This chapter examines the intricate relationship between visibility, epistemology, and political power in modern democracies. Based on Ezrahi’s previous research on the development of modern democratic visual culture and the impact of the scientific revolution on reshaping the role of human perception in knowledge acquisition, the chapter underscores the role of visibility in shaping democratic epistemology. It emphasizes how visibility, in conjunction with individualism, democratic causality, and the concept of public facts, form the epistemological foundations of democracy. Visibility plays a key role in objectifying politics, which allows citizens to be informed, make judgments about their leaders, and participate in the political process. The chapter highlights the importance of visible public facts as a form of political currency for government criticism and accountability. The chapter acknowledges that the common belief in the accuracy of visible perception, equating observables with reality, has given democratic citizens unwarranted confidence in navigating the political landscape. Paradoxically, these unfounded beliefs align with democratic norms and principles. The chapter suggests that the erosion of these illusions has contributed to the erosion of democratic values.

Many recent books, including the present one, aim to identify and destroy dozens of myths in the history of science. This destruction is only too easy for a “myth” that is just an enduring mistake. To qualify as a bona fide myth a false claim should be persistent and widespread and have a plausible and assignable reason for its endurance and cultural relevance. The most interesting myths for historians have an additional attribute: they transmit a useful caricature or an inspiring allusion. Although erroneous or fabulous, such myths are not entirely wrong, and their exaggerations bring out aspects of history that might otherwise be ignored.

This chapter defends Peirce’s conception of science against a pair of current, mutually antagonistic ideas of the difference of modern science from classical and medieval philosophy. The one party celebrates the difference, the other deplores it, but they agree that modern science rejects the classical ideal of theory as knowledge good for itself. Peirce saw that difference more subtly as one in which the classical ideal of knowing is transformed rather than abandoned. This revolution in cognitive aim did not occur arbitrarily. Well-established facts about the defeat of the Aristotelian world-view are cited to support the novel thesis that it depended on an empirical yet normative discovery, that restless, unending, specialist inquiry is more satisfying intellectually than is the dialectic of systems. The history of science reviewed in this chapter provides evidence for the argument of Chapter 9, that there is normative knowledge and that it is empirical.