South Korea implemented vertical as well as horizontal industrial policies in the 1960s and 1970s. Though they performed better than in other developing countries, the cost of the vertical policy outweighed its benefit. Industrial policies went side by side with the emergence of chaebol in a full-fledged form. Chaebol led the structural transformation of the economy, but they also led the production of non-performing loans, helping to deepen the 1979 crisis. In the 1980s, the government lifted vertical policy but strengthened horizontal policy while restructuring chaebol. In the 1990s, South Korea jumped into the newly-emerging information and communication technology industries with industrial policy. Meanwhile, the government began to promote small and medium-sized enterprises and introduced fair trade policies in the 1980s. By the mid-1990s, chaebol emerged as global players in higher-technology industries; however, they had many problems, the financial market problem being the most serious, ready to precipitate a crisis.

Evidence, from experimental work in behavioral/social psychology and from real-world examples of the effect of connectedness on charitable giving, is discussed that supports the relational theory of collective action. The earliest work in psychology shows how witnessing pain experienced by another leads to the self participating in this experience as well. Empathy, both emotional and cognitive, has been shown to be a pathway that links connectedness to other-regarding behavior. Countless examples of sefless giving are found in real life, where charities strive to strengthen bonds between givers and recipients, where fair trade organizations work to make the working conditions in farms, and the farmers themselves, more real to the consumer, and nature conservation organizations find ways to make protected species not just objects of collective action but living, feeling individuals.

This chapter uses a single case study – the NGO response to calls for a new imternational economic order (NIEO) – to analyse the mechanics of the global justice movement in the 1970s and the future it created for non-governmental aid. This NIEO ‘imaginary’ had a long history, rooted in the ethical consumerism of the anti-slavery movement, nineteenth century consumer ‘buycotts’, and the rise of alternative trading organisations in the aftermath of the Second World War. But it was also the product of the very specific ideological environment from which the NGO sector emerged. As this chapter shows, the debate surrounding the NIEO produced a conflict between welfarists and economic liberals about the kind of world they wished to build. Along the way, however, it also revealed much about the moral foundations on which non-governmental aid was constructed: its hierarchical nature, its politics and its ideological base. The chapter ends with a reflection on the NGO sector that this commitment to fair trade made. Put simply, it rooted its success in a commitment to reform rather than revolution – and an approach that was fundamentally incompatible with the radicalisation of aid.

This chapter uses a single case study – the NGO response to calls for a new imternational economic order (NIEO) – to analyse the mechanics of the global justice movement in the 1970s and the future it created for non-governmental aid. This NIEO ‘imaginary’ had a long history, rooted in the ethical consumerism of the anti-slavery movement, nineteenth century consumer ‘buycotts’, and the rise of alternative trading organisations in the aftermath of the Second World War. But it was also the product of the very specific ideological environment from which the NGO sector emerged. As this chapter shows, the debate surrounding the NIEO produced a conflict between welfarists and economic liberals about the kind of world they wished to build. Along the way, however, it also revealed much about the moral foundations on which non-governmental aid was constructed: its hierarchical nature, its politics and its ideological base. The chapter ends with a reflection on the NGO sector that this commitment to fair trade made. Put simply, it rooted its success in a commitment to reform rather than revolution – and an approach that was fundamentally incompatible with the radicalisation of aid.

This chapter analyses the growing use of ethical certification schemes as a strategy to fight forced labor in the contemporary global economy. It draws on a large primary dataset from the Global Business of Forced Labour study, collected from 2016–2018, which sheds light into the business models of forced labor in the cocoa and tea industries as well as the effectiveness of ethical certification in combatting forced labor. Drawing on data that demonstrates that ethical certification schemes are failing to create worksites that are free from exploitation, I argue that ethical certification labelling is misleading consumers about the labor conditions involved in the goods they are buying. I explore the contradictions of selling "ethical" products that give the impression that goods have been made through labor standards that they are known to fall short of. I explore the challenge of modernizing historically successful strategies to combat slavery made-goods for use in the present.

Activists have long used the market as a tool for empowering specific populations, sustaining the environment, and shifting cultural values. Today, these practices are commonly referred to as “ethical purchasing,” “political consumerism,” and “voting with your dollar.” The fair trade movement emerged in the 1940s as a way for consumers in the Global North to support populations in the Global South vulnerable to marginalization, exploitation, or oppression. Since then, the movement has grown in size, expanded in scope, and diversified in many ways. Today, it intersects with the organic movement, climate change advocacy, and other aspects of environmentalism. This chapter reviews the burgeoning fair trade literature, drawing heavily on publications from the past five years, to describe and discuss four provocative debates: 1) Fair trade for whom? 2) Fair trade by whom? 3) Fair trade through certification (or not)? and 4) What next for engaging capitalism and the state? After highlighting the perspectives and questions dominating each debate, this chapter offers several suggestions about the future of fair trade.

This chapter addresses the moral justifiability of some of the international legal rules that govern cross-border trade.The primary focus is on the moral standards that ought to be used to critically evaluate those rules or proposals for their reform.Thus the chapter investigates several moral arguments for free trade, such as the claim that it provides an especially effective mechanism for alleviating poverty, and several arguments in defense of restrictions or conditions on trade, including the moral permissible of partiality to compatriots and the right of those who cooperate to make international trade possible to a fair share of the benefits it yields.The chapter concludes with an examination of the argument that the import and consumption of oil and other natural resources from countries ruled by tyrants constitutes trade in stolen goods, a violation of existing international law.

Voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) seek to improve social and economic outcomes in developing nations through voluntary commitments by firms located in these countries, who can advertise their adherence to the standard through certification and associated labels. VSS are a potential instrument to help achieve some of the objectives of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but the current empirical evidence on their effectiveness is mixed. Distinguishing between Fair Trade VSS developed by non-governmental organizations and corporate-backed private VSS, this chapter disentangles the possible channels through which these two types of VSS regimes may impact on trade and, in turn, on SDGs. We review the evidence in the light of these channels, finding important differences between the two categories of VSS.

The chapter explains why the EU explicitly decided not to intervene in private fair trade governance on two separate occasions, in 1999 and in 2009. The chapter starts by comparing private fair trade governance schemes, including Fairtrade International, Rainforest Alliance, and UTZ Certified. It then discusses why EU policymakers in the 1990s focused on Fairtrade only and declined to intervene because of the specific North–South trade dynamics of this issue area; the lack of concrete productive opportunities in the EU; and institutional constraints of the international trade regime. The Fair Trade movement’s successful harmonization of complementary private governance schemes also contributed to the EU’s non-interventionist approach. The broadening of the policy domain beyond Fairtrade in the early 2000s did not lead to fragmentation concerns, since differences among the schemes were framed as commercial and economic-ideological in nature and not problematized as a fragmentation issue. Active lobbying by and on behalf of private governance schemes ensured this outcome, resulting in a market for private governance that remains free of public intervention.

This chapter examines (1) publicly available data on the municipal activities of TNCs culled from their own corporate reports, (2) the powers of local governments enshrined in local laws vis-a-vis the protections of TNCs under international law, (3) public opinion of municipal residents as captured in various surveys, (4) the results of scientific studies, including those that test the chemical composition of fuels sold by TNCs, and (5) those studies that subject the exercise of political power to social scientific analyses.

On these bases, it can be argued that, although they are not accountable to any electorate, transnational corporations (TNCs) in Africa play significant roles in planning and governing cities in Africa. TNCs effectively manage important aspects of African life through control of municipal utilities, through the corporate governance of natural resources held by Africans in common, and through ad hoc investment practices that facilitate the private appropriation of socially created rents.