We investigate the effects of order-of-play (simultaneous, unobserved sequential and fully observed sequential play) and form of presentation (extensive vs. normal) in three simple two person games: battle-of-the-sexes with and without outside option and a three strategy game which differentiates between virtual observability (VO) and iterated elimination of dominated strategies as principles of equilibrium selection. VO predicts that knowledge of the order of play alone will affect the distribution of strategies chosen. We contrast this with the predictions of iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We report results from 1800 one-shot games conducted in 6 sessions with 120 subjects and analysed as panel data. The form of presentation strongly affects the distribution of outcomes and strategies. Information about order of play shifts the distribution of strategies away from the distribution in simultaneous play and towards the distribution in fully observed play, especially in the less complicated games presented in normal order. Order-of-play effects are less evident as complexity of the game increases. Extensive form presentation appears to induce sequential thinking even in simultaneously played games.

We report experimental evidence showing a positive effect of redistribution on economic efficiency via the self-enforcement of property rights, and identify which status groups benefit more and which less. We model an economy in which wealth is produced if players voluntarily comply with the—efficient but inequitable—prevailing social order. We vary exogenously whether redistribution is feasible, and how it is organized. We find that redistribution benefits all status groups as property disputes recede. It is most effective when transfers are not discretionary but instead imposed by some exogenous administration. In the absence of coercive means to enforce property rights, it is the higher status groups, not the lower status groups, who benefit from redistribution being compulsory rather than voluntary.