This article argues that public property rights should be recognised as a separate category of property interest, different and distinct from private and common property interests and conferring distinctive rights and obligations on both “owners” and members of the public. It develops a taxonomy to differentiate private, public and common property rights. The article concludes that it is a mistake to think in terms of “private property”, “common property” or “public property”. The division and allocation of resource entitlements in land can result in private, common and public property rights subsisting over the same land simultaneously, in different combinations and at different times. The categorisation of property interests in land (as private, common or public) may also shift and change from time to time. The article considers the importance of distinguishing between private, common and public property interests for developing new strategies for environmental governance, and for implementing the effective protection of natural resources.

A bioeconomic model is used to estimate how managing glyphosate resistance to horseweed affects short- and long-run profits in corn, soybean, and corn-soybean rotation systems. Model results found that resistance management reduces profits in the first year of implementation, but increases profits in the second and subsequent 18 yr. In all three systems, long run gains begin to outweigh short-run costs (and resistance management “pays for itself”) by the second year. Over a 20-yr horizon, the estimated annual average profit advantage from managing resistance exceeded $158 ha–1 ($64/acre) for corn, $137 ha–1 ($55/acre) for corn-soybean, and $55 ha–1 ($22/acre) for soybean. Seed immigration from a neighbor's field can reduce these gains, but this reduction is negligible if the neighbor also practices resistance management. If the neighbor did not manage resistance, however, the grower's estimated annual profit advantage fell to roughly $123 ha–1 ($50/acre) for corn, $60 ha–1 ($24/acre) for the corn-soybean rotation, and virtually zero for soybean. Methods applied in this study identify corn and corn-soybean rotations as cases where resistance management “pays for itself' quickly and significantly, even if the neighbor does not manage resistance. Continuous soybean presents a more challenging case that may require additional programs and incentives to encourage collective resistance management among growers. Even for continuous soybean, however, joint grower–neighbor resistance management can pay for itself within 2 yr.

Traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) has become a focus of increasing attention by natural resource managers over the past decade, particularly in the context of the shared management authority between resource users and government agencies (co-management). Little work has been done on how TEK can be successfully integrated with science and applied in contemporary science-based resource management institutions, and the efficacy and legitimacy of co-management and associated attempts to document TEK or integrate it with science have recently been questioned. The cooperative research programme of one co-management group, the Alaska Beluga Whale Committee (ABWC), was studied to describe how TEK and science are integrated and applied in the research process, document perceptions and attitudes of native hunters and scientists towards TEK and science, and identify organizational characteristics that facilitate knowledge integration. Hunters and TEK played a variety of roles in ABWC's research programme, including hypothesis generation, sample collection and data interpretation. Hunters and scientists defined TEK similarly, but differed in their views of science, which hunters often perceived as a tool of state control. Despite political undercurrents, the ABWC displayed several indicators of successful knowledge integration. Organizational characteristics that facilitated integration included a membership structure fostering genuine power-sharing and a range of opportunities for formal and informal interactions among hunters and scientists leading to long-term relationships and an organizational culture of open communication and transparency in decision-making. Given the importance of long-term relationships between scientists and hunters for successful knowledge integration, this study raises questions about (1) the potential for meaningful integration in short-term projects such as environmental impact assessment and (2) the use of TEK documentation studies in the absence of other forms of active participation by TEK- holders.

The expansion of private production erodes the quality of commonly owned assets, thereby forcing individuals to rely increasingly on private goods to satisfy their needs. In the face of this deterioration, households increase their work effort and accumulate more capital in order to buy more consumer goods both in the present and in the future. By so doing, each household contributes to an increase in production and thus has a detrimental—though negligible—impact on commonly owned assets. Hence, the economy converges to a long-run equilibrium level of production that is higher than the level associated with the Pareto-efficient path.

Efforts to protect vulnerable environmental resources have focused largely on legal prohibitions and sanctions or on economic rewards or penalties. The role and importance of social and cultural factors have been much less considered. While theoretical arguments have addressed whether state institutions must be involved in resource protection, or whether private incentives can be manipulated to achieve desired outcomes, this preoccupation with either public sector or private sector solutions to the problems of environmental conservation has caused a neglect of social values and community consensus. The analysis offered here seeks to enlarge the debate from being two-sided to three-cornered.

By bringing in a third set of considerations, the socio-cultural, the analysis underscores that individual decisions are embedded in community and local contexts. All three kinds of incentives are considered to be potentially of equal importance for resource-conserving behaviour (RCB) vis-à-vis resource-degrading behaviour (RDB). The analysis is concerned first with the strength of different incentives in favour of RCB compared to RDB, comparing legal and economic with socio-cultural considerations affecting RCB and RDB. Efforts to protect vulnerable resources can seek to alter in an RCB direction the attitudes and incentives of people along any or all of these three dimensions of motivation, or they can seek to make a particular domain of motivation more salient if it is supportive of environmental conservation.

This analysis is proposed in part to get the socio-cultural domain taken more seriously alongside the legal and economic domains, as well as to prompt more systematic consideration of different kinds of policies, investments, actions or pronouncements that could shift the net balance of incentives in favour of RCB. While the analysis is admittedly simplified, there is utility in encouraging focused comparisons and evaluations of conservation alternatives. Examples of efforts to promote RCB in Madagascar and Costa Rica are given to illustrate this.