This chapter examines the diplomacy of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe in 1977, as they were now confronted with the development of an internal settlement plan between Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa and others in Salisbury. The chapter examines how Nkomo and Mugabe worked together on the diplomatic front to push back with British foreign secretary David Owen and US secretary of state Cyrus Vance, who had at first hoped to resume all-party negotiations. Nkomo and Mugabe insisted that they would only negotiate with the British and not with Smith at this stage. The Frontline State presidents, however, also pressured Nkomo and Mugabe to negotiate, arguing that time was running out if the international committee would eventually recognize the Internal Settlement government. That Internal Settlement was agreed upon in March 1978, which then put more pressure on the Patriotic Front to negotiate while also increasing the war efforts. The chapter discusses a challenge to Mugabe’s leadership from within ZANU in early 1978.

This chapter focuses mainly on the attempts by the British, Nigerians, and Zambians to set up the possibility of private negotiations between the Patriotic Front and Ian Smith in 1978. As the war grew increasingly costly and unwinnable from the Rhodesian perspective, Britain’s David Owen tried to work with the Zambians and Joe Garba of Nigeria to bring Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo together for secret negotiations in Lusaka in August 1978. The diplomacy leading up to this meeting is explored, especially around Nkomo’s insistence and need to involve Mugabe as part of his promise not to break up the Patriotic Front. As numerous sources explain, Nkomo kept to his word not to negotiate a transfer of power from Smith without Mugabe, but Mugabe refused the pressures from the Nigerians to accept further negotiations, mostly because the offer would have required Mugabe to a take a secondary role to Nkomo. The fallout of the meeting is examined, as it led to the heightening of the war and increased accusations that Nkomo was ready to “sell-out” the Patriotic Front.

This chapter analyzes how diplomacy over Sino-American scientific cooperation was central to the final agreement for China and the United States to establish official diplomatic relations, finally reached in December 1978. In the wake of Mao Zedong’s death in September 1976, China’s emerging post-Mao leadership prioritized the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s scientific development, believing that drawing on scientific knowledge from outside of China – including from the United States – was critical to the country’s development. The Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC had long been arguing that China’s interest in US science provided leverage to the United States and, after President Jimmy Carter recruited the top leadership of the CSCPRC into his administration, utilizing this leverage became a critical part of US China policy. Thus, Chinese and US leaders, working hand-in-glove with the nongovernmental CSCPRC, achieved a simultaneous upgrading of the Sino-American scientific and diplomatic relationship in 1978 that offered a final demonstration of the symbiotic relationship between exchange and high-level Sino-American diplomacy in the pre-normalization era.

This chapter focuses mainly on the attempts by the British, Nigerians, and Zambians to set up the possibility of private negotiations between the Patriotic Front and Ian Smith in 1978. As the war grew increasingly costly and unwinnable from the Rhodesian perspective, Britain’s David Owen tried to work with the Zambians and Joe Garba of Nigeria to bring Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo together for secret negotiations in Lusaka in August 1978. The diplomacy leading up to this meeting is explored, especially around Nkomo’s insistence and need to involve Mugabe as part of his promise not to break up the Patriotic Front. As numerous sources explain, Nkomo kept to his word not to negotiate a transfer of power from Smith without Mugabe, but Mugabe refused the pressures from the Nigerians to accept further negotiations, mostly because the offer would have required Mugabe to a take a secondary role to Nkomo. The fallout of the meeting is examined, as it led to the heightening of the war and increased accusations that Nkomo was ready to “sell-out” the Patriotic Front.

This chapter examines the diplomacy of Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe in 1977, as they were now confronted with the development of an internal settlement plan between Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa and others in Salisbury. The chapter examines how Nkomo and Mugabe worked together on the diplomatic front to push back with British foreign secretary David Owen and US secretary of state Cyrus Vance, who had at first hoped to resume all-party negotiations. Nkomo and Mugabe insisted that they would only negotiate with the British and not with Smith at this stage. The Frontline State presidents, however, also pressured Nkomo and Mugabe to negotiate, arguing that time was running out if the international committee would eventually recognize the Internal Settlement government. That Internal Settlement was agreed upon in March 1978, which then put more pressure on the Patriotic Front to negotiate while also increasing the war efforts. The chapter discusses a challenge to Mugabe’s leadership from within ZANU in early 1978.