Although movement is largely generated from the primary motor cortex, what movement to make and how to make it is influenced from the entire brain. External influences from the environment come from sensory systems in the posterior part of the brain, and internal influences, such as homeostatic drive and reward, from the anterior part. A movement is voluntary when a person’s consciousness recognizes it to be so because of proper activation of the agency network. Behavioral movement disorders can be understood as dysfunction of these mechanisms. Apraxia and task specific dystonia arise from disruption of parietal–premotor connections. Tics arise from a hyperactive limbic system. Functional movement disorders may also have an origin in abnormal limbic function and are believed to be involuntary due to dysfunction of the agency network. In Parkinson’s disease, bradykinesia comes from insufficient basal ganglia support to the anterior part of the brain.

Chapter 10 analyses nineteenth-century scientific and philosophical debates surrounding hypnotism by way of a close reading of George Du Maurier’s Trilby (1894). Criticism of Trilby has tended to focus on the extraordinary powers of Svengali to seize control of another’s consciousness in order to conduct their preternatural performances. I, however, attend to the intricately constructed physiological and psychological interiority of Trilby O’Ferrall and to the hidden spaces of the mind and body which constitute the complex, multilayered selves with which Du Maurier’s novel is preoccupied. Du Maurier, I argue, conceives of human selfhood in distinctly materialist terms, as a complicated series of caverns and recesses holding experiences and emotions, dreams and memories, latent talents, and the deep impressions of desire, pain, and trauma. His fiction probes the ways in which those depths might be sounded. In the case of Trilby, I argue, this investigation is primarily an acoustic and musical one.

Various areas in psychology are interested in whether specific processes underlying judgments and behavior operate in an automatic or nonautomatic fashion. In social psychology, valuable insights can be gained from evidence on whether and how judgments and behavior under suboptimal processing conditions differ from judgments and behavior under optimal processing conditions. In personality psychology, valuable insights can be gained from individual differences in behavioral tendencies under optimal and suboptimal processing conditions. The current chapter provides a method-focused overview of different features of automaticity (e.g., unintentionality, efficiency, uncontrollability, unconsciousness), how these features can be studied empirically, and pragmatic issues in research on automaticity. Expanding on this overview, the chapter describes the procedures of extant implicit measures and the value of implicit measures for studying automatic processes in judgments and behavior. The chapter concludes with a discussion of pragmatic issues in research using implicit measures.

Chapter 9 considers Victorian practices of mesmerism in the context of ongoing debates in the period as to whether a conscious, rational individual might be made to behave in certain ways through unconscious influences. The fundamental premise of mesmeric practice – the transmission and reception of nervous energy by way of the imponderable vibrations of the magnetic fluid – was, I argue, grounded in acoustics. Sound and music played a critical role in inducing trances and triggering responses, while also providing a potent series of auditory metaphors by which these unusual states of being might be framed and understood. The mesmeric bond between individuals was believed to operate as a form of communication network, which transcended the limitations of the individual body and its sensory capacities, while also pointing to the potential forces and energies that might operate beneath the threshold of human consciousness.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 proclaimed its goal as the creation of ‘new people’: the transformation of human bodies and minds to correspond to the transformation of society. Literature became a space in which this new model of human life could be explored. This chapter traces the genealogy of the ‘new person’ from the nineteenth century to the figure of the ideal worker in Socialist Realist texts of the 1930s and beyond. The temporal focus of the chapter lies in the decade following 1917, when urgent but often contradictory political imperatives shaped the new person in literary texts. The chapter focusses on three key tensions: the relationship between the individual and collective; competing ideals of spontaneous energy and iron discipline; and the ideal of the transformation of body and mind. It shows how texts explore the relationship between abstract ideals of humanness and their lived reality.

Many philosophers who endorse an environmental ethic are uneasy with animal protectionist philosophies. They reject sentientism – the view that sentience is necessary and sufficient for moral considerability – in favor of biocentrism, the view that being alive is necessary and sufficient for moral considerability. It is difficult to characterize both sentience and being alive in ways that are both informative and noncontroversial. Some environmental philosophers reject the individualism of both these views, and embrace instead holistic views that place such entities as ecosystems at the center of moral concern. Deep ecologists go even further, making it difficult to know how to live in accordance with their principles. Such views provide insight, but seem to abandon the fundamental questions of ethics.

The global and historical entanglements between articifial intelligence (AI)/robotic technologies and Buddhism, as a lived religion and philosophical tradition, are significant. This chapter sets out three key sites of interaction between Buddhism and AI/robotics. First, Buddhism, as an ontological model of mind (and body) that describes the conditions for what constitutes artificial life. Second, Buddhism defines the boundaries of moral personhood and thus the nature of interactions between human and non-human actors. And finally, Buddhism can be used as an ethical framework to regulate and direct the development of AI/robotics technologies. It argues that Buddhism provides an approach to technology that is grounded in the interdependence of all things, and this gives rise to both compassion and an ethical commitment to alleviate suffering.

This chapter explores issues for Islam in relation to religious themes arising from developments in artificial intelligence (AI), conceived both as a philosophical and scientific quest to understand human intelligence and as a technological enterprise to instrumentalise it for commercial or political purposes. The monotheistic teachings of Islam are outlined to identify themes in AI that relate to central questions in the Islamic context and to addresses nuances of Islamic belief that differentiate it from the other Abrahamic traditions in consideration of AI. This chapter draws together the existing sparse literature on the subject, including notable applications of AI in Islamic contexts, and draws attention to the role of the Muslim world as a channel and expositor of knowledge between the ancient and modern world in the pre-history of AI. The chapter provides foundations for future scholarship on Islam and AI and a resource for wider scholarship on the religious, societal and cultural significance of AI.

Chapter 4 focuses on illustrating and testing the microlevel pathways that I detail in Chapter 3. I present in-depth interview data with thirty-four Brazilians, which generates the hypothesis and illustrates how exactly education impacts political identity and racial subjectivity. I present firsthand accounts of each pathway of exposure (information, social networks, and the labor market), and show how subjective personal experiences altered racial subjectivities and racialized understandings of power relationships. After illustrating the plausibility of these pathways, I draw on survey data from the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s to systematically test the mechanisms uncovered through inductive research. My analysis shows that the direction of the relationship between education and identification indeed changed over time as public education became more inclusive, and that education correlates positively with racial consciousness and black identification by the 2000s.

What is the threshold that intervenes between one mind and another, across which the act of looking takes place?

This essay addresses this question, in relation to the work of Samuel Beckett, W. G. Sebald and J. M. Coetzee. All three writers are centrally concerned with what I here call the ‘threshold of vision’ – and for all three writers, to think this threshold requires an act of ethical imagination. This is the case for the exchange of any look between one consciousness and another; but for all three writers this exchange becomes particularly charged when it is shared between human and animal. The essay reads the act of looking through this relation between human and nonhuman, to produce a critical account of the politics of shared life, as this exceeds our given taxonomies for imagining consciousness.

This chapter examines how essayistic personae enabled writers and readers to understand personhood as a means of making a unity out of multiplicity. It draws on Thomas Hobbes’s theory of the person to track how essayistic personae both depicted corporate personhood and themselves served as corporate persons, allowing many writers, real or imagined, to write as one. It also uses Locke’s theory of personhood to show how essayistic personae present conscious persons as contingent unities imposed upon multitudinous thoughts and experiences. Essayistic personae not only extended personhood to non-human beings, such as corporations and animals, they also drew attention to the limited nature of personhood for many human beings, including married women and enslaved people.

Technology has served a recurrent role as a utopian imaginary for speculative fiction writers and consumers. As a utopian promise, technology appears to provide individuals, communities, and whole societies with the means to overcome nature – whether it is base human natures, relationships with one’s environment, or the perceived limitations of one’s body. This chapter focuses on two similar technological fantasies, James Cameron’s Terminator films and Martha Wells’ Murderbot series. In both series, central figures – namely the T-800 played by Arnold Schwarzenegger and Murderbot – approximate being human but are limited by their technological being. Yet, in being not-fully-human, they expose how technology always serves as a false utopian promise: there is no way out of our humanness through technology. In this way, technological fantasies serve as a form of horror, at once tempting readers with possibilities, but revealing those possibilities to be empty – or malignant.

The aim of this chapter is to establish that children are owed a sense of their own interiority. The chapter argues that although the literature on philosophy of childhood constitutes an advance on the deficit model of childhood insofar as it supports children’s rights and childhood goods, it risks reifying adult-child relations by continuing to essentialize childhood. While Gareth B. Matthews’ theory of development as socially and linguistically mediated begins to shift the focus toward the child’s own inner life, it falls short insofar as it fails to challenge the fact/value dichotomy. Drawing upon Iris Murdoch’s philosophy, the chapter concludes that a rejection of this dichotomy is in fact necessary for developing the notion of a morally inflected consciousness that is as available to children as it is adults.

Recent decades have seen a considerable renaissance of scienti?c interest in the study of human consciousness. For the purposes of descriptive clinical psychopathology, consciousness can be simply de?ned as a state of awareness of the self and the environment. Disorders of consciousness are associated with disorders of perception, attention, attitudes, thinking, registration, and orientation. Consciousness can be changed in three basic ways: it may be dream-like, depressed, or restricted. This chapter outlines these different types of disturbance of consciousness, including delirium, twilight states, and dissociative fugue, among other conditions. The chapter concludes with suggested questions for eliciting specific symptoms in clinical practice, in addition to standard history-taking and mental state examination.