Strategies are proposed to cope with uncertainties in a way that all possible kinds of uncertainty are named, recognized, statistically quantified as far as possible and utilized in efficient decision-making in flood risk management (FRM). We elaborated on the metaphor of uncertainty as a monster. We recommend two strategies to cope with the uncertainty monster to support efficient decision-making in FRM: monster adaptation and monster assimilation. We present three cases to illustrate these strategies. We argue that these strategies benefit from improving the structure and reducing the complexity of decision problems. We discuss ways to involve decision-makers in FRM, and how communication strategies can be responsive to their informational needs.

Terrorism elicits strong public reactions immediately after the attack, with important implications for democratic institutions and individual well-being. Are these effects short-lived? We answer this question using a natural experiment design and combining data on terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom with a Continuous Monitoring Survey. We find that heightened risk perceptions and emotional reactions in the wake of deadly attacks do not dissipate in the very short run but are sustained over time and up to 120 days after the attacks. Whereas large-scale attacks cause a long-lasting shift in risk assessments and emotions, the corresponding effect of smaller-scale terrorism incidents appears to subside within one month. Overall, the impact of terrorism does not fade away easily.

Could an individual’s perception of the possibility of a future ecological crisis be linked to their level of political trust? Studies of environmental attitudes have identified political trust as an important predictor of support for environmental taxation or risk perceptions surrounding specific local environmental hazards, but less is known about its role when environmental risks are perceived as diffuse and distant. Using original survey data from Ecuador, this article finds that political distrust predicts heightened ecological crisis perceptions and that higher educational attainment intensifies this relationship. A follow-up analysis of the AmericasBarometer’s Ecuador survey shows that political distrust also predicts higher concern about climate change. These findings suggest that when evaluations of political institutions reflect perceptions of environmental risks, individuals blame the government for environmental failures. The implications of this study are particularly relevant for political institutions in developing economies, where the public sector often spearheads development efforts.

The current field study uses data collected after the 2009 war between Israel and the Hamas militias in the Gaza Strip ended. The study compares recalled emotions and perceived risks among two groups of students, all of whom were exposed to rocket attacks. Individuals in the “left the war zone” group left the region under attack as a precautionary action, while the “stayed in the war zone” group remained in the region during war. The results indicate no significant differences in the levels of recalled fear and anger between the two groups, while the perceived self-risk from terror was higher among the “stayed in the war zone” group. Yet, a higher level of recalled fear was found among those who left the war zone and whose parents resided in the war zone, compared to those who left the war zone and whose parents resided outside the war zone. In addition, fearful people became more pessimistic about their level of personal risk from terror, but not about the routine risks. We conclude that civilians need attention even if they leave the war zone since leaving the attacked region as a precautionary action may mitigate perceived self-risk from terror but does not seem to eliminate the high level of negative emotions evoked by the terror attacks.

It has been argued that individuals behave according to a threshold level of concern decision rule when considering protection against risk: if the perceived probability of the risk is below a threshold level, then the likelihood of the risk is treated as zero and protection is deemed unnecessary. Little is known about the determinants of this threshold nor about whether individual thresholds are related to risk specific emotions like worry and regret. We study threshold probabilities and factors that influence these in the context of flood insurance decision making. Based on data collected from 1,041 Dutch homeowners, we find that on average the threshold level of concern for flood insurance demand is negatively related to the expected regret an individual might feel about not purchasing flood insurance if a flood occurs, as well as to worry about flooding.

Globally, water resources are under immense and increasing pressure. This, coupled with the threat of climate change, has increased global interest in water reuse. However, global water reuse remains limited because of public opposition. This paper thus examines public perceptions and attitudes to water reuse across the world. It finds that results from studies of water reuse acceptance have tended to be context specific, although claims can be made about the universal relevance of some predictors, underscoring the need for individual water reuse schemes to carefully consider their local context. Disgust remains a constant in the public psyche, while public trust in delivery agents as well as how water reuse is communicated vis-à-vis perceptions about the quality and safety of recycled water are also critical. The latter particularly highlights public concerns about the indeterminate health risks associated with water reuse.

Dutch coastal land markets are characterized by high amenity values but are threatened by potential coastal hazards, leading to high potential damage costs from flooding. Yet, Dutch residents generally perceive low or no flood risk. Using an agent-based land market model and Dutch survey data on risk perceptions and location preferences, this paper explores the patterns of land development and land rents produced by buyers with low, highly skewed risk perceptions. We find that, compared to representative agent and uniform risk perception models, the skewed risk perception distribution produces substantially more, high-valued development in risky coastal zones, potentially creating economically significant risks triggered by the current Dutch flood protection policy.

This paper examines whether national differences in political culture add an explanatory dimension to the formulation of policy in the area of biotechnology, especially with respect to genetically modified food. The analysis links the formulation of protective regulatory policies governing genetically modified food to both country and region-specific differences in uncertainty tolerance levels and risk perceptions in the United States, Canada, and European Union. Based on polling data and document analysis, the findings illustrate that these differences matter. Following a mostly opportunistic risk perception within an environment of high tolerance for uncertainty, policymakers in the United States and Canada modified existing regulatory frameworks that govern genetically modified food in their respective countries. In contrast, the mostly cautious perception of new food technologies and low tolerance for uncertainty among European Union member states has contributed to the creation of elaborate and stringent regulatory policies governing genetically modified food.

Despite large-scale investments and government mandates to expand biofuels development and infrastructure in the United States, little is known about how the public conceives of this alternative fuel technology. This study examines public opinion of biofuels by focusing on citizen knowledge and the motivated processing of media information. Specifically, we explore the direct effects of biofuels knowledge and the moderating effect of partisanship on the relationship between media use and benefit vs. risk perceptions in the following four domains: environmental impacts, economic consequences, ethical/social implications, and political ramifications. Our results suggest that more knowledgeable respondents see fewer benefits of biofuels relative to risks, and that Democrats and Republicans are affected differently by media use when forming opinions about biofuels. Among Democrats, greater attention to political media content leads to a more favorable outlook toward the technology across several domains of interest, while among Republicans, an increase in attention to political content has the opposite effect. Possible reasons for these results, as well as implications of the findings at the intersection of politics and the life sciences, are discussed.

Decreased care or offsetting behavior by potential victims can reduce or reverse benefits provided by some safety policies. We explore reasons for offsetting behavior associated with food safety policies using a survey of a nationally representative sample of almost 3,000 consumers. Results reveal that positive food safety information can change consumers’ risk perceptions and attitudes, causing them to be less vigilant and to consume more of relatively unsafe foods. This behavioral anomaly plausibly explains ongoing incidences of food poisoning after a meat processing facility implements a pathogen-reduction hazard analysis of critical control points (PR/HACCP).

Double-cropping of soybeans and wheat is often promoted by extension personnel. This paper seeks to explain how the decision to adopt double-cropping is made, using a Tobit regression model. Tobit makes use of more of the information in the data set than do logit or probit and explains not only the decision to double-crop but also the rate of adoption. The paper considers factors such as profit and risk perceptions and risk which have not been included in the past models used to explain adoption of technology. The results show that risk perception is important. Contrary to the findings of some other adoption studies, this decision in not influenced by human capital factors. The farmers who double-crop are more highly leveraged and appear to do so both to achieve higher income and as part of a risk diversification strategy. This is consistent with the importance of the location factor, measured as the average number of growing degree days at the farm's location. Growing degree days is a proxy for the actual distribution of returns from double-cropping and is the main factor explaining this decision. Extensive adoption of double-cropping in cooler regions of the Midwest must await technological advances that can increase the profitability of double-cropping by reducing the growing season for wheat and/or beans.