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Chapter 15 provides a glimpse of alternative approaches to deal with supermarket power, outside the competition law toolbox, by exploring the various Russian law instruments designed to protect the weaker party to a contractual agreement, which is subject to the principles of Russian law. The authors argue that both Russian law and Russian judicial practice dispose of all the necessary instruments to help contracting parties achieve economic justice in specific cases. The authors describe the genesis and further development of Russian legislation, judicial practice and legal policy regarding the protection of the weaker party, through a comparative law perspective. In particular, the authors describe the impact of the concept of ‘superior bargaining power’ in both contract law and competition law in Russia. They argue that this traditional civil-law concept may narrow down antitrust enforcement and make it more balanced and fair from the perspective of market actors. By fostering the expansion of the superior bargaining power concept, the authors contend that it will mitigate the problems that arise out of the complexity and excessive formality of the traditional antitrust enforcement criteria applied in Russia.
Chapter 14 explores how this debate over supermarket power has manifested itself in China, where disputes between large retailers and suppliers regularly occur and have been at the core of legal developments. In this country, the supply of commodities generally exceeds demand which, in turns, leads retail channels, especially those provided by well-known large retailers, to effectively become scarce but valuable resources. Furthermore, the combination of the majority of small and/or medium-sized suppliers in China operating on a small-scale, the fact that they are scattered throughout the nation and the high degree of homogeneity between the products they provide has resulted in fierce competition among suppliers. Due to such factors, it is difficult for suppliers to form a coalition capable of successfully bargaining with large retailers. Also these factors currently permit large retailers to enjoy positions of market power; commonly they enjoy a comparatively advantageous position over that of suppliers, which they abuse in order to bully suppliers into submission. To combat this issue, China has introduced legislation and regulation. However, due to the lack of clarity concerning the interplay between different laws and regulations, there are challenges inherent in their practical application.
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