The article has the main aim of utilizing the literature on “fragment urbanism” and case studies in infrastructure from the global South to question the notion—dear to the World Bank and the IMF—that the global South ought to follow the North’s lead in aiming at “the modern infrastructure ideal,” that is, a series of integrated nation-wide networks. That model suits certain needs—electricity, phone service, perhaps Internet—but it doesn’t always work, even if funding can be found, for many other infrastructure needs. What is often thought of as “informal” solutions may in fact deploy more site-specific and community-specific techniques and tools.

The article also shows that even in the global North’s most advanced capitalist countries, the lack of overall planning and the absence of needs assessments done before choosing which projects will go ahead mean that infrastructure provision and governance is far more fragmented than the “modern” ideal would suggest. The fact that major projects are usually financed separately, often having their own credit rating, encourages a way of non-evidence based planning that is rife for political interference in infrastructure decision-making. The “art of the deal” is in fact the model for infrastructure projects these days, not the ‘seeing like a state’ that characterized many projects in the post-World War II era.

The expansion of EU regulatory governance in the financial sector since the end of the global financial crisis 2008 has given rise to the need to examine regulatory consistency in the volumes of financial regulation that may have cross-cutting implications. In this light, this article examines the effectiveness of the Regulation of ESG infomediaries through the lens of “functional regulatory consistency” with other infomediary regulations, for credit rating agencies and stock market benchmarks. It argues that this lens most aptly reveals the three key weaknesses of the regulatory regime for ESG infomediaries. These relate to sub-optimal coverage of scope, over-inclusiveness in the application of regulatory standards and under-inclusiveness where appropriate governance is not provided. the sub-optimal coverage of scope raises the question of whether ESG stock market index providers should indeed be regulated as ESG infomediaries or as stock market benchmarks more generally falling within the Benchmarks Regulation 2016. Over-inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness in the regulatory provision reflects blind spots in applying functional regulatory consistency, where it is inappropriate due to distinguishing features in business models, market structures or market relations.

How do regulators regulate with metrics? This article offers a rhetorical approach to this question, using early U.S. securities regulation as a case in point, and reliance on credit ratings as empirical illustration. A rhetorical approach challenges economists’ claim that metrics are limited to providing technical guidance to policy formation: the fact is that the role of metrics in regulation can be appreciated only if technical and social aspects are considered together. A rhetorical perspective also fills an important gap in sociological studies of “co-production” that claim that procedural deliberation enhances the legitimacy of regulation but underemphasize the role of quantification when procedural rules are lacking. This article suggests that rhetoric is not suboptimal or irrational but a vital form of deliberation in contexts of uncertainty, when decision-making requires some amount of persuasion outside a procedural context. I observe that metrics can be a powerful vehicle of rhetorical change. Two components of rhetorical metrics are highlighted. First are cognitive clutches, or the capacity to shift prevailing models of attention. Second are actionable arguments, the capacity to embed cognitive deviance into a compelling argument for change. I conclude with reflections on the legacy of rhetorical decisions on current policy debates.