‘ “Denmark” is a mythical place that is known to have good political and economic institutions: it is stable, democratic, peaceful, prosperous, inclusive, and has extremely low levels of political corruption’ (p. 14). What are the historical sequences that lead to Denmark? This, in a sense, is the project of this ambitious quest for the ‘origins of political order’. The desirable features of Denmark are shared, more or less, by a handful of (mostly) north-western European countries and some of their outposts in newer parts of the world, and lacking, more or less, in so many other parts. Is this, then, yet another treatise on the ‘uniqueness of the West’, with so many illustrious predecessors from Max Weber (acknowledged) to, more recently, Ernest Gellner, Perry Anderson, and John Hall (largely ignored)? Yes and no. The ‘West’ does emerge as the privileged exemplar, but not through any kind of cultural or historical essence, rather through contingent historical sequences, conceived in terms of systematic factors, advanced as the elements of comparison. In this respect it does not follow the ‘clash of civilizations’ paradigm of Samuel Huntington, Fukuyama's acknowledged and revered mentor. The historical narratives for both the West and the Rest are differentiated: China, privileged as the first strong state, is a different story from India, Japan, and the Muslim empires; England, the privileged exemplar of the West, has a different trajectory from France, Spain, and Russia. These narratives are detailed, nuanced, and systematically analytical.

Political prehistory in this account follows familiar evolutionary lines: roaming bands of families of hunter-gatherers, then agriculture and tribal organization, and, through warfare over resources, the state. The variables that inform the analysis of political order in the regions of early civilizations are: the state, the rule of law, and accountable government. China is the first strong state, starting from the second century BC and continuing on and off, through the dynasties, into modern times. It featured well-coordinated and forceful control through a bureaucracy under imperial command. Crucially for the argument, the state separated itself and ruled over the kinship- and clan-based social organization of the society, and subordinated potential aristocracies of powerful families. It thus avoided patrimonialism, the personalized delegation of powers, and the sale or grant of revenue extraction. This is a major theme in the comparative accounts: state strength and the eventual emergence of modern polities depends on the subordination of kinship and patrimonial delegation to institutions. England and other success stories also depended on this factor, another common theme in comparative histories, at least since Max Weber. But their success needed further ingredients: rule of law and accountable government.

The origins of rule of law are attributed to religion. Chinese religions, ‘privatized’ into family cults, were not binding on the ruler, and Chinese rulers were not checked by laws other than what they decreed. Religion, it is argued, was the source of law in Europe, India, and the Muslim world, specifically the Ottoman empire. In Europe the Church and its legal powers were institutionalized in the early Middle Ages in the process of struggle between the different polities and the Church. This latter then became a powerful actor affecting states and societies, notably in weakening kinship ties and favouring inheritance by women as part of securing its own property interests. The Brahmins constituted a source of law and a potential counter-power to the rulers, though nowhere as unified in a coherent institution as the Church in Europe. The Ottoman sultan was similarly constrained by the idea of the shari'a and its upholder, the corpus of ulama. While the power of the Catholic Church in Europe is well attested, we may express some doubts about the other two cases. We should note that both the shari'a and Brahmin rules relate primarily to ritual and to private areas of law – family, property, and transactions – with little beyond nominal relevance to public affairs and the state. And neither clerical caste enjoyed anything like the corporate coherence and political power of the European Church, let alone its legal thrust.

Accountable government and the rule of law were best achieved in England, through the accumulation of contingent advantages consolidated after the Norman conquest. A strong king was challenged by a cohesive nobility and parliament, increasingly free cities, and a prosperous gentry, all aided by the tradition of common law and its embodiment in courts and corporations at local and regional levels, culminating in the confrontations of the seventeenth-century civil war between king and parliament, followed by the Glorious Revolution. France and Spain were not so lucky: a weak absolutism divided the nobility in competition over rent-seeking through venal office and purchase of state revenues, combined with frequent wars, making for unsustainable debts and intensified fiscal pressures. Russian rulers subordinated the aristocracy into hierarchical office holders, bribing them with a bonded peasantry. These variables of absolutisms versus nobility and bureaucracy guide the comparison into other European countries: Scandinavian (success) and Hungary (failure). Outside Europe, the Ottoman and Mamluke states of the Middle East, at the height of their power, relied on slave soldiers and bureaucrats, with no kinship loyalties in the native society, thus avoiding patrimonial and aristocratic challenges: the erosion of those institutions was one factor in their political decay.

Though the main themes are familiar in comparative histories, Fukuyama's book makes an original contribution in the scope of its comparisons and its systematic analyses, and in avoiding the simple contrast of the West and the Rest. As the title indicates, this historical tour de force only brings us to the French (and industrial) Revolution. A second volume is promised, which will take the comparative narrative into modern times.