Under oath at the Dardanelles Commission, convened in 1917 to investigate the Gallipoli campaign, Surgeon General Sir Neville Howse, Director of Medical Services (DMS) for the Australian Imperial Force (AIF), stated that ‘as far as the Australian troops were concerned’ medical arrangements for the Gallipoli campaign ‘were so inadequate that they amounted to criminal negligence’.1 He squarely laid the blame for this ‘negligence’ on the shoulders of the British General Staff and informed the commissioners that he intended to share his concerns with Australia’s leaders. A palpably frustrated Howse stated: ‘I personally will recommend my Government when this war is over, that under no conceivable conditions ought they ever to trust to the medical arrangements that may be made by Imperial authorities for the care of their sick and wounded.’2 His scathing critique not only called into question the British General Staff’s ability to plan and execute a comprehensive strategy but also revealed his doubt regarding the benefits of Australian deference to Britain in medical–military matters.

‘In the very elaborate medical arrangements for “Messines” every possible factor in the problem of collecting, clearing, treating and evacuating casualties, was foreseen and exactly provided for,’ wrote Butler in the official history. He continued: ‘As it turned out, “events” were in so close accord with “arrangements” that, as an exposition of military medical technique, an account of the medical features of the battle may be based on either.’1 This glowing description of the medical provisions at Messines stands in stark contrast to the medical care provided to wounded and sick soldiers at Gallipoli.

At the end of 1918, the Australian Army Medical Corps (AAMC) was a different organisation from the one that had existed when war was declared in 1914. Commencing the war with a regular staff of four officers, the AAMC rapidly expanded and developed. Almost entirely dependent on assistance from Britain and the Royal Army Medical Corps (RAMC) during the Gallipoli campaign in 1915, the AAMC, during the remaining years of the war, became more independent, developed its own practices and procedures, and asserted its expertise in order to have Australian medical control of Australian casualties.