *Radnicka Straza,* 9 April 1916; *Adenpost,* 7 January 1915. For the *Adenpost*'s opposition to restriction and to the unions they saw behind the movement, see 14 January 1894. *Washington Post*, 5 January 1896.

28. *Report of the Select Committee on Immigration and Naturalization*, and Testimony Taken by the Committee on Immigration of the Senate and the Select Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House of Representatives Under Concurrent Resolution of March 12, 1890, 51st Cong., 2nd sess., 14 January 1891, H. Rept. 3472 (Serial 2886), here 938, 930, and 812. (Hearings were conducted in 1890.) See especially 928–37 (Wolff), and testimony of Herman(n) Raster, editor of the *Illinois Statts-Zeitung*, 639–52. For Scandinavian and "Bohemian" witnesses, see 673–83. For opposing views among representatives of German aid societies, see 592–94 and 776; Jewish, Italian, and other new immigrant witnesses uniformly opposed new restrictions, and labor union representatives

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near as uniformly supported them, though Samuel Gompers had not yet become a restrictionist (93). Henry Pratt Fairchild, "The Literacy Test and Its Making," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 31, no. 3 (May 1917): 447–60. Zeidel examines this congressional testimony in "Literacy Test," 42–45.

29. Robert Zeidel, "Knute Nelson and the Immigration Question: A Political Dilemma," *Minnesota History* (Summer 1999): 328–44.

30. H. W. Boynton, "The American Character," *North American Review* 183, no. 604 (7 December 1906): 1182–86(1185).

31. Hoar, letter to Lodge, 18 March 1883, as quoted in David Wendell Dotson, "Henry Cabot Lodge: A Political Biography" (Ph.D. diss., University of Oklahoma, 1980), 81–82, 84–85; and Hoar, *Autobiography,* 1: 331.

32. Lodge reviews his work in the 1883 campaign with anxiety and satisfaction in his Diary, entries for 1883–84, Correspondence, Henry Cabot Lodge Papers, MHS (hereafter Lodge Papers). See John A. Garraty, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biography* (New York, 1953), 62, 68, 230–32.

33. "Senator Hoar Tells of the Battles Won by Worcester Voters," dated 13 November [1883]. Lodge Scrapbooks, MHS.

34. Constituency estimates employ data drawn from Steven Ruggles et al., *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 5.0* [Machine-readable database] (Minneapolis, 2010), http://usa.ipums.org/usa/cite.shtml (accessed 13 October 2014). Additional data taken from Edgar Truesdell, *The Canadian Born in the United States: An Analysis of the Statistics of the Canadian Element in the Population of the United States, 1850 to 1930* (New Haven, 1943).

35. Massachusetts did not allow unnaturalized aliens to vote. Gerald M. Rosberg, "Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?" *Michigan Law Review* 75, nos. 5–6 (April–May 1977): 1092–1136.

36. Jensen, *The Winning;* Kleppner, *Cross;* Ronald Berthoff, *British Immigrants in Industrial America* (Cambridge, 1953), and H. H. Boyesen, "The Scandinavian in the United States," *North American Review* 155 (July–December 1892): 528–35.

37. McCready to Hoar, 23 September 1887, Folder "September 21–30." See also McCready to Hoar, 16 October 1887, Folder "October 11–20," Hoar Papers, MHS.

38. Glasgow, Treasurer of the Worcester Republican Club, letter to Hoar, 7 October, Folder "October 1–10," Hoar Papers, MHS.

39. Thomas, letter to Hoar, 25 March 1896, Folder "March 19–25, 1896," Hoar Papers, MHS.

40. Lodge to Doering, 1 May 1892. Correspondence, Lodge Papers, MHS. Hoar, "Are the Republicans in to Stay?" *North American Review* 149 (July–December 1889): 616–24.

41. Peter H. Argersinger, "The Value of the Vote: Political Representation in the Gilded Age," *Journal of American History* 76, no. 1 (June 1989): 59–90.

42. Karl Schriftgeisser, *The Gentleman from Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge* (Boston, 1944), 60.

43. *Sunday Record,* 7 November 1886, Scrapbook, Lodge Papers, MHS. Newspaper accounts and unsigned analyses of election returns in this section of Lodge's papers reveal a search for positions friendly to labor, with continued reliance on the tariff and liberal Civil War pensions.

44. Lodge, Diary, 2 November 1886, Lodge Papers, MHS. Schriftgeisser, *Gentleman,* 72–73, 90–91. Dotson, "Henry Cabot Lodge," 96–97.

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45. Lyman to Lodge, 23 December 1897, G. H. Lyman Papers, MHS. "Address Before the Citizens of Nahant, Memorial Day, 1882; see also *Boston Daily Advertizer,* 11 August 1882, Scrapbook, Lodge Papers, MHS.

46. Lodge, "The Tariff Question," *New York Independent,* 28 August 1888. Scrapbook, 1887–90, Lodge Papers, MHS. See quick coverage of Lodge's position in other papers, e.g., 29 August 1888 in *Oshkosh Daily Northwestern*. Bishop William Lawrence's hagiographic biography states without citation that Lodge first publicly called for restriction in 1887. William Lawrence, *Henry Cabot Lodge: A Biographical Sketch* (Boston, 1925), 65.

47. Lodge, "New Immigration Laws Needed," *The Laster,* 15 December 1888, Scrapbook, 1887–90, Lodge Papers, MHS. Lodge's speeches explicitly link the tariff to immigration restriction, with strong response from audiences. See Lodge, "At the Harvard Meeting in Tremont Tempe, Speech of Hon. Henry Cabot Lodge," 2 November 1888, Lodge Papers, MHS.

48. At the Harvard Meeting . . . ," [no newspaper title], 21 October 1888, "Restrict Immigration," Scrapbook, Lodge Papers, MHS.

49. "Mr. Lodge at Everett," *Morning,* 24 October 1890, Scrapbook, Lodge Papers, MHS.

50. *Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley: From His Election to Congress to the Present Time* (New York, 1893), 237–38. Hans P. Voight references this speech in *The Bully Pulpit and the Melting Pot: American Presidents and the Immigrant, 1897–1933* (Macon, Ga., 2004), 21 n. 50. H. Wayne Morgan, *William McKinley and His America*, rev. ed. (Kent, Ohio, 2003), links McKinley's support of the tariff and immigration restriction to the demands of his working-class constituency; see 45–56. Jensen, *The Winning,* reports the first official Republican party opposition in 1886 in Pennsylvania; see 259–60. Smith, *Ohio,* 1: 539 and see 535.

51. In *Winning the Midwest,* Jensen argued that McKinley campaigned by "offering pluralism to the American people" (291), a view repeated in "Comparative Nativism: The United States, Canada, and Australia, 1880s–1910s," *Canadian Issues/Thèmes Canadiens* (Spring 2009): 45–55. Similar readings can be found in Kevin Phillips, *William McKinley* (New York, 2003). Eric Rauchway, "William McKinley and Us," *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 4, no. 3 (July 2005): 235–53; Morgan, *William McKinley;* Voight, *Bully Pulpit;* Zeidel, "Literacy Test"; and Roger Daniels, *Guarding the Gate,* esp. 33.

52. Charles S. Olcott recognized this political reality: *William McKinley: Part 1 American Statesmen Series* (Boston, 1972, reprint of 1916 publication), esp. 58 and 130. See also Shoemaker, "Mark Hanna," 194 and 203. For an insightful treatment of McKinley's efforts to win labor votes, a necessity in his district and part of his vision for broader success for the party, see John Waksmundski, "Governor McKinley and the Working Man," *The Historian* 38, no. 4 (August 1976): 629–47.

53. Lew Wallace and Murat Halstead, *Life and Public Services of Hon. Benjamin Harrison, President of the U.S. With a Concise Biographical Sketch of Hon. Whitelaw Reid, Ex–Minister to France* (Philadelphia, 1892), 334, 357.

54. E. P. Hutchinson, *Legislative History of American Immigration Policy, 1798–1965* (Philadelphia, 1981), 104–5. By the 50th Congress (1887–89), multiple petitions for relief from immigration were filed annually (93–109). Zeidel treats rising congressional attention in the late 1880s in *Literacy Test* (34ff.).

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55. *Staats-Zeitung,* 23 May 1888. Robert Zeidel, *Immigrants, Progressives, and Exclusion Politics, 1900–1927* (DeKalb, Ill., 2004), citing Immigration Restriction League materials, finds extensive newspaper editorial support for restriction; see 18ff.

56. In the Senate of the United States, 22 May 1890, ordered to be printed, Mr. Chandler, from the Committee on Immigration, submitted the following report: *Immigration investigation. Report* / 51st Cong., 1st sess., Senate, no. 1095.

57. Bemis, "Restriction of Immigration," *Andover Review* 53, no. 211 (March 1888): 251–64 (263). Bemis provided the political logic, but condemnation of illiteracy in the new immigrants was *au courant*; workers in the Wisconsin survey had called for an "educational qualification." See as well, Terence Powderly, "A Menacing Irruption," *North American Review* 147, no. 381 (August 1888): 165–75.

58. "The Restriction of Immigration," *North American Review* 152, no. 410 (January 1891): 27–36 (27, 28, 36).

59. *Report of the Select Committee*; Select Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, *Immigration and Contract-Labor Laws*, H. Rept. 2206, 52nd Cong., 2nd sess., 7 January 1893 (Serial 3140).

60. Bemis, "Restriction of Immigration," 263.

61. William Phalen, *But They Did Not Build This House: The Attitude of Evangelical Protestantism Towards Immigration to the United States* (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers, 2010). The quotations are from *The Congregationalist*, "Restricting Immigration," 10 July 1884, and "Guarding the Door," 11 June 1891, as cited in Phalen, 196–97.

62. *The Nation* 44, no. 1134 (24 March 1887): 240.

63. For speeches, see *The Boston Journal,* 29 May [1891], "Earnest Republicans" and *The New York Recorder,* 31 July 1891, "The Restriction of Immigration," Scrapbook, Lodge Papers, MHS.

64. Lodge, "The Restriction," 30, 35. The lack of capacity for responsible citizenship had also been a central theme of antebellum nativism, which criticized the authoritarian Catholic religion immigrants followed. Walker had sparked attention to new immigrants by (spuriously) correlating native fertility decline to immigration. "Immigration and Degradation," *Forum* 11 (August 1891): 634–44. By 1896 his views about immigrant quantity, quality, and suitability for self-government mirrored those of Lodge, shifting toward a racial view. See Walker, "Restriction of Immigration," *Atlantic Monthly* 77, no. 464 (June 1896): 822–29.

65. Lodge, "Lynch Law and Unrestricted Immigration," *North American Review* 152, no. 414 (May 1891): 602–12 (605). Lodge repeatedly condemned "birds of passage" as poor citizenship material and "a constant drain on our resources." See Lodge to W. I. Gilbert, 18 January 1897, Lodge Correspondence, Lodge Papers, MHS.

66. Lodge, "Lynch Law," 608–9, 611. For his attentiveness to the tragedy's political potential, see *Boston Journal,* 3 June 1891, and "The Restriction of Immigration," *The New York Recorder,* 31 July 1891, Scrapbook, Lodge Papers, MHS.

67. "Mr. Lodge Talks Politics," *New York Recorder*, 5 November 1891, 152, Scrapbook, Lodge Collection, MHS.

68. 29 December 1890, Scrapbook, Lodge Papers, MHS. Clippings detail formation of the club, its membership, and platform. Lodge employed immigration restriction in his speeches while a Representative from 1891 to 1892, Scrapbook, 119–26, Lodge Collection, MHS; and see Rachel Leah Hershfield, "The Immigration Restriction League: A Study of the League's Impact on American Immigration Policy, 1894–1924" (Master's

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thesis, University of Calgary, 1993), 56–57. For subsequent advocacy, see "Senator Lodge," 9 August 9 1894, Scrapbook, Lodge Papers, MHS, with speeches addressing such themes as "Immigration and Labor." See "Dedham Rally," 19 October 1894, Lodge Papers, MHS. Lodge, "The Census and Immigration," *Century* 46 (September 1893): 737–39 (737).

69. Lodge, "The Census and Immigration," 737, and 7 January 1892, "To Mr. Manchester," Correspondence, Lodge Papers, MHS.

70. Dotson, "Henry Cabot Lodge," 151.

71. In addition to the standard treatments of the League, such as Solomon, *Ancestors*, see Hershfield, "The Immigration Restriction League," esp. 50–52. Hutchinson, *Legislative History,* 102, 108.

72. Lodge to O'Kane, 1 May 1892. Lodge to A. C. Lodge, 17 September 1893, as quoted in Dotson, 185; Lodge to Prof. L. Amateis, 21 March 1896; Lodge to Samuel Closson, 21 February 1896; Lodge to Grattan, 13 March 1896; Lodge to A. J. Brush, 20 January 1897, Correspondence, Lodge Papers, MHS.

73. Wolcott, *Boston Journal,* 12 October 1895, "Race and Religion," Hoar Papers, MHS.

74. For state platforms and local calls for restriction before and after the convention, see *New York Times*, 17 and 24 April, 17 and 12 September 1896; *Los Angeles Times,* 22 and 28 April; 5, 7, and 8 May; 25 August, 12 September, and 30 October 1896; *Washington Post*, 15 May 1896.

75. *New York Times,* 28 June 1896; *Hartford Courant,* 27 August 1896.

76. *Los Angeles Times*, 10 November 1896; *New York Times,* 28 June, 11 September, 10 November 1896; *Hartford Courant,* 27 August 1896; W*ashington Post,* 13 and 22 September and 21 November 1896.

77. House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, *Amending the Immigration Laws*, 54th Cong., 1st sess., 1896, H. Rep. 1079, 1.

78. Lodge to Martin M. Woods, 1 April 1896; to "Mr. Hayes," 15 February 1897; to Robert (de Courcy) Ward, 20 February 1897.

79. Lodge to F.W. A. Poppie, 28 January 1897; to Prescott F. Hall, 24 December 1896, 9 and 29 January 1897; to William C. Brensman, 1 February 1897; Lodge to Hayes, 15 February 1897. Ward and Hall were major figures in the Immigration Restriction League; Lodge urged them to have the League press for the legislation.

80. For voting records and tallies, see GovTrack.us (accessed 15 April 2016) and Hutchinson, *Legislative History*, 116–21. In both houses, negative votes came principally from Southern Democrats.

81. Lodge to "Guild" [Curtis Guild Jr.], 18 February 1897, Correspondence, Lodge Papers, MHS.

82. Lodge, "Immigration Regulations," *Congressional Record*, 54th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 28, part 3, 16 March 1896, 2817–18, republished as "The Restriction of Immigration," in Henry Cabot Lodge, *Speeches and Addresses, 1884–1909* (Boston, 1909): 243–66.

83. *Lois Psychologiques* . . . (Paris, 1917), 19, 23. Le Bon enjoyed great favor as an iconoclastic thinker in the *fin de siècle* intellectual world; criticism of his work has enjoyed a longer life. Robert A. Nye, *The Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustave Le Bon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the Third Republic* (Beverly Hills, 1975).

84. Stocking, "Turn-of-the-Century," 7–8, 15.

85. "Immigration Regulations," 2818. As Saveth illustrates, considerable historical gymnastics was required for Lodge to create a Teutonic population in the United States;

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Saveth, *American Historians*, 52–53. Ward, "The Transmission of Culture," *The Forum* 11 (1891): 312–19.

86. "Immigration Regulations," 2817, 2819–20.

87. "Immigration Regulations," 2818–19.

88. Ibid.

89. "Immigration," Massachusetts Reform Club, 10 April 1896, Folder: "Immigration, 1891–1905," Hoar Papers, MHS.

90. Hoar, *Autobiography* 2:123. Originally in 13 *Congressional Record,* 1517 (1882).

91. Untitled manuscript dated "Nov. 12 1895 (?)." Hoar papers. Hoar's tolerance is recounted in Richard E. Welch Jr., *George Frisbie Hoar and the Half-Breed Republicans* (Cambridge, 1971), 12, 188, though Welch mistakenly asserts "Hoar's consistent opposition to immigration restriction," 193 n. 39.

92. Garrison to Hoar, 18 February 1897; Hoar to Garrison, 19 February 1897, Folder: 18–21 February 1897, Hoar Papers, MHS.

93. Using econometric methods, Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Global Migration and the World Economy,* (Cambridge, 2005), reject racial interpretations and find that labor market competition best explains restriction in a variety of democratic immigrant-destination states.

94. Carl N. Degler, "American Political Parties and the Rise of the City: An Interpretation," *Journal of American History* 51, no. 1 (1964): 42, 49, 56.

95. In this analysis, House Representatives' votes were mapped to the counties in their districts; district/county etho-demographic data were drawn from the Public Use Sample of the 1920 Census. For the procedures used and a fuller exploration of these data, see Brian Gratton, "The Demography of Immigration Restriction in the United States," in *Political Demography,* ed. J. A. Goldstone and E. Kaufmann (Oxford, 2011).

96. Eileen Lorenzi McDonagh, "Representative Democracy and State Building in the Progressive Era," *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 4 (December 1992): 938–50.

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