This chapter focuses on the "alternate endings" typology. Building on theories of political rhetoric, we can break norms down into norm frames (norm-based justifications) and behavioral claims (conclusions for actions) and identify four alternate endings of norm contestation: norm impasse, norm neglect, norm recognition and norm clarification. Whether states (dis)agree on frames, claims, or both affects the stability of these alternate endings and norm strength. As identifying frames and claims in actors’ interpretations of international law is the cornerstone of this book, this chapter first provides detailed guidance on different kinds of norm frame and claim disagreements. It then analyzes the relative stability of each "alternate ending" and shows that frame agreement is an internal source of stability. Norm strength is conceptualized as the extent of collective expectations related to applying a norm of international law in a certain way. Norms are stronger when these collective expectations are clearer (social norm strength), and are held by more (critical) actors and/or cover more situations (relative norm strength). The chapter shows that the "alternate endings" typology can anchor the assessment of how contestation affects collective expectations. This approach provides a more actor-centric assessment of norm strength, compared to other prominent approaches.

This chapter analyzes the norm impasses over the status of Kosovo after its declaration of independence in February 2008 and over the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia following the 2008 August war. Both cases happened within quick succession, revolved around the same well-established norms in the United Nations (UN) Charter – the rights to territorial integrity vs. self-determination – and showed an interesting reversal of sides: While the United States (US) and European states recognized Kosovo’s statehood and rejected Russia’s emphasis on Serbian territorial integrity, the US and European states rejected Russia’s support of South Ossetia’s statehood and emphasized Georgian territorial integrity. These norm impasses became protracted because each side received social support from key audiences, or at least only muted criticism, for their interpretations, lowering the cost of disagreement. These disputes show both the power and limits of international law: The US’s sui generis frame and Russia’s quasi-legal argumentation indicate that there is a strong collective expectation regarding using international law to justify claims. Yet these cases also indicate that protracted norm impasses weaken individual norms: Unclear norm meaning gives leeway for interpretation, which can be used to craft interpretations that appeal to important audiences and thereby reduce pressure to abandon contested norm interpretations.

In 2019, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II decided not to open an investigation into potential Taliban and US crimes in Afghanistan on the grounds that it would not be in the ‘interests of justice’. In arriving at this conclusion, the judges relied upon management concerns about organisational sustainability and the proposed use of resources to justify their position. While heavily criticised by scholars at the time, the judges’ reasoning alludes to the pervasiveness of management ideas and reasoning throughout the court, even in the realm of legal argumentation. This chapter takes the Afghanistan decision as the starting point for a discussion on management’s relationship to core argumentative dilemmas comprising the ICC legal field. Whether in framing case selection as a matter of court capacity or fashioning past obstacles to victim participation as ‘lessons learnt’, management ideas and practices enact a flight from the dilemmas and complexities of ICC-style justice by experts, deferring critique and sustaining the institutional project of global justice.

In this study, I adopt an argumentative perspective on evidence, focusing on three points: (1) The structure of evidentiary inference; (2) which reasons count as good ones for establishing the degree of corroboration of a hypothesis and (3) the possibility of formulating a precise, objective standard of proof.