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Fertility, immigration, and lifetime wages under imperfect labor substitution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 November 2020

Ross Guest*
Affiliation:
Griffith University, Griffith Business School, Nathan, Queensland, Australia
Nick Parr
Affiliation:
Faculty of Business and Economics, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: r.guest@griffith.edu.au

Abstract

This paper provides new insights into the effect of birth cohort size on cohort lifetime wages and its sensitivity to the future trajectories of immigration and fertility. The main innovation is to relax the typical assumption of perfect substitution of labor by age. The effect of imperfect substitution of labor by age is to qualify the standard result that smaller birth cohorts are likely to enjoy relatively high wages since that result depends on the size of co-worker cohorts. The positive small cohort effect on lifetime wages therefore depends on demographic patterns, which are simulated here through low and high fertility and immigration projections. The analysis applies to actual and projected cohorts for Australia and tests the sensitivity to alternative demographic parameters, and the substitution and discount parameters. The effects of imperfect substitution can amount several percentage points of lifetime wages.

Type
Research Papers
Copyright
Copyright © Université catholique de Louvain 2020

1. Introduction

Easterlin (Reference Easterlin1978, pp. 401–402) argued that younger and older workers were imperfectly substitutable and therefore the observed relative scarcity of younger male workers in the United States from 1940 to the mid-1970s explained their superior “relative economic position”. Easterlin's hypothesis about the effect of relative cohort size on cohort income has received moderate empirical support. A large study of 21 European countries in Moffat and Roth (Reference Moffat and Roth2013) finds negative effects of cohort size on wages, therefore supporting the Easterlin hypothesis, with the effect being stronger shortly after entering the labor market and stronger for more educated workers. Moffat and Roth note that their findings are consistent with most, but not all, of the prior econometric studies.

This is the first paper that applies an analytical framework in order to show an Easterlin effect of immigration and fertility on the lifetime wages of future cohorts. Under imperfect labor substitution by age, lifetime wages depend on the size of the birth cohorts of co-workers—indeed the wages of birth cohorts are interdependent. The sizes of co-worker cohorts are in turn affected by trajectories for fertility and immigration which are applied in the simulations here. The idea that workers of different ages are perfectly substitutable is intuitively implausible. Skills and attributes differ with age, including physical capacity, judgment, maturity, ability to assimilate new knowledge, interpersonal skills [Guest and Shacklock (Reference Guest and Shacklock2005)]. The assumption of perfect substitutability by age implies, for example, that the marginal contribution of an additional 25 year old to a workforce is the same regardless of how many 25 year olds are currently employed—in other words, irrespective of how scarce they are. The assumption of perfect substitution of labor among age cohorts, although still common in demographic-macroeconomic models, has been challenged, tested empirically, and relaxed in a variety of modeling approaches [Levine and Mitchell (Reference Levine and Mitchell1988), Lam (Reference Lam1989), Hamermesh (Reference Hamermesh1993), Kremer and Thomson (Reference Kremer and Thomson1998), Card and Lemieux (Reference Card and Lemieux2001), Blanchet (Reference Blanchet2002), Rojas (Reference Rojas2005), Guest (Reference Guest2007), Prskawetz et al. (Reference Prskawetz, Fent and Guest2008), Roger and Wasmer (Reference Roger and Wasmer2009), Moffat and Roth (Reference Moffat and Roth2013)].

Fertig and Schmidt (Reference Fertig and Schmidt2003) analyze the effect of imperfect labor substitution by age on wages of large cohorts, which is relevant for the present study. They find through econometric estimation that the size of the cohort effect is not as large in the presence of rigidities in the labor market due to, for example, wage bargaining. Our analysis does not allow for wage rigidities, although we leave this question open for future research. The contribution in this paper is to analyze the potential magnitude of the impact of immigration and fertility on the Easterlin small cohort effect.

Several of the above studies estimate specific elasticities of substitution between age groups of labor. While there is considerable variation, the studies generally find significant finite elasticities. Roger and Wasmer (Reference Roger and Wasmer2009) found constant elasticities of substitution by age for different industries to be <1.5, while Card and Lemieux (Reference Card and Lemieux2001) found higher elasticities, in the range of 4–6. Levine and Mitchell (Reference Levine and Mitchell1988) find a wider range of elasticities for gender and broad age brackets, some being complements and some with substitution elasticities up to 8. Rojas (Reference Rojas2005) is perhaps the only study that introduces imperfect labor substitution into a full macroeconomic Computable General Equilibrium model with overlapping generations of households and cost-minimizing firms. That study investigates the effect of demographic change on relative wages due to imperfect labor substitution and is therefore the closest in aims and approach to the present study. In Rojas (Reference Rojas2005), cohort size effects have a significant impact on age-wage profiles; this affects lifecycle saving rates and has positive implications for the government's pension obligations, which is the focus of their study.

One point of departure of the model in this study is in the number of age groups and the implications for substitution. In Rojas (Reference Rojas2005) there are only two groups of workers: “less experienced” and “more experienced”, which they embed in a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) function of labor. This is a potential restriction. The model in this paper has 11 five-year age groups of labor. Also, the focus of this paper is different—it is concerned with the effect of immigration and fertility on the value of aggregate employment rather than the government's pension obligations, and the model here is applied to Australia whereas the model in Rojas (Reference Rojas2005) is applied to Spain. The present study implicitly assumes that age-specific education, returns to education, and labor experience do not change over the projection period or differ between the resident population and new immigrant arrivals. There is no attempt control for the education levels of the initial age cohorts.

The analytical method in this study is to apply an economy-wide CES labor index of workers by age, calibrated for alternative values of the substitution parameter which is sufficiently flexible to allow alternative parameterizations of the imperfect substitutability of labor by age. Firms minimize labor costs by equating the relative marginal contribution of workers by age to their relative wages. The empirical simulations here indicate that the relatively small birth cohorts between 1995 and 2005 increase the lifetime wages of those cohorts by several percentage points, but that plausible fluctuations in immigration and fertility can reduce or increase this by around two percentage points. In the absence of imperfect labor substitution, there would be no small cohort effect, and therefore different immigration and fertility projections would also have no effect on cohort lifetime wages.

This paper also contributes to the considerable literature on the economics of immigration. The literature generally finds that immigration increases average living standards in the destination country, albeit modestly, and that the relatively high concentration of the ages of newly-arrived immigrants in the younger working ages is a contributory factor [McDonald and Kippen (Reference McDonald and Kippen2001) , Withers (Reference Withers2002), Productivity Commission (2006), Bijak et al. (Reference Bijak, Kupiszewska, Kupiszewski, Saczuk and Kicinger2007), McDonald and Temple (Reference McDonald and Temple2010), Parr and Guest (Reference Parr and Guest2014)]. Much evidence also exists on the effects on the owners of capital and various sections of the labor force [e.g., Borjas (Reference Borjas2014), Card and Peri (Reference Card and Peri2016)]. However, there has been no analysis of the effects of immigration on the lifetime wages of birth cohorts. This paper provides such analysis, connecting the immigration literature with insights from the Easterlin effect of imperfect labor substitution, which adds a new dimension to public policies targeted at immigration. Similarly, while the relationship between fertility and income at the aggregate level has been considered widely [Fox et al. (Reference Fox, Klusener and Myrskyla2019)], the link between fertility and cohort lifetime wages via imperfect labor substitution has not been analyzed.

The focus here on the lifetime wages of birth cohorts has implications for intergenerational equity in that the lifetime wages can affect wealth accumulation, consumption, home ownership, retirement incomes, inheritance, health, and life expectancy [Abeysinghe and Gu (Reference Abeysinghe and Gu2011), Tamborini et al. (Reference Tamborini, Kim and Sakamoto2015), Attanasio and Pistaferri (Reference Attanasio and Pistaferri2016), Haan et al. (Reference Haan, Kemptner and Luthen2019)]. Intergenerational equity has become an increasingly prominent issue in public discourse in many advanced countries in the context of concerns about public debt levels, population aging, house prices, and climate change—all of which have intergenerational equity implications [McDonald (Reference McDonald2000), Thompson (Reference Thompson2003), Stern (Reference Stern2007), Garnaut (Reference Garnaut2008), Parr (Reference Parr2015), Stebbing and Spies-Butcher (Reference Stebbing and Spies-Butcher2016), Kendig et al. (Reference Kendig, Hussain, O'Loughlin and Cannon2019)].

Recent demographic trends allow an empirical exploration of the Easterlin effect in the context of migration and fertility. Following a 45-year period of decline, the annual number of births in more developed countries rose by 5.2% between 2000–05 and 2005–10 [UNPD (2017a)]. The country on which this paper focuses, Australia, had one of the larger increases in births: the annual number of births increased by nearly 26% between 2001 and 2012 [ABS (2014); Figure 1]. This substantial change followed a period of relative stability in the numbers of births. Other countries in which similar increases in births were recorded over the same period include England and Wales (22.4% increase over the same period), Ireland (18.5%), New Zealand (18.7% from 2002 to 2008), and Sweden (18.5%) [CSO (2018), ONS (2018), SCB (2018), Statistics NZ (2018)]. The Easterlin hypothesis would imply that the significantly larger initial size of the post-2012 birth cohorts will adversely affect their lifetime incomes.

Figure 1. Past and baseline scenario projections of annual births: Australia, 1945–2035.

The percentage of population formed by international immigrants increased considerably in a number of the more developed countries between 2000 and 2017 [UNPD (2017b)]. The ages of international immigrants to such countries (including Australia) are generally concentrated in the younger working ages (i.e., 20–34) at the time of arrival in the destination country [Eurostat (2019)]. Net immigration typically decreases rapidly between the younger and middle working ages, and more gradually between the middle and later working ages. With such an age structure, an increase in immigration to higher than previous levels will increase the sizes of the cohorts in younger working ages relative to the sizes of cohorts in middle and later working ages. Moreover, these differences between cohorts in immigrant population numbers will persist over the remaining lifetime.

Australia is an interesting case both because it has consistently had one of the world's highest rates of net international immigration and because immigration has been a controversial policy issue. Over 2010–15, Australia's rate of net immigration (of 8.6 per 1,000 population) was 3.7 times the average for all more developed countries [UNPD (2017a)]. In 2017, international immigrants formed 29% of Australia's population [ABS (2019a)]. Over the 2009–14 period, the level of net international migration to Australia fluctuated between 178,800 and 229,400 (0.8% and 1.0% of population), with an average of 203,900 [ABS (2015a)]. Similarly, fertility levels have also been an objective of public policy in Australia and other countries. In the mid-2000s, the Australian Government's family policies, including the introduction of “Baby Bonus”, appear to have been motivated at least in part by pronatalism [Heard (Reference Heard2006), Parr and Guest (Reference Parr and Guest2011)]. In 2005, the Australian Government reported to the United Nations that the national fertility rate was “too low” and its policy was to “raise” it [UNPD (2006)].

2. The model, data, and calibration

2.1 The model

Firms in the economy employ labor inputs, L i, where i = 1,…, M is the age of the labor inputs (workers). The aggregate quantum of labor, L t, employed in a firm by the M workers is determined according to the CES labor index:

(1)$${\rm} L_t = \left[ {\sum\limits_{i = 1}^M \alpha_iL_{i,t}^\rho} \right]^{1/\rho}, $$

where α i are the weighting parameters and ρ is the parameter governing the degree of substitution between pairs of L i,t. (See section 3 for a comment on the assumption that ρ is age-invariant.) The firm determines the aggregate labor input L t by minimizing total costs given an aggregate production technology. Our concern here, however, is only with the choice of the labor inputs L i, having determined the optimal aggregate labor input L t. The firm chooses L i by minimizing a cost function: $C = \sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^M {w_iL_i}$. From the standard first-order condition for optimal L i:

(2)$$\displaystyle{{w_{i,t}} \over {w_{\,j,t}}} = \displaystyle{{\partial L_t/\partial L_{i,t}} \over {\partial L_t/\partial L_{\,j,t}}} = \displaystyle{{\alpha _i} \over {\alpha _j}}\left( {\displaystyle{{L_{i,t}} \over {L_{\,j,t}}}} \right)^{\rho -1},\quad i\ne j,$$

where w i,t is the wage of workers of age i in year t. Since L t is the index value of all workers who are combining with the workers of age i in year t, then L i,t/L t is a measure of the workforce share of L i,t in year t. For the analysis here, it is important to note that the marginal contribution of L i,t to the aggregate index L t depends not only on the size of L i,t but also on the size of co-worker cohorts. To see this, note that the marginal contribution ∂L t/∂L i,t is given by the differentiation of (1):

(3)$$\displaystyle{{\partial L_t} \over {\partial L_{i,t}}} = \alpha _i\left( {\displaystyle{{L_{i,t}} \over {L_t}}} \right)^{\rho -1},\quad i = 1, \ldots, M.$$

This helps explain the result in (2) that the relative wage of workers depends on their relative labor size. Further we can show how the relative wage of a worker of age i responds to a change in its own size and the size of workers of another age, all else constant. The elasticity of the wage ratio, w i/w j, with respect to the labor input, L i is given by:

(4)$$E\left[ {\displaystyle{{w_{i,t}} \over {w_{\,j,t}}},L_{i,t}} \right] = -1 + \rho \lt 0;\quad E\left[ {\displaystyle{{w_{\,j,t}} \over {w_{i,t}}},L_{i,t}} \right] = 1-\rho \gt 0.$$

By (4) increasing L i will always decrease the relative wages of L i. Moreover, a larger L i will always increase the relative wages of the other labor groups L j. The latter result implies that the effect of cohort size on the relative wages of that cohort depends on the absolute size of co-worker cohorts.

It is also noted that the relative size of a birth cohort depends not only on the sizes of past birth cohorts but on the sizes of future birth cohorts which cannot be known in advance of their birth. Moreover, immigration may change the future sizes of all birth cohorts as they progress through their working ages. In other words, history is not sufficient to determine the relative wage of a cohort according to its size.

The discussion in relation to (2) and (4) has implications for the size of the Easterlin effect, which is represented here as the effect of the relative size of a labor cohort on the discounted lifetime wages of that cohort. The discounted lifetime wages of a cohort entering the labor force at year t is given by

(5)$$W_n = \sum\limits_i^{} {w_{i,t-1 + i}{\lpar {1 + r} \rpar }^{1-i}}, $$

where r is a discount rate. As an example, suppose that a worker is aged i = 1 in the year t = 2005, then the worker's wage at that time will be w 1,2005. In order to calculate the wage level, w i,t, we specify the aggregate wage bill for the economy:

(6)$$W_tL_t = \sum\limits_i {w_{i,t}L_{i,t}}, $$

where W t is the wage per unit of the aggregate labor index, L t, at time t, which is set exogenously at W t = 1 for all t (this normalization is discussed in section 2.3). Dividing (6) by w 1,t and using (2) gives:

(7)$$w_{1,t} = \displaystyle{{W_tL_t} \over {\left( {L_{1,t} + \sum\nolimits_i {(w_{i,t}/w_{1,t})L_{i,t}}} \right)}},$$

which allows all w i,t to be calculated by substituting for w 1 in (2):

(8)$$w_{i,t}{\rm}={\rm } w_{1,t}\displaystyle{{\alpha _i} \over {\alpha _1}}\left( {\displaystyle{{L_i} \over {L_1}}} \right)^{\rho -1}{\rm,} \;i \gt 1.$$

Using this method, we calculate the discounted lifetime wages, W n, for a worker entering the labor force for years between 2014 and 2100. The aim is to show the effect on W n of alternative migration and fertility projections.

2.2 Data, calibration, and demographic projections

The number of age groups is M = 11, consisting of 10 five-year age groups, 15–64, and a group aged 65 and over. The values of L i/L t for the base year are given in Table 1. The parameters α i are the labor input weights and are calibrated to the data variables w i and L i given the value of ρ which governs the relative degree of substitutability of workers of a given age with other workers. This calibration uses data on relative wages by age, as follows. Re-arranging (2):

(9)$$\displaystyle{{\alpha _i} \over {\alpha _j}} = \displaystyle{{w_{i,t}{\lpar {L_{\,j,t}/L_t} \rpar }^{\rho -1}{\rm}} \over {w_{\,j,t}{\lpar {L_{i,t}/L_t} \rpar }^{\rho -1}}}.$$

Table 1. Productivity weighting parameter values (α i) by age (i) and rate of labor substitution (ρ) for baseline projection

To determine the values of w i, we choose the average values of w i for full-time employees (persons) for the 10-year period 2002–2011 from ABS (2012). For ρ we apply two cases: ρ = 0.5, implying a constant elasticity of substitution by the age of 2.0; (ii) ρ = 0 implying an elasticity of 1.0. The ratios α i/α j are then determined given the scaling restriction $\sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^M {\alpha _i = 1}$ which allows α 1 to be calculated and hence all α i to be obtained. The choices of ρ and α i are interdependent in order to ensure that the calibrations are consistent with the known data for w i,t and L i,t [Temple (Reference Temple2012)]; hence, a change in one of these parameters implies a change in the other. Table 1 gives the values of α i for alternative assumptions about ρ and the values of L i/L and w i for the base year. Given the values for L i, α i, and ρ, (1) is solved for the value of the index, L t. The optimal values of w i are then determined for years t = 2,…h from (7) and (8). In calculating discounted lifetime wages, we adopt two reference values: 0% and 5%, which represent a typical range of long run real interest rates for developed countries [Yi and Zhang (Reference Yi and Zhang2016)].

Projections of future values for L i,t and, hence, L t are generated by applying age-specific hours worked per person to the projections of the future numbers in the corresponding age group I (assumptions for labor force participation are described below):

(10)$$L_{i,t} = H_{i,t}N_{i,t},$$

where H i,t denotes the hours worked per person in age group i at time t (i.e., the product of the employment to population ratio for age group i at time t and hours worked per employed person for in age group i at time t) and N i,t is the projected population in age at time t. The future population numbers are projected using the standard cohort component method [Siegel and Swanson (Reference Siegel and Swanson2004)]. A baseline population projection was prepared using the following set of assumptions:

  • Fertility. All age-specific fertility rates remain constant at 2013 levels. The corresponding total fertility rate (TFR) is 1.89 births per woman [ABS (2014)]. Australia's TFR is higher than that for all more developed countries and its mean age at birth is older [UNPD (2017a)].

  • Mortality. All age–sex specific mortality rates remain constant at 2013 levels. The corresponding life expectancies at birth are 80.3 years for males and for 84.4 years for females [ABS (2015b)]. For both sexes, life expectancy at birth for Australia is among the highest in the world [UNPD (2017a)].

  • Labor force participation. This is calculated as hours worked per person. For both sexes for each age group, between 15–19 and 65+ hours worked per person continues at the average values over the 2010–2014 period [ABS (2015c)]. Average hours worked per person rise steeply between the 15–19 and 25–29 age groups, are broadly similar between the 25–29 and 50–54 age groups, and decrease steeply with increasing age above 55.

  • Net migration. Annual net migration is 200,000 per annum and the percentage age distributions for net migration are based on the average patterns over the period from 2004 to 2014 [ABS (2016)]. Sixty-two percent of net migration is between the ages of 15 and 34. Australia's rate of net migration is one of the highest in the world, and the mean age of its immigrants is somewhat younger than for other more developed countries for which data are available [United Nations (UNDP) (2017), Eurostat (2019)].

The baseline projection is compared to four variant projections:

  1. (i) Low fertility, which is the lowest TFR over the past 20 years i.e., 2001 (Figure 2).

  2. (ii) High fertility, which is the highest TFR over the past 20 years i.e., 2008 (Figure 2).

  3. (iii) Low immigration, defined as 100,000 per annum net immigration, same percentage age–sex shares as the baseline migration.

  4. (iv) High immigration, defined as 300,000 per annum net immigration, same percentage age–sex shares as the baseline migration.

Figure 2. Past and assumed future total fertility rates: Australia 1980–2025.

2.3 Cohort size and lifetime wages

First, we discuss the effects of cohort size on age-specific relative wages (2) for the baseline demographic scenario. We focus on the differences between the birth cohorts “1995–2000” (which spans the youngest working age group i.e., 15–19 in 2015), “2000–05” (which does so in 2020), “2010–15” (in 2025), “2020–25” (2040), and “2030–35” (2050). Figure 1 shows that the initial sizes of the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 birth cohorts are relatively small, and Figure 2 shows the dip in the TFRs over these periods (Figure 2). The TFR recovered after 2000–05 and is assumed to remain at 1.89, which is approximately the average of the past 20 years. The 2010–15 cohort is projected to be a significantly larger cohort, reflecting the significantly larger numbers of births between 2010 and 2015 (Figure 1). Subsequent cohorts are projected to be larger still in terms of absolute numbers (but not necessarily as a percentage of the working age population). Figure 3 shows the average working lifetime labour force shares $(l_n = \sum\nolimits_{i = 1}^M {L_{i,n-1 + i}/L_t} )/M$. The figure shows that l 2000–05 is slightly lower than l 1995–2005 and significantly lower than l 2010–15 which in turn is somewhat higher than l 2020–25 and l 2030–35.

Figure 3. Average lifetime share of labor force by cohort (n), baseline demographic scenario.

Turning to the implications of these relative lifetime labour force shares, l n, for cohort lifetime wages, W n, an important qualification is the normalisation W t = 1 in (6). This assumption implies zero productivity-driven aggregate wage growth which would otherwise clearly affect cohort lifetime income and therefore lifetime income inequality. For example, if productivity-driven aggregate wage growth is 1%, cohorts 20 years apart would differ in their lifetime wages by 22% in the absence of any Easterlin effect and all else equal. Given that our focus is on the Easterlin effect and the extent to which it is affected by fertility and migration, aggregate productivity-driven wage growth is assumed to be zero. Given this assumption, the implications of l n for W n are shown in Figures 4 and 5 for the baseline demographic projection. More detailed results are discussed in the Appendix which gives tables showing the wages at each age for each cohort under alternative assumptions about the substitution parameter, ρ, and the discount rate, r. Figure 4 shows W n for a zero discount rate and Figure 5 for a discount rate of 5%. Both figures show W n for a relatively low (ρ = 0) and high (ρ = 0.5) substitution elasticity. It is important to note from (3) that under perfect labour substitution, ρ = 1, the age-specific wages, w i, would not change from one cohort to another and nor would the discounted lifetime wage—hence the series in Figures 4 and 5 would be horizontal lines.

Figure 4. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of substitution parameter. Baseline demographic scenario, r = 0.

Figure 5. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of substitution parameter. Baseline demographic scenario, r = 5%.

For the undiscounted case (Figure 4), W n for n = 1995–2000 is very marginally higher than W n for n = 2000–05 (by 0.1% for ρ = 0.5 and 0.3% for ρ = 0). The strong similarity of the results for these cohorts reflects the stability in the number of births over the periods when they were (initally) formed (Figure 1). W n is 1.5% greater for n = 2000–05 than for n = 2010–15 for the higher substitution case (ρ = 0.5) and 3.2% greater for the low substitution case (ρ = 0). Hence, the lower substitution case produces a greater effect on cohort lifetime wages. The differences between the results for n = 2000–05 and n = 2010–15 illustrate the Easterlin effect of imperfect labour substitution on lifetime wages; and the less the degree of substitution, the greater the effect. For the discounted case where r = 5% (Figure 5), W n for n = 1995–2000 is virtually identical to n = 2000–05 [just 0.02% greater for the higher substitution case (ρ = 0.5) and 0.05% greater for the low substitution case (ρ = 0)]. In turn, n = 2000–05 is 1.6% greater than for n = 2010–15 for the higher substitution case (ρ = 0.5) and 3.2% greater for the low substitution case (ρ = 0). The effect of discounting is therefore small—the effect on W n on the difference between n = 2000–05 and n = 2010–15 is 0.1 percentage points greater under both elasticity parameters. The effects of l n on W n for the other cohorts in Figures 4 and 5 are entirely consistent with the cases discussed for n = 2000–05 and 2010–15. From Figure 3, l 2020–25 and l 2020–25 are somewhat higher than l 1995–2000 and l 2000–05 and the values of W n are commensurately lower than W 1995–2000 and W 2000–05 (Figures 4 and 5).

In the next section, we discuss the main contribution of this paper, arising from (4), which is to show that the Easterlin effects of l n on W n illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 depend on demographic projections for immigration and fertility.

2.4 Migration, fertility, and lifetime wages

2.4.1 Low fertility

Under the low fertility projection, the TFR is constant at 1.73 for all years beyond mid-2015, compared with 1.89 in the baseline projection. The low fertility assumption impacts on the numbers of entrants to the labour force post 2030, and therefore the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts will be working for most of their working lives with cohorts born during the low fertility period. The effect is that the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts have smaller successor co-worker cohorts for most of their working lives, and this reduces their marginal contribution to the labour index according to (3) and reduces their wages according to (2), (4) and (5). Hence, the Easterlin small cohort effect is mitigated by the smaller sizes of successor co-worker cohorts. This is illustrated in Figure 6 which shows the average lifetime labour force shares, l n, for the five demographic projections. In the low fertility projection, the values for l n for 1995–2000 and 2000–05 are greater than under the baseline projection (by 1.2% and 1.7%, respectively), reflecting the smaller co-worker cohorts under low fertility. The effect is to reduce the lifetime wages, W n, for the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts by magnitudes that depend on the degree of labour substitution and the discount rate (Figures 710, Table A2). The reductions are smaller for higher labour substitution (ρ = 0.5) and higher discount rate (r = 5%) (Figure 8). The lower substitution case (ρ = 0) doubles the sizes of the effect on W n for 1995–2000 and 2000–05, as does eliminating the discount rate. The largest effects are 1.8% for the 1995–2000 cohort and 2.5% for the 2000–05 cohort where ρ = 0 and r = 0 (Figure 9). Despite the similarity of the sizes of the two cohorts, the effects of the change to fertility on W n for the 2000–05 cohort are greater than those on 1995–2000, due to the 5-year longer time the latter spends co-working with the cohorts whose size is reduced by the change in fertility (Figures 710). That the effects are proportionately greater with a higher discount rate is linked to the 15-year time lag between the change in fertility and its effect on numbers in the labour force.

Figure 6. Average lifetime share of labor force by cohort (n), various demographic projections.

Figure 7. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of demographic projection. ρ = 0.5, r = 0.

Figure 8. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of demographic projection. ρ = 0.5, r = 5%.

Figure 9. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of demographic projection. ρ = 0, r = 0.

Figure 10. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of demographic projection. ρ = 0, r = 5%.

Whereas under the baseline scenario 2020–25 and 2030–35 are “large cohorts”, under the low fertility scenario their initial sizes are reduced to such an extent that their average lifetime labour force shares are similar to those for the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts (Figure 6). The effects of low fertility on the share labour force (L i,t/Lt) are greatest 5–15 years after the entry of these cohorts to the labour force, when their co-worker cohorts are mostly older cohorts whose sizes have not been reduced by low fertility and their labour force participation rate is high. Further in their future, they are working with younger cohorts which, like them, are reduced in size by low fertility, which is why above the age of 45 their L i,t/Lt becomes higher under low fertility than under baseline (Tables A1 and A2). The similarity of their average lifetime share of labour force under the low fertility and baseline scenarios thus is due to a canceling out of trends with different directions at different ages.

The above analysis shows the effect of low fertility on the absolute levels of W n. We can also compare the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts and the 2010–15 and subsequent cohorts under low fertility, and compare this with the gap under the baseline projection. This intergenerational comparison is a comparison of the Easterlin effect under baseline and low fertility. The same process that reduces the size of co-worker cohorts and therefore reduces W n for the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts, described above, also reduces the intergenerational gap between these and subsequent cohorts in terms of W n. For baseline demographic scenarios, W n for the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts are, respectively, 3.5% and 3.2% above that for the 2010–15 cohort for the low substitution zero discount case (Figure 9). Under low fertility, these differences are reduced to 1.4% and 0.5%, respectively. Hence, in the low fertility case, the small size advantages of being in the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts are reduced considerably relative to 2010–15.

The advantage of the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts relative to the 2020–25 and 2030–35 cohorts is almost entirely eliminated in the low fertility case. There are slight differences in these magnitudes between substitution and discount assumptions (Figures 710). The increases to the value of W n under the low fertility scenario for the 2020–25 and 2030–35 cohorts are greater under r = 5% than under r = 0%. This is because for these cohorts, the effect of low fertility on w i,t is positive for the lower values of t (and i) when their co-workers are mostly drawn from older cohorts whose sizes are unchanged by low fertility and negative for the higher values of t when their co-workers are mostly from younger cohorts whose sizes also are reduced by low fertility. Indeed, for the higher values of t (and i), w i,t for the 2020–25 and 2030–35 cohorts are lower under low fertility than under baseline, because of the smaller sizes of their successor cohorts.

2.4.2 High fertility

Under the high fertility projection, the TFR is constant at 2.02 for all years beyond 2015, compared with 1.89 and 1.73 in the baseline and low fertility projections, respectively. The high fertility projection exaggerates the “smallness” of the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts—l n is 1.0% less for 1995–2000 and 1.2% less for 2000–05 under high fertility than under the baseline projection. This is because the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts are working with larger successor co-worker cohorts which raise their marginal contribution to the labour index and hence raise their wages, the opposite to the low fertility outcome. The Easterlin small cohort effect is therefore magnified, reflected in higher lifetime wages, W n, for the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts compared with baseline, with the increase being somewhat larger for the latter. The increase in the value of W n for the 1995–2000 cohort is in the range of 0.3% (ρ = 0.5, r = 5%) to 1.4% (ρ = 0, r = 0), whilst that for 2000–05 is in the range of 0.5% (ρ = 0.5, r = 5%) to 2.0% (ρ = 0, r = 0). Due to the higher fertility, the 2020–2025 and 2030–35 cohorts have larger sizes, as well as having some co-worker cohorts larger sizes. The Easterlin effect, in terms of the gaps in W n between the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts and the 2010–15 and subsequent cohorts, is wider under the high fertility scenario than under baseline or low fertility (Figures 710, Table A3).

2.4.3 Low immigration

In the low immigration projection, net migration is reduced from 200,000 to 100,000 while maintaining the proportionate age distribution of migrants for each year in the projection period. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively different from those for the low fertility case, in fact the results are closer to those of the high fertility case. The average lifetime labour force shares, l n, are slightly lower for the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts under the low migration scenario than under baseline (by 0.2% for both cohorts), whilst the differences for the 2020–25 and 2030–35 cohorts are negligible (Figure 6). The changes in l n are the net result of increases in labour force shares when the cohorts are in the younger working ages and decrease when they are older. When the “small” 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts first enter the workforce (in 2015 and 2020, respectively), they are working with cohorts whose sizes, in most cases, are less affected by the assumed fall in migration. Consequently, their shares of the labour force are higher than under baseline. Over time, the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts are joined in the labour force by increasing the numbers of younger cohorts which have been affected by the (assumed) low immigration over a longer time period. As the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts grow older, the comparison to successor co-worker cohorts, as opposed to predecessor co-worker cohorts, progressively becomes more influential, and the shares of the labour force in the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts eventually become slightly higher than under baseline.

By the time the 2020–25 and 2030–35 cohorts enter the labour force (in 2040 and 2050, respectively) the assumed low migration has been in effect for longer, and its cumulative effect on the numbers in older co-worker cohorts has been greater. Hence, the reductions to L i,t/Lt for younger age (i) low migration are smaller for the 2020–25 and 2030–35 cohorts than for the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts, and are balanced by larger increases for older i.

Since the impact on the 2000–05 workforce shares is greater than the impact on the shares for the 2010–15 and 2020–25 cohorts, the average workforce shares of the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts are even further below those of the 2010–15, 2020–25, and 2030–35 cohorts than in the baseline case (Figure 6). Hence, like the high fertility case, the Easterlin small cohort effect is therefore magnified relative to baseline, reflected in higher lifetime wages, W n, compared with baseline in the range of 0.8–3.2% for the 1995–2000 cohort and 0.2–2.0% for the 2000–05 cohort, and wider gaps in W n between these cohorts and the 2010–15 and later cohorts (Figures 710, Table A4).

Whilst the overall directions of the effects of low migration on l n appear broadly similar to those for high fertility (Figure 6), the effects of high fertility and low immigration differ in terms of which cohort sizes are changed and the directions of changes over time (Tables A2–A5). Whereas the effect of high fertility on l n for the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts is entirely due to the magnification of the size of co-worker cohorts, the effect of low migration on l n is the product of shrinkage to differing degrees to these cohorts as well as to their co-worker cohorts. Moreover, there are differences in the timing (and the ages) of the effects of high fertility and low immigration on l n which also affect the values of W n. Since the effect of fertility on l n for the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts is delayed, whilst the effects of change to immigration are more immediate, the proportionate reduction of W n by r = 5% relative to r = 0% is greater under high fertility (compared to baseline) than under low fertility (as opposed to baseline) migration (Figures 710).

2.4.4 High immigration

Under this scenario, net immigrantion is 300,000 per year from 2014 compared with 200,000 in baseline and 100,000 under low net migration with the same proportionate age distribution of migrants as in the other projections for each year. High immigration raises l 1995–2000 and l 2000–05 relative to baseline (Figure 6) and reduces W 1995–2000 and W 2000–05 commensurately (between 0.6% and 2.5% for W 1995–2000 and between 0.2% and 1.6% for W 2000–05). The initially small sizes of the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts are generally increased by high immigration to a greater extent than their predecessor co-worker cohorts, and therefore the Easterlin small cohort effect is mitigated (Figures 710, Table A5).

3. Limitations and sensitivity

The analysis here is partial in that some effects are not modeled. Firstly, the effects of changes in fertility and immigration interact: the effects of changes to immigration depend on fertility levels. Secondly, for simplicity, we ignore the effects of physical and human capital accumulation or education levels. Implicitly, education levels are constant within age groups. We could, for example, have modeled labor of a given age as an index of education levels, as do Roger and Wasmer (Reference Roger and Wasmer2009), but we leave this as a possible future extension. Also, age-specific education levels change over time. In Australia, for example, younger working age cohorts have higher levels of education than older age cohorts. Also, immigrants have higher levels of education than the Australia-born at a given age [Parr (Reference Parr2015)]. However, these effects are further complicated by the observed lower returns to education in terms of occupational status and earnings among the young and among immigrants [Chiswick and Miller (Reference Chiswick and Miller2010), De Alwis and Parr (Reference De Alwis and Parr2018), De Alwis et al. (Reference De Alwis, Parr and Guo2019), ABS (2019a)]. Moreover, human capital accumulation could be affected as larger cohorts may be more likely to experience larger school class sizes, shortages of resources and of teachers in particular subjects, less choice of schools, higher (private) school fees, greater competition (and hence entry scores) for scarce places at university and in vocational education and training courses. Our modeling also assumes that age-specific labour force participation rates are constant. As in other OECD countries, in Australia, labour force participation rates at ages 55 and above have increased [Parr et al. (2016), OECD (2019)]. Our model suggests that the more immediate effect of a continuation of this trend would be to decrease the relative wages of the cohorts which are currently in the older working ages whilst increasing the relative wages of those that are currently in the younger and middle working ages.

Another potential limitation is the assumption that the parameter governing the degree of substitution, ρ, between the pairs of workers of different ages is invariant with respect to age. It is plausible, for example, that middle age workers have a mix of attributes that make them harder to substitute than somewhat younger or older workers, in which case middle-aged workers would have relatively low values for ρ i, implying a U-shape pattern. Such a U-shape pattern was simulated in Guest and Jensen (Reference Guest and Jensen2016) . Simulations (not reported) indicate that a U-shape pattern for ρ i produces quantitative and qualitative effects of fertility and immigration, which are the focus of this paper, that are not materially different to those produced here, where the average value of ρ i is close to the constant values simulated here, such as ρ = 0.5.

Finally, the absence of a government sector in the model does not allow us to determine the cohort effects on taxation revenue and therefore on net wages. The higher wages of the relatively small cohorts may be partly offset by the higher taxes that they must bear, due to their smaller numbers, in order to finance a given level of government spending. Conversely, the lower wages of larger cohorts may be partly boosted by relatively lower taxes due to their greater numbers.

4. Summary and conclusion

The simulations reported here illustrate that the Easterlin small cohort effect on lifetime wages depends on the size of co-worker cohorts. The focus of the simulations is on the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 birth cohorts for Australia, which are relatively small cohorts, and the gap between these cohorts and the 2010–15 cohort and also subsequent cohorts, which are projected to be larger. There are implications for other developed migrant-receiving countries that have experienced similar birth trends to that of Australia, especially England and Wales, Ireland, New Zealand, and Sweden. The four demographic projections simulated here have different implications for the lifetime labour force shares of all the cohorts and for their comparative lifetime wages. The low and high fertility and immigration projections were chosen as a way of illustrating these effects in part because fertility and immigration have been the targets of public policy in Australia and other OECD countries for reasons discussed in the Introducton section. For each demographic projection, two alternative values of the substitution parameter and the discount rate were simulated.

In the baseline projection, lifetime wages for the relatively small 1995–2000 cohort were greater than that for the larger 2010–15 cohort by magnitudes from 1.6% to 3.5% depending mainly on the substitution parameter, ρ. Differences between the (similarly small) 2000–05 and 2010–15 cohorts were only marginally less. The low fertility and high immigration projections reduced the gain in lifetime wages for the 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohorts compared with subsequent cohorts by up to 2.5%. On the other hand, the high fertility and low immigration projections had the opposite effect: they increased lifetime wages for the 2000–05 cohort and increased the gain in lifetime wages compared with subsequent cohorts by up to 2%. The effects of high fertility and low immigration differ in their effects across time, and therefore the effects are sensitive to the choice of discount rate. Hence, the benefits of being in the relatively small 1995–2000 and 2000–05 cohort are not as great when the low fertility or high immigration assumptions are applied, and are greater for the high fertility or low immigration assumptions. The smaller effect of low fertility on the 1995–2000 cohort is due to the shorter time span it will spend coworking with younger cohorts whose size is diminshed by low fertility. In contrast, the larger effect of high immigration on the 1995–2000 cohort is due to the longer time it spends coworking with older cohorts whose numbers are considerably less affected than it is by the change to high immigration.

Our simulations show that immigration policy, in particular the quantum of immigration, affects intergenerational differences in lifetime wages and the effect depends on the relative sizes of existing generations, the elasticity of labour substitution by age, and the discount rate. Also, a pronatal fertility policy, if successful which is a matter of debate in the literature, could affect the relative prosperity of cohorts [Gauthier (Reference Gauthier2007), Parr and Guest (Reference Parr and Guest2011), Lopoo and Raissian (Reference Lopoo, Raissian, Averett, Argys and Hoffman2018)]. Since 2015, fertility in Australia has fallen and net immigration has generally risen [ABS (2019b)]. Both these changes serve to reduce the small cohort advantage of the millenial cohorts.

Whether the magnitudes found in these simulations are significant is a subjective question that has policy implications. If workers are not indifferent to a 2–3% increase or decrease in their wage on average every year of their working lives, then they may be not indifferent to the immigration or fertility policies that have impacts of that magnitude on lifetime wages. Moreover, the intergenerational analysis here is significant in light of the growing public discourse on intergenerational equity in Australia and other OECD countries, as cited in the Introduction section, where governments face large and growing public debts which some fear impose a burden on future generations. Long run issues that have ignited concern about intergenerational equity include population aging and climate change. The analysis in this paper shows that immigration and fertility can potentially affect intergenerational equity through their impact on cohort size. The analysis therefore connects new insights and evidence on the Easterlin effect with concerns about contemporary impacts on intergenerational equity.

Appendix

This Appendix presents tables with more detailed simulation results which support the figures in the text. Table A1 provides the results for the baseline projection for cohorts (n) born 1995–2000, 2000–05, 2010–15, 2020–25, and 2030–35. The labor force shares, L i,t/L t, and wages, w i,t, are given for each age. Underneath each of the columns for L i,t/L t and w i,t is the average value of these variables over the working lifetime, followed by the discounted lifetime wage, W n, at each of two discount rates: 5% and 0%. Table A1 is divided into two horizontal blocks, one for each of the two assumptions about labor substitutability.

Table A2 provides the corresponding results for the low fertility projection, Table A3 for the high fertility projection, Table A4 for the low immigration projection, and Table A5 for the high immigration projection.

Table A1. Projected share of labor force (L i,t/Lt), and wage for age group (i) at year (t) and discounted lifetime wages (W n) for birth cohorts by labor substitutability scenario: baseline projection

Table A2. Projected share of labor force (L i,t/Lt) and wage (w i,t) of age group (i) in year (t) and discounted lifetime wages (W n) for birth cohorts, by labor substitutability scenario: low fertility projection

Table A3. Projected share of labor force (L i,t/Lt) and wage of age group (i) in year (t) and discounted lifetime wages (W n) for birth cohorts by labor substitutability scenario: high fertility projection

Table A4. Projected share of labor force (L i,t/Lt) and wage of age group (i) in year (t) and discounted lifetime wages (W n) for birth cohorts by labor substitutability scenario: low immigration projection

Table A5. Projected share of labor force (L i,t/Lt) and wage of age group (i) in year (t) and discounted lifetime wages (W n) for birth cohorts by labor substitutability scenario: high immigration projection

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Figure 0

Figure 1. Past and baseline scenario projections of annual births: Australia, 1945–2035.

Figure 1

Table 1. Productivity weighting parameter values (αi) by age (i) and rate of labor substitution (ρ) for baseline projection

Figure 2

Figure 2. Past and assumed future total fertility rates: Australia 1980–2025.

Figure 3

Figure 3. Average lifetime share of labor force by cohort (n), baseline demographic scenario.

Figure 4

Figure 4. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of substitution parameter. Baseline demographic scenario, r = 0.

Figure 5

Figure 5. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of substitution parameter. Baseline demographic scenario, r = 5%.

Figure 6

Figure 6. Average lifetime share of labor force by cohort (n), various demographic projections.

Figure 7

Figure 7. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of demographic projection. ρ = 0.5, r = 0.

Figure 8

Figure 8. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of demographic projection. ρ = 0.5, r = 5%.

Figure 9

Figure 9. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of demographic projection. ρ = 0, r = 0.

Figure 10

Figure 10. Lifetime wage, W[n]. Effect of demographic projection. ρ = 0, r = 5%.

Figure 11

Table A1. Projected share of labor force (Li,t/Lt), and wage for age group (i) at year (t) and discounted lifetime wages (Wn) for birth cohorts by labor substitutability scenario: baseline projection

Figure 12

Table A2. Projected share of labor force (Li,t/Lt) and wage (wi,t) of age group (i) in year (t) and discounted lifetime wages (Wn) for birth cohorts, by labor substitutability scenario: low fertility projection

Figure 13

Table A3. Projected share of labor force (Li,t/Lt) and wage of age group (i) in year (t) and discounted lifetime wages (Wn) for birth cohorts by labor substitutability scenario: high fertility projection

Figure 14

Table A4. Projected share of labor force (Li,t/Lt) and wage of age group (i) in year (t) and discounted lifetime wages (Wn) for birth cohorts by labor substitutability scenario: low immigration projection

Figure 15

Table A5. Projected share of labor force (Li,t/Lt) and wage of age group (i) in year (t) and discounted lifetime wages (Wn) for birth cohorts by labor substitutability scenario: high immigration projection