Huang & Bargh (H&B) propose a theory for interpretation of human behavior based on a psychological analogy of Dawkins's selfish gene paradigm. According to such framework, instead of a unitary and coherent multitasking coordination apparatus, human beings would operate under the continuous (and, in most cases, unconscious) influence of a dynamic selection process among multiple task-generating goals, which would be constantly competing for psychological resources from different cognitive faculties such as attention, emotional salience, language, and analytical reasoning.
Although H&B assume the empirical validity of Dawkins's selfish gene theory, several authorities in physiology and evolutionary biology (Huang Reference Huang2012; Noble Reference Noble2011) have considered such a proposal a simplistic, metaphoric, and untestable hypothesis that presents close similarities with old mythological interpretations of natural events. In fact, Dawkins himself recognized: “I doubt that there is any experiment that could prove my claim” (Dawkins Reference Dawkins1982). Affirming an “apparent purposiveness of evolution” or stating that the “psychological and behavioral phenomena are designed by natural selection for a purpose” applies exclusive human attributes (such as intentionality) to purely biological processes. This naive intellectual modus operandus based on anthropomorphic analogies has been considered by several authors as a classic form of early pre-scientific reasoning (Agassi Reference Agassi and Wiener1968; Dundzila Reference Dundzila1987; Hordern Reference Hordern1972) in which objective natural processes are “personalized” and interpreted as functioning according to the same human framework that involves analytical reasoning, emotions, and purpose. Interestingly, Dawkins, as a neo-Darwinian, is not far from his master, who, although widely considered an epitome of a scientist also seems to have appreciated the use of anthropomorphic reasoning as illustrated by the following quote (Darwin Reference Darwin1871, pp. 39–40): “Even insects play together, as has been described by that excellent observer, P. Huber, who saw ants chasing and pretending to bite each other, like so many puppies.”
Additionally, at the present time, the so-called “central dogma of molecular biology” proposed by Crick (Reference Crick1970) (which consists of a simplistic paradigm of “DNA→transcription→RNA→translation→protein”) has been strongly questioned by new research findings in the emergent field of systems biology (Bor-Sen et al. Reference Bor-Sen, Chih-Yuan and Jing-Jia2011; Longo & Tendero Reference Longo and Tendero2007). Actually, it has already been demonstrated that several other mechanisms involving epigenetic regulation may play an important role in information encoding within the cell, such as the three-dimensional tertiary structure of proteins that can be changed by allosteric transitions (Shapiro Reference Shapiro2009), and multitasking RNA molecules like riboswitches, microRNAs, and small interfering RNAs (Mirouze Reference Mirouze2012).
Moreover, the human genome is more than 98% noncoding DNA (Pennisi Reference Pennisi2012), which do not operate “selfishly” but serve as regulators of the transcription/translation process. Following such discovery, some began advocating an evolutionary theory focused on whole cellular subsystems, such as the aerobic respiratory or the photosynthetic system, because theories focusing on individual genes cannot account for the emergence and preservation of important portions of genome such as promoters, enhancers, operators, and transcription factors (Noble Reference Noble2011). In the same way, if we adopt an individualistic view of genes as operating apart from their ultimate effects on cellular functions, as “semi-parasitic” entities whose major goal is to maximize their propagation into future generations despite the final outcomes to cellular homeostasis, it is very hard to explain the evolutionary emergence of apoptosis, cell-cycle regulation, and tumor suppressor genes (da Fonseca et al. Reference da Fonseca, Kosiol, Vinar, Siepel and Nielsen2010; Pearson & Sánchez Reference Pearson and Sánchez2008).
Besides Dawkins's original selfish gene theory, another major theoretical pillar of the proposed Selfish Goal model is the assumption that human decision making processes are the evolutionary product of a much older system, in which unconscious mechanisms directed by different environmental-generated goals elicit a psychological competition for the cognitive resources required to accomplish survival-related tasks. Since early pioneering studies in psychology (Freud Reference Freud1915; James Reference James1890; von Schelling Reference von Schelling and Heath1800), unconscious processes have exerted a significant attraction to researchers and several contemporary experts have strongly emphasized the activity of an “unconscious mind” (Kihlstrom Reference Kihlstrom1987; Schacter Reference Schacter1992; Wilson Reference Wilson2002). Nevertheless, in a recent evaluation about the scientific merit of such claims, Newell and Shanks (Reference Newell and Shanks2014) severely criticized the methodology of previous experimental studies that were considered as evidence for the decisive role of unconscious factors in human choices. In fact, according to these authors, unconscious influences in decision making and behavior have acquired an inflated and erroneous explanatory power in current psychological theories that is not supported by experimental evidence.
In the proposed Selfish Goal Theory, consciousness figures predominantly as an epiphenomenon of the human mind, not providing any clear evolutionary advantage because H&B argues that most of the decision making is governed at the unconscious level. Such a paradigm goes against the basic assumptions of current neuroscience theories of self-awareness (Morin & Michaud Reference Morin and Michaud2007) and agency (Haggard & Clark Reference Haggard and Clark2003; Kühn et al. Reference Kühn, Brass and Haggard2013), which strongly emphasize the evolutionary emergence of consciousness as a cognitive framework through which multi-sensory and intertemporal events can be coordinated through a highly elaborated unitary cognitive faculty (Cabanac et al. Reference Cabanac, Cabanac and Parent2009; Donald Reference Donald1995; Pennartz Reference Pennartz2009). According to such a viewpoint, consciousness has emerged as the by-product of the activity of the multimodal integrative areas of the human brain that receive inputs from a diffuse neocortical network operating through hierarchical levels of information analysis. Such neural correlates of consciousness would be closely connected with the limbic system and, by providing an estimation of the self-relevancy of sensory stimuli (as well an overview of their relation to previous beliefs and future expectations), would lead to emergence of an unique first-person perspective experience of reality (Vogeley & Fink Reference Vogeley and Fink2003) with the ultimate goal of supplying the premotor areas of the brain with coherent sequential motor plans.
In summary, because H&B's theory is based on a metaphoric and, at best, unproven biological paradigm (Dawkins's selfish gene theory) and because it puts an excessive emphasis on the role of unconscious processes in decision making (which is not warranted by experimental evidence), the proposed Selfish Goal model, although constituting a major theoretical tour de force for addressing the major issue of intertemporal inconsistencies in human behavior, provides a questionable interpretation of the underlying psychological structure of human agency.
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Huang & Bargh (H&B) propose a theory for interpretation of human behavior based on a psychological analogy of Dawkins's selfish gene paradigm. According to such framework, instead of a unitary and coherent multitasking coordination apparatus, human beings would operate under the continuous (and, in most cases, unconscious) influence of a dynamic selection process among multiple task-generating goals, which would be constantly competing for psychological resources from different cognitive faculties such as attention, emotional salience, language, and analytical reasoning.
Although H&B assume the empirical validity of Dawkins's selfish gene theory, several authorities in physiology and evolutionary biology (Huang Reference Huang2012; Noble Reference Noble2011) have considered such a proposal a simplistic, metaphoric, and untestable hypothesis that presents close similarities with old mythological interpretations of natural events. In fact, Dawkins himself recognized: “I doubt that there is any experiment that could prove my claim” (Dawkins Reference Dawkins1982). Affirming an “apparent purposiveness of evolution” or stating that the “psychological and behavioral phenomena are designed by natural selection for a purpose” applies exclusive human attributes (such as intentionality) to purely biological processes. This naive intellectual modus operandus based on anthropomorphic analogies has been considered by several authors as a classic form of early pre-scientific reasoning (Agassi Reference Agassi and Wiener1968; Dundzila Reference Dundzila1987; Hordern Reference Hordern1972) in which objective natural processes are “personalized” and interpreted as functioning according to the same human framework that involves analytical reasoning, emotions, and purpose. Interestingly, Dawkins, as a neo-Darwinian, is not far from his master, who, although widely considered an epitome of a scientist also seems to have appreciated the use of anthropomorphic reasoning as illustrated by the following quote (Darwin Reference Darwin1871, pp. 39–40): “Even insects play together, as has been described by that excellent observer, P. Huber, who saw ants chasing and pretending to bite each other, like so many puppies.”
Additionally, at the present time, the so-called “central dogma of molecular biology” proposed by Crick (Reference Crick1970) (which consists of a simplistic paradigm of “DNA→transcription→RNA→translation→protein”) has been strongly questioned by new research findings in the emergent field of systems biology (Bor-Sen et al. Reference Bor-Sen, Chih-Yuan and Jing-Jia2011; Longo & Tendero Reference Longo and Tendero2007). Actually, it has already been demonstrated that several other mechanisms involving epigenetic regulation may play an important role in information encoding within the cell, such as the three-dimensional tertiary structure of proteins that can be changed by allosteric transitions (Shapiro Reference Shapiro2009), and multitasking RNA molecules like riboswitches, microRNAs, and small interfering RNAs (Mirouze Reference Mirouze2012).
Moreover, the human genome is more than 98% noncoding DNA (Pennisi Reference Pennisi2012), which do not operate “selfishly” but serve as regulators of the transcription/translation process. Following such discovery, some began advocating an evolutionary theory focused on whole cellular subsystems, such as the aerobic respiratory or the photosynthetic system, because theories focusing on individual genes cannot account for the emergence and preservation of important portions of genome such as promoters, enhancers, operators, and transcription factors (Noble Reference Noble2011). In the same way, if we adopt an individualistic view of genes as operating apart from their ultimate effects on cellular functions, as “semi-parasitic” entities whose major goal is to maximize their propagation into future generations despite the final outcomes to cellular homeostasis, it is very hard to explain the evolutionary emergence of apoptosis, cell-cycle regulation, and tumor suppressor genes (da Fonseca et al. Reference da Fonseca, Kosiol, Vinar, Siepel and Nielsen2010; Pearson & Sánchez Reference Pearson and Sánchez2008).
Besides Dawkins's original selfish gene theory, another major theoretical pillar of the proposed Selfish Goal model is the assumption that human decision making processes are the evolutionary product of a much older system, in which unconscious mechanisms directed by different environmental-generated goals elicit a psychological competition for the cognitive resources required to accomplish survival-related tasks. Since early pioneering studies in psychology (Freud Reference Freud1915; James Reference James1890; von Schelling Reference von Schelling and Heath1800), unconscious processes have exerted a significant attraction to researchers and several contemporary experts have strongly emphasized the activity of an “unconscious mind” (Kihlstrom Reference Kihlstrom1987; Schacter Reference Schacter1992; Wilson Reference Wilson2002). Nevertheless, in a recent evaluation about the scientific merit of such claims, Newell and Shanks (Reference Newell and Shanks2014) severely criticized the methodology of previous experimental studies that were considered as evidence for the decisive role of unconscious factors in human choices. In fact, according to these authors, unconscious influences in decision making and behavior have acquired an inflated and erroneous explanatory power in current psychological theories that is not supported by experimental evidence.
In the proposed Selfish Goal Theory, consciousness figures predominantly as an epiphenomenon of the human mind, not providing any clear evolutionary advantage because H&B argues that most of the decision making is governed at the unconscious level. Such a paradigm goes against the basic assumptions of current neuroscience theories of self-awareness (Morin & Michaud Reference Morin and Michaud2007) and agency (Haggard & Clark Reference Haggard and Clark2003; Kühn et al. Reference Kühn, Brass and Haggard2013), which strongly emphasize the evolutionary emergence of consciousness as a cognitive framework through which multi-sensory and intertemporal events can be coordinated through a highly elaborated unitary cognitive faculty (Cabanac et al. Reference Cabanac, Cabanac and Parent2009; Donald Reference Donald1995; Pennartz Reference Pennartz2009). According to such a viewpoint, consciousness has emerged as the by-product of the activity of the multimodal integrative areas of the human brain that receive inputs from a diffuse neocortical network operating through hierarchical levels of information analysis. Such neural correlates of consciousness would be closely connected with the limbic system and, by providing an estimation of the self-relevancy of sensory stimuli (as well an overview of their relation to previous beliefs and future expectations), would lead to emergence of an unique first-person perspective experience of reality (Vogeley & Fink Reference Vogeley and Fink2003) with the ultimate goal of supplying the premotor areas of the brain with coherent sequential motor plans.
In summary, because H&B's theory is based on a metaphoric and, at best, unproven biological paradigm (Dawkins's selfish gene theory) and because it puts an excessive emphasis on the role of unconscious processes in decision making (which is not warranted by experimental evidence), the proposed Selfish Goal model, although constituting a major theoretical tour de force for addressing the major issue of intertemporal inconsistencies in human behavior, provides a questionable interpretation of the underlying psychological structure of human agency.