Jeanne Morefield’s book and ours are complementary in their understanding of U.S. foreign policy and political agenda. We recognize the destructive effects of hubris both at home and abroad: how it is maintained through the repetition of illusions until they become embedded in a political culture and cemented by conceptual sleights of hand. Morefield focuses on the strategy of deflection and we on the defense of hegemony. Both attempt to reduce dissonance between behavior and proclaimed values.

Deflection describes the behavior in question as exceptional and unavoidable. It regards empire as in the interest of colonizer and colonized alike, arguing that valuable ends justify occasionally unpalatable means. Hegemony relies on the same logic. As with a strategy of deflection, both its advocates at home and beneficiaries abroad proclaim that others accept this logic, as they understand empire or hegemony as serving their interests as well. The indispensible hegemon is all that stands between order and chaos in this popular formulation, propagating the mistaken and ultimately often tragic assumption that the United States has the capacity to control the course of events as a product of its vast material power. Material power does not confer influence, and the language of the powerful is only one component in the quest for recognition. Rather, legitimacy is conferred by the governed. It is a product of just rule and entails an acceptance that deferring to others can be a more effective instrument than the assertion of leadership.

Our disagreements are minor but highlight important issues. Morefield believes that the United States is an empire, and we reject this characterization. She thinks that our use of a miracle counterfactual to remake American drug policy toward Mexico is an admission that it would take a miracle to have changed it, and by extension, to reorient contemporary American foreign policy. Yet she criticizes us for not offering a road map showing how the United States could move toward a strategy of what we call sponsorship. Yet that is far from being a “technical fix” or requiring an unattainable reorientation. Indeed, we provide examples—from the global campaigns against human trafficking and piracy to America’s role in the campaign against Muammar Gaddafi’s forces in Libya—that have proved restorative in terms of America’s global reputation. None required a miracle. All simply demonstrated a capacity to discard conventional prejudices and view America’s role through a different lens.

In an ideal world, we would like Americans—and especially their leaders—to develop a greater sense of humility and appreciation of the contours and limits of power. It entails American policymakers renouncing their characteristic vision of world leadership and accompanying sense of entitlement, recognizing a plurality of values and interests and with it an acceptance that coordination and behind-the-scenes, patient diplomacy are often more effective than coercion, confrontation, and bribery. We have no magic wand. But we do believe that our book—and hers—have the potential to constitute a small step in this direction by exposing the illusory conceptual architecture of current policy and—in our case—offering an alternative, plausible vision of America’s role in the global system in the twenty-first century.