The Introduction is a chapter-length outline of the of the book which does more than simply summarise. Though not exhaustive, it includes both explanation and discussion of the historical context of Brexit and Brexitspeak, combined with a description of the linguistic tools of analysis. The starting point is that without language politics could not happen, so it is essential to understand how language works in general and how it is strategically deployed by politicians. In this chapter populism is discussed as an unwritten ideology best characterised by its demagogic appeal to an idea of ‘the people’ within a nationalist notion of ‘the British people’, at the same time promoting a friend-foe antithesis, stirring up emotion and avoiding reasoned argument. Demagoguery is a little used term in political science but highly relevant to the present state of democracy. Indeed, demagoguery exploits and undermines democracy. It is both an effect and a cause of post-truth politics, where truthfulness and facts are overridden. The final section takes a closer look at the fundamentals of language and language use that are at issue in examining the discourse of Brexit.

This chapter deals with the issue of epistemology or the oftentimes implicit theories of knowledge that guide research and methodological choices. The chapter starts with a brief discussion of what it means to live in a society in which the factual basis of truth can be easily questioned – the post-truth climate. It then outlines several popular conceptions and misconceptions about epistemology and maps out some of the main epistemological positions that inspired if not research then certainly philosophical debate. The second part of the chapter argues for pragmatism as an epistemology that can help us deal with the complexities of doing empirical research in a post-truth context by transcending the old realist–relativist divide and fostering methodological pluralism.

Since the advent of COVID-19, the widespread dissemination of misleading health information has impeded efforts to control the pandemic. The COVID-19 “infodemic,” as the World Health Organization has termed it, is a symptom of the larger “post-truth” phenomenon, which has its roots in deepening partisan divides, the rise of social media, the politicization of the news, the uncovering of research fraud, and the perceived impotence of government. But our inquiry centers on the role that law, especially health law, has played by unwittingly eroding trust in expertise regarding matters of health. We look particularly at the role of the evolving commercial speech doctrine, which has significantly limited government’s capacity to regulate potentially confusing or harmful commercial speech related to health. We also consider how generally salutary protections for autonomy, including those within the law of informed consent, may have left patients with the (mis)impression that all judgments about medical interventions are of equal weight. Blind reliance on expertise has its own problems, as shameful examples of the disregard for the well-being of vulnerable populations (as in the case of the Tuskegee study) suggest, Nevertheless, the public health consequences of the infodemic, from reduced compliance with mask wearing to distrust of potential vaccines, loom large. We conclude that re-assessing how health law can help rebuild trust in science is crucial if we wish to prepare for the inevitable pandemics ahead.

This chapter considers some of the legal and professional implications of social media use. These are discussed from two perspectives: firstly, how the law is changing to help ensure harmful and false information is not distributed, and secondly how professionals should responsibly use social media. To illustrate each of these, the chapter focuses on proposed reforms to the UK law and the UK General Medical Council’s (GMC) guidance for doctors. The principles discussed will apply to other jurisdictions and professional groups, but individual professionals should ensure they are familiar with the frameworks within which they practise.

The introduction argues that Cavell’s democratic perfectionism is uniquely situated to respond to the democratic crisis of post-truth politics. It argues that post-truth politics is a political response to the epistemological problem of skepticism. As a first step in exploring democratic perfectionism, the introduction offers a brief overview of Cavell’s interpretation of skepticism and its salience for politics. Section 2 provides a preliminary sketch of skepticism. Section 3 expands what Cavell means by responsiveness. Section 4 discusses how these two concepts shape democratic perfectionism. Section 5 asks, where is the politics in Cavell’s writings? While Cavell never wrote a text that was explicitly about political philosophy, his thoughts on politics are scattered throughout his writings. An initial obstacle to interpreting his democratic perfectionism is identifying where in his thought to look for those ideas. Section 6 explains how these themes are analyzed throughout the remainder of the book.

There are different generations of information warfare that evolve with technological, (geo)political and economic changes occuring in society. They are a ’convenient’ means of covert and indirect engagement with another actor in international relations while exposing oneself to the minimum of risk and accountability. It is linked to the popularized international relations concept of hybrid warfare.

Judicial law-making has frequently been likened to arts and crafts of various sorts, from minting coins to writing novels. While considering these analogies and how they demonstrate the reality of the law’s fabricating processes, the deeper aim of this chapter is to challenge the assumption that facts and truths established in law courts are ‘found’ and ‘discovered’. It is only by acknowledging that legal facts and legal truths are made by judicial crafts that we will come to appreciate the merits of those crafts and to discern the attributes of truth-making in courts that set the standard by which to judge the quality of truth claims in other contexts.

This chapter discusses the ways in which Rushdie and his work can be understood in the context of the aesthetics and ideologies of postmodernism. Rushdie’s novels deploy postmodern fictional devices, such as intertextuality and metafictional interruptions, to explore questions of politics, epistemology, and ontology. In his early work, Rushdie provides an instance of both the potential for postmodern techniques to craft original political perspectives commensurate with the aims of postcolonialism, and the limitations of a western theoretical perspective sceptical of those grand narratives of history and subjectivity over which postcolonial subjects were only now gaining purchase. His status as literary spokesperson for immigrant communities in Britain was revised after the Satanic Verses affair, and subsequent novels are sometimes found to lack the radical critique offered by the early work. This chapter argues that the development of Rushdie’s writing – particularly in recent volumes – shows evidence of a move away from the deconstructive application of postmodern strategies in particular postcolonial contexts to challenge political master-narratives, and towards a more general exploration of classical humanist themes such as love, good and evil, life and death. This chapter ends with illustrative readings of two recent Rushdie novels, The Golden House and Quichotte.

The epistemic community research programme, which in the last generation helped frame International Relations understandings of the relationship between knowledge and power, rested on the influence of scientists and experts on policymaking through framing, persuasion, and socialization. In this chapter, we argue that while pioneering, the epistemic-community research programme was incomplete, since it neglected the relationship between knowledge, power, and practice. Because practices are at the core of what epistemic communities are, do, and aim to achieve, we suggest a pragmatist practice-based approach, according to which knowing requires active participation in social communities and knowledge is not a product but is bound with action. We, therefore, explain the political adoption of knowledge-generated practices by the very nature of practicing and joining communities of practice. With this purpose in mind, we propose understanding epistemic communities as epistemic communities of practice. By identifying epistemic communities as a special and heuristically important case of communities of practice, we will open new and exciting avenues of theory-making and empirical research. We illustrate our approach by examining the establishment of nuclear arms control verification practices during the Cold War and the recent spread of a populist ‘post-truth’ epistemic community of practice.

Focusing on the historical and contemporary dilemmas posed by the “refugee crisis,” this essay investigates the potential for international progress in acknowledging our common humanity. I examine the utility of Emanuel Adler’s theory of cognitive evolution as a lens through which to assess the extent of that potential. I employ the theory to explore how certain practices dealing with forced migration became prevalent, while others lay dormant. I also examine how competing communities of practice battle to shape our understanding of forced migration in the current “post-truth” environment. I argue that cognitive evolution offers a potent conceptual framework for understanding both the extent to which the suffering of migrants has and has not been alleviated – a powerful indicator of the degree to which the world community has acknowledge their humanity. This holds for the social order of refugee protection, even in the current period as tribalism threatens to erode epistemological security, as normlessness threatens to replace a competition among norms, and as these threats weaken our shared reality.

The introduction summarizes overall argument unfolding through the six main chapters of the book and provides basic motivation for pursuing the pragmatist considerations of the volume. It emphasizes that the concept of truth may seem to have become seriously threatened in our culture - especially due to familiar political events and the active use of the social media today. As pragmatism, particularly Jamesian pragmatism, might be considered partly responsible for these developments, a novel critical exploration of pragmatist resources for dealing with the issues concerning the responsible pursuit of truth across a wide range of human practices is needed. The introduction also offers preliminary reasons why the argument of the book moves through a rather complex discussion of Kantian transcendental philosophy (and transcendental pragmatism) instead of merely "directly" utilizing the classical pragmatists' views on truth as such.

The first chapter asks whether there is a threatening slippery slope from William James's pragmatist conception of truth (as presented in his 1907 work, Pragmatism), via Richard Rorty's radical neopragmatism, to Donald Trump's and other populists' fragmentation of the concept of truth, or even ultimately to the destruction of truth depicted in George Orwell's dystopic novel, Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949), whose character O'Brien was interestingly analyzed by Rorty in a 1989 essay on Orwell, arguing for the primacy of freedom over truth. The chapter criticizes Rortyan pragmatism by arguing that the concept of freedom also presupposes the concept of truth (and not just the other way round), also suggesting that, despite the unclarity of some of James's original ideas about truth, there is a sound core to the Jamesian conception of the pursuit of truth. It is, furthermore, suggested that the concept of truth may itself receive a plurality of interpretations within a (meta-level) pragmatist understanding of truth, one of them being the realistic correspondence account, which remains highly relevant, e.g., in the context of combatting post-truth politics.

Moving from the recently changed landscape in literary theory, in which the distinction between sacred and secular literature blurs, this book demonstrates that Dante’s Vita nuova harbors enormous potential for responding creatively to the cultural and intellectual crises of our times. Our “post-truth” era can rediscover the deeper meaning of truth as a poetic interpretation of what in the Middle Ages could still be understood as theological revelation. Dante’s “little book” makes startlingly clear how theology is crucial to the continuing intelligibility and viability of the humanities. Meant here is especially negative theology, or theology as (negated by) poetry. Theology, qua negative, is the knowing of our own unknowing of divinity – or of whatever it is that most deeply bonds us together as humans and grants us our very existence together with everything else. Dante’s hybrid of lyric poetry and autobiographical prose in his “little book” shows how the language of theology, like that of poetry, is grounded in the ineffability of human existence itself. This recognition is the beginning of the critique of all ideology as, in effect, idolatry. On this basis, a possibility of salvation through and for humanities tradition and theological revelation alike is projected from Dante’s work into our contemporary times.

This chapter seeks to explore how, why and under which conditions a move away from critique as a negative practice towards an—educationally more valuable—affirmative notion of critique is important in formulating pedagogies that might respond more productively to the challenges of the post-truth era. What is at stake here in reframing critique as affirmative practice in addressing post-truths in schools, is the aspiration to create pedagogical spaces that enable teachers and students to turn their attention to care for the world in ways that go beyond the post-truth/negative critique/us-them impasse. The chapter engages with Foucault’s and Butler’s analysis of critique to show how a combined Foucauldian-Butlerian framework reconceptualizes criticality as an affirmative practice. It is suggested that cultivating an affirmative attitude and ethos of critique in the school context constitutes a virtuous practice of self-transformation and a passionate pedagogical goal that educators cannot afford to ignore.