We investigate the Baron-Ferejohn (The American Political Science Review 83(4): 1181–1206, 1989) model of legislative bargaining with cheap talk between the designated proposer and potential coalition partners. Communication results in substantially increased proposer power close to the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium prediction. This is achieved primarily through voters competing with each other to get the proposer to include them in the winning coalition, while arguing for a zero allocation for redundant voters. Voters typically follow through on their stated reservation shares, but proposers often fail to partner with voters making excessively low offers, as these are more likely to be reneged on.

In large, impersonal moral orders many of us wish to maintain good will toward our fellow citizens only if we are reasonably sure they will maintain good will toward us. The mutual maintaining of good will, then, requires that we somehow communicate our intentions to one another. But how do we actually do this? The current paper argues that when we engage in moral responsibility practices—that is, when we express our reactive attitudes by blaming, praising, and resenting—we communicate a desire to maintain good will to those in the community we are imbedded in. Participating in such practices alone will not get the job done, though, for expressions of our reactive attitudes are often what economists call cheap talk. But when we praise and blame in cases of moral diversity, expressions of our reactive attitudes act as costly signals capable of solving our social dilemma.

We compare two approaches to mitigating hypothetical bias. The study design includes three treatments: an actual payment treatment, a contingent valuation (CV) treatment with a follow-up certainty question, and a CV treatment with a cheap talk script. Our results suggest that both the follow-up certainty treatment and the cheap talk treatment produce willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates consistent with the actual payment treatment. However, the follow-up certainty treatment provides response distributions at all offer amounts that are statistically similar to the actual payment treatment, while the cheap talk treatment provides similar responses only at some offer amounts. Furthermore, the cheap talk treatment is effective only for inexperienced individuals. We conclude that the follow-up certainty approach is more consistent than the cheap talk approach for eliminating hypothetical bias.