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The post-Frederician Prussian army cultivated the glory of the past, but also experienced continuous debates and reforms intending to optimize the army according to the principles of enlightened rationalism. The confrontation with the French revolutionary armies activated intensive discussions, but for the military authorities, the experiences did not call for principal doubts about the suitability of the army. The defeat of 1806, however, did. The following reforms had to handle elementary needs to re-establish the armed forces, but also took the opportunity to create new organisational frameworks and to introduce new principles for recruitment, military justice and officers’ careers. From a quantitative perspective, the important measures converged on the implementation of a general conscription, and from a qualitative perspective, they especially targeted reconciling the educated middle-class with military service. When the break with France in 1813 effaced the previously existing restrictions, the plans resulted not only in an augmentation of the standing army, but in the establishment of complementary military formations of own characters. Their coexistence reflected organisational constraints, as well as different aspects of the previous debates. Although not without improvisations, the authorities were able to increase the armed forces more than sevenfold within about nine months.
The overall approach of the book is thematic, with the Introduction providing important context for what follows, especially for those less familiar with Roman history, first by defining key terms and parameters (especially explaining the chronological range of the volume, from the fourth century BC to the early seventh century AD), and then through an overview of the incidence of warfare, both external and internal, across the course of Roman history. The evolution of Roman military forces from the Republic through to Late Antiquity is outlined, with particular attention to Augustus’ formalisation of a standing army and the reconfiguration of the empire’s forces in the early fourth century. Finally, the most important ancient sources for the subject are introduced, with discussion of key literary sources (Polybius, Caesar, Livy, Josephus, Tacitus, Ammianus Marcellinus and Procopius), the less familiar Syriac chronicle atttributed to Joshua the Stylite, military treatises, documentary evidence (inscriptions, papyri) and relevant archaeological material.
In 1521, Francis I of France visited Dijon, where he was shown the skull of John the Fearless, duke of Burgundy. Oaths were taken by the greatest French princes, such as Burgundy and Brittany, to pledge their allegiance to a Lancastrian succession to the throne of France after the death of Charles VI. Hatred of the Burgundians and their allies was as powerful an incentive to resist the Lancastrian war effort as any sense of nascent French nationalism. The creation of the standing army had been preceded by a period in which positive gains were made by Charles VII's forces, especially in the southern territories of the Lancastrians. Although there were apprehensions about a further revival of English war aims the disturbed political condition of Lancastrian and Yorkist England militated against a concerted policy of intervention in France. The strength of regionalism had led to a widespread devolution of royal authority: poor communications militated against effective government from the centre.
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