Previous research suggests that emotion words elicit lower emotional reactivity in languages acquired later in life (LX), prompting bilinguals to make less emotional decisions when responding to emotionally charged moral dilemmas in the LX compared to their first language (L1). This study investigated the influence of word emotionality on bilinguals’ moral judgements by manipulating the degree of emotiveness of the moral questions (i.e., emotive versus neutral conditions) accompanying different types of moral dilemmas (i.e., personal/sacrificial versus impersonal/realistic). Mixed effects logistic regression models revealed that the use of the LX increased the number of utilitarian decisions in both the emotive and the neutral conditions but only in the sacrificial moral dilemmas. Moreover, the emotive questions led to more deontological moral judgements than the neutral questions but only in the L1. Taken together, these findings provide further insight into the impact of emotion on bilinguals’ moral decision-making.

Philosophers have struggled to explain the mismatch of emotions and their objects across time, as when we stop grieving or feeling angry despite the persistence of the underlying cause. I argue for a sceptical approach that says that these emotional changes often lack rational fit. The key observation is that our emotions must periodically reset for purely functional reasons that have nothing to do with fit. I compare this account to David Hume’s sceptical approach in matters of belief, and conclude that resistance to it rests on a confusion similar to one that he identifies.

Speaking truth ought to be normative in churches, and yet when it does, the foundations and structures of power are often shaken to the core. This paper explores the issues of identity and integrity in ecclesiology and is concerned with the ethical paradigms and moral frameworks that need to be in place if churches are to be places where honesty and truthfulness can be normative. Churches often fail as institutions because they presume they can conduct their affairs as organizations might. Churches become anger-averse, resisting the voices and experiences of victims, in order that the flow of power and its structures are unimpeded. At that point, churches become inherently committed to re-abusing victims and are unable to hear their pain and protests, which only leads to the perpetration of further abuse.

Weekly cycles in emotion were examined by combining item response modeling and spectral analysis approaches in an analysis of 179 college students' reports of daily emotions experienced over 7 weeks. We addressed the measurement of emotion using an item response model. Spectral analysis and multilevel sinusoidal models were used to identify interindividual differences in intraindividual cyclic change. Simulations and incomplete data designs were used to examine how well this combination of analysis techniques might work when applied to other practical data problems. Empirically, we found systematic individual differences in the extent to which individuals' emotions follow a weekly cycle, and in how such cycles are exhibited. Weekly cycles accounted for very little variance in day to day emotions at the individual level. Analytically, we illustrate how measurement, change, and interindividual difference models from different traditions may be combined in a practical manner to describe some of the complexities of human behavior.

We present an approach for evaluating coherence in multivariate systems that considers all the variables simultaneously. We operationalize the multivariate system as a network and define coherence as the efficiency with which a signal is transmitted throughout the network. We illustrate this approach with time series data from 15 psychophysiological signals representing individuals’ moment-by-moment emotional reactions to emotional films. First, we summarize the time series through nonparametric Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves. Second, we use Spearman rank correlations to calculate relationships between each pair of variables. Third, based on the obtained associations, we construct a network using the variables as nodes. Finally, we examine signal transmission through all the nodes in the network. Our results indicate that the network consisting of the 15 psychophysiological signals has a small-world structure, with three clusters of variables and strong within-cluster connections. This structure supports an effective signal transmission across the entire network. When compared across experimental conditions, our results indicate that coherence is relatively stronger for intense emotional stimuli than for neutral stimuli. These findings are discussed in relation to multivariate methods and emotion theories.

What is epistemically required of the rationally hopeful? In this paper, I propose that, as a subject becomes hopeful that p, she also adopts an inquiring attitude toward the question of whether p. Moreover, remaining rationally hopeful requires maintaining an inquiring attitude toward those possibilities we are hopeful about. On top of being led by a particular practical goal (that of attaining p), I suggest that the hopeful agent is also led by the epistemic goal of knowing whether p. Adding the “inquiry” criteria to rational hopefulness helps explain our intuition that there is something wrong with being hopeful that p and not disposed to inquire into whether p. It also helps us further distinguish hopefulness from other positive attitudes we adopt in the face of uncertainty, such as optimism, and faith.

Perceptualism is a prominent theory analyzing emotions as perceptual experiences of value. A long-standing challenge to perceptualism says that emotions cannot be perceptual because they are subject to normative assessments in terms of reasons and rationality, while perceptual experiences are not. I defend perceptualism from this charge. My argument begins by distinguishing two forms of normative assessment: fundamental and non-fundamental. Perceptualism is compatible with the latter (i.e., non-fundamental reasons and rationality); even sensory experiences are so assessable. I next argue that emotions are only non-fundamentally assessable. Following this argument, I outline a perceptualist-friendly theory of emotions as non-fundamentally normatively assessable.

Existential happiness is happiness that one has a basic life at all. Having a basic life, as I understand it, involves being the subject of experiences and being an agent in some minimal sense. As I argue, existential happiness is a fitting response to having a basic life. To make this argument, I look at two possible accounts of the fittingness of existential happiness: the value of a basic life and attachment to the constitutive elements of one’s life. I also consider a few possible sources of existential happiness, including encounters with death, counterfactual thinking, and hedonically positive feelings of awe directed toward one’s own consciousness.

Threat perception provokes a range of behaviour, from cooperation to conflict. Correctly interpreting others’ behaviour, and responding optimally, is thought to be aided by ‘stepping into their shoes’ (i.e. mentalising) to understand the threats they have perceived. But IR scholarship on the effects of attempting this exercise has yielded mixed findings. One missing component in this research is a clear understanding of the link between effort and accuracy. I use a US-based survey experiment (study N = 839; pilot N = 297) and a novel analytic approach to study mentalising accuracy in the domain of threat perception. I find that accurately estimating why someone feels threatened by either climate change or illegal immigration is conditional on sharing a belief in the issue’s overall dangerousness. Similar beliefs about dangerousness are not proxies for shared political identities, and accuracy for those with dissimilar beliefs does not exceed chance. Focusing first on the emotional states of those who felt threatened did not significantly improve accuracy. These findings suggest that: (1) effort does not guarantee accuracy in estimating the threats others see; (2) emotion understanding may not be a solution to threat mis-estimation; and (3) misperception can arise from basic task difficulty, even without information constraints or deception.