Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

1 results

  • 5 - The Rationality of Beliefs

  • Mario J. Rizzo, New York University, Glen Whitman, California State University, Northridge
  • Book:
    Escaping Paternalism
    Published online:
    02 December 2019
    Print publication:
    05 December 2019, pp 119-189

  • Summary

    Rational beliefs need not be truth-tracking nor adhere strictly to basic logical or statistical-inference principles. They must simply be appropriate to the attainment of the individual’s purposes in specific contexts. We analyze various “errors” that behavioral economists have supposedly discovered in belief formation. Specifically, we examine supposed errors related to imperfect logical deduction, the conjunction fallacy (including the famous “Linda problem”), availability bias, overconfidence bias, and distorted salience. In each case we show that the standard behavioral analysis is too simple and that many of their behaviors qualify as inclusively rational. The fundamental error of behavioral analysts is to expect that universal, abstract methods of belief formation will be appropriate for guiding all concrete choices.