In the digital age, the landscape of information dissemination has undergone a profound transformation. The traditional boundaries between information and news have become increasingly blurred as technology allows anyone to create and share content online. The once-excusive realm of authoritative media outlets and professional journalists has given way to a decentralized public square, where individuals can voice their opinions and reach vast audiences regardless of mainstream coverage. The evolution of the digital age has dismantled the conventional notions of journalism and reshaped how news is obtained and interpreted. This shift has paved the way for the proliferation of fake news and online disinformation. The ease with which false information can be fabricated, packaged convincingly and rapidly disseminated to a wide audience has contributed to the rise of fake news. This phenomenon gained global attention during the 2016 US presidential election, prompting nations worldwide to seek strategies for tackling this issue.

This chapter provides a history of sweatshops during the industrial revolution in the United States and Great Britain and explains how higher wages and better conditions were eventually attained. It then looks at the postwar East Asian economies that had sweatshops and that developed more rapidly than Great Britain and the United States did. Finally, the chapter looks at how economic development has taken place over the last two decades in countries that had sweatshops identified in the first edition of this book and how sweatshop wages have improved.

Without enhancing their innovation capabilities, latecomer countries will be subject to the middle-income trap, and global inequality will not be reduced. This chapter thus discusses the roles of diverse forms of intellectual property rights (IPR) in promoting innovation among latecomers. It argues, first, that utility model or petit patents can be a useful form of IPR for recognizing and encouraging innovation by latecomers in their earlier stage of development, and, secondly, that latecomer firms in sectors involving tacit knowledge can rely on trademarks, rather than regular patents, as the main forms of IPR in their innovation and growth pathways. This chapter further discusses the negative impacts of strong IPR protection in Northern economies on the exports by Southern or catch-up economies to Northern markets. As a means to overcome this barrier, the chapter discusses the role of leapfrogging strategy, where latecomers pursue different technological trajectories from those of incumbent countries.

This chapter presents case studies from ten countries: Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, South Africa, South Korea, and Spain. These cases show that many world leaders believe that nuclear latency provides greater international influence.

When compared to previous administrations, did South Korean public opinion of the US change during the Donald Trump presidency? During an unusual and sometimes tumultuous four years, President Trump questioned the value of America’s alliance system, specifically the South Korea–US alliance, and agitated against the liberal international order and democratic rule itself. However, Trump also pursued summit diplomacy with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, enabling South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s pro-engagement policy with Pyongyang. It stands to reason that South Koreans took notice, but what did they think of these significant and sometimes contradictory moves? Using a longitudinal dataset constructed with data from the Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Surveys, this chapter assesses South Koreans’ opinions toward the United States and President Donald Trump within the context of the last two decades. Specific focus is given to changes in opinion during the Trump administration and attitudes toward Trump-specific policies, especially his North Korea policy. This analysis finds that South Koreans’ views of the US, which remained positive and significantly higher than those of most other regional actors, were held separate from views of Donald Trump, which were negative but not consistently so and especially not for some groups (such as conservatives).

This chapter offers a brief overview of US relations with the Korean Peninsula from the late nineteenth century through the Trump administration to provide a historical framework for understanding the chapters that follow. While laying out this framework, this chapter also advances the argument that the policies of the Trump administration toward the Korean Peninsula were not the dramatic breaks with the past the administration often claimed they were. President Trump was hardly the first American president to be skeptical of the US alliance with the ROK and attempt to change it – though the bluntness with which he did this was unprecedented. While Trump’s three meetings with Kim Jong-un could rightly be called historic in a narrow sense, there is ample evidence they were just the latest installment of what some scholars refer to as “entrepreneurial diplomacy” with the DPRK. In the broader historical context of US relations with the Korean Peninsula, President Trump’s policies toward the ROK and the DPRK appear more as variations on a theme than dramatic breaks with the past.

This chapter examines major events in US–China–North Korea triangular relations before and during the Trump years and considers Trump’s legacy and the outlook for the Biden administration. It concludes that the US under Trump failed to decouple US–China relations from US–North Korea relations in its policymaking and considers US–China relations on its own terms.

Korea’s public diplomacy vis-à-vis the US is the centerpiece of the country’s overall public diplomacy policy, with an emphasis on influencing the policy elites in Washington, DC, primarily through think tank-centric activities. This chapter explores Korea’s public diplomacy strategy vis-à-vis the US with an emphasis on the “policy public diplomacy” that was introduced in 2016 – coinciding mostly with the presidencies of Moon Jae-in in Seoul and Donald Trump in Washington, DC. At the policy elite level, the main objective of Korean public diplomacy in the US has been to generate support for Korea’s foreign policies, including in inter-Korean relations; and at the grassroots level, creating more favorability among the general American public. The former is more based on agenda-setting and framing Korean Peninsula-related issues and Korea’s increasing role in global governance. The latter is more diffuse and attempts to increase the country’s visibility and improve its brand value. In this time period, Korean public diplomacy has become partisan for the first time due to dividing nature of emphasis on inter-Korean relations in policy public diplomacy in the US.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) seeks to end impunity for the world’s worst crimes to contribute to their prevention. But what is its impact to date? This book takes an in-depth look at four countries under scrutiny of the ICC: Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, and Uganda. It puts forward an analytical framework to assess the impact of the ICC on four levels: on domestic legal systems (systemic effect); on peace negotiations and agreements (transformative effect); on victims (reparative effect); and on the perceptions of affected populations (demonstration effect). It concludes that the ICC is having a normative impact on domestic legal systems and peace agreements, but it has brought little reparative justice for victims, and it does not necessarily correspond with how affected populations view justice priorities. The book concludes that justice for the world’s worst crimes has no “universal formula” that can easily be captured in the law of the ICC.

This chapter examines the US approach to North Korean human rights issues since the 1980s and argues that while the situation was afforded greater rhetorical attention during the Trump administration, his approach did not in fact substantively differ from that of previous presidents. In his North Korea policy, Trump sought the headlines and did what he could to appear to be shaking things up. In practice, however, not much changed. He was subject to the same concerns and values and external forces as his predecessors. As a result, US policy toward North Korean human rights continued to follow a familiar pattern: Human rights issues are raised only when relations between the US and DPRK deteriorate.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) seeks to end impunity for the world’s worst crimes to contribute to their prevention. But what is its impact to date? This book takes an in-depth look at four countries under scrutiny of the ICC: Afghanistan, Colombia, Libya, and Uganda. It puts forward an analytical framework to assess the impact of the ICC on four levels: on domestic legal systems (systemic effect); on peace negotiations and agreements (transformative effect); on victims (reparative effect); and on the perceptions of affected populations (demonstration effect). It concludes that the ICC is having a normative impact on domestic legal systems and peace agreements, but it has brought little reparative justice for victims, and it does not necessarily correspond with how affected populations view justice priorities. The book concludes that justice for the world’s worst crimes has no “universal formula” that can easily be captured in the law of the ICC.

This chapter considers how Confucian values constitute constitutional identity in three Confucian-influenced countries in Asia: China, South Korea, and Singapore. Drawing on Professor Gary Jacobsohn’s framework for the comparative study of constitutional identity, this contribution argues that Confucian commitments are embodied in the formal and/or prescriptive constitutions in the three Asian jurisdictions. The constitutions’ Confucian heritages are continuously dynamic. Disharmony provokes a change in Confucian constitutional identity. The change involves not only judicial but also social and political activities.