1. Last's Problem with Traditional Readings

Prior to Last's proposal, interpreters widely agreed that 1 Cor 11.19 was about not ‘elections’ in the church, but ‘divisions’ in the eschaton (which we shall refer to as the ‘traditional’ reading). In the gospels, several sayings of Jesus link a rise in dissension with the eschaton (Matt 10.34–9 // Luke 12.51–3; 14.25–7; Matt 24.9–13 // Mark 13.13 // Luke 21.17–18). The same link is found in an otherwise unattested logion attributed to Jesus in Justin Martyr, which contains close verbal similarities with 1 Cor 11.18–19 (cf. σχίσματα ... αἱρέσεις ... εἴναι). Compare

with

While Last does deal with these texts, his analysis is, to my mind, unduly dismissive of their relevance. Admittedly, the gospel texts do not share close verbal similarities with 1 Cor 11.18–19 (e.g., no σχίσματα, αἵρεσις, δόκιμος, φανερός in Matt 10.34–9 // Luke 12.51–3; etc.), but it is certainly worth pondering that their thematic affinities were close enough for Justin, when discussing divisions in the eschaton, to have mixed these very same texts together with the saying just cited.Footnote ⁵ Clearly, in Justin's reception of Jesus’ teaching, σχίσματα and αἱρέσεις shared a close connection with the eschaton. Moreover, it cannot be said that Justin has here ‘invented’ a saying of Jesus in order to explain 1 Cor 11.19, for he gives no indication that Paul's Corinthian letter was close to mind, and certainly no indication that he has this specific text in view. Note also that Pseudo-Clementine Homily 16.21.4 has Jesus predicting ‘αἱρέσεις’ as well, citing this ‘saying’, again, with the gospel texts noted above. Were we to assume that Justin had made the saying up, we would have to assume either that Pseudo-Clement was dependent on Justin, or that, by coincidence, he was led through precisely the same, mistaken, train of thought.

Why then is Last dismissive of Justin's logion? He states: ‘Justin records Jesus to have predicted σχίσματα and αἱρέσεις (Dial. 35.3), but αἱρέσεις is used by the apologist to mean heresies, which represents a later development of the word's usage.’Footnote ⁶ With all respect to Last, I fail to see why a development in terminology-reception would mean that Justin's logion is not based on the same logion as 1 Cor 11.18–19. Augustine (Serm. 51.11), in commenting on 1 Cor 11.19, also reads αἱρέσεις as ‘heresies’: by Last's reasoning, would that mean that Augustine was not reading the same verse we are? It is only to be expected that a second-century Christian would interpret the terminology through the experience of his own time. Indeed, whether αἱρέσεις is understood as ‘factions’ or as ‘heresies’ is immaterial to the question of the saying's origin. Of course, it is always possible that Justin has taken the spirit of Jesus’ teaching from the gospels and inadvertently formulated it in terms of Paul's remarks in 1 Cor 11.18–19 (indeed, nothing is too incredible for the scholarly imagination), but I see no reason why we should default to an imaginative, sceptical hypothesis over against Justin's straightforward, and relatively early, attestation.Footnote ⁷ As it is, verbal evidence gives us ample warrant to suppose that Justin and 1 Cor 11.18–19 commonly preserve an authentic, if otherwise unattested, saying of Jesus, eschatological in orientation. Any further eschatological resonances in the context would only strengthen the case – a point to which we shall return momentarily.

For Last, however, the most difficult crux of 11.19 is the question of why Paul would suggest that αἱρέσεις are ‘necessary’ (δεῖ), when throughout the letter the problem of ‘factions’ is the very thing he has exercised himself trying to resolve (as Last puts it, ‘the dominant theory that Paul endorses “factions” does not work within the context’).Footnote ⁸ The objection is not without merit, and Last is not alone in recognising the tension. But I am afraid that Last's framing of the issue here in terms of Paul's ‘endorsement’ of factions starts us off immediately on the wrong foot (who has ever said that Paul was doing that?). In fact a number of plausible solutions to this problem lie ready to hand. If a genuine ‘eschatological resignation’ to the reality of divisions does not in itself provide a fully satisfying answer,Footnote ⁹ it is at least worth asking how this tone might work in service of Paul's present rhetorical purposes. The extent to which ad hoc exigencies condition Paul's discursive strategies should not be underestimated. This is the same man who could appeal to ‘nature’ (φύσις) in a way that defies common sense, because it provided a premise acceptable to his philosophically minded audience (11.14), and the same man who repeatedly availed himself of Stoic arguments while confronting a church divided in large part because of Stoic influences.Footnote ¹⁰ Moreover, we find plentiful examples where he ‘grants’ the Corinthians their own self-designations, but only after having invested the designations with new meaning, or repeats his opponents’ terminology entirely tongue in cheek: ‘Not many of you were “wise”, “powerful”, and “of noble birth” at the time of your calling’ (1.26); ‘We speak wisdom among the “perfect’” (2.6); ‘Are you already “rich”, already “kings”? … You are “prudent”, … “strong”, … “held in honor”’ (4.8, 10); ‘If someone sees you, with your “knowledge”’ (8.10); or ‘I speak as to “prudent” people’ (10.15).Footnote ¹¹ Moreover, if it is asked whether Paul's resignation to divisions here does not run directly at cross-purposes with what he has strongly opposed in the first four chapters of the letter (esp. 1.10–12), it should be noted that we find him veering about in precisely the same way regarding the Corinthians’ status as ‘wise men’: after spending four chapters trying to convince them that there were not acting as wise men at all,Footnote ¹² he presumes in 6.5 to ask them whether there is not some ‘wise man’ (σοφός) among them who is able to judge among his brothers, the introductory οὐκ indicating clearly that his question now wants the answer ‘Yes.’ Footnote ¹³ If Paul was able, for present purposes, and with some irony, to grant them the ‘wisdom’ they so esteemed, and which all interpreters agree was the main problem contributing to the church's divisions,Footnote ¹⁴ why should he not also have been able to resign himself, again with some irony, to the problem to which that wisdom led, namely divisions? Undoubtedly, Paul's arguments were capable of shifting with his rhetorical purposes. Such as he was, it should come as no surprise if he momentarily shifted into his audience's own frame of mind in order to score a point. In this regard, I find it quite likely that we have here simply a further instance of Paul's penchant for ‘redefinition’: Paul turns the self-attribution of those high-status Corinthians as ‘approved’ (δόκιμοι) over on its head, agreeing that ‘divisions’ among them serve to mark out those who are ‘distinguished’, only not in the way they fancy. In effect: ‘Well, I suppose divisions are necessary after all, for only then will it become evident who is truly “approved”.’Footnote ¹⁵ It would seem to me to be entirely within his character for him to have spoken in such a way.

But still more serious problems present themselves. Semantically, Last's argument rests on the convergence of four terms in 11.18–19. Each of them, he thinks, is used with reference to the election of church officers, just as they were with reference to the election of Greek or Roman magistrates in contemporary associations: σχίσματα, referring to ‘divisions’ (v. 18); αἵρεσις (verb, αἱρέομαι), referring to the ‘election’ of officers (v. 19); δόκιμος (verb, δοκιμάζω), referring to the ‘vetting’ of elected officials (v. 19); and φανερός, meaning ‘prestigious’ or ‘of distinction’ (v. 19).

While Last is able to mine parallels to each of these in sources pertaining to Greco-Roman associations, as far as I can tell he does not locate a single text where any two of these terms appear together in the same context (that one ‘becomes approved’ is hardly significant, copulative that γίνομαι is).Footnote ¹⁶ One, moreover, looks in vain for further discussion of ‘officers’ or ‘elections’ in a letter that is supposedly addressed to a community embroiled in conflict that could ostensibly be resolved by electing said officials. We need not go far, however, to find striking thematic clustering, and with more abundant resonances in the letter, in proof that the context here is eschatological.

1 Cor 11.18–19 states: σχίσματα ἐν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν … δεῖ γὰρ καὶ αἱρέσεις ἐν ὑμῖν εἶναι, ἵνα [καὶ] οἱ δόκιμοι φανεροὶ γένωνται ἐν ὑμῖν. As has long been recognised, two themes come together here: that of divisions and that of eschatological testing.

(1) With σχίσματα ἐν ὑμῖν and αἱρέσεις ἐν ὑμῖν here, compare σχίσματα ἐν ὑμῖν again in 1.10, 11; and ἐν ὑμῖν ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις in 3.3 (‘rivalry and strife among you’). In this regard, we have a varied semantic cluster centred around ‘dissension’, including four different terms of similar meaning, each occurring with ἐν ὑμῖν:

(2) Whether αἱρέσεις ought to be interpreted within the same semantic field as σχίσματα, ζῆλος and ἔρις, however, depends in part on establishing an ‘eschatological’ meaning for δόκιμος. This connection Last does not allow, on the grounds that the verse ‘is otherwise devoid of apocalyptic terminology’.Footnote ¹⁷ But he is quite mistaken about this. Not only does δόκιμος often carry eschatological meaning (Jas 1.12; as also δοκιμάζω, e.g. 1 Pet 1.7), but – as the literature hereto has not adverted attention to – so also does φανερός and its whole word group: φαίνω (Matt 24.27, 30), φανερόω (1 Cor 4.5; 2 Cor 5.10; Col 3.4; 1 Pet 5.4; 1 John 2.28; cf. Mark 4.22), φωτίζω (1 Cor 4.5) and ἐπιφάνεια (2 Thess 2.8; 1 Tim 6.14; 2 Tim 4.1, 8; Titus 2.13). The clinching text comes in 1 Corinthians, 3.13, where δόκιμος and φανερός occur together, and indisputably in an eschatological context:

Note the clear use of synonymous parallelism, δηλώσει being matched with δοκιμάσει. One's work will thus be made ‘manifest’ (φανερόν), with day ‘showing’ (δηλώσει) it, in the same way that fire ‘tests’ (δοκιμάσει) it.

Note, moreover, that the discourse in chapter 11 takes an explicit turn towards eschatology. Verse 26 states that the Lord's Supper ritual should be repeated ‘until [Christ] comes’ (ἄχρις οὗ ἔλθῃ). Verses 28–32 then enjoin each person, before taking the elements, to ‘test’ themselves (δοκιμαζέτω, the verb equivalent of δόκιμος), lest they ultimately be ‘condemned’ (κατακριθῶμεν) along with the world in the final judgement. Last, by contrast, has no further ‘elected officials’ context to speak of here.

We can then summarise the semantic portion of the argument as follows. (1) ‘Divisions among you’ are frequently referenced in 1 Corinthians. (2) ‘Divisions’ in the relevant sayings of Jesus, both canonical and extra-canonical, are associated with the eschaton. (3) Terms both for ‘testing’, and for the becoming ‘manifest’ of that which is tested, frequently occur in eschatological contexts, and occur together elsewhere even in 1 Corinthians itself. In this light, it should come as no surprise that ‘divisions’ + ‘among you’ in 1 Cor 11.18–19 come together with another occurrence of ‘testing’ + being made ‘manifest.’ Given this evidence, I do not see what need we have of resorting to an argument that finds four terms used together in 1 Cor 11.18–19 but discretely in other ancient sources, as Last would have us do. So much for the semantic argument.

2. Problems with Last's Reading

So far we have seen that Last's treatment of 1 Cor 11.18–19 exaggerates the problems involved in traditional readings, problematising an eschatological interpretation when such a reading is in fact plainly suggested by the semantic context. Dealing yet a more serious blow to Last's argument, however, are its numerous ‘discourse’ problems, which do not enter in with a more traditional reading. I present three such problems.

The first is a problem of information flow, introduced by his translation of φανεροί as ‘persons of distinction’.Footnote ¹⁸

Linguistic theorists distinguish between ‘established’ and ‘non-established’ clausal constituents, according to the constituents’ cognitive availability within the discourse. Established information may be either assumed on the basis of generally accessible knowledge of reality, or supplied, explicitly or implicitly, from the preceding discourse content. Thus, established information provides the cognitive framework for the processing of new, or non-established, information, the communication of which is the goal of the discourse-unit. In each clause, newly asserted information is said to be the focus, and it is the focus, in turn, that serves as the main point of the clause.Footnote ¹⁹ In languages that are not overly constrained by word order, the intended focus may often be placed at the end of its clause or sentence to draw added attention to it. In some languages, such as English, the focus may also be highlighted by a change in voice inflection. Note, for instance, the difference between the following statements, each of which puts the focus in a different place, despite the fact that each is identical as to the letter:

The problem with Last's translation is that it entails a reversal of the discourse function of the constituents, so that φανερός becomes the focus of the clause, when the emphasis must in fact lie elsewhere. Last's translation, ‘[I]n order that the approved ones become persons of distinction (φανεροί)’, in other words, locates the clause's punch in exactly the wrong place: indeed, does Paul (or Last) really want to say that ‘becoming a person of distinction’ is the end unto which (ἵνα) elections should take place?Footnote ²⁰ Is that focus not widely off the point, or at best only quite indirectly relevant, if, according to Last's reconstruction, the purpose of elections is really to restore order to the community? By contrast, the flow of information occurs much more naturally, and the clause is able to retain its intended focus, it seems to me, onlyFootnote ²¹ when φανεροί is understood in its more usual sense of ‘manifest’: ‘it is necessary that there be divisions, in order that there might come to light those who are approved (οἱ δόκιμοι)’.

The second, and perhaps most serious, problem with Last's view involves his interpretation of γάρ at the opening of v. 19. In this regard Last states: ‘When Paul moves from σχίσματα in 11.18 to elections in 11.19 (see below) his line of thought remains entirely continuous.’Footnote ²² What Last means by ‘continuous’ is explained in a footnote: ‘Here, on my reading, Paul argues that reports of factions at the common meal are believable in part because he does not regard the current leadership's competency highly.’Footnote ²³ If I may paraphrase the proposed syntax, by this Last means: ‘I believe the report because (γάρ) elections are necessary.’ Such an interpretation, however, clearly puts the cart before the horse. Specifically, it reverses the logical order of what is grounded and what is doing the grounding, for in fact elections would not be necessary unless Paul believed the report. Thus it should be not: ‘I believe the report because (γάρ) elections are necessary’ (Last's explanation); but: ‘Elections are necessary because (γάρ) I believe the report’; which amounts to ‘I believe the report; therefore elections are necessary.’ Last, in other words, puts the grounds where there ought to be a conclusion. Unless the logic is strained beyond good sense, only by replacing γάρ with an inferential marker like οὖν or διὰ τοῦτο would the proposed reading hold: ‘I believe it in part; therefore (οὖν) [or for this reason (διὰ τοῦτο)] it is necessary that there be elections among you.’ This little γάρ, it seems, looms large.Footnote ²⁴

Finally, I cannot see how, on Last's reading, οὖν offers us an entrée into the material in v. 20. Following his reading through, it become evident that οὖν, which signals a logical development of what precedes, is in fact impossible to connect with v. 19: on his reading, we should rather have expected a circumstantial νῦν,Footnote ²⁵ a δέ, or perhaps another γάρ. He might, of course, have recourse in explaining the inference as a continuation, not of v. 19, but rather of v. 18. This is in fact how the conjunction must function if the verse is taken in a more traditional sense (i.e. ‘I hear that when you come together there are divisions among you … Accordingly [οὖν], when you come together …’). Yet, contrary to the traditional reading, where the topic remains continuous throughout vv. 18–20 (i.e. ‘divisions’) even if v. 19 poses somewhat of a logical parenthesis, on Last's reading the break between vv. 18 and 20 would leave v. 19 a disruptive intrusion into the discourse – not what he wants given the troubling absence of contextual ties already noted.

All these problems, I maintain, disappear if we continue to understand v. 19 in eschatological terms, additional evidence for which has been provided here. Moreover, I have argued, on the basis of numerous similar examples found elsewhere in 1 Corinthians, that Paul is here deploying a strategy of ‘redefinition,’ granting the factious group their status as ‘distinguished’ people, but bending the meaning they give to the term away from reference to social status and towards forensic status in the eschaton. Quite possibly σχίσματα (‘divisions’) shifts to αἱρέσεις (‘factions’) for the sake of allusion to the dominical saying preserved by Justin and others; thus I place ‘factions’ in quotation marks in my own translation, provided below. The γάρ in v. 19 grounds μέρος τι πιστεύω, and the οὖν in v. 20 resumes συνερχομένων ὑμῶν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ἀκούω σχίσματα ἐν ὑμῖν ὑπάρχειν in v. 18 (thus οὖν, ‘accordingly’ = ‘with regard to the coming together to the same place mentioned above’). I offer, then, the following translation of vv. 18–20 to illustrate what sense is made of these verses, and of the developmental markers involved, when construed in these terms: