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Frederic S. Lee and Marc Lavoie, eds., In Defense of Post-Keynesian and Heterodox Economics: Responses to Their Critics (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. x, 263, $135 (cloth). ISBN 978-0-415-69436-0.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 April 2014

Don Mathews*
Affiliation:
School of Business and Public AffairsCollege of Coastal Georgia, USA
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Abstract

Type
Book Reviews
Copyright
Copyright © The History of Economics Society 2014 

Would it not be a sad state of affairs if, in a discipline we like to think of as a science, there were a debate about whether (not just how) scholars of different perspectives can benefit by simply communicating with one another? It certainly would be. And yet, that is just the state of affairs in economics, according to the contributors to In Defense of Post-Keynesian and Heterodox Economics, edited by Frederic Lee and Marc Lavoie.

The book is a collection of responses from heterodox economists to an issue raised in articles by David Colander, Richard Holt, and Barkley Rosser (2010, 2007–08, 2004); the issue is how heterodox economists can better advance their ideas among mainstream economists.

The impetus for the Colander, Holt, and Rosser articles: “The economics profession would be far better off if it took heterodox ideas more seriously, and our interest in shaking up heterodoxy is grounded in our belief that what they have to say is important and should be considered by the mainstream. Our concern is that heterodox ideas are not getting the hearing they should” (Colander, Holt, Rosser Reference Colander, Holt and Barkley Rosser2010, p. 308). The advice to heterodox economists: “worry less about methodology, focus on being economists first and heterodox economists second, and prepare ideas to leave the incubator of heterodoxy to enter the mainstream economic debate” (ibid., p. 303 [in abstract]).

The advice touched a raw nerve. The contributors to In Defense unanimously believe that if anything needs shaking up in order to give heterodox ideas a better hearing, it is mainstream economics. The contributors contend, and with some bitterness, that the mainstream has deliberately shut heterodox economics out of the discussion: heterodox economists are frequently bypassed for jobs and tenure, and heterodox work is rejected by mainstream journals and ignored by mainstream economists. With a history of that kind of treatment, why would heterodox economists think a change in tactics might lead to fruitful discussion and greater acceptance and influence with the mainstream?

The contributors address four primary issues: methodology, strategies for advancing heterodox economics as a discipline, strategies for dealing with the mainstream (which includes not dealing with it at all), and the prospects for productive exchange with the mainstream. By no means do the contributors speak with a unified voice; they are unified only in being heterodox economists and in being unable to find very much on which to agree with Colander, Holt, and Rosser.

With regard to methodology, though a couple of contributors are sympathetic to the Colander, Holt, and Rosser suggestion that heterodox economists will better advance their cause by doing more economics and less talking about how economics ought to be done, most contributors to In Defense think critical studies of methodology are important to heterodoxy. It is primarily methodology, they argue, that distinguishes heterodox approaches from the mainstream, and expounding on the weaknesses of mainstream methodology and the strengths of heterodox methodologies helps to make the case for heterodoxy.

As for ways of advancing heterodoxy and making inroads with the mainstream, the contributors are all over the place—hardly surprising if for no other reason than what we conveniently call ‘heterodoxy’ is not a unified perspective but a loose collection of different and, to some degree, competing perspectives. Some contributors call for more unity, without sacrificing differences, among heterodox approaches. Some propose different ways to brand and promote heterodoxy. Some agree with Colander, Holt, and Rosser that heterodoxy can best increase its influence by being politically relevant. Some think heterodoxy is best advanced by fighting the mainstream; others by ignoring the mainstream.

As for the prospects of fruitful exchange between heterodoxy and the mainstream, none of the contributors is optimistic, and readers of the Colander, Holt, and Rosser articles and In Defense who think the exchange of ideas between economists of different perspectives is good for the discipline are likely to come away from the writings rather depressed.

Historians of economics interested in the relationships between competing schools of thought and how those relationships affect the course of economics might find the Colander, Holt, and Rosser articles and In Defense of Post-Keynesian and Heterodox Economics well worth exploring. It is not an uplifting or inspiring story, but it is reality.

At least between Colander, Holt, and Rosser and the contributors of In Defense, there is an exchange. That would seem to be more than what usually takes place between heterodox and mainstream economists. Heterodox and mainstream economics are not incommensurable. Communication and exchange are certainly possible. A bit of mutual appreciation might even be possible. Agreement is not at all necessary; the goal is to improve our understanding of the economic side of life.

Is the relationship between heterodox and mainstream economics typical of how social science is done? Is it common for social scientists of different approaches to a discipline to hunker down with their methodologies and conclusions, refer to each other in terms such as ‘heretics’ and ‘blasphemers,’ and all but refuse to communicate with each other? Are we doing science or theology? Are we members of schools of thought, or “epistemological communities,” as one of the In Defense contributors calls them, or members of intellectual cults? And what of empirical evidence? Does it even matter? Are we prepared to modify our perspectives when evidence conflicts with our ideologies, or are we quicker to throw the evidence out?

References

REFERENCES

Colander, D., Holt, Richard P. F., and Barkley Rosser, J. Jr. 2004. “The Changing Face of Mainstream Economics.” Review of Political Economy 16 (4): 485499.Google Scholar
Colander, D., Holt, Richard P. F., and Barkley Rosser, J. Jr. 2007–08. “Live and Dead Issues in the Methodology of Economics.” Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 30 (2): 303312.Google Scholar
Colander, D., Holt, Richard P. F., and Barkley Rosser, J. Jr. 2010. “How to Win Friends and (Possibly) Influence Mainstream Economists.” Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics 32 (3): 397408.Google Scholar