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This chapter discusses Kant's views on the nature of the beings to whom we can owe duties. It also discusses views held by Andrews Reath and Allen Wood about what it means to have a duty to a person. The chapter discusses the relationship between duties to a person and the claims she may have on us as a result of such duties. In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant offers a principle that he regards as the foundation of the division between obligations toward oneself and obligations toward others. Kant evidently thought that the necessity of willing our happiness together with our individual inability to achieve it implied the proposition that we cannot rationally will that everyone refuse to adopt anyone else's happiness as his end. The latter is the proposition he would need in order to gain the conclusion that the happiness of others is an obligatory end.
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