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Over the years, the US has intervened covertly in many countries to remove dictators, subvert elected leaders, and support coups. Explanations for this focus on characteristics of target countries or strategic incentives to pursue regime change. This Element provides an account of domestic political factors constraining US presidents' authorization of covert foreign-imposed regime change operations (FIRCs), arguing that congressional attention to covert action alters the Executive's calculus by increasing the political costs associated with this secretive policy instrument. It shows that congressional attention is the result of institutional battles over abuses of executive authority and has a significant constraining effect independent of codified rules and partisan disputes. These propositions are tested using content analysis of the Congressional Record, statistical analysis of Cold War covert FIRCs, and causal-process evidence relating to covert interventions in Chile, Angola, Central America, Afghanistan, etc.
In this article, we analyse the implications of the end of the Cold War for US non-proliferation policy and the non-proliferation regime. Contrary to widely held expectations, we show that the end of bipolarity did not undercut the pursuit of non-proliferation but supercharge it. While bipolarity had afforded non-proliferation hold-outs opportunities to evade superpower pressure, the structural condition of unipolarity both incentivised and enabled the United States to pursue a more robust non-proliferation policy than before. Against the view that contemporary unipolar power is severely circumscribed by the need to make compromises and adhere to social norms, unipolarity allowed the United States to entrench a regime that was widely considered unjust. We support this argument with an analysis of non-proliferation dynamics in the early 1990s, focusing in particular on the process that culminated with the indefinite extension of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995.
Shifting the focus from land to sea when considering the Cold War in East Asia, Kuan-Jen Chen sheds light on the importance of the 'oceanic' lens as a structural imperative in grand strategic thinking. Despite extensive scholarship on postwar US-East Asia relations, questions about the relationship between maritime space, national sovereignty, and geopolitics have not been fully explored. Drawing on archives in Chinese, English, and Japanese, Chen uses the western Pacific as a historical platform, illustrating the relationship between the geopolitical value of the sea and the strategic deliberations of American and East-Asian decision making. The recent deterioration of US-China relations has turned maritime East Asia into a powder keg, with no country in the region able to remain neutral. By anchoring today's maritime East Asia in the past, this book traces the evolution of historical factors that led to the current status quo in the western Pacific, and shows the origins of controversial issues in the region.
Nominally, the policy of the United States towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan is governed by the ‘One China’ Policy (OCP). However, the conditions under which OCP was originally formulated have long since given way to substantial growth in the economic and military power of the PRC and the democratisation of Taiwan. These changes raise several questions regarding the viability and applicability of OCP. Drawing on securitisation theory, this article examines discourses across three US presidential administrations to assess the trajectory of socio-political constructions of the PRC, Taiwan, and OCP. Three case studies suggest substantial challenges for OCP as a basis for maintaining desecuritised relations between the United States and the PRC. While discourses of ‘engagement’ prominent in the 1990s have lost ground, with presidential administrations increasingly but inconsistently drawing on OCP, in Congress OCP plays no role, while Taiwan is increasingly constructed as akin to the American self, serving as an identity proxy that highlights the otherness of the PRC. Polling supports the idea that OCP is not rooted in general American understandings of the region and consequently cannot serve to ground policy in a crisis.
This chapter examines how oil wealth has fueled authoritarian resilience – dictatorship without significant outbreaks of civil war – in oil producers (petrostates) exposed to Muslim conquest. While the chapter’s analysis corroborates existing research that oil rents can hurt democracy, it makes four original contributions relevant for understanding why oil wealth has engendered authoritarian resilience in conquest petrostates. First, it identifies a tension in existing scholarship: the negative relationship between oil wealth and democracy but positive relationship between oil wealth and civil war, particularly in dictatorships. Second, this clarification is important in understanding why greater oil wealth in conquest petrostates has hurt democracy but has not fostered civil war. Third, the chapter introduces a new type of rent that is intricately tied to oil production in many conquest petrostates. The chapter argues that an implied security guarantee from the United States government has comprised an additional geopolitical rent which has augmented the military capacity of conquest petrostates to thwart insurgency. Finally, the chapter that oil wealth has not hindered a trajectory towards greater democracy in non-conquest petrostates.
This chapter illustrates the forms and dynamics of contractual hybridity in American wars using the case of Blackwater. Blackwater’s contractual hybridity was visible in its formal contracts with public funding. Contractual relations created power payoffs by deploying a contractor force for American wars and raised Weberian legitimacy dilemmas from limited contractor oversight and distributed accountability. Security contractors also disturb civilmilitary relations by posing as “civilian combatants” or “unlawful combatants,” depending on the preferred definition under international law. The chapter also follows bureaucratic debates on defining "inherently governmental functions" given contracting, which reveal the effort it takes to balance Idealized and Lived Sovereignty. By being attentive to formalized and publicized hybrid relations, the chapter thus wrestles with unique problems in sovereign governance that challenge the legitimacy of a sovereign authority that contracts itself.
What is the essence of group decision-making? How does group dynamics affect policy outcomes? This chapter contributes to foreign policy analysis and national security decision-making by advancing a comparative group dynamic perspective. Specifically, we examine three models of group decision-making: Groupthink, Polythink, and Con-Div, and apply each model to the Kennedy administration’s decision to impose a naval blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis. We claim that applying different group decision-making models to real-world cases presents a new way of explaining governmental decisions. Based on our comparative analysis of the three models, we find that the Con-Div model performs best in explaining the naval blockade decision.
What will be the contours of the “post-post-Cold War” world? This chapter takes up that question by examining the defining international and domestic characteristics of this new age and assessing their similarities with previous eras. We begin by identifying three defining attributes of the Cold War: ideological clash, limited economic exchange, and nuclear arms racing between the American and Soviet-led blocs. Next, we explore the central feature of the post-Cold War era - namely, American primacy. We then examine the trends that have eroded primacy's material underpinnings and produced new domestic and International conditions — global power shifts, technological change, and sociopolitical fragmentation -- then project forward how those trends are likely to evolve over the next ten to fifteen years. Finally, we examine the extent to which those trends are distinct from, or continuous with, the conditions facing the United States during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, and find that some important continuities remain even as meaningful discontinuities will disrupt existing patterns of international order. The chapter concludes by arguing that the post-post-Cold War world requires a new strategic approach for the United States — one guided by a principle of openness, rather than Cold War-style containment or post-Cold War-style liberal universalism.
Now that more than thirty years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, it is clear that, while some borders have disappeared, new fronts have appeared as well. And, rather than a “new world order,” a familiar antagonism between Russia and the West is once again asserting itself. Among the central points of dispute is the question of whether the West offered Moscow assurances in 1989-90 in the form of a NATO non-expansion guarantee. Diverging interpretations of this crucial development continue to hinder international understanding and dialogue. In this chapter, Sarotte draws on elements of her historical research into archives in six countries to present evidence on what actually transpired, and to discuss the following questions: To what extent do current challenges for European security policy still have roots in the decisions and commitments of the powers involved in the process of German reunification thirty years ago? How did the Clinton administration come to support full Article 5 NATO enlargement rather than NATO’s Partnership for Peace? And what can we learn from those events to address the challenges of today?
Scholarship on human rights diplomacy (HRD)—efforts by government officials to engage publicly and privately with their foreign counterparts—often focuses on actions taken to “name and shame” target countries because private diplomatic activities are unobservable. To understand how HRD works in practice, we explore a campaign coordinated by the US government to free twenty female political prisoners. We compare release rates of the featured women to two comparable groups: a longer list of women considered by the State Department for the campaign; and other women imprisoned simultaneously in countries targeted by the campaign. Both approaches suggest that the campaign was highly effective. We consider two possible mechanisms through which expressive public HRD works: by imposing reputational costs and by mobilizing foreign actors. However, in-depth interviews with US officials and an analysis of media coverage find little evidence of these mechanisms. Instead, we argue that public pressure resolved deadlock within the foreign policy bureaucracy, enabling private diplomacy and specific inducements to secure the release of political prisoners. Entrepreneurial bureaucrats leveraged the spotlight on human rights abuses to overcome competing equities that prevent government-led coercive diplomacy on these issues. Our research highlights the importance of understanding the intersection of public and private diplomacy before drawing inferences about the effectiveness of HRD.
Julia Lee identifies temporal, spatial, and affective innovation in 21st century transpacific fiction. Locating formally innovative contemporary Asian American writing in the post-1965 contexts of migration, global economies of labor, environmental anxiety, language difference, and racialized violence, Lee shows how writers have represented new technologies of immediate communication across oceanic flows of migrants, commodities, information, and waste in disjointed, parallel, and non-sequential narrative structures. Childhood trauma lingers across time and geography in a story about a Filipino nurse by Mia Alvar, while novels by Min Jin Lee, Ruth Ozeki, and Thi Bui layer Asian and American modernities, postmodernities, and contemporary present-tenses.
Since its formation, the GATT/WTO system has facilitated a worldwide reduction of trade barriers. We return to a founding moment of the regime, the GATT 1947 (GATT47), and look closely at the liberalization process, analyzing exactly what concessions were granted to whom and in return for what. With these data, we evaluate three prominent explanations for the operation of the early GATT. First, we ask whether or not US negotiators granted asymmetric access to the US market to spur post-war recovery. Second, we look at how the rules adopted in GATT47 balanced the interests of import sensitive producers with those of the more nascent exporter interests. Third, we examine specific US concessions and ask whether or not the US used the domestic market to either increase the productive capacity of nations damaged during the war and/or to bolster unstable regimes. Our most general finding is that the US, at least in this first Round of the trade regime, was less a liberal warrior and more a seeker of stability, and that tariff setting was significantly constrained by the institutions governing global tariff negotiations.
This chapter analyzes a symbolic politics of 1980shuman rights discourses by focusing on the place Poland and Chile had in global debates on human rights. In particular, it shows how these two countries featured in three different debates: First, the chapter reconstructs debates at the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1982 to show how the Reagan administration tried to turn the situation in Poland, where martial law had been imposed in 1981, into a symbolic counterweight to Chile, a country that had come to encapsulate the human rights discourse of actors and movements critical of US policies in Latin America. Second, this chapter shows how Polish and Chilean activists themselves struck an alliance to increase the international salience of their causes and thus mobilize international support. Third, this chapter shows how these debates on human rights in Poland and Chile intersected with US debates about neoliberal economic policies.
This chapter focuses on the strong support Poland’s Solidarity movement received from the USA’s largest trade union, the AFL-CIO. At least partly, this chapter shows, the AFL-CIO’s strong advocacy for Solidarity has to be seen within US political debates triggered by the election of Ronald Reagan. In Reagan’s rhetoric, Communist totalitarianism came to denote only the most extreme form of the general threat of the modern state to silently encroach on the lives of individuals. Even as he revived the ideological Cold War, Reagan went on to reshape the social imagery underpinning it – a change that entailed curbing the power of organized labor. Against this background, Solidarity fascinated the AFL-CIO not primarily as an anti-Communist movement, but as a trade union. As Reagan reduced the influence of trade unions, the AFL-CIO invoked Solidarity to argue that it was not human rights as such that expressed the difference between East and West, but a particular human right – freedom of association. In the United States, the chapter demonstrates, Solidarity became a contested icon in a political and intellectual struggle initiated not by different foreign policy aims – in this field, the AFL-CIO agreed with Reagan – but by a reconfiguration of the normative and conceptual world of US politics.
While it is widely accepted that foreign relations law determines the domestic competences for international treaty-making and the place and status of international law in the respective domestic systems, the more informal and contextual influence of foreign relations law on international treaty making is understudied. With reference to the US position on the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, I argue that domestic foreign relations law at times shapes the negotiation process by limiting possible outcomes. At the same time domestic foreign relations law might be used as a bargaining tool to push other states to sign onto a particular negotiating position. Even though foreign relations law can unfold this power only under very specific circumstances, the example demonstrates potential effects of domestic constitutional design for the international legal system.
This article examines extradition in nineteenth-century Ottoman diplomacy by exploring an illustrative legal conflict between the Ottoman Empire and the United States. The Kelly affair, which revolved around the murder of an Ottoman subject by an American sailor in Smyrna (Izmir) in 1877, sparked a diplomatic dispute that lasted for several decades. The controversy stemmed from conflicting interpretations of the treaty of commerce signed in 1830. The inability to reach a consensus pushed the parties to resort to the 1874 Extradition Treaty, which was the only official Ottoman extradition agreement. The Kelly affair poignantly illustrates how extradition, an issue of international law that touched on territorial jurisdiction and subjecthood, was a complicated and ill-defined matter when addressed in practice. By investigating the confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and the USA, both putative secondary powers on the international stage at the time, this article challenges the existing historical narratives on interimperial relations that highlight Europe as the locus of power and agency. Even though ad hoc political actions overshadowed the binding force of the treaty text, it demonstrates how both governments adopted a political strategy that moved beyond the intrinsic arguments and logic of the capitulations to embrace a novel legal discourse.
A common explanation for the increasing polarization in contemporary American foreign policy is the absence of external threat. I identify two mechanisms through which threats could reduce polarization: by revealing information about an adversary that elicits a bipartisan response from policymakers (information mechanism) and by heightening the salience of national relative to partisan identity (identity mechanism). To evaluate the information mechanism, study 1 uses computational text analysis of congressional speeches to explore whether security threats reduce partisanship in attitudes toward foreign adversaries. To evaluate the identity mechanism, study 2 uses public opinion polls to assess whether threats reduce affective polarization among the public. Study 3 tests both mechanisms in a survey experiment that heightens a security threat from China. I find that the external threat hypothesis has limited ability to explain either polarization in US foreign policy or affective polarization among the American public. Instead, responses to external threats reflect the domestic political environment in which they are introduced. The findings cast doubt on predictions that new foreign threats will inherently create partisan unity.
This paper probes the attempt to use power analysis to link three domains: ontology, explanation, and the strategy of political actors. It shows how Katzenstein and Seybert develop an open social ontology that serves as the backdrop for explanations that need to be causal but indeterminate, and a cautious political practice. It exposes tensions in two important links. First, the open ontology becomes retranslated as an explanatory cause. Second, the call for being cautious because of ‘unknown unknowns’ may just as well invite strategies of doubling down in control power.
Chapter 1 offers a survey of human rights concerns in American foreign relations in the 1980s. First, it traces the human rights breakthrough in US foreign policy during the 1970s, emphasizing the important role individual members of Congress played in this development. The chapter notes the varied motivations behind congressional human rights activism and the selective adoption of human rights concerns. The chapter then examines the role of human rights in the 1980 presidential election between Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, noting the candidates’ different visions for human rights concerns in US foreign policy. Aside from putting Reagan in the White House, the 1980 election also altered the composition of Congress, with Republicans winning control of the Senate. The chapter explores the implications this new political landscape had for congressional attention to human rights and summarizes the measures members of Congress employed to address human rights issues. Surveying American attention to human rights in the 1980s, the chapter examines liberal and conservative visions of human rights. Finally, the chapter situates human rights concerns within the context of other expressions of morality in American foreign relations.
This chapter explores the effects of the Trump presidency in human rights foreign policy. Taking into account the mixed character of U.S. foreign policy in previous decades, it provides a measured account of how the populist rhetoric of “America First” was translated into concrete actions, initially under Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and more intensely under National Security Adviser John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The disorganization of the administration has left room for career officers to implement a relatively traditional human rights policy in some areas. The Trump administration has departed most significantly from past administrations in declining to embrace the core principles on which human rights policy is based. Its support of strongmen because of – not in spite of – their authoritarian qualities may leave its most distinct (and damaging) human rights legacy.