We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
This essay is a write-up of my Professorial Inaugural Lecture, delivered at the London School of Economics on 9 December 2024. Herein, I describe how I became involved and have helped develop the field of behavioural public policy (BPP). I detail how the intellectual architecture of BPP – its journal, Annual International Conference and Association – came into existence, and allude to my hopes for how the field might develop as we go forward.
In institutional design, public policy and for society as a whole, securing freedom of choice for individuals is important. But how much choice should we aim for? Various theorists argue that above some level more choice improves neither wellbeing nor autonomy. Worse still, psychology research seems to suggest that too much choice even makes us worse off. Such reasons suggest the Sufficiency View: increasing choice is only important up to some sufficiency level, a level that is not too far from the level enjoyed by well-off citizens in rich liberal countries today. I argue that we should reject the Sufficiency View and accept Liberal Optimism instead: expanding freedom of choice should remain an important priority even far beyond levels enjoyed in rich liberal countries today. I argue that none of the arguments given for the Sufficiency View work. Neither psychological evidence nor any broader social trends support it. If anything, they support Liberal Optimism instead. I also show why further increases are possible and desirable, and sketch some implications for debates around immigration, economic growth, markets and the value of community.
“Militant Neoclassicism” argues that W. E. B. Du Bois marshaled post-Kantian aesthetics against the anthropological categories posited by Enlightenment theorists. The chapter departs from the traditional interpretation of Du Bois as a champion of integration, which relies heavily on The Souls of Black Folk at the expense of Du Bois’s later Marxism. This interpretation downplays his controversial advocacy for the self-segregation of African-American communities, which sought to capitalize on intra-group solidarity in order to rectify class conflict. The chapter argues that these collectives, spheres of free action carved out from predominately white social structures, evince the aesthetic autonomy theorized by Friedrich Schiller, whom Du Bois admired and quotes in Souls. Attending to aesthetic autonomy also reveals new connections between Du Bois and cultural anthropology, especially the work of Ruth Benedict, who advanced aesthetic arguments about anthropological communities that distinguished themselves from a dominant social milieu.
This chapter covers the common ethical and legal issues that arise in psychiatry. It begins with an overview of the four ethical principles guiding medical practice: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. A brief discussion of parens patriae and police power follow, highlighting their particular applications in psychiatry. The chapter then goes on to illustrate how the balancing of these principles guides everyday ethical and legal issues. Confidentiality and its exceptions in the interests of safety and prevention of abuse/neglect are covered in detail. Next, informed consent and decision-making are explored. The requirements for informed consent are reviewed, leading into a discussion of those instances when an individual lacks capacity for informed consent (surrogate decision-making, involuntary admission and treatment, and exceptions). Finally, the chapter closes with an examination of the prohibitions against dual relationships, including sexual relationships, with patients.
John Hoffmann argues that a combination of aesthetics and anthropology allowed modernist writers to challenge social hierarchies they associated with the nineteenth century. He shows how Enlightenment philosophers synthesized the two discourses and how modernists working in the early twentieth century then took up this synthesis to dispute categories of social difference that had been naturalized, and thus legitimized, by pre-evolutionary and Darwinian anthropological theories. The book brings a range of new insights to major topics in modernist studies, revealing neglected continental sources for Irish anti-colonialism, the aesthetic contours of Zionism in the era of Mandatory Palestine, and the influence of German idealism on critiques of racism following World War I. Working over a long historical durée, Hoffmann surveys the ways aesthetics has been used, and misused, to construct and contest social hierarchies grounded in anthropological distinctions.
This chapter argues that it is ethical to buy sweatshop products. It explains why arguments to the contrary made in the business ethics literature fail, why sweatshops are not wrongfully exploitative, and why it is better to benefit workers a little bit rather than not at all. It also considers how background injustices impact the ethics of sweatshop employment, and finally reviews issues of worker autonomy and goals other than the welfare of sweatshop workers.
In a departure from standard approaches to the concept of liberty, in this book John Christman locates and defends the concept of freedom as a fundamental social value that arose out of fights against slavery and oppression. Seen in this light, liberty must be understood as requiring more than mere non-interference or non-domination – it requires the capacity for self-government and the capabilities needed to pursue valued activities, practices, and ways of life. Christman analyses the emergence of freedom as a concept through nineteenth- and twentieth-century struggles against slavery and other oppressive social forms, and argues that a specifically positive conception best reflects its origins and is philosophically defensible in its own right. What results is a model of freedom that captures its fundamental value both as central to the theoretical architecture of constitutional democracies and as an aspiration for those striving for liberation.
This chapter discusses social-cognitive domain theory (SCDT) as a theoretical lens for studying parental monitoring and adolescents’ information management. Theoretical concepts are presented, social cognitive domains are defined, and research applying SCDT to parenting and adolescent information management is reviewed. Research on various beliefs (parental authority legitimacy, parents’ right to know about adolescents’ behaviors, adolescents’ obligations to disclose to and obey parents) and adolescents’ reasons for disclosing and concealing information are discussed and related to adolescents’ disclosure and nondisclosure. Distinctions are drawn between issues that are legitimately regulated by parents (i.e. moral, conventional, prudential issues) and those viewed as personal prerogatives and essential to autonomy and identity development. Developmental changes, cultural variations, and parent-adolescent discrepancies in beliefs are discussed, and explanations are considered for observed discrepancies between youth’s beliefs about obligations to disclose their risky behaviors and involvement in those behaviors. The chapter concludes with directions for future research.
Although debate has long raged about how to understand the emergence of modern industrial society, it has generally been agreed until recently that Europe’s (and especially Britain’s) pioneering role was enabled by certain distinctive features of its history, economy, or society. Today, however, certain scholars deny this, arguing that other societies had reached a level of development from which a transition similar to Britain’s could have emerged, and that the special trajectory Britain followed was enabled only by accidental or incidental factors or circumstances. The two proposed candidates are China and India, and this chapter takes up and seeks to refute the claims made in regard to each, in the process developing comparisons that show the utility of the categories of autonomy and teleocracy employed throughout this book for the history of industry. The impressive achievements of both countries are acknowledged and described, but growth and sophistication are shown to be insufficient without the structural features that made British society the special case it was.
In adolescence, an important challenge for parents is to keep track of their adolescents’ behaviors and to create conditions in which adolescents disclose relevant information about themselves. According to Self-Determination Theory (SDT), dynamics of autonomy play a central role in both the effectiveness of parental monitoring and adolescents’ willingness to disclose toward parents. This chapter provides a review of SDT-based studies on parental monitoring and adolescent disclosure. This research begins to show that, whereas autonomy-supportive communication increases the potential benefits associated with parental monitoring, controlling communication of monitoring is rather counterproductive. Further, adolescents disclose more often toward parents and do so more willingly when parents are perceived as autonomy supportive (rather than controlling). In conversations about unfamiliar topics, adolescents additionally benefit from parental support for competence (i.e. guidance). Studies also highlight adolescents’ agency in the dynamics of monitoring and disclosure. Implications for practice and directions for future research are discussed.
Marx summed up Europe’s many impacts on world history as showing “what human activity can bring about” – namely, the capacity to undo and remake the human world. Although we have become increasingly aware of the negative side of this release of human energies, in war, ecological destruction, and imperial domination, the positive one survives in the closer contact between peoples, modern industry’s potential to reduce poverty, and the expansion of practical knowledge and scientific understanding. Remaking the World argues that what put Europe at the center of these changes was first the division and fragmentation that persisted through much of its history and then the emergence of spheres of activity that were autonomous in the sense of regulating themselves by principles derived from the activities carried on within them, as opposed to “teleocratic” domains governed by norms that were generated outside themselves. Unlike other attempts to grasp European distinctiveness which focus chiefly on economics and industry, it gives equal attention to culture, science, and the politics of liberty, and makes comparisons based on substantial discussions of counterparts to these developments elsewhere.
Although lying is frequently associated with problem behaviors, recent research also suggests that lying to parents is part of a normative developmental process that serves important functions for the growth and maintenance of adolescent autonomy and reflects complex and mature moral reasoning. This chapter examines adolescent lie-telling as an information management strategy and a form of everyday resistance that adolescents engage in as they strive for autonomy and increased independence in their relationships with parents. Connections between adolescent lie-telling and the development of their autonomy and moral evaluations are considered in detail. The chapter examines adolescent lying as a concealment strategy and situates lying among other information management techniques discussed in this volume. Literature on the developmental trajectory of lying is discussed, with an eye toward the changing alchemy of the adolescent–-parent relationship as children enter and move through adolescence.
Balancing individual autonomy and collective action is crucial in promoting dignity in participatory policy processes, particularly within urban policymaking. This chapter presents a case study of Lancaster City Council’s efforts to redesign the deteriorating “Mainway” housing estate, home to approximately 500 diverse inhabitants, within a dignified, inclusive framework. The project required devising a participatory process that effectively solicited input from all community members, including both regular meeting attendees and those sceptical of authority or unable to leave their flats due to health concerns. Amidst these complexities and COVID-19 restrictions, the My Mainway initiative was born. This ongoing initiative aims to transform the challenged estate through a £35 million urban regeneration project. Using a dignity-focused legal design framework, we examine how such an intricate process can facilitate dignified participation, ensuring a fair, respectful platform and offering advocacy for the seldom heard in community decisions.
This article examines the evolution of bioethics over the past four decades since the publication of John Harris’ seminal work, “The Value of Life” (1985). It argues that while the core principles articulated by Harris remain relevant, bioethics has undergone significant transformation across four key domains. First, the expanding frontiers of biotechnology have necessitated engagement with complex issues beyond individual clinical ethics. Second, there has been a widening of the circle of moral concern to encompass nonhuman animals, disability rights, and global health equity. Third, bioethics has become increasingly entangled with public policy and governance. Finally, the field has seen substantial academic proliferation and institutionalization. These developments have pushed bioethics to adapt its frameworks and methodologies while maintaining fidelity to foundational principles. This article concludes by considering the future challenges and opportunities for bioethics in an increasingly complex technological and social landscape.
Living systems are complex systems made of components that tend to degrade, but nonetheless they maintain themselves far from equilibrium. This requires living systems to extract energy and materials from the environment and use them to build and repair their parts by regulating their activities based on their internal and external conditions in ways that allow them to keep living. The philosophical and theoretical approach discussed in this Element aims to explain these features of biological systems by appealing to their organization. It addresses classical and more recent issues in philosophy of biology, fromorigins and definitions of life to biological teleology and functions, from an original perspective mainly focused on the living system, its physiology and behavior, rather than evolution. It discusses and revises the conceptual foundations of this approach and presents an updated version of it. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
It is often morally important that you have a choice between two options in the sense that each option is available to you and you are not coerced into choosing one or the other. Even when you have a choice, though, the presence of time constraints and other noncoercive influences can prevent you from taking the time you need to make up your mind and really choose for yourself. How are we to understand this latter phenomenon? In this essay, I argue that while choosing for yourself seems, at first glance, to be an exercise in discovering your preferences, this is not the whole story. At least sometimes, choosing for yourself instead involves creating your preferences—and, in so doing, choosing what kind of person and valuer to be—through the exercise of what I call formative autonomy. I then explore some objections to this account and some implications for public health policy and clinical ethics. Throughout, I draw primarily on examples that involve choosing whether to continue or terminate a pregnancy and the regulations governing such choices.
It is widely believed that health policy should take care to ensure that persons are informed about the expected risks as well as the anticipated advantages of medical procedures. This is often justified by a concern for the moral value of personal autonomy, as it is widely believed that to the extent that a person makes decisions on the basis of false beliefs or ignorance her autonomy with respect to them is compromised. This essay argues against this widespread claim. A person’s autonomy with respect to her decisions will not be compromised by either ignorance or false beliefs. However, it does not follow that there is no reason to provide persons with the opportunity to have access to the available information relevant to their decisions concerning their medical treatment. The epistemic requirements for a person to give her consent to her treatment are more stringent than those that must be met for her to be autonomous with respect to her consent. Consent, not autonomy, can be undermined by ignorance or false belief. It is a concern for consent, not a concern for autonomy, that justifies providing people with information about their prospective medical procedures.
Balancing autonomy and beneficence remains an ongoing challenge in the ethical treatment of patients with schizophrenia and other psychiatric disorders of thought. Psychiatric advance directives (PADs) offer one mechanism through which individuals can guide their own care, but unlike medical advance directives, they are not widely utilized in the United States. They are also highly limited by state law in the scope of their legal authority. This article explores the evidentiary basis for PADs as well as the legal and ethical issues that arise in the use of PADs in individuals with schizophrenia, arguing that providers’ fears of complete opt-out from care by patients are likely unfounded and that PADs offer a powerful tool through which individuals with schizophrenia can ensure meaningful consideration of their own values and goals.
This chapter charts the processes by which deceptive sex came to be regarded as potentially constituting rape. Through tracing these developments, the chapter shows how doctrinal features of the law, such as the way consent and deception are thought to be related and the modes of deception punished by law, were important to this process. Yet the chapter also argues that to fully appreciate how and why the changes occurred, it is necessary to pay attention to the array of interests the law has sought to protect and how these have shaped the range of topics of deception that might ground a charge of rape. This argument leads to the conclusion that, in the context of deceptive sex, deception has not been considered wrongful because it invalidates or precludes consent, as is commonly thought; rather, deception has invalidated or precluded consent because it has sometimes been considered wrongful. The chapter ends by introducing some reasons why this insight is important to ongoing debates regarding the criminalisation of deceptive sex.