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Omitted items cannot properly be treated as wrong when estimating ability and item parameters. A convenient method for utilizing the information provided by omissions is presented. Theoretical and empirical justifications are presented for the estimates obtained by the new method.

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This chapter argues that perceptual experiences must have content if they are to rationalize beliefs, at least in the sense that has traditionally been invoked in the context of epistemological debates about empirical justification. The representational content, Bill Brewer thinks, is modeled on that of a person's thought about the world around him, as expressed in his linguistic communication with others, and registered by their everyday attitude ascriptions to him. A view of perception which apparently meets this need, while still remaining within the spirit of the object view, is defended by Mark Johnston, for whom perception presents with states and events as well as objects and stuffs. The modifications made to the object view do indeed entail that perception resembles thought in having representational content, and specifically representational content with the generality characteristic of the content of thought.

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Estimation of Latent Ability and Item Parameters when there are Omitted Responses

7 - Perception, generality, and reasons

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Estimation of Latent Ability and Item Parameters when there are Omitted Responses

7 - Perception, generality, and reasons

Summary