The online Chinese community and Chinese foreign policy

Many researchers have studied the online Chinese community and its relationship with domestic politics and democratisation. Most take the line of Geoffrey Taubman (Reference Taubman1998), who predicts that the internet will challenge the ideational and organisational control of China's party-state. Sometimes, this challenge can be indirect and subtle, as dissidents may use the strategy of dachabianqiu (kicking the ball from the side) to criticise the party-state by using remote topics (Chase & Mulvenon Reference Chase and Mulvenon2002). Characterising the internet as serving Habermas' conception of a ‘public sphere’, Yang Guobin (Reference Yang2003: 461) argues that the relatively free chat rooms, listservs, newsgroups, electronic magazines and bulletin boards are already forming such an arena in China. Most analyses of the online community in China focus on its impact on information flow and the growth of Chinese civil society, or even the popularisation of dissenting ideas, such as Falun Gong (Qiu Reference Qiu2003; Zhao Reference Zhao, Couldry and Curran2003).

Online discussion of Chinese foreign policy is believed to have had an impact on the topics of discussion in the following ways. First, as Peter Gries (Reference Gries2005) and Liu Shih-Diing (Reference Nathan and Ross2006) respectively argue, when a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out in China in April 2005, online mobilisation was the major catalyst. They claim that this online mode of mobilisation bypasses the censorship of the party-state in China, and represents a bottom-up approach of popular nationalism (renmin minzuzhuyi) (Chan Reference Chan2005). Second, online discussions may have specifically influenced the policy-making elites in China, who may adopt ideas first aired by internet users to formulate Chinese foreign policy. For example, Chinese scholar Zhou Me (Reference Zhou2007) argues that the sudden cancellation of her scheduled meeting with the Japanese prime minister Koizumi, as well as the schedules of other high-level meetings, can be viewed as being influenced by Chinese online protests about China's foreign policy. Third, some radical users may hack into what they see as anti-Chinese websites, involving ‘collectivist tendencies and links to state and corporate establishments’, and pose a potential danger for Chinese foreign relations (Qiu Reference Qiu2003: 16). However, how such discussions of foreign affairs reinforce the stereotypical image China has of the outside world remains an issue to be studied (Warschauer Reference Warschauer, Kolko, Nakamura and Rodman2000). For seemingly remote regions such as Africa, studies on how online discussions among Chinese users influence their perceptions of the African continent are at best given scant attention and at worst almost non-existent.

A new phase in Sino-African relations for the twenty-first century: re-entry or re-charge? Academic explanations in the non-online community

Contemporary Sino-African relations date back to 1955, when Premier Zhou Enlai of the People's Republic of China attended the Bandung Conference, followed by the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China and Egypt in 1956. When the PRC was admitted into the United Nations in 1971 at the expense of the Republic of China (Taiwan), African votes were crucial. During the Cultural Revolution, China's support of her African comrades against imperialism (best symbolised by the huge investment in, but poor outcome of, the Tanzam Railway [Tazara]) was a cornerstone of Chinese diplomacy (Gao Reference Gao1984: 248–9; Jackson Reference Jackson1995). Sino-African relations started to wane after 1976, as most of the political and economic investments made by China in Africa proved to be of doubtful value. Fighting for formal diplomatic recognition from the Africans for the purpose of competing with Taipei's diplomacy also became increasingly unnecessary. However, after China's economic reform produced its early successes in the late 1990s, rapprochement between China and Africa was achieved. May 1996 can be identified as the milestone marking China's re-entry into Africa, when President Jiang Zemin visited Africa and presented a Five-Point Proposal for Sino-African relations, namely ‘reliable friendship, sovereign equality, non-intervention, mutually beneficial development and international cooperation’ (Alden Reference Alden2005: 147). This position, as Alden argues, is a significant move away from Mao's legacy, replacing the ideological motor with the concept of mutual benefit (ibid.: 147–8). What, however, are the reasons that lie behind Beijing's new African campaign? Although the explanations offered are interrelated, rather than coming from totally opposed schools of thought, the existence of non-monolithic views and interest groups on Africa within and beyond the Chinese borders has meant that different scholars have given different emphases.

Of all the explanations, two prime rationales repeatedly appear: those of energy and market. Scholars who support the resource maximisation assumption, such as Erica Downs (Reference Downs2004, Reference Downs2007) and Ian Taylor (Reference Taylor2006a, Reference Taylor2006b), argue to different degrees that the campaign primarily results from considerations for the supply of natural resources. As one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, and the world's second-largest consumer of oil, China is attracted to Africa's abundant resources to help solve its own economic problems; it has been a net importer of petroleum in general since 1993. According to a projection by the International Energy Agency (2007), China's net oil imports will jump to 13·1 million barrels a day by 2030. Chinese oil-imports from African countries have increased from one fourth of the total in 2004 to one third in 2006. Recognising the urgency of these issues, China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) has twice explicitly encouraged Chinese investors to go to Africa, in 2003 and 2005, in the hope of securing a long-term supply of resources (PRC ECCO 2003; PRC MOFTEC 2005). In November 2003, Chinese president Hu Jintao declared that oil and finance constituted the two major components of China's national economic security (Shi Reference Shi2004). China used to rely heavily on the Middle East for oil, which provided 40–50% of China's total oil imports, but over 75% of this went through the Malacca Strait, a sea route which is vulnerable to hostile action by external powers and terrorist attacks (Lanteigne Reference Lanteigne2007). As David H. Shinn (Reference Shinn2007) argues, the contribution from the African continent to China will continue to increase, as ‘China is reluctant to become excessively tied to the Middle East as a source of oil. China also lacks refinery capacity for the heavier crude that comes from the Middle East.’ Yet, we should acknowledge the fact that, as noted officially, the concurrent flames of a ‘China threat’ and a conspiracy of ‘plundering’ African natural resources have been discussed by many Africans, especially of the younger generation.Footnote ³ Anti-Chinese feeling has already led to protests and scattered violence in Africa, for example in the Zambian copper belt and Lesotho. Partly as a result, kidnapping of Chinese is more frequently reported in recent years.

While acknowledging the role of energy, other scholars such as Andrea Goldstein et al. (Reference Goldstein, , Reisen and Chen2006) and Domingos Jardo Muekalia (Reference Muekalia2004) give equal weight to the lure of the potential markets and investment opportunities in Africa to explain contemporary Chinese interest in the continent. According to Goldstein et al. and Muekalia, Sino-African trade could make a significant impact on the Chinese domestic economy. For instance, low-cost Chinese merchandise could be sold through the growing network of trading posts across urban and rural Africa. Through direct investment in Africa-based firms, the Chinese could take advantage of the mutual agreements between Africa and the USA (like the United States' African Growth and Opportunity Act, AGOA) and between Africa and the European Union (like the Contonou Agreement), in order to export textile and agro-industrial products to other parts of the world via Africa (Muekalia Reference Muekalia2004). They argue that this is why both the Beijing government and Chinese companies of different sizes have an interest in developing Sino-African relations, even though the general public may not share the same vision.

At the same time, forging strategic partnerships with the Africans is seen by many Chinese scholars, such as Luo Jianbo (Reference Luo2006) and Zhang Yongping (Reference Zhang2005; see also Xu Reference Xu2007), as Beijing's means of launching, or responding to, a diplomatic battle with other status quo powers, especially the USA. Besides the competition in economic and geopolitical terms, the African votes in multilateral forums represent scarce goods that Beijing is keen to obtain. Indeed, China and most African states share similar viewpoints on issues like human rights, democracy and sovereignty. Gaining African support on such issues might effectively put China into a leadership role of the Third World.

On the less tangible but equally important identity-building front, we should not neglect the fact that symbolic diplomacy and developmental assistance are still part of the key issues behind China's interests in Africa. Scholars such as Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong (2007) point out that the contemporary Chinese position originates from its identity as a developing, socialist and former semi-colonial country. Compared with other foreign interests in Africa, China is, quite often, believed to be thought of by the Africans as the ‘lesser evil’, allowing Chinese leaders to claim the Africans as ‘all-weather friends’ (Liu Reference Liu2005). The direct funding from Beijing to African civil services or the Chinese debt-waiving agreements with the Africans all serve such public relations purposes. These measures are meant to project a special message for the Africans. Unlike the assistance given from Washington, that from Beijing does not come with attached reforms aimed at changing tradition in Africa, and thus should be seen by Africans as a more welcome alternative. Whether this suggestion is overwhelmingly accepted by contemporary Africans or not, which is not very likely, it is indeed the rationale behind Beijing's recent ‘peaceful development’ (heping fazhan) diplomatic slogan – the latter replaced the more zero-sum implied ‘peaceful rise’ (heping jueqi). The slogan was coined in the hope of claiming more credits for China as a responsible state in the global arena, without violating its principle of non-interference in the domestic politics of other sovereign states.

Probably all these rationales were in some way behind Beijing's calculation to re-enter Africa in the late 1990s. The Chinese government has not denied any of these reasons for its African interest. As Andreas Lorenz (Reference Lorenz2005) reminds us, PRC leaders always work as traditional rationalists, pursuing only eternal interests but not eternal friends. But subtle questions remain. How do ordinary Chinese, as represented by the online community, view China's re-entry into Africa? Do their perceptions fit any of these academic assumptions, or do they come up with other justifications? Might their perceived images of Africa affect Sino-African relations? These are the questions to be addressed by this article.

Constructivism and internet response

Viewed as an ‘off the map’ continent by most Chinese, Africa has undeniably failed to draw particularly fervent attention from internet users. Most Chinese know little about African history and politics besides what is portrayed in popular culture. High-level political exchanges between China and Africa, such as the ministerial conference of the FOCAC, have gained little attention online. Even the recent kidnapping, and deaths, of Chinese workers in Ethiopia and Nigeria aroused relatively little controversy online, especially when compared with the heated internet response to every tiny move of the Japanese rightists. Nonetheless, online discussions on the topic may be found with prudent research. What then are the key differences between the internet opinions on China's re-entry into Africa, and the academic explanations cited above? Putting aside the energy, market, partnership or friendship issues, when commenting on China's re-entry into Africa, it was largely the constructivist line that caught the nationalist fancy of Chinese internet users.

Briefly, constructivism emphasises the role of constructed images and self-image imposed on other nations, rather than absolute interests. According to leading constructivist Alexander Wendt (Reference Wendt1992), ‘anarchy is what states make of it’, because ‘there is no “logic” of anarchy apart from the practices that create and instantiate one structure of identities and interests rather than another; structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process’. Realist interpretations of national interest-maximisation in the international order did exist to a certain extent, but, as explained by constructivist Douglas Porpora (Reference Porpora1993), they were only useful in explaining international relations when they were ‘embedded’ into the ‘social knowledge’ of a country. Politicians, as well as fellow internet users, could well apply constructivism to explain the mechanism of international relations as a strategy: a strategy designed to construct an image of reality. When a nation wishes to advance its national interests by constructing a desired national image to be taken up by the international system, it may intentionally use constructivist techniques – such as reconstructing reality – to create a more appealing national image, which however often deviates from the public perception found in the same nation. When China constructs itself to become a responsible state that is allegedly peacefully rising or peacefully developing, whether the Chinese in reality present such an image is quite another issue. The online Chinese perception on Africa and the Africans can be regarded as a typical example of this deviation.

‘Poor’, ‘lazy’, ‘sexist’, ‘threatening’: stereotyping Africans as inferior Chinese partners

These Chinese images of Africa portrayed by Snow and Dikötter can repeatedly be found in our research. To start with, there may be on the internet one or two random postings portraying the romanticised image of Africa: the ‘sincere faces and soft music’, the romance of Casablanca, the spectacular Victoria Falls and the like (Message ID 7835502, 2007; Message ID 142695, 2008). However, the almost-overriding perception of Africans that we gathered online from China is that they are generally economically and spiritually poor. Even the sympathetic users stereotype Africans as their ‘poor buddies’ (qiongxiongdi), a term coined in the Maoist era. While poverty in Africa is not without factual support, the general online Chinese view that the Africans are ‘lazy’ is more problematically grounded (Message ID 166266, 2007; Message ID 2627, 2007; Message ID 85548424, 2008). For example, when commenting on the purpose of the African summits in which China has participated, most Chinese internet users reiterate that Africans are ‘lazy and inefficient at their workplaces’, and draw a sharp contrast with the industry of Chinese workers (Message ID 534, 2006). This is also the general impression given by Chinese who claim to have actually visited Africa (Message ID 708, 2007). Understandably, many Chinese internet users see illegal African immigrants present in China as ‘paralysing’ Chinese society by unfairly tapping into the resources of the socialist welfare system (Message ID 58305, 2006). Even the few comments in defence of the Africans are often social Darwinist-based; they claim that the laziness of Africans can be explained away as ‘owing to the hot weather in Africa’ (Message ID 200781164714, 2007). As a follow-on to this logic, those Africans who choose to remain in China illegally are assumed to be doing so because they wish to stay in such a ‘paradise’ forever (Message ID 84, 2007). The dissentients of poorly educated Africans can always be recognised by the terms they attribute to them, which is the main focus of Dikötter's study already discussed.

These described perceptions of Africa are also found in some circulating Chinese publications. However, the extremely politically incorrect sexual references to Africans are more predominantly an online Chinese product, even though the origins of these seem to lie in the old Kunnunlu metaphor discussed by Snow. Some Chinese internet users believe that the physical strength of Africans is an indicator of their having sexual organs of ‘abnormal size’ (Message ID 82043, 2008). This is despite the fact that Africans' mystical strength, as viewed in the Tang Dynasty, is not necessarily commented on negatively online. During the Beijing Olympics in August 2008, for example, many online messages expressed amazement at the African athletes, saying things with racial overtones like ‘it seems that the darkest among the Negroes are the most powerful ones’ (Message ID 148612, 2008). But the level of sexual misperception becomes much more racist once the topic is raised online. In a message warning fellow Chinese women to ‘beware of the Africans’, various internet users said:

In a further posting commenting on illegal African immigrants in China, another user warns fellow Chinese girls that the main purpose of the Africans in China is to look for sexual partners:

Thus, the allegedly unreasonably active sexual behaviour of the Africans, as some Chinese internet users perceive it, presents a threat to morality and health within Chinese society. For instance, there is a story circulating online that ‘10 out of 40 Africans who go for medical checks in China are found to have sexually transmitted diseases’; reports that Chinese university students have been infected with HIV by fellow African schoolmates are frequently found (Message ID 58305, 2006; Message ID 86455443, 2008). Such alarming statements prompted even the sympathetic Chinese, like the following Guangzhou user, to be alert:

Worse still, this stereotype is extended to those Chinese who have established close relationships with Africans. Chinese girls who have fallen in love with Africans are often described as ‘horny’, ‘female liberals’ (nu xiaoyou) or ‘too open’. Sentiments expressed in the following posting are typical:

Given the above stereotyping of Africans, which clearly reflects attitudes similar to those studied by Snow in the first stage of Sino-African relations, what contribution do Chinese internet users see Africans making to China? When commenting on the kidnapping of Chinese in the Niger Delta in 2007, a user offered an innovative option for the Africans; this was to fight for China on inhospitable terrain, like the Indonesian jungle (Message ID 2_2104481, 2007). Another user suggested the Africans would only be useful to China if they could help kill ‘US spies’ in Nigeria, so as to defend Chinese interests in the area (Message ID 85595517, 2008). Compared with the superior civic virtue and cultural attributes of the Chinese, the strength and force of the Africans seem to be their only valuable assets in the eyes of online Chinese (Message ID 2627, 2007). In other words, even though the Chinese users do not see Africans in a very positive manner, they still rather wishfully keep certain stereotypical positions for Africans to fill in the international arena – presumably for China's benefit. Interestingly, it seems to Chinese internet users that Africans have little choice but to cooperate with the Chinese as an inferior, junior partner in the world. This perceived relationship between Chinese and Africans is nothing odd to Chinese internet users. It can, to a certain extent in their view, be readily compared with the relationship between the dominating ethnic Han Chinese people (who are perceived as more ‘civilised’) and the ethnic minorities (who are perceived as ‘barbaric’) that existed in the dynastic feudal China of the past. As a result of contemporary pride experienced in China, brought on by recent economic success, this centric-peripheral worldview, with its roots in China's ancient ‘Middle Kingdom’ complex, can still be applied to the present day (Christensen Reference Christensen, Deng and Wang1999; Nathan & Ross Reference Nathan and Ross1997).

Doomed disciples with the same history: the fatalist Africans should learn from the Chinese experience

Why are these African stereotypes being reinforced within the online Chinese community? One rationale of the users seems to be to employ the African image to highlight China's recent contrasting success. Indeed, most online messages describe China as an ancient nation sharing a similar history with Africa. To them, contemporary Africa is just like the China of old. Equating Africa today with China's dynastic past or the chaos of its Cultural Revolution, the modern-day Chinese can easily enjoy a sense of superiority. This sense of superiority is comparable to the core missionary feature described by Snow in his third stage of Sino-African relations. For instance, a user commenting on the ‘clash of civilisations’ in Africa says:

As another example, a sense of timelessness is often projected for Africa:

Sometimes, such historic analogies restrain users from making critical comments about Africans (ibid.). But they are not in the mainstream. Even though Africa is seen as sharing a similarly traumatic history with China, most Chinese internet users do not believe that Africa can eventually catch up and emulate the current Chinese miracle. Such a belief is firmly entrenched in the online Chinese stereotype of the African, as discussed in the last section. The ‘internal problems of the Africans and the African culture’ are frequently cited by the Chinese users to account for the ‘impossibility’ of Africa catching up with China (Message ID 2627, 2007). The following message from someone who allegedly had working experience in Africa is frank about the sense of doubt in the ability of the Africans:

Another internet user who allegedly observed the Chinese training of African military in Nanjing believes the same. To this user, the Africans are all but inferior:

The sense of disapproval also has roots in what some Chinese users generically term ‘the African socio-political system’. Although the Chinese socio-political system does not have full democracy either, to many internet users, China's authoritarian model seems to be able to offer a perfect substitute for the chaos in Africa:

Cutting costs – low priority should be given when money is involved: online calculation about realist-driven Sino-African relations

Given the above impression of the inferiority of Africa and the stereotypically assumed impossibility that Africans could catch up with the Chinese, either economically or politically, many Chinese internet users express cynicism and scepticism about developing a closer relationship with African nations, particularly when money is involved. To the users of SNF in particular, the implied benefits the Africans brought in the past, especially during the peak of Sino-African friendship during the Maoist era, have already been dismissed (Message ID 85014172, 2008). They see the ‘real intention’ behind African nations' befriending of China as being almost totally interest-driven, rather than looking upon the Chinese as their ‘real friends’ (Message ID 85217128, 2008).

Since the intentions and the sincerity of the Africans are predominantly interpreted in a realist manner by the online Chinese community, whether Chinese investment in Africa can bring reciprocal realist returns for China is of prime concern for the internet users. Most of them do not think that China's re-entry into Africa is of benefit to their nation, at least not in monetary terms. Some argue that Africa is the only continent available for the Chinese to explore ‘simply because the Westerners have no interest in it at all’ (Message ID 85611130, 2008). Quoting the famous realist doctrine of ‘no eternal friends but only eternal interests’, some users propose ‘constructing our eternal interests with the US instead of making friends with several poor African buddies’, since ‘both of them are bad guys anyway’ (Message ID 534, 2006).

The aid that China gave Africa in the Maoist era remains for many a sore issue. Consequently, discussing China's current aid programme, many have expressed doubts as to whether the ‘huge Chinese aid’ given to Africa would be redeemed this time also; they think that China's African campaign is far from being cost-effective (Message ID 2308022, 2007; Message ID 85498640, 2008). After the Sichuan earthquakes in May 2008, some internet users bluntly asked: ‘Which is more important, the huge developmental aid for Africa or the provision of free elementary education for our kids?’ (Message ID 2308022, 2007; see also Message ID 86205651, 2008; Message ID 86244154, 2008). In such a context, because of the lack of comprehensive socio-economic ties between China and Africa at the popular level in society, assisting Africans out of diplomatic and selfish needs, or assisting Sichuan's inhabitants for humanitarian and livelihood needs, is framed under a dialectical dichotomy, selecting a dichotomised answer from the two options poses no difficulties for almost all online Chinese users. In comparison, when natural disasters, such as earthquakes, occur in Taiwan, the same dichotomy is less easily imposed because the humanitarian needs of the Taiwanese are directly tied to their family or business affiliates in mainland China.

Although some of these comments acknowledge the abundant supply of natural resources in Africa, even the most positive comments on China's economic expenditure in Africa only see Africa as a ‘gold-mining route’ for ad hoc individual Chinese pioneers or desperados (Message ID 809662, 2006; Message ID 85548424, 2008). The potential realist benefits for China in gaining access to a cheaper energy supply from the continent as a whole, and the strategic importance of Africa to Chinese diplomacy, are not fully attended to by the Chinese users (Message ID 85428195, 2008). Most online messages simply equate the current African campaign of China with that of the Maoist era, the uneconomical returns from which still haunt collective Chinese memory. The gains China stands to make in the campaign, as studied by Peter van Ness (1993), are unknown to the users.

Africa ‘cannot be abandoned’: constructing China's national pride and benevolent identity via Africa

Paradoxically, despite these sentiments, the Chinese do not wish their country to abandon Africa either. If somehow the Chinese are seen as ‘losing face’ in Africa, the internet users will respond rigorously and complain that Beijing has not done enough. Any negative behaviour, or simply negative comments, coming from Africa about China are taken seriously by the Chinese internet users:

Despite this confession, quite often Chinese users simply deny that Africans might have any bad impressions about the Chinese. For example, when discussing why there had been kidnappings of Chinese in Ethiopia and Nigeria in recent years, some postings expressed the belief that the sole reason for this was that the Chinese workers had been mistaken for Japanese (Message ID 85420541, 2008). A more popular belief is that the Western conspiracy of portraying China as an aggressive country in Africa led directly to the kidnappings (Message ID 2_2104481, 2007). The reasons elaborated upon in Western media to account for these abductions, such as being a backlash to the flood of cheap Chinese products into Africa, are largely ignored by the online Chinese community.

When unfriendly African gestures are levelled at the Chinese, the internet community will mount a certain degree of pressure on the government. For instance, when a Chinese freighter – trying to deliver supplies to the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe – was prevented from coming into port in South Africa and subsequently expelled by the South Africans (under American pressure) in April 2008, many users were furious. They assumed South Africa to be like any other African nation and used to being befriended by Beijing. Few of them seemed to know that South Africa was highly critical of Beijing and maintained formal diplomatic relations with Taipei until 1997. They exclaimed that ‘even the Africans do not allow our ships to anchor, and bully us’, calling this ‘shameful’, finding it surprising that ‘even our African friends are not welcoming us now’ (Message ID 85496103, 2008; Message ID 85496042, 2008). To most of them, it simply meant that ‘our African policy is not working well’, and they asked government officials to ‘make a deep reflection’ and to go to Africa to sort it out. They also expected ‘official protests’ but none was forthcoming (Message ID 85496042, 2008; see also Message ID 85498640, 2008). This example shows that emotionally the Chinese cannot afford to be brushed off by the Africans, whom they perceive as being inferior to themselves in many ways. Without this junior partner and admirer of China reflecting China's relative success, the Chinese users find it hard to flaunt their sense of superiority.

This is why, even though many Chinese internet users have asked the government to reduce the scale of their engagement with the Africans, the Chinese commitment in Africa still gives them a sense of national pride. Although they do not like the Chinese government investing so heavily in Africa, they still hope Beijing will continue some ‘benevolent policies’ in Africa in order to help Chinese nationalists sustain their self-esteem (Message ID 156285, 2007; Message ID 85548424, 2008; Message ID 86932074, 2008). Indeed, the Chinese users often compare the Chinese aid offered to Africa with that offered by the USA, the European Union or Japan, claiming that the intention of these countries is ‘never sincere’ (Message ID 86541820, 2008). They believe that the unconditional aid offered by the Chinese ‘is not another form of colonialism’ but grants the Africans ‘a sense of confidence that cannot be gained from the Europeans’ (Message ID 1469849, 2007; Message ID 86541820, 2008). To them, the contribution of China in the development of Africa is more beneficial to the Africans than that offered by the Europeans (Message ID 86906864, 2008). Even the USA should ‘take the Chinese train’ if they want to enter the African market (Message ID 86682113, 2008). This image of China, which is built upon but goes beyond Snow's categorisation, fits quite well with the recent official rhetoric to construct China as a ‘responsible state’ in the global arena.Footnote ⁴ In short, most Chinese internet users agree with the strategy of constructing national pride by using relations with Africa to project a benevolent image to the world. The issue is simply how to do it in a more economical manner.