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This Element examines evolving methods of cultivating the embodied self, including healing diseases and creating a superior person, in late Warring States and early imperial East Asia. It analyses many topics, including the textualization of bodily regimens and therapies, their systematization, their dissemination among different (and sometimes rival) social groups, and the diversity of traditions – religious, pharmacological, nourishing of life – that contested and combined to form a hegemonic medical practice. These topics in turn feature several issues: models of the body, regimens of cultivating and extending vitality, models of disease, and therapies for these ailments. All these ideas will be refined and extended through comparison with early Western medical traditions.
Does the conception of worship – in expressing, as it does, a direct relationship with God – prevent an understanding of love for God as mediated by love for humans? Taking the latter to be an existential model of one’s relationship with God, in this chapter I answer in the negative to the above question by demonstrating the role that worship plays in such a model. To do so, I turn to Kierkegaard’s image of “resting transparently” in God. For Kierkegaard, this image represents what he perceives as the highest possible state of the believer’s relationship with God; a state that is achieved, according to Kierkegaard, when one becomes the self – the individual – that God intends one to be. And how does one become this self? By loving properly the neighbour (that is, another individual). The suggestion I develop in this chapter is that it is the worshipping of God – that is, by being in a state of respect and attendance to God’s will – that directs one in loving properly the neighbour. Hence, it is worship of God that paves the way to fully loving the neighbour and thus to fully loving God.
The turbulent Second Temple period produced searching biblical texts whose protagonists, unlike heroes like Noah, Abraham, and Moses, were more everyday figures who expressed their moral uncertainties more vocally. Reflecting on a new type of Jewish moral agent, these tales depict men who are feminized, and women who are masculinized. In this volume, Lawrence M. Wills offers a deep interrogation of these stories, uncovering the psychological aspects of Jewish identity, moral life, and decisions that they explore. Often written as novellas, the stories investigate emotions, psychological interiorizing, the self, agency, and character. Recent insights from gender and postcolonial theory inform Wills' study, as he shows how one can study and compare modern and ancient gender constructs. Wills also reconstructs the social fabric of the Second Temple period and demonstrates how a focus on emotions, the self, and moral psychology, often associated with both ancient Greek and modern literature, are present in biblical texts, albeit in a subtle, unassuming manner.
This chapter will show you how traversing the overlapping identities of self (micro), organisation (meso) and system (macro) is an essential skill for educators to be culturally responsive. This includes making decisions informed by broader contexts, organisation/learning environment interpretations of those cultures and, crucially for educators at all stages, what this then looks like in their own educational setting. For pre-service teachers, this calls for a consideration of multiple layers in the development of teacher identity. For all educators, it demands reflection and scrutiny throughout one’s career recognising that some aspects of identity may remain a continuity, while others may change. By examining practitioner examples, research literature, national and global contexts, this chapter will equip you with practical and theoretical examples. We hope this will help you identify and negotiate micro, meso and macro levels of teacher identity as a way to better identify, empathise and implement effective culturally responsive pedagogies for the contexts you work in.
What are we? What owns our thoughts and experiences? Are we anything at all? After an introduction, Section 2 assesses a 'no-bearer' theory of experience, and the 'no-self' contention that self-representations are about no real entity, before introducing a positive hypothesis about the objects of our self-representations: the 'animalist' claim that we are biological organisms. Section 3 discusses the classic challenge to animalism that brain transplantation is something we could survive but no animal could survive. This challenge introduces positive alternatives to animalism, as well as animalist responses, including one which questions the assumption that psychology is irrelevant to organism persistence. Section 4 surveys a 'thinking parts' problem and conjoined twinning and commisurotomy, also considered problematic for animalism. The interpretation of these cases revisits questions about bearers of experience, objects of self-representation, and the relation of biology and psychology. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Adolescence is a critical period for brain development, consolidation of self-understanding, and onset of non-suicidal self-injury (NSSI). This study evaluated the RDoC (Research Domain Criteria) sub-construct of Self-Knowledge in relation to adolescent NSSI using multiple units of analysis.
Methods
One hundred and sixty-four adolescents assigned female at birth (AFAB), ages 12–16 years with and without a history of NSSI entered a study involving clinical assessment and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), including structural, resting-state functional MRI (fMRI), and fMRI during a self-evaluation task. For imaging analyses, we used an a priori defined Self Network (anterior cingulate, orbitofrontal, and posterior cingulate cortices; precuneus). We first examined interrelationships among multi-level Self variables. We then evaluated the individual relationships between NSSI severity and multi-level Self variables (self-report, behavior, multi-modal brain Self Network measures), then conducted model testing and multiple regression to test how Self variables (together) predicted NSSI severity.
Results
Cross-correlations revealed key links between self-reported global self-worth and self-evaluation task behavior. Individually, greater NSSI severity correlated with lower global self-worth, more frequent and faster negative self-evaluations, lower anterior Self Network activation during self-evaluation, and lower anterior and posterior Self Network resting-state connectivity. Multiple regression analysis revealed the model including multi-level Self variables explained NSSI better than a covariate-only model; the strongest predictive variables included self-worth, self-evaluation task behavior, and resting-state connectivity.
Conclusions
Disruptions in Self-Knowledge across multiple levels of analysis relate to NSSI in adolescents. Findings suggest potential neurobiological treatment targets, potentially enhancing neuroplasticity in Self systems to facilitate greater flexibility (more frequently positive) of self-views in AFAB adolescents.
This chapter examines how essayistic personae enabled writers and readers to understand personhood as a means of making a unity out of multiplicity. It draws on Thomas Hobbes’s theory of the person to track how essayistic personae both depicted corporate personhood and themselves served as corporate persons, allowing many writers, real or imagined, to write as one. It also uses Locke’s theory of personhood to show how essayistic personae present conscious persons as contingent unities imposed upon multitudinous thoughts and experiences. Essayistic personae not only extended personhood to non-human beings, such as corporations and animals, they also drew attention to the limited nature of personhood for many human beings, including married women and enslaved people.
White extremism has been a rising trend in North American and European countries over the past two decades. Despite the systemically engrained privileged status of people who identify as white in US society, one of the causes of white extremism is a perceived threat of being sidelined/disadvantaged by individuals with non-white identities. For example, the mainstreaming of the great replacement theory among right-wing media outlets and politicians demonstrates this perception. We examine this perception, and white extremism rhetoric and radicalization broadly, within the context of social exclusion at both the individual and systemic levels. We further embed this analysis within theories and research focused on concepts of “the self,” social identity, and related psychological needs usually impacted by social exclusion. We recommend researchers and practitioners interested in extremism and radicalization to intentionally consider self-related theories and constructs going forward.
Feeling marginalized, silenced and excluded, as an individual or as a (sub)group within a collective, can make one feel uncertain about one’s self and identity and about “fitting in.” This feeling of uncertainty can be reduced by group identification – especially with a distinctive group that has a clearly defined, unambiguous, and homogenous social identity. Such groups and identities can sometimes be characterized as extremist. Excluded individuals may exit the larger group to identify with a different and possibly more extreme group, and the larger group may thus become less diverse and more homogeneous and extreme itself. Members of excluded subgroups can bond tightly together as a highly distinctive entity and identify strongly with it, a process that can fragment and polarize the larger group into oppositional or combative factions. In this chapter we draw upon an uncertainty identity theory framework to describe how exclusion can generate self and identity uncertainty, which is resolved by a process of identification that fragments groups and can produce extremist groups and identities.
Chapter 4 considers the project of worldmaking and the concept of personality from the perspective of two prose genres that dominated Yeats’s writing in the 1920s and 1930s: autobiography and occult philosophy. My justification for bringing these genres together lies in an understanding of how they are used in his exploration of personality and aesthetic Bildung. The logic of misrecognition can be discerned not only in Yeats’s growing understanding of the self/anti-self dichotomy but also in the the process by which he learns, at the hands of sometimes deceptive instructors, the secrets of the spirit world. Yeats’s spiritual journey in A Vision frames a cosmic system in which personality, understood as a dialectics of self and anti-self, defines many of the historical figures who exemplify the phases of the moon. In Autobiographies, he becomes increasingly aware of the need to document his own personality with the rectifying aim of discovering the “age-long memoried self” that coexists with his ordinary “daily self” (Au 216). Each text creates in its own fashion the contours and atmosphere of a world in which the past – on the one hand, through recollection; on the other, through an understanding of the historical gyres – retains its vitality and presentness.
One of the earliest patents for an automaton in Victorian America was for a steam-powered android, drawn as a caricature of a Black man. Most histories of the so-called Steam Man tend to treat this automaton in one of two ways: Historians of science have addressed the machine indirectly, drawing general connections between Victorian Black androids, white femininity, and imputed inferiority; literary and cultural studies have addressed the Steam Man directly as a product of Reconstruction-era white anxiety over free Black labor. In this chapter, we argue for a different way of understanding the Steam Man and other Victorian Black automata, one that sees them as concealing historical truths about the Black technological self in nineteenth-century America. We follow a counterhistory of the mechanics that underpinned Black automata and show that, although androids like the Steam Man portrayed Black people in pastoral, leisurely, and nontechnological roles, their reliance on blackface minstrelsy ultimately concealed the intimate relationships between Black Victorian Americans, contemporary technologies, and the self
In its original version, before Wittgenstein decided to extend the book’s scope, the Tractatus advanced a solipsism of a decidedly etiolated sort – so etiolated, indeed, that the self which according to this solipsism claims ownership of the world ends up stripped of any substantial content. By the time it was published, however, the solipsism passage had been revised so as to gesture towards a puzzling ‘metaphysical’ subject, whose importance seems to be primarily (though no doubt not exclusively) ethical. By the time he wrote the Blue Book Wittgenstein no longer held the unitary conception of language on which his Tractarian conception of solipsism depended, but he continued to deny coherence of a substantial self.
Published just over a century ago, Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the only book-length work to have been published during his lifetime and it continues to generate interest and scholarly debate. It is structured as a series of propositions on metaphysics, language, the nature of philosophy, and the distinction between what can be said and what can be shown. This volume brings together eleven new essays on the Tractatus covering a wide variety of topics, from the central Tractarian doctrines concerning representation, the structure of the world and the nature of logic, to less prominent issues including ethics, natural science, mathematics and the self. Individual essays advance specific exegetical debates in important ways, and taken as a whole they offer an excellent showcase of contemporary ideas on how to read the Tractatus and its relevance to contemporary thought.
In the 1930s, the Bengali philosopher K. C. Bhattacharyya proposed a new theory of rasa, or aesthetic emotion, according to which aesthetic emotions are feelings that have other feelings as their intentional objects. This paper articulates how Bhattacharyya's theory offers a novel solution to the puzzle of how it is both possible and rational to enjoy the kind of negative emotions that are inspired by tragic and sorrowful tales. The new solution is distinct from the conversion and compensation views that dominate the existing literature, and it derives its significance from how it ties aesthetic experience to self-awareness.
Recent decades have seen a revival of interest in the study of the self, self-awareness and various changes in self-awareness, especially in the context of mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia. This chapter outlines the psychopathology of various disturbances of awareness of self-activity, including depersonalisation, loss of emotional resonance, disturbances in the immediate awareness of self-unity, disturbances in the continuity of the self and disturbances of the boundaries of the self. It also explores theory of mind, consciousness and schizophrenia, which represent areas of growing research interest. The chapter concludes with suggested questions for eliciting specific symptoms in clinical practice, in addition to standard history-taking and mental state examination.
Kierkegaard’s thesis that lacking faith is necessarily a state of despair leads to the conclusion that Either/Or’s fictional character Judge William, who belongs to the “ethical” rather than the “religious” stage of life, is, despite the many virtues of his position, in a state of despair. What does his despair amount to, then? Relying on Kierkegaard’s analysis of despair in The Sickness unto Death, I claim that the failure in the Judge’s view of life is rooted in his misguided understanding of what it is to be a “self.” By taking himself to have ultimate control over the way he is (in a manner akin to what Sartre’s means by “radical freedom”), the Judge fails to acknowledge that he possesses what I term an individual essence, bestowed upon him by God in a state of potential. This chapter explains the conception of individual essence and demonstrates how it applies to the Judge’s despair.
Most accounts of bodily self-awareness focus on its sensory and agentive dimensions, tracking the origins of our special relationship with our own body in the way we gain information about it and in the way we act with it. However, they often neglect a fundamental dimension of our subjective bodily life, namely, its affective dimension. This Element will discuss bodily self-awareness through the filter of its affective significance. It is organized around four core themes: (i) the relationship between bodily awareness and action in instrumental and protective contexts, (ii) the motivational role of pain and interoception, (iii) the sense of bodily ownership and its relation to the value of the body for survival, and (iv) bodily anchoring in peripersonal and egocentric awareness. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Plotinus’ understanding of self is formulated largely in dialogue with the Stoics. In early works he categorically rejects the Stoic notion of the hēgemonikon (‘leading part’ or ‘commanding faculty’) of the soul. In this paper, I show how, in light of a general dissatisfaction with the Stoic account of self articulated in his early work, Plotinus deals with the Stoic notion of oikeiōsis (‘appropriation’). I argue that Plotinus’ understanding of oikeiōsis develops across the period during which he uses it. In his middle writings, Plotinus engages with Stoic oikeiōsis by exploring how it functions in contexts related to selfhood. In his later writings, he shows, on the one hand, how the concept of oikeiōsis can be Platonized, such as to account for the relation of the self to the Good, and, on the other, how the Stoic understanding of oikeiōsis is untenable for many of the same reasons that he rejects the Stoic notion of the hēgemonikon. Ultimately, Plotinus thinks that Stoic understandings of the hēgemonikon and oikeiōsis are untenable because they lead to something that could be characterized as ‘selfishness’.
Gambling affected the mental apparatus that people employed to understand the world around them as well as their own desires and compulsions. Casino gambling established a psychological dynamic perfectly calibrated to drive people to the edge of madness. The “storm” of despair generated by a loss, never compensated by a corresponding elation coming with a win, can overwhelm the player and leave them incapable of self-direction. Descriptions of the psychological effects of addiction – not only how those behaviors were formed through repetition but also how they resulted in a person whose entire world had shrunk – indicate how the machinery of Blanc-style casino gambling affected people in new and profound ways.
This chapter introduces the interdisciplinary field of relationship science. It describes the human drive for belonging, including the biological underpinning of sociality and the harmful consequences of social isolation and social exclusion. It also defines romantic relationships and the characteristics that differentiate romantic relationships from other close relationships (high interdependence, high intimate knowledge, high commitment). In addition to emphasizing the core commonalities across romantic relationships, this chapter explores the many ways in which romantic relationships are diverse (e.g., structure, exclusivity, composition, duration, motives). Finally, this chapter highlights the critical importance of close relationships for individual health and well-being as well, as for society more broadly.