Case Selection and Research Methods

Nairobi is a particularly suitable place in which to investigate questions of youth, conflict, and peacebuilding programming for at least three reasons. First, Kenya has a very youthful population, with a median age of just nineteen. Kenyans under thirty comprise 75 percent of the population, and 43 percent of Kenya’s population is younger than fifteen (Ministry of Youth Affairs 2013; Kenya National Assembly 2010b:26). While just 11 percent of Kenya’s youth population currently live in the capital, the United Nations (UN) predicts that the global number of youth living in cities will rise dramatically in the next fifteen years and notes that if current trends continue, “the plight of young people in cities is likely to be one of the main challenges of the Century” (Njonjo et al. Reference Njonjo, Kitonga and Ponge2011:56). Second, in the past decade, Kenya has seen multiple forms of unrest, for which youth are often blamed. Youth are reported to have comprised 70 percent of the participants in the 2007–2008 post-election violence (EDC 2009), there are repeated concerns about the radicalization of Muslim Kenyan youth by al-Shabaab^{Footnote 1} (ICG 2012, 2014; Meleagrou-Hitchens Reference Meleagrou-Hitchens2013), and violent youth gangs appear to be on the rise in urban centers. Finally, Kenyan policy makers and international organizations working in the country routinely prescribe education and subsequent jobs as the solution that will turn “the reality of the youth menace . . . [into] the greatest resource . . . of this country” (Kenya National Assembly 2010b:28). The government also notes the importance of developing “a sustainable program to create jobs in this country and get[ting] the youths of this country properly employed and engaged” as a strategy to prevent youth from being recruited by al-Shabaab, as well as to circumvent participation in youth gangs (Kenya National Assembly 2010c: 25–28).

This study is based on six principal sources gathered with the help of two Kenyan research assistants between June 2013 and October 2014: (1) a survey of 233 in-school youth, (2) forty qualitative interviews with a sub-set of these in-school youth, (3) eighteen interviews with principals and teachers from the same schools, (4) forty qualitative interviews with out-of-school youth, (5) nearly two dozen interviews with representatives from NGOs and the government who are involved with youth issues and (6) six focus groups from four participating schools and with two groups of out-of-school youth. While age brackets for youth differ by definition (for example the United Nations focuses on ages 15–24, the Government of Kenya on ages 18–35), this study focuses on youth in their late teens.

The Human Development Index puts Kenya in the low development category, ranking it 145 out of 187 countries (UNDP 2015). Forty-three percent of the Kenyan population lives below the poverty line of PPP USD1.25 per day (Malik Reference Malik2013). There are more than seventy ethnic groups, with five principal groups accounting for approximately 70 percent of Kenyans, and a political system that has consistently privileged some groups over others. In order to vary the socio-economic, ethnic, and other background factors of participants, I purposively selected six secondary schools, as illustrated in Table 1. The latter two schools were both located in slums (Over 60 percent of Nairobi’s population lives in slums.) (Oketch & Mutisya, Reference Oketch and Mutisya2012; UNESCO 2011). In each high school, a school official chose one form four (final year) class to participate in a written survey on themes related to aspirations, education, and day-to-day attitudes and behaviors. Students in form four are on the brink of graduating and entering the adult world or continuing their education, which places them in a unique position to reflect upon the themes of interest.

Table 1. Schools in Sample

¹ USD1 = KES100 (Kenyan Shilling)

² Students receive significant scholarships based on merit. Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) scores for this school are consequently higher.

In these six schools, we collected survey data from 233 participants. We then used the surveys to purposively select five male and five female students from each school to participate in a total of forty in-depth, one-on-one interviews, varying factors such as demographic and socio-economic background, school achievement, and civic engagement to access a cross-section of the different circumstances that characterize youth experiences in Nairobi. The sample demographics are summarized in Table 2. Using snowball sampling, we also spoke with forty out-of-school youth whose demographics are summarized in Table 3. These youths were concentrated in the slums around two schools in our sample. About a third had dropped out after primary school, another third had completed a few years of secondary school, and roughly a third had finished secondary school but had no prospects for continuing their studies. Nearly all of the out-of-school youth told us that lack of funds explained their being out of school.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of In-School Youth Sample for Interviews

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for Out-of-School Youth Sample

I also interviewed more than two dozen representatives from NGOs, bilateral agencies, and government ministries involved in youth-related issues to elicit their understandings of challenges and opportunities for youth in Kenya.

Finally, I presented the preliminary results to four focus groups in the participating schools (different form four students than those who participated in the interviews, since the original sample had already moved on) and two focus groups of available participants from the out-of-school interviews. The focus groups also served as an opportunity for youth to help explain and interpret the preliminary findings.

One limitation of these approaches is the likelihood of social desirability bias. In order to minimize potential bias and increase the comfort levels of the participants, all interviews were one-on-one. Most interviews with youth were undertaken by one of two youthful research assistants of the same gender as the youth participant and in the language of the participant’s choice (English, Kiswahili, and/or Sheng^{Footnote 2}); I conducted five interviews with male participants and five with females, all of whom were comfortable in English, as well as all of the organizational and governmental interviews. We communicated clearly that we were not engaging in programming, only research, in an effort to minimize efforts to impress us. With out-of-school youth, we tried to build rapport and trust via snowball sampling from known organizations and individuals. We have remained in touch with a number of participants and continue to engage in informal discussions with them. To the extent possible, in both surveys and interviews, we asked questions related to negative attitudes and behaviors about other youth, rather than about the participants themselves.

The Dominant Discourse: Youth, Conflict, and Youth Programming in Conflict-Affected Contexts

Education and employment programs are common strategies deployed with the aim of deterring youth participation in violence. Indeed, education and training are becoming the most common youth-targeted programs in conflict-affected countries (Olenik & Takyi-Lerea Reference Olenik and Takyi-Lerea2013). Likewise, employment programs are consistently identified as a top strategy (World Bank 2009; Creative & International Peace and Security Institute 2016). International aid organizations continue to expand both types of programs. For example, from 2000 to 2010, the World Bank increased its investments in youth-targeted initiatives fifteen-fold (World Bank 2010). While the end goals of such programming vary, there is often little variation in design; education and jobs are believed to be effective measures to deter youth from political violence, rebellion, violent extremism, and civil war (Monaghan & King, forthcoming).^{Footnote 3} While scholars often carefully distinguish between these variables, in practice, the international aid community often refers to these outcomes interchangeably.

Education and employment programming are consistent with the scholarly literature on youth and conflict that commonly attributes the correlation between youth bulges and various forms of violence to low opportunity costs among youth (Collier et al. Reference Collier2003; Collier & Hoeffler Reference Collier and Hoeffler2004). While most youth do not engage in violence, when there are many young people in a society, youth are said to have a “comparative advantage” in violence, similar to the argument often made of the poor that “life is cheap.” Youth’s opportunity costs—the cost of participating in violence, compared with the value of the sacrificed next best alternative (not participating)—are said to be particularly low. The upshot is that educated (Barakat & Urdal Reference Barakat and Urdal2008; Fearon & Laitin Reference Fearon and Laitin2003) and/or employed youth (Berman et al. Reference Berman2011; Izzi Reference Izzi2013) are busy with other things and have, for the most part, too much to lose to engage in conflict or other acts of violence.

Likewise, that education and employment are both thought to raise opportunity costs makes them attractive as widespread programs across the international aid community (see for instance Chaffin [Inter-Agency Network on Education in Emergencies] 2010; Dupuy [Save the Children] Reference Dupuy2008; IMF 2015; Mercy Corps 2011; Østby & Urdal Reference Østby and Urdal2011; Smith Ellison & Smith [UNESCO] Reference Smith Ellison and Smith2012; World Bank 2011). Interviews with representatives of non-governmental organizations, bilateral organizations, and the Kenyan government also echoed the same narrative. Nearly every interviewee discussed education and jobs as the solutions to getting youth onto pro-social pathways. Notably, each interviewee referred to youth as “idle” in explaining why youth involve themselves in conflict. And, as such, in explaining these initiatives, many interviewees invoked the logic of opportunity costs. For example, as one representative of an international NGO explained, “A lot of young people who participated in violence are [a] vulnerable group. They don’t have much education…which may then really limit opportunities for them, and makes them take an attitude of [having] nothing to lose.” Of course, the existence of the dominant discourse does not mean that all actors in the international aid community are identical and equally committed to the programs and logics presented here. Yet, reliance on this simplified narrative is a widespread practice of “Aidland” or “Peaceland” (Autesserre Reference Autesserre2014).

Moreover, as discussed in the introduction, the commonality of the dominant discourse is not matched by evidence of program effectiveness. As Blattman and Ralston put it, referring to employment programming in the aim of stability, they are “based first on faith, second on theory, and last on evidence” (2015:i). The same is true of education for peace, with governments, aid agencies, and scholars facing an “absence of robust evidence” and still seeking to “understand what works best among various practices and program interventions” (Burde et al. Reference Burde2015:12). Many explanations for the disappointing results have to do with programmatic elements: inadequate access to education, poor quality education, a lack of long-term vision, unpredictable funding cycles, an inadequate understanding of the local economy and labor needs, inadequate attention to increasing demands as opposed to youth employability, and/or poor targeting of those most at risk (Beasley Reference Beasley2009; Chaffin Reference Chaffin2010; Izzi Reference Izzi2013). As Spears writes,

Less common explanations target the more fundamental assumptions underlying such programming. These include that insurgency may not be as low-skilled an occupation as the logic presumes or that poor households typically have a “portfolio of work” as opposed to one job (Berman et al. Reference Berman2011; Blattman, Jamison & Sheridan Reference Blattman, Jamison and Sheridan2015).

This study focuses on yet another set of fundamental assumptions: the dominant discourse surrounding youth, education, and jobs continues to understand youth within a materialist, economic, or “human capital” framework.^{Footnote 4} Nevertheless, there are many aspects of youth attitudes and behaviors that cannot be explained in these ways (Cramer Reference Cramer2002; Frye Reference Frye2012). Indeed, recent studies point beyond economic rationales for participation in various forms of violence to the importance of psycho-social motivations (Blattman, Jamison & Sheridan Reference Blattman, Jamison and Sheridan2015; Gilligan 2016; Morris Reference Morris2014; Mercy Corps 2015), and there has long been a debate over the relative merits of understanding such motivations as rooted in greed and/or grievance (Collier & Hoeffler Reference Collier and Hoeffler2004). While simple and reductionist narratives, of the education-jobs-opportunity-costs type, are common in explaining developing and conflict-affected contexts, they often lead to unintended consequences that may be counterproductive, or even detrimental, to peacebuilding (Autesserre Reference Autesserre2012, Reference Autesserre2014). It is thus important to focus on more localized and contextualized understandings of youth aspirations and lives and to bring more youth voices, still too often left out, into the conversation. This study endeavors to do both by drawing on qualitative methods that prioritize youth voices and by focusing on youth aspirations.

Youth Voices: Aspirations and Agency

There are relatively few studies in sub-Saharan Africa that seek to understand what it is that youth want and why they want it.^{Footnote 5} Nonetheless, the period of youth is widely understood as a crossroads or watershed in which difficult or important decisions must be made—not the least by youth themselves, as suggested in the epigraph. While identity is constructed across one’s life course, identity formation is an especially important component of youth. The transition to adulthood leads youth to seek connections and to “find their place in the world” (Erikson Reference Erikson1968; Guerra & Olenik Reference Guerra and Olenik2013).

Aspirations are a key part of this process. Here, aspirations means “hopes for the future”; an individual’s desire to attain status, an object, or a goal. Aspirations are multi-dimensional, with education and career most common among studies, but with youth also often developing aspirations in many other realms such as environment, religion, and community (Hart Reference Hart2012). Aspirations may be the same as or different from expectations; expectations are realistic estimates of one’s ability to achieve one’s aspirations (Howard et al. Reference Howard2011). While aspirations typically develop at an earlier age, it is during the period of youth in which people expect their aspirations to begin to be actualized. Youth in their late teens, the age of focus in this study, may become increasingly pessimistic about their ability to achieve their hopes for the future (Armstrong & Crombie Reference Armstrong, Ian and Crombie2000). Indeed, in contrast to traditional accounts, where youth was seen as a clear, transitional, and linear phase between childhood and adulthood—during which young people typically completed their education, got secure jobs, got married, and had children—scholars are increasingly describing youth, especially in the developing world and across Africa, as a prolonged, or even permanent, period of “waithood” (Honwana Reference Honwana2012; Singerman Reference Singerman2007).

Despite the many challenges of youth and “waithood” today, a host of studies show that youth the world over have high aspirations and are optimistic about the likelihood of achieving them. Most of these studies are from the United States and the United Kingdom, but they also represent such places as Burundi (Uvin Reference Uvin2009), Malawi (Frye Reference Frye2012), and Tanzania (Nalkur Reference Nalkur2009), which are consistently among the poorest countries in the world and in the bottom forty on the Human Development Index (UNDP 2015).

Youth in Kenya too have very high aspirations, although “youth” need to be disaggregated, and there are some important variations (see Sommers Reference Sommers2015). For instance, the surveys and interviews with secondary school students illustrate important educational aspirations. In an open-ended question asking students in the final year of secondary school to list “what are your hopes for the future?” the most common answer was to successfully complete secondary education, with the aspiration of going to university coming in as the second most common choice. No clear socioeconomic patterns emerged; even those that experience various forms of economic hardship, such as regularly not having enough money to buy food and/or to buy school supplies like pens and notebooks, aspired to university degrees, including Masters’ and PhDs. Likewise, there were no statistically significant differences between ethnic groups. Girls, however, had higher future schooling aspirations than boys.^{Footnote 6} Out-of-school youth generally shared in-school youth’s high regard for education, noting the importance and power of education in bringing about social mobility. More than a third of out-of-school respondents, who had discontinued their education at different stages, named education as their top aspiration. Some out-of-school youth wanted to finish high school, some wanted to go on to university, while others wanted to take a course related to furthering their job opportunities.

In terms of careers, the in-school youth who participated in this study aspired to high salary, high prestige, formal sector positions that typically require not only university degrees, but post-baccalaureate degrees as well. In response to the question “what kind of job would you like to have?” the top four target occupations, in order, were engineer, doctor, “a well-paying job,” and lawyer. Again, socioeconomic background did not make a clear difference in aspirations, although gender did. Eleven boys, but only one girl, for instance, aspired to be engineers, while twice as many girls as boys wanted to be lawyers. More girls than boys also aspired to be medical doctors or surgeons.

There were again both important similarities and key differences in the job aspirations of out-of-school youth as compared to those who are in school. The most frequent responses to the question about career aspirations, in order, were: business professional, nurse, and (tied for third) athlete, doctor, engineer, and lawyer. Other jobs that out-of-school youth mentioned included: actor, chef, coach, computer professional, fashion designer, editor, entrepreneur, and journalist. Many out-of-school youth were more modest in their income goals and more specific in the personal and family needs that would be met with their earned incomes than in-school youth. Very few of the out-of-school cohort spoke about living a high standard of life or being rich. The humblest aspiration we heard across all interviews was from an out-of-school youth who aspired to a “decent job” which he defined as “one where you earn a legitimate wage, not something clandestine.” While there was more variation among this group than among the in-school-youth, out-of-school youth too aspire—and do so unprompted—to higher-earning, prestigious, formal sector positions that require significantly more education than they have.

Every in-school youth that we interviewed, as well as all but three of the forty out-of-school youth with whom we spoke, believed that s/he would achieve his or her aspirations. For many, it was difficult to even imagine not reaching them, as if it were sacrilege or tempting fate to discuss the possibility. Even when we asked some participants about whether they thought being from a poor background or being a woman could prevent them from reaching their goals, we typically received responses like this one from a woman living and attending school in a Nairobi slum: “No. If you believe you can, you can.” The in-school youth who participated in the survey (recall there was no survey for out-of-school youth) asserted strong agency and the belief that they could shape their own lives. Their survey responses suggest a strong sense of self-efficacy: the vast majority (217/233, 93 percent) “agree strongly” that they are “able to improve my own life”; “agree” or “agree strongly” that when they see a problem in their neighbourhood they can help fix it (197/233, 85 percent); and “agree” or “agree strongly” that “if Kenya is on the wrong track, I believe I can do something to help my country” (193/233, 83 percent).

Many interviewees, both in schools and out, described that in the face of challenges, other youth despair. Several participants explained, for example, that youth turn to drugs or even commit suicide after failing exams because of hopelessness and a sense of failure. Raising issues directly related to peace and conflict, many youth talked about how failure to reach aspirations makes youth susceptible to mobilization by politicians seeking to abuse youth. Two interviewees talked about how youth who do not meet their aspirations are likelier to join al-Shabaab. Part of these responses may in fact be about the responders themselves, responding in ways that engage in self-promoting bias. Yet, it was also marked that nearly every interviewee espoused that s/he was different and many said that they would “never lose hope,” displaying an optimistic bias (Harris Reference Harris1996).

In discussing possible failures to reach aspirations, youth often blamed themselves and believed that their personal characteristics are what either hold them back, or enable them to triumph. Consistent with prominent explanations for aspiration-achievement mismatches in US-based sociological literature, Nairobi youth appeared to have bought into ideologies of meritocracy and individualism epitomized by the American Dream and rags-to-riches stories. They believed in the possibility of upward mobility and were convinced that, despite challenges, “hard work and talent bring a just reward” (Sawhill & Morton Reference Sawhill and Morton2007:2). Also, consistent with explanations in the US-based literature, our study participants viewed education as the best means for achieving upward mobility.^{Footnote 7} As Silva shows, for instance, in her study of working-class adulthood in the United States, youth often see themselves as the principal barrier to their own success, as opposed to such factors as unexpected economic or social shocks and racism, “cling[ing] so fiercely to neoliberal ideals of untrammelled individualism and self-reliance” (2013:19). While nearly all participants’ responses indicated that they have a plan to achieve their success, most youth, both in-school and out-of-school, of both genders and from different socio-economic backgrounds, were very vague on the details of such plans. Most youth referred only to traits in responding to the details of their particular plans such as “work hard and have determination”; “being positive in everything I do”; and “trusting in God.”

There are both consistencies and inconsistencies with the dominant discourse that arise from these interviews with youth. Consistent with the dominant discourse presented above, youth highly value formal education. This does not mean that they found the education system in Kenya to be perfect—they had multiple complaints—but they had strongly embraced the instrumental value of education. They further placed high value on jobs. Also consistent, youth’s aspirations were, in part, driven by material concerns. As one boy told us in a statement representative of many, “In the future I hope to achieve in terms of my career to enable me to live a sustainable life, without any suffering or I can be able to fend for my family to put food on the table, such a life [in which] I can afford something.” Yet, while material concerns certainly underlay many of our conversations with youth, it was not generally what youth themselves chose to speak about. This suggests that the dominant discourse—focusing on education and jobs for predominantly material reasons—is too simple and reductionist; it may be fundamentally overlooking important components of what matters to youth.

Complicating the Dominant Discourse

Charting a Research and Programming Agenda

The dominant logic in the current scholarship is twofold: material motivations underlie youth participation in political violence, and education and jobs raise human capital in a way that makes it costlier to participate in conflict. This dominant logic has oriented peacebuilding policy and programming on the ground, yet evidence of effectiveness has not kept pace with enthusiasm. Understanding what is overlooked by the dominant discourse and why it is overlooked is crucial to building a research agenda in regard to youth and peace in Africa as well as to actually designing youth-focused peacebuilding programs that address youth’s needs.

The dominant discourse is simple in its materialist approach and in its consequent assumptions about the interests and concerns of youth. Its simplicity is part of its success, as it has been readily accepted by the organizations concerned about youth violence. As Autesserre (2012:207) writes, “an uncomplicated story line, which builds on elements already familiar to the general public, and a straightforward solution—is particularly important in enabling a narrative to achieve and maintain prominence.” As a way to understand and address the “problem” of youth, a materialist lens that recommends providing more education and jobs (or training ostensibly leading to jobs) is relatively straightforward. Efforts can be measured quantitatively. This approach does not raise fundamental questions about the complexities of what youth want, why youth involve themselves in conflict, the purposes of education, or the place of youth in society. It does not fundamentally challenge power or existing social or political frameworks. It is, admittedly, much more difficult to think about concrete, implementable, interventions that would help a broad spectrum of youth feel more connected to their identities and communities and/or that meaningfully challenge governance and social structures.

Including and prioritizing youth voices in research and policy-making is important in and of itself and may lead to a more holistic understanding of the needs and motivations of this demographic. In particular, two key challenges to the dominant discourse emerged from this in-depth research with youth: the importance of self-identity and community belongingness, and the challenging of governance and social structures. Both suggest further avenues of exploration for research and a revised approach to programming for youth peacebuilding interventions.

First, with a dearth of evidence regarding the effectiveness of education and job programs in fostering peace, this research suggests that programming is less likely to be successful if it does not engage with the aspirations and identities of youth. A number of recent NGO reports likewise attest to the importance of doing more to harness youth hopes and optimism (Mercy Corps 2015) but offer few suggestions in regard to the specific ways to do so. According to our interviews with young people, it is clear that current educational programs are not entirely wrong: youth do indeed desire education and ultimately jobs. Yet these programs also leave too much overlooked. Borrowing Amartya Sen’s terminology, “human capital” interventions—that concentrate on knowledge, skills, and effort in increasing productivity—are much easier than “human capabilities” interventions—that focus on the ability of human beings to “lead the kind of lives they value––and have reason to value” (Sen Reference Sen1999:18). In response to questions about programming that youth themselves would like to see implemented, many of them advocated for mentorship. One possible avenue for research might examine interventions that focus on soft skills, such as grit, self-regulation, mindsets, and implementation intentions (Duckworth et al. Reference Duckworth2007; Dweck Reference Dweck2006; Gollwitzer Reference Gollwitzer1999; Steinberg Reference Steinberg2014; Tough Reference Tough2013). Such interventions may help operationalize aspirations and offer a culturally embedded alternative to the dominant materialist focus. One promising study shows that, among criminally-engaged Liberian men, training in non-cognitive skills including self-control and self-image significantly reduced their involvement in crime and violence (Blattman, Jamison & Sheridan Reference Blattman, Jamison and Sheridan2015).

Second, this research suggests that doing more to address the structural challenges that youth face could also improve programming and related research. These dimensions, too, are omitted from the dominant discourse. Education and job programs generally overlook the structural conditions that enable corruption and other social injustices. However difficult, addressing deep-rooted questions of governance cannot be side-stepped.

Third, building on this study of youth aspirations, further research is required to understand the links between youth aspirations and their attitudes and behaviors, especially as they relate to peace and conflict. In the context of the United States, researchers are beginning to explore the role of aspirations, optimism, and hope as potential mediators of a host of positive behaviors. Higher aspirations have been associated with a reduction in a variety of violent actions (Aspy et al. Reference Aspy2004; Bernard et al. Reference Bernard2014; Bernat et al. Reference Bernat2012; Howard et al. Reference Howard2011; Stoddard et al. Reference Stoddard2011). Then, equally importantly, more research is needed to understand how, under what conditions, and to what effect, youth lose hope (Mains Reference Mains2012; Sommers Reference Sommers2012). Unmet aspirations are increasingly cited in the youth and conflict literature as a driver for participation in violent conflict (McLean Hilker & Fraser Reference McLean Hilker and Fraser2009; Ray Reference Ray, Banerjee, Benabou and Mookherjee2006), although with little empirical study.

The world population is currently comprised of the largest number of youth in history, and projections suggest that the “youth bulge” will never again be so large (Sommers Reference Sommers2015:18). By 2020, there are projected to be 57 million more fifteen-to-twenty-four year olds in Arab states, south and west Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. This youth cohort will require significant expansion of education and employment opportunities, simply to remain at current levels. The situation is particularly acute in Africa since, within two to three decades, three of every four youth-bulge countries will be in sub-Saharan Africa (Borton Reference Borton2009; Njonjo et al. Reference Njonjo, Kitonga and Ponge2011; UNESCO 2012). In the next decade, Kenya is projected to move from a child-rich population to one dominated by youth. While the questions raised herein are globally pressing, they are of heightened relevance for Kenya and Africa.