Reflection on the history of skepticism shows that philosophers have oftenconjoined as a single doctrine various theses that are best kept apart. Some ofthese theses are incredible—literally almost impossible toaccept—whereas others seem quite plausible and even verge on theplatitudinous. Mixing them together, one arrives at aview—skepticism—that is as a whole indefensible. My aim isto pull these different elements apart and focus on one particular strand ofskepticism that deserves sustained and respectful attention, which I will referto as epistemic defeatism. Roughly, in its most global form, this is the viewthat, in the final analysis, we have no good evidence for the truth of anyproposition. I do not attempt to argue for the truth of epistemic defeatism, butonly to untangle it from neighboring views and in particular to establish itsindependence from questions about knowledge. Having thus established theview's autonomy, I turn to considering the options forself-consciously accepting defeat. One may despair or one may have faith. But Iwill ultimately propose that the most attractive option—the optionthat preserves the most of our epistemic integrity—is to havehope.
