There is no doubt that AI systems, and the large-scale processing of personal data that often accompanies their development and use, has put a strain on individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms. Against that background, this chapter aims to walk the reader through a selection of key concerns arising from the application of the GDPR to the training and use of such systems. First, it clarifies the position and role of the GDPR within the broader European data protection regulatory framework. Next, it delineates its scope of application by delving into the pivotal notions of “personal data,” “controller,” and “processor.” Lastly, it highlights some friction points between the characteristics inherent to most AI systems and the general principles outlined in Article 5 GDPR, including lawfulness, transparency, purpose limitation, data minimization, and accountability.

This essay examines how nineteenth-century American literature paved the way for the modern exposure of private life in such disparate venues as the gossip column, social media, and reality television. In particular, this essay examines the sketch form, a popular nineteenth-century prose genre that has often been characterized as a minor form in comparison to the novel. In examining the history of the sketch form, this essay shows how the sketch conveyed reservations about the interiority and exposures central to the novel form. As practiced by Washington Irving, the earliest popularizer of this genre, the sketch advocated respectful discretion, the avoidance of private matters, and social stasis, the latter of which positioned the sketch in opposition to the social mobility characteristic of the novel. Irving presented the sketch as the genre of literary discretion, but its latter practitioner, Nathaniel Parker Willis, used the sketch to divulge confidences and violate social decorum. Willis adapted the sketch to become a precursor of the gossip column and to mirror the novel form in exposing private life.

Chapter 4 presents a review of the ISO 18000-63 protocol, including data encoding and modulation, and aspects of the transponder memory structure, security, and privacy, and presents real examples of reader–transponder transactions.

Adolescents’ ability to access health care depends on sharing accurate information about concerns, needs, and conditions. Parents and other adults serve as both resources and gatekeepers in adolescents’ ability to access and manage care. Understanding information sharing between adolescents and parents, adolescents and providers, and parents and providers is thus critical. This chapter distinguishes between adolescents’ routine and self-disclosure of information. The former refers to sharing information required for the partner to perform their role. The latter refers to voluntarily sharing more information than required. Because the roles of parent and provider are distinct relative to the adolescent, disclosure decisions can conflict. These differences are discussed in the context of communication privacy management theory and the literature on legitimacy of authority. A framework for understanding information sharing processes is developed that considers stage of care, type of care, stigma/privacy associated with the condition, and the age of the adolescent.

Design is integral to every part of our justice system: from the built spaces like courtrooms and the clerk’s office counter, to the paper and digital forms litigants submit, to the rules of procedure themselves. This chapter argues that good architectural design can make our justice system more just by enhancing participants’ sense of fairness and dignity, and more efficient by contributing to mindsets from which it is easier for parties to resolve conflict. We begin by discussing historical inspirations and manifestations of courtroom and courthouse design. We then look at some of the key stakeholders who make design decisions before highlighting a few modern efforts to use design to bring dignity to patrons of courthouses. We illustrate our position by referencing a 2018 collaboration among a graduate architecture studio course at Wentworth Institute of Technology, Northeastern University School of Law’s NuLawLab, and Massachusetts Housing Court in which architecture and law students and faculty tackled spatial interventions in Boston Housing Court.

Much of the internet of today is dominated by the big tech companies such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon that use it to amass profits. The chapter looks at three ways in which their pursuit of profit arbitrarily interferes with people’s access to and use of the internet. (1) Big Tech corporations operate a version of the internet that forces users to yield personal data in exchange for ‘free’ services. The chapter explains why this routine harvesting of personal data is morally problematic as it forces internet users to choose between two elements of minimally decent lives: their privacy and accessing the internet. (2) Social media platforms are among the dominant online services today. They have enhanced opportunities for exercising human rights, but their business practices also limit people in the enjoyment of these rights. The chapter suggests several ways for improving the situation. (3) Some businesses lobby for ending net neutrality. The chapter explains why net neutrality is crucial for keeping internet access free from arbitrary interferences, and argues for a version of net neutrality that allows some unequal treatment of data that does not diminish human rights.

Non-fungible tokens (NFTs) introduce unique concerns related to the privacy of personal data. To create an NFT, users upload data to publicly accessible and searchable databases. This data can encompass information essential for the creation, transfer, and storage of the NFT, as well as personal details pertaining to the creator. Additionally, users might inadvertently engage with technology crafted to gather personal data. Traditional paradigms of privacy have not evolved in tandem with advancements in NFT and blockchain technology. To pinpoint where current privacy paradigms falter, this chapter delves into an introduction of NFTs, elucidating their foundational technical mechanisms and processes. Subsequently, the chapter juxtaposes current and historical privacy frameworks with NFTs, underscoring how these models may be either overly expansive or excessively restrictive for this emerging technology. This chapter suggests that Helen Nissenbaum’s concept of “contextual integrity” might offer the requisite flexibility to cater to the distinct attributes of NFTs. In conclusion, while there is a pronounced societal drive to safeguard citizen data and privacy, the overarching aim remains the enhancement of the collective good. Balancing this objective, governments should be afforded the latitude to equate society’s privacy interests with its imperative for transparency.

Digital traces that people leave behind can be useful evidence in criminal courts. However, in many jurisdictions, the legal provisions setting the rules for the use of evidence in criminal courts were formulated long before these digital technologies existed, and there seems to be an increasing discrepancy between legal frameworks and actual practices. This chapter investigates this disconnect by analyzing the relevant legal frameworks in the EU for processing data in criminal courts, and comparing and contrasting these with actual court practices. The relevant legal frameworks are criminal and data protection law. Data protection law is mostly harmonized throughout the EU, but since criminal law is mostly national law, this chapter focuses on criminal law in the Netherlands. We conclude that existing legal frameworks do not appear to obstruct the collection of data for evidence, but that regulation on collection in criminal law and regulation on processing and analysis in data protection law are not integrated. We also characterize as remarkable the almost complete absence of regulation of automated data analysis – in contrast with the many rules for data collection.

Dean John Wade, who replaced the great torts scholar William Prosser on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, put the finishing touches on the defamation sections in 1977.1 Apple Computer had been founded a year before, and Microsoft two, but relatively few people owned computers yet. The twenty-four-hour news cycle was not yet a thing, and most Americans still trusted the press.2

The laws of defamation and privacy are at once similar and dissimilar. Falsity is the hallmark of defamation – the sharing of untrue information that tends to harm the subject’s standing in their community. Truth is the hallmark of privacy – the disclosure of facts about an individual who would prefer those facts to be private. Publication of true information cannot be defamatory; spreading of false information cannot violate an individual’s privacy. Scholars of either field could surely add epicycles to that characterization – but it does useful work as a starting point of comparison.

In the spring of 2022, visitors to the Smoking Gun website would find a challenging “game, where [one’s] wasted time [was] well spent.”1

Coordinated campaigns of falsehoods are poisoning public discourse.1 Amidst a torrent of social-media conspiracy theories and lies – on topics as central to the nation’s wellbeing as elections and public health – scholars and jurists are turning their attention to the causes of this disinformation crisis and the potential solutions to it.