…we who were Occidentals now have been made Orientals. He who was a Roman or a Frank is now a Galilaean, or an inhabitant of Palestine. One who was a citizen of Rheims or of Chartres now has been made a citizen of Tyre or of Antioch. We have already forgotten the places of our birth; already they have become unknown to many of us, or, at least, are unmentioned. Some already possess here homes and servants which they have received through inheritance. Some have taken wives not merely of their own people, but Syrians, or Armenians, or even Saracens who have received the grace of baptism. Some have with them father-in-law, or daughter-in-law, or son-in-law, or stepson, or step-father. There are here, too, grandchildren and great-grandchildren…. The one and the other use mutually the speech and the idioms of the different languages.
———Fulcher of Chartres, ca. 1120 CEFootnote 1This cursed man was a superior man, although God did not inform him of the right religion.… He was an extraordinary man.
———Ibn Ḥayyān al-QurṭubīFootnote 2Recent years have seen an increase in interest in the pre- and early modern Mediterranean as a discrete historical region. Work that has been done on Mediterranean trade, environment, and intellectual culture, for example, has helped to establish the notion that one can speak of “the Mediterranean” in a similar manner as one speaks of “Europe,” or “the Islamic World,” or “Africa.”Footnote 3 Indeed, in many contexts the Mediterranean provides a framework for inquiry that is much more appropriate for the period. Nevertheless, this has met with considerable skepticism and resistance from those determined to see the area as a space of intersection rather than a coherent and discrete region with particular characteristics. Part of this is due to the distorting effects of modern historical discourse, which has developed in such a way, for example, that national identities, though a recent historical innovation, are viewed almost as platonic universals.Footnote 4 This remains particularly evident in literary studies, where the dominance of national paradigms—anachronistic and inappropriate as they may be—exerts a chokehold on comparative and pre-national studies. History and art history are subject to the same distortions, if slightly more subtly. Furthermore, imprecise and variable taxonomical labels such as “Europe,” “Spain,” “Italy,” and “the Islamic world” are imagined to have a validity that is exclusive for describing historical developments and cultural identity, when in many contexts they have little value. Adding to this is the tendency for us to imagine history on teleological terms and to adduce a schema of historical development that, despite our best intentions, remains overwhelmingly and instinctively Eurocentric.Footnote 5
It is certainly legitimate to regard the Mediterranean as an area in which three major ecumenian spheres—Islam, Latin Christendom, and Byzantine Christendom—rubbed up against each other and overlapped, and in which one “ecumenian” culture, Judaism, was manifest throughout the region.Footnote 6 But to imagine it exclusively on these terms is a mistake, and applying this framework as a universally valid paradigm leads almost inevitably to the development of faulty analyses based on modal fallacies, essentialist assumptions, and selective use of evidence. In short, to analyze them on purely ecumenian terms would be as absurd to do for the past as for the present. As important as they may have been, there is no reason to assume that confessional divisions trumped all other factors in determining either policy or the politics of personal and community identity. In any event, if in certain contexts the Mediterranean can be seen as partitioned into zones of distinct ethno-religious identity, in many other contexts it is precisely the opposite that is true.
It is just as accurate to characterize the Mediterranean in the premodern era as a zone of profound and remarkable interpenetration of ecumenian groups, particularly during the period from roughly 750 to 1450 CE. Latins, Byzantines, and Muslims all existed as minority communities under the rule of rival ecumenian groups. And dispersed around the Mediterranean were not only Jews, who themselves comprised three confessional groups, but a host of other non-sovereign or semi-sovereign ethno-religious groups, including Armenians (both Melkite and Armenian Christians, as well as Muslims), Copts, Syriac Christians, and Turkic peoples.Footnote 7 The result was not merely a situation of cohabitation, but one in which members of distinct ethno-religious groups were interconnected and interdependent economically, politically, intellectually, culturally, and at times, socially. As the much-quoted declaration of Fulcher of Chartres in my epigraph reflects, the ecumenian was only one vector of identity among many that individuals and groups might deploy at any given time. In many cases, even religious identity became imprecise and ambiguous.Footnote 8 Common lifestyles, consumption patterns, languages, and social traditions often bound together groups of distinct confessional orientations, encouraging acculturation and communication, but also provoking anxiety and defensiveness.Footnote 9 While such dynamics are not exclusive to the Mediterranean at this time, the diversity of ethno-cultural communities involved, the variety of contexts of intercourse, and the proportion of the population that minorities comprised made the region unique in the contemporary West. It was these characteristics that generated the cultural, intellectual, and commercial ferment of the Mediterranean that transformed the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian worlds.Footnote 10
And yet, few broadly comparative studies of medieval Mediterranean societies have been carried out, and works that address the nature of the region per se—what Horden and Purcell have qualified as “history of,” rather than “history in” the Mediterranean—are uncommon.Footnote 11 This is due in part to the linguistic (and paleographic) challenges inherent in carrying out such studies, particularly if they are based on unedited archival material, in part to the often incompatible or non-comparable data sets that are available for different societies around the Mediterranean, and in part because the weight of the ecumenian paradigm makes it difficult to establish a comparative approach. This essay presents a comparative study—or rather a sketch—of one aspect of ecumenian interaction in the medieval Mediterranean: the situation of members of ethno-religious minorities who were appointed to powerful political positions within the dominant or majority society under which they lived. It takes as its point of departure the careers of three individuals, who throve in the period from the mid-eleventh to the mid-twelfth centuries in distinct Mediterranean locales.
THREE CASE STUDIES
The first of my three cases is that of Yehōsēf (Joseph) ha-Levi—better known as Yūsuf b. Naghrālla (or Naghrilla)—who was proclaimed nagid, or “leader,” of the Iberian Jews, and served as wazīr (“prime minister”) of the Muslim Kingdom of Granada. In December 1066, Yūsuf was crucified in the aftermath of a popular uprising, which claimed not only his life but purportedly also the lives of a significant proportion of the Jewish community of the city of Granada. The kingdom of Granada was one of more than a score of taifa, or “sectarian” kingdoms (mulūk al-ṭawā'if), that emerged in Islamic Spain following the sudden collapse of the Caliphate of Cordoba in the early eleventh century. It was established thanks to an accord between the Muslim, Jewish, and Christian inhabitants of the area and a clan of Berber mercenaries, the Banū Zīrī, refugees who had abandoned Cordoba and were on their way back to their Tunisian homeland.Footnote 12
In the 1020s a young Jewish scholar and aristocrat, Shemu’ēl (Samuel), or Ismaʿīl b. Naghrālla, was recruited to work as a secretary and tax official in the Kingdom of Granada, and soon rose to the rank of wazīr and commander-in-chief of the Muslim kingdom's armies. He was also the first nagid of Spanish Jewry. A towering figure in Muslim and Jewish society in al-Andalus, Ismaʿīl was a courtier, littérateur, religious authority, military man, and consummate politico. He had close allies and supporters as well as bitter enemies within both communities. That Ismaʿīl was a Jew who was effectively ruling over a Muslim kingdom was exploited as propaganda by rival kingdoms and archenemies Seville and Almería, though each of them also cultivated important Jewish communities and Jews also occupied positions of power and influence there.Footnote 13 But Ismaʿīl also had messianic ambitions, and imagined himself as a prophet-king who would save “Israel.”Footnote 14 When he died in 1056, his position and ambitions were inherited by his son, Yūsuf, who was widely regarded as a budding scholar and generous patron, but lacked his father's finesse, discretion, and political and military abilities.Footnote 15
Things soon came to a head as a series of power struggles developed within the family of the reigning king, Bādis (1038–1073). When the king's favorite son and heir apparent, Bulluggīn, was poisoned, it was loudly rumored that Yūsuf had done it. From here, things went from bad to worse for Yūsuf, who launched a series of backfiring intrigues, mishandling and misjudging situation after situation as the kingdom slid into crisis. With his enemies closing in, Yūsuf struck on a daring plan to save his own situation and realize his father's ambitions. He dispatched messengers to Ibn Ṣumādiḥ, ruler of the neighboring kingdom of Almería, a traditional enemy, promising to open Granada's gates to his army if Ibn Ṣumādiḥ would install him as king in exchange for his submission and allegiance. But it was not to be; Ibn Ṣumādiḥ lost his nerve at the last moment, and as Yūsuf held a feast on the eve of the anticipated invasion and regaled his slaves and clients with the riches that would soon be theirs, word of his plot got out. When it was shouted through the streets that he had assassinated Bādis and was about to betray the kingdom, the populace rose up, chased him down, and killed him, and then sacked his palace and attacked the city's Jewish community.Footnote 16
My second case focuses on Philip of Mahdia, admiral and confidant of Roger II, king of Sicily (1130–1054; 1105–1130 as count), and son of Roger d'Hauteville, the Norman adventurer who conquered the island from the Muslims and fought the Byzantines on the Italian mainland.Footnote 17 In 1147, Philip had led the kingdom's conquest of the Tunisian port city of Bône (‘Annaba), completing Roger II's conquest of the Zirid kingdom of Ifrīqiya, over which the Christian king had assumed both authority and title, as mālik Ifrīqiya (“king of Africa”).Footnote 18 But Philip's homecoming was far from triumphant, since shortly after his return to Palermo he was called up on charges of treason and apostasy, and after a very public trial was dragged from the palace to the lime kilns outside the city by a team of wild horses, and was there burned alive.Footnote 19 Roger himself was closely tied to the case. He had, according to his testimony, served as a mentor for Philip, a Muslim eunuch he had purchased or acquired as a young man. Philip had been raised a Christian and become an intimate in Roger's court, rising through the administration until he was given command of the king's fleet.
But it seems that Philip's conversion was a ruse and that he maintained his old faith. He was known, it turns out, for acts of pious Islamic charity, including supporting the mosques of Palermo's large Muslim community and sending offerings to the tomb of the Prophet Muḥammad in Medina. Apostasy was not only an offence punishable by death, but was held to be an expression of a general propensity to betrayal. A very specific betrayal, or suspected betrayal, was probably the cause of Philip's execution. At the dawn of the twelfth century, Zirid Ifrīqiya had comprised one corner of a geopolitical triangle composed also of Norman Sicily and the Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt, with their relations characterized by alliances, diplomatic exchange, trade, and competition. When, in the century's first decades, the Zirid kingdom began to sunder from internal political tensions, the Normans and the Fatimids looked on hungrily. From the 1120s onward, the Normans began conquering the Tunisian port cities either by assault or intimidation, beginning with those closest to Fatimid territories. Bône was the westernmost port and the last to fall. But the Normans and Fatimids were not the only ones looking towards the Zirid kingdom; the Almohads, a messianic religious-political movement originating in Morocco's Atlas Mountains, had emerged as the new predatory imperial power in the western Mediterranean. Having destroyed the Almoravid imperium in the Maghrib and Spain, they were now turning toward the east, and they approached Bône at the precise time the Normans took it. In 1160, when the city capitulated to Philip of Mahdia, he made a generous concession not untypical of either Muslim or Christian conquerors in the medieval Mediterranean: he allowed the wealthiest citizens to withdraw with their property to the countryside. But in the present context, it was an act that could be construed as the admiral hedging his bets, or even garnering favor with the local Muslim community prior to his own defection to the Almohads. Roger could not take a chance, and an unequivocal, public example needed to be made—Philip was put to a very public death.Footnote 20
My final case is that of Ibn Dukhān, a Coptic Christian who was evidently a finance minister of the last Fatimid Caliph, al-ʿĀḍid li-Dīn Allāh (1160–1171), in the mid-twelfth century.Footnote 21 In the wake of what are described in the account of his trial as a series of outrages which the powerful Ibn Dukhān had perpetrated on the caliphate and its Muslim subjects, he was taken to task by a certain Zayn al-Dīn, an expatriate Damascene cleric, who during an administrative assembly denounced him publicly for embezzlement from the state treasury and spying for the Frankish crusaders. In 1160/1161, Ibn Dukhān was sentenced to death and executed. Although the figure of Ibn Dukhān is attested in contemporary satirical poetry, the account of his trial was recorded in the thirteenth century by Zayn al-Dīn's great-grandson, the poet, polemicist, and civil servant al-Nābulusī, and subsequently developed as a stock tale of Coptic malfeasance among the Muslim majority in Mameluke lands. In his stinging indictment, which presented Ibn Dukhān's dishonesty as a consequence of his religious identity, Zayn al-Dīn referred to all Christians, saying, “They … make the number one to be three, when they reckon the One Unique as Three…. And Almighty God … said, ‘They do blaspheme who say: God is one of three in a Trinity: for there is no god except One God.’ … How can accounting be understood by those who impart God with the claim that He is three, when He is One?”Footnote 22
While it is reasonable to assume that Ibn Dukhān was skimming from the top of whatever financial accounts he was managing for the caliphate, since such was normal business practice in the medieval world as much as today, the charge that he was spying for the Franks and the other, more lurid accusations were almost certainly untrue. The Coptic Christians, who may well have still comprised the majority of the Egyptian population, had arrived long before at an accommodation with their Muslim overlords, and relations between the two communities were for the most part stable, and even cordial.Footnote 23 While the Christians had yielded their sovereignty to the Islamic regime, they had managed to maintain a virtual monopoly on the kingdom's fiscal administration. As for the Frankish crusaders, while it is true that the Copts shared a common ecumenian orientation with them, there is little evidence of cordial relations, and by the mid-twelfth century it would have been clear to Copts who had observed Frankish comportment toward native Christians in Palestine that the Egyptian Church stood to gain nothing from a crusader conquest.Footnote 24 Indeed, half a century later, the crusade at Damietta failed due not only to the hubris of the papal legate Pelagius but also an outbreak of gastrointestinal illness rumored to have been the work of native Christians who deliberately sold the Frankish camp putrid fish. Another sensational accusation that Zayn al-Dīn made—that Ibn Dukhān had publicly forced a Coptic convert to Islam to apostatize and return to his old religion—was also undoubtedly false; the Coptic aristocracy was certainly proud, but not so foolhardy as to openly defy Islamic law.Footnote 25
A MEDITERRANEAN PHENOMENON
In sum, these three episodes all took place within the same hundred-year period but were scattered across the breadth of the Mediterranean, and in each case an individual who belonged to an ethno-religious minority held tremendous political power in a kingdom defined and dominated by a rival ecumenian group. All three ended up executed or killed. One was a Jew, one a Muslim, and another a Christian; in two cases the dominant religious culture was Islamic and the other Christian. If one were to assume that minority-majority relations in the medieval Mediterranean were primarily the consequence of religio-cultural factors, or of “civilizational” characteristics, then one would not expect these cases to resemble each other except perhaps superficially. However, when we compare the cases of Yūsuf b. Naghrālla, Philip of Mahdia, and Ibn Dukhān, then strikingly common circumstances and patterns emerge that suggest a Mediterranean dynamic defined by confessional particularities only in part.
Each of these individuals, for example, lived in societies that were undergoing major transformations, particularly in the sphere of ecumenian hegemony. Yūsuf b. Naghrālla lived in the taifa kingdom of Granada. It was a kingdom of indigenous Arab-identifying Muslims, with a significant Jewish population and a smattering of Christians, ruled over by an illiterate Berber military elite. The ruling clan, who were Ṣanhāja tribesmen, were not only riven by internal rivalries but also had to contend with a hostile Zanāta faction. The kingdom was in a state of constant conflict with its Muslim neighbors, notably Seville and Almería, and was caught between predatory Christian Castile-Léon, and the only slightly less threatening Muslim Almoravids of the Maghrib.Footnote 26
Philip of Mahdia was a castrated, crypto-Muslim African who lived in a Sicily inhabited overwhelmingly by Byzantine Christians and Muslims of North African origin, and ruled by a Latin prince with marked Byzantine-Greek and Islamo-Arabic affectations who was strongly beholden to a small Italo-Norman military and ecclesiastical clique. Moreover, the kingdom was expanding, against both its Latin and Byzantine neighbors and the weakened and divisive city-states of Islamic Ifrīqiya.Footnote 27
Ibn Dukhān was a powerful Christian finance minister in a kingdom headed by a Shīʿī Caliph and ruled over by an Armenian wazīr, but with a population consisting of Sunnī Muslims, who constituted the “political majority,” together with a Christian population that was perhaps more numerous but was in a non-sovereign, “minority” position.Footnote 28 Also there lived a small but dynamic and divided Jewish minority and a smattering of non-Coptic Christian confessions.Footnote 29 It was a kingdom in decadence, lurching towards collapse as various factions in the army (including Central Africans and Armenians) and the civil administration struggled for power, while the ʿulamā', the Islamic learned elite, fought to assert itself and claim a place in the caliphate's political structure. It was also under intermittent attack from Latin crusaders and Saljuq Turks, its western dependencies were dropping away, and it was being sucked into a disadvantageous mercantile dependency on northern Italian trading states. It was on the brink of becoming, temporarily, a Frankish protectorate, when one of the parties involved in internal power struggles—a Muslim—called in crusader forces to support his position.Footnote 30 Thus, the kingdoms at the center of each of these three case studies were characterized by diversity, a multiplicity of ethno-confessional currents, and political flux. The communal relations of each was in a state that we might call “unstable equilibrium,” in which various factions and communities, defined on ethnic and confessional terms, were vying for position and influence but were not in open conflict.
Each of the three individuals concerned belonged to a religious minority, wielded tremendous political power within the majority society, and came to an end in a manner related in some way to his religion. But although the death of each was linked, explicitly or implicitly, to his confessional identity, it is not precisely accurate to say they met their respective ends because of their religion. Yūsuf b. Naghrālla was a Jew killed by a Muslim mob, but he was killed not because he was a Jew but rather because he was believed to be a regicidal traitor. The other victims from the city's Jewish community, which suffered in what has been mischaracterized as the first medieval pogrom in the West, were, to use a modern euphemism, collateral damage. Philip of Mahdia was tried as an apostate and condemned to death on those grounds, but the historical narrative makes clear that he was not executed because he was an apostate, but either because his loyalty was in question or as a response by Roger to political tensions within his realm.
Philip was not the only crypto-Muslim employed in administration by the Norman kings, who knowingly turned a blind eye to apostasy within the palace bureaucracy.Footnote 31 Although Ibn Dukhān was derided for his religion, and his religion itself is insulted in al-Nābulusī's account, he was put to death because of his allegedly traitorous and illegal activities.Footnote 32 However, in his case, too, the motive behind the accusations made against him was likely more mundane; Zayn al-Dīn and his Muslim contemporaries resented the position of Copts like Ibn Dukhān in the caliphal government because they themselves wanted those positions. Be that as it may, the real motivation behind Zayn al-Dīn's campaign against him was that the Coptic functionary had personally humiliated the Damascene cleric by calling on him to request his assignation from the treasury. The fact that he was a Christian may have led to his death, but Ibn Dukhān was not killed because he was a Christian; his religious identity was neither a sufficient nor necessary cause for that.
This is not to say there were not strong strands of religious hatred involved in each of the three cases. Yūsuf b. Naghrālla was by no means universally loved, particularly among those who might be qualified as “conservative” Andalusi Muslims (that is, those who harkened back to the stability of the caliphal era), but also among some Granadan Jews. Although his religious identity was a minor issue for local Muslims, enemies of Granada had made much propaganda of the fact that the kingdom was run by a Jew. In an incendiary qaṣīda (ode) addressed to Bādis, the poet Abū Isḥāq urged the king, who had “chosen an infidel as his secretary,” to “hasten to slaughter him as an offering,” adding “and do not spare his people….”Footnote 33 A few years earlier, the preeminent litterateur and ʿālim Ibn Ḥazm had decried Yūsuf's father and predecessor, the political and cultural giant Ismaʿīl b. Naghrālla (Shemu'ēl han-Nāghīdh, or Samuel ha-Nagid), for lacking the humility incumbent on dhimmīs and for being “filthy” and a liar, something he presented as “Jewish” traits. But Ibn Ḥazm was reacting specifically to a polemic against Islam and an attack on the Qur'ān allegedly penned by Ismaʿīl.
In any event, religion cannot be easily separated from more mundane causes—Abū Isḥāq himself had been a powerful operative in the Granadan kingdom until he fell afoul of King Bādis, who sent him into exile at Yūsuf's instigation.Footnote 34 Thus, his poem and other invectives aimed at Ismaʿīl had as much or more to do with the political conflict between the taifa kingdoms of Seville and Granada than issues of religion or religious identity per se. Indeed, Ismaʿīl ha-Nagid was widely eulogized by contemporary Muslims.Footnote 35 But, all that aside, the Naghrāllas had plenty of enemies (including local Jews), and also many supporters and allies (including powerful Muslims) in the Kingdom Granada.Footnote 36
As for Philip of Mahdia, eighty years after Yūsuf's death, when Roger II's royal council condemned him to death it was said to have been because he was “a derider of the Christian name and agent of the works of faithlessness under the guise of faith.” He was “a secret soldier of the devil … [who] hated Christians, and esteemed pagans greatly.”Footnote 37 Among his crimes were his failure to observe Lenten fasts and his patronizing of mosques, and his donations to the eunuch guardians at the Prophet's tomb in Medina. According to the anonymous Latin chronicler who recorded Philip's trial and execution, it was these offenses against God, rather than any against the king, that moved the ruler—who had “raised the eunuch from boyhood”—to condemn Philip.Footnote 38 But there are reasons to seriously doubt this; it is far more likely—charges of apostasy notwithstanding—that Philip was executed because he was suspected of disloyalty, and Roger II was determined to make an example of him. The two Muslim chroniclers who recount his execution, Ibn al-Athīr and Ibn Khaldūn, each attributed it to his supposed disloyalty based on Roger's interpretations of his actions at the conquest of Bône.Footnote 39
Ibn Dukhān was also guilty of religious offences. According to his unsympathetic biographer, al-Nābulusī, the official—“the Christian dog”—had once ordered a former co-religionist who had converted to Islam to renounce his new faith and to return to Christianity.Footnote 40 This would have been seen as an outrageous act given that apostasy was one of the most serious offences that one can commit in Islam (as it was in Christianity and Judaism), and it was compounded by the fact that Ibn Dukhān made this demand publicly. He was also accused of embezzling money from the royal treasury. When he was seized at the behest of the author's great-grandfather, the shaykh Zayn al-Dīn, Ibn Dukhān was found to be, on top of everything else, a Frankish spy. It was this last charge that led to his execution. The story was recounted in al-Nābulusī's Kitāb al-tajrīd (“Book of Exposition”) in the part titled, “On the Character of the Copts, and their Treacheries”—a fair indication of the author's objectivity. The allegations against Ibn Dukhān are also peppered with generic condemnations of Christianity, particularly the doctrine of the Trinity. Religious difference and the polemical spirit associated with it provided a vocabulary to express tensions that were not in fact rooted in religious concerns.
In each case, then, the official in question was not killed because of his religion, but rather because of allegedly traitorous activities, which would have resulted in the same outcome had they been members of the majority religious community. There is little doubt that Yūsuf b. Naghrālla was guilty of treason. Whether or not Philip of Mahdia was is open to debate. Ibn Dukhān was, in all likelihood, innocent. The falsity of their religious beliefs was not at issue, since that was taken for granted. Christians, Muslims, and Jews each believed each other's beliefs to be fundamentally wrong and, as minorities, did not expect their faiths to be recognized as religiously valid. Yet their beliefs were considered legitimate; this is to say, although Christians, Muslims, and Jews each believed that members of rival faiths were wrong, they were forced by the practical necessities of interaction to concede that their beliefs were at least superficially reasonable and well intentioned. Without such a concession, a diverse multi-confessional society simply could not function on practical terms.Footnote 41
Much of the religious tension as there was, both in these cases and society in general, resulted from the fact that, in the view of the majority confessional group, the activities of each of these men constituted an inversion of the Earthly order as it had been ordained by God. The Qur'ān, for example, was quite clear about this:
Fight those who do not believe in God or the Last Day, who do not hold illicit what God and His Messenger hold illicit, and who do not follow the religion of truth, until they offer up the tribute (jizya), by hand, in humble mein (Qur'ān 9:29).Footnote 42
O believers, take not Jews and Christians for allies; they are allies one of another. Whoso among you takes them as allies is counted of their number (Qur'ān 5:51).
These are sentiments echoed in the so-called “Pact of ʿUmar,” a spurious document purportedly originating with the second caliph, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb (634–644), which was held to have established the constitutional terms of the subjugation of non-Muslims (dhimmīs) in Islamic lands. Christians and Jews had the “right” to exist as communities and practice their religion in Islamic lands, but only subject to an array of restrictions and always within the framework of subjugation or a “protected” status.Footnote 43
The doctrine of the Latin Church was similar; decretalists reconciled the legitimacy of fighting foreign Muslims with the toleration of peaceful Muslims as subjects of Christian princes.Footnote 44 The marginalization of non-Christians was first elaborated with Lateran IV in 1215, but it had been a feature of both canonical and secular legislation since the fourth century.Footnote 45 As Innocent III (1168–1216) decreed, “Since it would be absurd beyond measure that a blasphemer of Christ should exercise the force of authority over Christians, we … resolve to prohibit Jews being placed in public office, since many might infest the Christians under such a pretext….”Footnote 46
In civil and canon law, such restrictions went back to the late Roman codex juris civilis, while the religious position was anchored in the Bible. The scripture in question was the Mosaic Law of Deuteronomy and Leviticus, which Innocent III specifically cited as justification for the Lateran legislation aimed at marginalizing non-Christians. Jewish attitudes were little different, but in the absence of a kingdom to call their own west of the Caucuses, Jews had limited opportunities to marginalize their religious rivals.Footnote 47 Hence, as far as Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Isḥāq, al-Nābulusī, Zayn al-Dīn, and the clerics and magistrates of Roger's court were concerned, the traitorous actions of our three unfortunate protagonists merely confirmed what was already obvious: they should never have been put in the positions of authority they held.
Given that employing minority individuals in such positions of power and authority ran contrary to the letter and principle of the law, how do we account for the fact that Yūsuf, Philip, and Ibn Dukhān attained them? One stock explanation for why minority members ended up serving in such high positions in the expanding Muslim and Christian principalities was that, the argument goes, the conquerors had yet to develop sufficiently sophisticated institutions to rule the complex societies they had conquered, and in each case substantial indigenous populations of minority religions had stayed on as their subjects. This holds a certain logic. For example, when the Arab armies first poured out of the Arabian Peninsula in seventh century, they were unequipped to administer the urban centers and irrigation systems which they came to count among their patrimony, nor were they interested in doing so. The Arab Muslim warriors settled in deliberately isolated garrison towns—amṣār (sing.: miṣr)—in order to quarantine themselves from the corrupting influence of their infidel subjects and maintain their status as a distinct ruling caste. In such circumstances, it seems logical that a population made up almost entirely of non-Arab dhimmīs (or “protected peoples”) should be managed by their own elites. Nevertheless, within a century or so the amṣār had been abandoned, the administration was carried out in Arabic rather than native languages, the indigenous populations had begun to convert to Islam, and there was a growing Islamic educated elite.Footnote 48
By the second Islamic century it seems that minority officials were no longer needed to run Muslim kingdoms. For example, the Caliphate of Córdoba had developed as the most powerful principality in the western Mediterranean with an entirely Muslim officiate. Exceptional non-Muslim figures, such as the Jew Ḥasdai b. Shaprūt, or the Christian Rabīʿ b. Ziyād, did wield impressive influence in the caliphate, but they did not occupy formal positions within the Muslim bureaucracy and were certainly not indispensable.Footnote 49 As for the kingdom of Granada, while it did have a substantial Jewish population, the Zirid kings hardly needed Jews to run their administration. By a similar token, although the Coptic elite of Fatimid Egypt was certainly adept at managing that kingdom's complex financial administration, it was precisely the fact that they were no longer needed in this role, and that Muslims were becoming interested in this type of career, that brought Christian financiers into the sights of the ʿulamā'.
Similar causes have been ascribed to Christian “tolerance” of Muslims and Jews in the areas that they conquered, at least in the early phases of colonization. It may well have been the case that eleventh- and twelfth-century Iberian kings found it most convenient to employ Arabo-Jewish administrators and financiers, but that does not explain how such individuals could continue to play important roles even once Christian institutions had “caught up,” and Christian credit institutions had developed.Footnote 50 Nor does it explain why the Norman kings of Sicily came to depend on a clique of eunuch slaves, who were widely recognized as being crypto-Muslims, for the core of their administration. Norman Sicily certainly had a Muslim population, although its size and proportion of the overall populace are the subject of some debate, and its short-lived colonies in Ifrīqiya were all but entirely Muslim. And yet the Arabic language was in no way required to run the Norman kingdom. Greek was far more important in terms of administration, and indeed the Norman Arabic chancery seems to have represented a deliberate revival rather than a continuation of pre-conquest practices.Footnote 51 In each case, the individuals in question were adequately and even eminently qualified for their positions, but there was no practical necessity that demanded their functions be carried out by a member of a minority community. Still less was there any reason for them to be given formal status as officials.
Yet, both Christian and Muslim rulers clearly saw it as useful at this time to employ minority individuals openly in key positions. There are likely a number of factors behind this. One is dependency: minority individuals could never hope to aspire to usurp their employers since they lacked the minimum qualifications for membership in the mainline political elite. Nor could they hope to build networks by religious patronage or intermarriage with the elites of their kingdoms, which were the two chief strategies for extending networks of political influence. Their confessional identity acted as an effective barrier against those types of interaction. Nor, as infidels, could they hope to cultivate a broad popular base, and indeed the population at large would likely regard their service in a powerful position as provocative. This could all be turned to a ruler's advantage, since he could use these officers as his agents when he wanted or needed to implement unpopular policies such as extra-canonical taxation, or to defy established legal custom. Unfavorable popular opinion would tend to focus, not on the sovereign himself, but on his officials (and their wide religious community).
Furthermore, providing members of minority communities access to official positions kept them and their communities both dependent upon and loyal to the sovereign. They would come to see him as a “protector” whose interests should be safeguarded. The flipside of this was that, by empowering minority members, a ruler withheld the same advantage from factions within the majority that might challenge his power. When seen in these ways, the maintenance and manipulation of minority communities in a poly-ethnic society does not necessarily manifest any spirit of “tolerance.” Whether deliberate or circumstantial, it may have represented nothing more than another item in the authoritarian toolbox. In the culturally and religiously diverse societies of the Mediterranean, it was an obviously beneficial policy to pursue. In other words, the custom of employing minority members in government offices was a consequence of the nature of the political and social structure of premodern Mediterranean society.
This contention that the social structure of Mediterranean society was at the root of such policies is supported by the fact that they changed remarkably little over time. The English historian R. I. Moore famously charted the emergence of the Latin West as a “persecuting society” from the late twelfth century.Footnote 52 According to Moore, as the Papacy, canon law, and religious orders and secular political institutions developed a systematic and rational approach to authority, the notion of heterodoxy became increasingly threatening and intolerable, and this development transformed Latin Christian society and ushered in an age of crusade and inquisition. While it may be true that Latin culture developed a theoretical foundation and apparatus of persecution (or an apparatus for enforcing ideological orthodoxy) at this time, it is remarkable how little that apparatus came to be employed in the Latin Mediterranean.Footnote 53 The Muslim minority of Sicily was in steady decline through thirteenth century, culminating first in their transportation to Lucera beginning in 1222, and subsequently their enslavement in 1300, but this was not motivated by ideologically rooted policies on the part of their Latin rulers.Footnote 54 In Iberia, where Christian kingdoms maintained important Muslim and Jewish minorities through the fifteenth century, the proclamations of canon lawyers and popes who called for the marginalization of non-Christians went largely ignored.Footnote 55
Bearing this out, and contrary to what one might expect, neither the death of Yūsuf b. Naghrālla nor those of Philip of Mahdia or Ibn Dukhān were watersheds or turning points that heralded an age of intolerance. Contemporary Jews did not see the killing of Yūsuf and the attack on the Jews of Granada as signs that the Islamic world had become hostile to them. Jews remained an important presence in the kingdom, and the overwhelming majority of those who did depart took refuge in other Muslim kingdoms.Footnote 56 As for Philip of Mahdia, he was not the last crypto-Muslim eunuch to serve as a Norman king's admiral and chamberlain, but, rather, was the first.Footnote 57 And while Coptic administrators certainly came under pressure from pious Muslims from the thirteenth century onward, Christian domination of the Egyptian financial system outlived the Middle Ages, and some would say it continues to this day.Footnote 58
Moreover, these three men suffered a fate no different from that of many of their non-minority contemporaries who operated within the same cutthroat political environment. Yūsuf b. Naghrālla was succeeded as wazīr of Granada by an African Muslim, al-Nāya, who after only a short time in power met a similarly gruesome end for almost precisely the same reason.Footnote 59 Philip of Mahdia was briefly succeeded as admiral by a Christian, Maio of Bari, who ended up being assassinated himself, after which power in the Norman palace returned to the hands of the palace's crypto-Muslim eunuchs. As for Fatimid Egypt, not long after Ibn Dukhān's demise the kingdom became locked in a power struggle between two rival Muslim wazīrs, Shāwar and Ḍirghām, who were each ultimately overthrown and killed (in 1168 and 1164, respectively).Footnote 60 Such was “normal” political life in the twelfth century. The fate of an unsuccessful incumbent was death, and that this was the case also for minority figures is a further symptom of their integration rather than their marginalization.
MINORITIES IN THE MEDIEVAL MEDITERRANEAN
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, a succession of new groups arrived on the Mediterranean scene. On the Christian side were Normans, Angevins, and Burgundians (collectively referred to as “Ifranj” or “Franks” by the Muslims), and on the Muslim side there were Saljuqs, Almoravids, Almohads, and Qipchaks.Footnote 61 To the extent that a “persecuting society” developed in Latin lands, an analogous process could be seen in the Muslim world in the reformationist movements that originated in Persia, and the Atlas and Sahel. To borrow Bulliet's paradigm, it was not only Islam that was developing from “the edge,” but also Christianity.Footnote 62 These groups started in the periphery of their ecumenian zone, coalesced in environments that were far less ethno-religiously diverse than the Mediterranean, and arrived in the region with no appreciation of their new environment. Hence, in their earliest stages of contact, they behaved in a manner that struck the natives, acculturated as they were to confessional diversity, as inappropriate. This was true whether the newcomers were Frankish cannibals at Maʿarrat al-Nuʿmān, Burgundian treaty-breakers in Toledo, Norman oath-breakers in Barbastro, persecuting Almoravids, or dhimma-abrogating Almohads.Footnote 63 What is remarkable, however, is that in each case the new arrivals acclimatized to the Mediterranean and adopted an approach to politics and administration that took minority groups into account and integrated them into the political scene, generally within a generation of contact. Dominant elites harnessed the potential of the minorities to the extent that it served their purposes and, in exchange, conceded temporary guarantees to maintain their privileges. This dynamic was based on what I call the “convenience principle,” or conveniencia (a riposte to Américo Castro's frequently invoked, but vague, convivencia).Footnote 64
In their landmark study, The Corrupting Sea, Horden and Purcell describe a Mediterranean characterized on environmental terms by an agglomeration of diverse micro-regions, each particular, vulnerable, and barely sustainable, but which—bound together by a fabric of interconnectedness—comprised an environment that was flexible and resilient, fragmented but not fractured, and diverse yet interconnected. It was this structure, they suggest, that facilitated the transmissions of goods and ideas and the movements of people that were so essential to the region's history. Something very similar can be said, I would argue, for the political and cultural character of the Mediterranean in the premodern era. A common environment of religious, ethnic, cultural, intellectual, and linguistic heterodoxy, manifest in particular but interdependent “micro-communities,” endowed the region with a coherence and unity that defied grand confessional or “civilizational” divisions. It also overlay a cultural substratum, a common foundation from which the various diverse, distinct, and even contradictory and opposed cultures emerged, or fit themselves into. It was this underlying foundation that gave Mediterranean society coherence, and facilitated cultural and intellectual transmission, adaptation, and exchange. Ideas, technology, and beliefs are only adopted if they are regarded as useful and sensible; the Mediterranean provided a framework for both exchange and synthesis because it comprised a zone of “mutual intelligibility” that embraced European, Asian, and African societies, and Muslim, Latin, Byzantine, and Jewish religious cultures.
“Mediterranean culture” was manifest through an array of contexts: music, popular verse, high literature, art, architecture, philosophy, theology, medical practice, and scientific thought were but a few of its vectors. However, while this contention contradicts the essentialization of ethno-religious groups inherent in the “clash of civilizations” approach to ethno-religious diversity, it does not imply that the Mediterranean was some sort of Shangri-La of good-natured, intercommunal harmony and convivencia.Footnote 65 The Mediterranean is interesting precisely because it was an arena of conflict, at times communal, at times religious, and usually merely political, while simultaneously it was a region of mutual habitation, interpenetration, and collaboration above, below, and across confessional lines. This is what made it such a dynamic and innovative region during the Middle Ages. Apparent inconsistencies that one encounters, such as the deaths of the three protagonists I have described here, are typical of the medieval Mediterranean, and they disprove neither the notion of cultural interpenetration and synthesis, nor that of religious and cultural conflict. On the contrary, they invite us, oblige us, to develop a more complex picture of the societies of this region, one that can accommodate such conflicting impulses simultaneously and yet remain coherent and consistent.
The careers of Yūsuf b. Naghrālla, Philip of Mahdia, and Ibn Dukhān were the products of different generations, different cultures, and different continents—different “civilizations,” if one insists—but their trajectories were remarkably similar, and in an important way distinctly Mediterranean. All three of these men participated in the same regional political framework, in which the atmosphere of mutual intelligibility allowed the Mediterranean to function as a coherent socio-cultural body across a range of contexts, and not merely as an aggregate of self-contained and clearly defined cultural entities that happened to be located side-by-side. This is also what allowed members of any of the communities to recognize, whether begrudgingly or readily, the practical virtues of their “infidel” counterparts. Hence the title of this essay, which is taken from an appraisal of Yūsuf b. Naghrālla's father, Ismaʿīl, the first Jewish wazīr and commander-in-chief of the Berber Kingdom of Granada, reported by the fourteenth-century chronicler Ibn al-Khaṭīb and attributed to Ismaʿīl's contemporary, the historian Ibn Ḥayyān al-Qurṭubī: “This cursed man was a superior man, although God did not inform him of the right religion.… He was an extraordinary man.”Footnote 66