solidarities created during the 2011 uprising in order to restart Yemeni national unity on more favorable terms.

The book is based on research spanning 17 years, and Day's in-depth knowledge and personal familiarity with the country is evident. In addition to secondary research and an incalculable number of interviews, his argument is supported with a first-of-its-kind survey of provincial administrators (1985–97), demonstrating the dominance of appointed government officials from the northwest highland region.

Day's premise that an understanding of Yemen's regionalism is key to understanding the country's politics springs partially in response to studies, largely from the 1990s, that, he argues, were caught up in the unionist spirit following formal unification and consequently denied the existence of multiple regional divisions. For Day, a Yemeni national identity never existed. In his words, "the national union of the Yemeni people is only an imagined social construct. . . . In other words, Yemen's national union is not a given, natural state to which the country's population returned in 1990" (p. 14). United Yemen as an imagined community will only exist, he states, with the fair and equitable distribution of resources. Resource competition plays a pivotal role in the formation and maintenance of group identities. However, while the author's account of regional rebellion competently demonstrates the mobilization of group identities as a result of political and economic policies, the formation or social construction of these identities is covered in far less depth, with regional identities appearing to be primordial, almost innate. Indeed, Day calls for a form of "primordial federalism" (p. 309) as the solution for Yemen's future.

The author's conceptualization of regionalism and how it relates to other forms of identity also remains relatively unclear. For Day, the country's various contestants for power, whether tribal or sectarian, not only are found in specific regions but also emerge from and are expressions of regionalism. Yemen's geography thus plays an almost deterministic role in isolating regions from each other and creating the conditions under which different regional dialects, traditions, and identities develop. While few would deny Yemen's geographic diversity or the fact that there are clear expressions of regionalism, the extent to which groups identify and mobilize as a result of tribalism, for example, or whether they do so as a result of regionalism that expresses itself in tribal markers, remains a nagging question for the reader. Day's discussion is relatively unhelpful when he states, for example, that "Yemen's seven regions are based on loose social structures, inside which regional group bonds are weak compared to other social bonds like tribal and clan affiliations. Tribes and clans create the most powerful group bonds inside Yemen" (pp. 44–45).

With regionalism the focus of Day's analysis, Yemen's vibrant civil society makes little to no appearance in the book. While civil society may not be considered of central concern to the author's argument, three actors that are integral to his account and would have benefited from greater analysis are the Islamist Islah Party, the Joint Meetings Party (JMP)—a coalition in which Islah is a member—and the opposition within the northwest highland region. Given Islah's substantial popular support, the role it played in the 2011 uprising, and the role it is playing in post-Salih Yemen (as is the case with Islamists in other post–Arab Spring countries), a deeper discussion of Islah would have been justified. Similarly, the significance of the JMP as the first coalition of Islamists and leftists—expressing precisely the type of solidarity Day deems as important to Yemen's future—and the key role it played in the cancellation of the 2009 parliamentary elections warranted greater attention. Lastly, the book also would have benefited from a far greater discussion of the rise of the opposition within Salih's highland region. While Day considers this opposition the strongest indication of Salih's inevitable downfall, he devotes relatively little attention to the conditions under which it developed.

These weaknesses aside, *Regionalism and Rebellion in Yemen* must be commended. Day ably presents a complex political history with multiple players of diverse regional, tribal, ideological, and sectarian backgrounds in a manner that is accessible to nonspecialists, while simultaneously providing detail and analysis from which Yemen specialists can benefit. His deep affection for Yemen and its peoples is clear and expresses itself in references to the customs, dialects, and even the architecture of its cities, making the book highly enjoyable to read. Substantively, Day provides an excellent analysis of the Salih regime's strategies to maintain control and of the mobilization of the regionally based groups that ultimately helped to bring down the president. His account offers much to students of Yemen and of Arab Springs elsewhere.

Banking on Sterling: Britain's Independence from the Euro Zone. By Ophelia Eglene. New York: Lexington Books, 2010. 167p. $63.00.
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— David Howarth, *University of Luxembourg*

The status of the United Kingdom as a euro area "outsider" has come under renewed scrutiny since the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis in late 2009. A series of policy and institutional reforms have been adopted that reinforce integration among euro-area member states. Ongoing negotiations (as of April 2013) on the creation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism for euro-area banks and a "Banking Union" threaten to further entrench Britain's second-tier status. While London's position as the European Union's leading financial center appears secure for the time being, the reinforcement of euro-area economic governance creates a potential menace for the "City's" preeminence—with, for example, the official preference of the European Central Bank (ECB) and some governments that major euro clearing operations take place within the euro area. Ophelia Eglene's impressive study serves as a timely reassessment of the preferences of different British governments over the past two decades not to adopt the euro.

Eglene's is the most theoretically sophisticated study yet published on British policy on the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). It also ranks among the stronger political science analyses of European Union member-state government preferences on the EMU. The argument, covering both the impact of economic interests on government preference on monetary integration and the impact of government policy interests in European Union policymaking more generally, suggests a superficial analysis, wedding two very different explanations of British policy. However, Eglene's study is far from this.

The bulk of the author's analysis involves an application of two of the leading political economy theories on government preferences on participation in exchange rate regimes to explain British policy on the EMU: Jeffry Frieden's ("Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* 45 [Autumn 1991]: 425–51; "Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration," *International Organization* 56 [Autumn 2002]: 831–860) and C. Randall Henning's (*Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan,* 1994). Both Frieden and Henning make specific claims as to government policy being directed by a configuration of economic interests, with distinct preferences on exchange rates and whether they are fixed or flexible.

Eglene tests specific hypotheses derived from these two theories. Frieden's well-known hypothesis is, simply put, that national policy on exchange-rate regimes reflects the balance of economic interests in favor of or against fixing the exchange rate. Exporters tend to like fixed exchange rates at a depreciated rate, while investors prefer fixing at an appreciated rate. Companies producing nontradable goods and services prefer flexibility and appreciation, while producers of import-competing products like flexibility and depreciation. An application of Henning's hypothesis provides additional added value. On the one hand, Henning's approach is even more parsimonious than Frieden's: Export-oriented industry has a "strong and unambiguous" preference for a fixed but depreciated currency, while international banking has 'mild and ambiguous' preference for flexibility and appreciation. On the other hand, Henning adds a helpful political economy underpinning to his approach: The relationship between banks and non-financial companies (NFC) shapes bank preferences. In countries where capital markets dominate the financial system, this bank–NFC relationship will be more distant and the preferences of banks more detached from those of NFCs. In credit-based financial systems where relationships are closer—with German relational banking as the clearest example—bank preferences are more likely to be shaped by those of NFCs.

The author's broader objective is not to side with one theory over another but to apply both, the better to tease out the interests involved and the impact on British government policy. Eglene finds for the applicability of Frieden's approach but against the further clarifications of his 2002 article and a differentiation between standardized and specialized goods exporters. Finding for Henning, Eglene shows that more distant bank-industry relations in the United Kingdom resulted in banks forming preferences that were distinct from those of industry—the pro-euro "Britain in Europe" campaign failed to recruit many members from the financial sector—and confirms his hypothesis about the intensity of preferences. Given the divisions in manufacturing and services, the soft financial-sector opposition to the EMU shifted government policy toward a preference against membership. The relative importance of the financial sector in the British economy increased the sector's relative influence over government policy. Most of these findings are not, in themselves, surprising and confirm what has been written elsewhere. The ability of the author to relate these findings to the theoretical literature nonetheless provides clear added value to our understanding of British government preferences on the single currency.

Eglene adds a further level of theoretical sophistication to her analysis: She convincingly shows how actors' stated preferences and firm lobbying of public authorities—and thus the underlying political economy of British policy on the EMU—shift over time. For example, she shows that the preferences of trade associations—concerned with their "public image"—differed at specific periods from the individual businesses that they were supposed to represent. The author also explains why business groups formed preferences relatively quickly, while finance was slower. On this temporal dimension, the bulk of the literature on exchange rate preferences is silent.

Eglene also enters into the details of the preference formation of the main economic interests, moving beyond any previous account. Notably, she shows how the financial sector was concerned not only with the impact of fixing exchange rates (and the inflation performance of the ECB) but also with technical issues concerning the operation of the EMU. Notably, membership would have imposed a higher minimum reserve requirement on UK-based financial institutions that would have been damaging to financial interests, which gained competitive advantage from lower requirements. The author thus shows how the City attracted business from the euro area by staying out of the EMU! But the City also wanted to ensure access to the euro area's wholesale payment system (TARGET) which explains initial caution as to remaining

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outside of the EMU. She also shows how different economic interests had varying influence over government policy, but not only because of their relative contribution to the economy. Internationally oriented exporters had influence because they could leave. Yet this was not enough to bring about a definitive shift in government policy on the single currency. Rather, Eglene shows that these industries forced governments to offer compensatory policies and maintain a certain ambiguity on eventual entry ("wait and see" for the Conservatives, and "prepare and decide" for Labour). Neither leading party has ever definitely opposed eventual membership—despite the appearance of greater hostility from the Conservative Party.

In making her argument, Eglene brings to bear an impressive range of quantitative and qualitative data. She covers most of the important secondary literature and puts interview material to good effect. Empirically, there is little in *Banking on Sterling* that has not been examined previously, although the author competently covers the most important dimensions of the subject, and she presents a few new golden nuggets of information—notably on financial sector preferences, as noted. The book serves as an excellent rejoinder to (constructivist) analyses of British nonmembership in the EMU that emphasize "Euroskepticism" and "deeply rooted" opposition to further integration. Ultimately, though, this is a first-rate work of political science/political economy that should be of immense interest to scholars working on Britain and the EU, British economic policy, European economic integration, and, more broadly, economic (business) interests and public policy.

The European Commission and Bureaucratic Autonomy: Europe's Custodians. By Antonis A. Ellinas and Ezra Suleiman. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 250p. $99.00.

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— Robert Thomson, *University of Strathclyde*

This book offers insightful analyses of senior bureaucrats in the European Commission, which is one of the world's most powerful international bureaucracies and least transparent of the European Union's institutions. The authors demonstrate the relevance of general theories of bureaucratic behavior, and in doing so illustrate again that the EU is an excellent testing ground for theories from comparative politics. Their book will be of interest not only to Europeanists but also to comparativists whose main interests include bureaucracies in other political systems.

The authors formulate testable hypotheses about the conditions under which bureaucratic agents have most autonomy from their political masters (Chapter 2). Firstly, when political authority is fragmented, bureaucratic agents are said to have more autonomy. They argue that this is the case in the EU because Commission bureaucrats answer to a diffuse set of political masters: the College of Commissioners (somewhat similar to national ministers) at the apex of the Commission, the Council where member states are represented, and the European Parliament. While this is correct, bureaucrats in each Directorate General (DGs are the main organizational units in the Commission) are answerable to an individual Commissioner, usually an experienced national politician, who is responsible for the specific portfolio in question. The second theoretical proposition is that when bureaucratic agents have more political legitimacy, they have more autonomy. The authors argue that Commission bureaucrats have the potential for such legitimacy in terms of their legal status, which is enshrined in European treaties, their specialized technical expertise, and the specific functions they perform. The third proposition is that bureaucratic agents with a distinct organizational culture have more autonomy. The authors contend that while previous scholarship disputed the existence of a coherent culture in the Commission, there is potential for one, and part of their investigation is devoted to establishing whether it exists.

The empirical basis of the book consists of semistructured interviews with 194 senior Commission officials held in 2005 and 2006. Five chapters dissect the qualitative and quantitative information from these interviews and relevant secondary sources. In the chapter on bureaucrats' views on the autonomy of the Commission, we learn that most respondents (69%) believe that their DGs influence the College of Commissioners more than it influences them (p. 73). Another substantive chapter investigates whether bureaucrats perceive that there is a common culture across the Commission; 76% agreed or strongly agreed that there is. Other chapters focus on bureaucrats' views on a range of issues, including attempts to reform the Commission, the desirable level of integration, and public Euroskepticism.

Although the theoretical propositions are plausible, relevant theoretical models of delegation to bureaucratic agents suggest alternative mechanisms and relationships between key variables, and our knowledge of the causes of bureaucratic autonomy will develop by specifying and testing these alternatives more rigorously in the future. Consider the authors' proposition that fragmentation in political oversight leads to more bureaucratic autonomy. The commitment perspective on delegation, according to which politicians delegate to solve commitment problems, also suggests this proposition (e.g., David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, *Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers,* 1999; Giandomenico Majone, "Two Logics of Delegation: Agency and Fiduciary Relations in EU Governance," *European Union Politics* 2 [2001]: 103–22). One such commitment problem occurs when politicians wish to commit themselves credibly to a decision outcome they did not