Given growing worry about dark money electoral spending and covert forms of business lobbying – neither of which generally require federal reporting – a shareholder-activist movement has emerged to pressure companies to increase their voluntary political disclosures. This chapter investigates how companies are pressured for greater disclosure and how they respond. I find that firms are likely to be targeted if they are larger and more prominent, and engage in higher levels of conventional lobbying and electoral spending. Additional qualitative evidence shows that targeting follows from a firm’s receptivity to engagement and also if their spending appears contradictory to corporate values. Lastly, I investigate the likelihood that shareholder activism is successful, finding that apparent concessions are more likely after repeated targeting and during years of S&P 500 index constituency. The chapter draws conclusions about the prospects for greater transparency of corporate political expenditures in a time of uncertain government oversight.

This chapter examines the role of disclosure as a tool for promoting corporate political accountability by reviewing how shareholders reacted to various events in the United States and abroad that either changed the ability of firms to engage in the political process or revealed previously hidden corporate political activity. The conclusions drawn from this summary are mixed, with investors’ reactions contingent on myriad factors, including the form of the political activity engaged in, prior contestation over such activity by shareholders, and other firm-level nonmarket and market dynamics. The chapter concludes by discussing the limits of disclosure as a tool for regulating corporate political activity, as well as public policy more broadly, and advocates for broader, institutional reforms regarding the role of money in politics.

In this chapter, we examine the measurement issues that currently plague analysis of corporate political activity and that must be remedied for CPR to be credible, with a focus on the federal level. We begin with issues of electoral spending before turning to spending on lobbying. In each case, we survey the laws mandating disclosure of these activities, along with what some firms and third parties are doing to shed light on activities that fall outside these reporting requirements. We then discuss the questions that can be answered with existing data, and the important questions that are impossible to answer due to data gaps. Finally, we discuss changes to current laws, and to norms of corporate behavior, that could increase transparency and accountability around corporate political activity.