What role does knowledge play in the exercise of power? Edward Said argued in Orientialism (London: Routledge, 1978) that Western scholars’ and artists’ representations (or misrepresentations) of the East provided a basis for the imperialisms of their day. In an ambitious new work, Osamah F. Khalil undertakes a mission in the same spirit, surveying the creation of knowledge related to the Middle East and its connection to US foreign policy towards this region. The book features the university as a central though not unique component of Middle East knowledge production, arguing that area studies programs were “integral” to forming Washington's understanding of the region, and that complementarily, the US government's foreign policy interests shaped the knowledge that was produced. That said, Khalil's wide-ranging narrative goes well beyond the university to include other producers of knowledge: missionaries, foundations, scholarly associations, think tanks, and advocacy groups. The result is an impressive work of synthesis that tracks the history of US involvement in this area.
America's Dream Palace contributes to several bodies of academic literature. In its broadest sense, it is a narrative retelling of US involvement in the Middle East since the late 19th century, echoing themes from Matthew Jacobs’ study of the networks of influence that helped to shape US policy towards the region and Douglas Little's contention that a unique blend of culture and cultural stereotypes influenced American policy. Additionally, much of the book falls within the new histories of scientific disciplines, sharing common ground with the work of Zachary Lockman and others on the evolution of Middle Eastern studies. Finally, in tracing intellectual trends, it includes a particular focus on modernization theory, whose impact on the Middle East has been recently examined by Nathan Citino amongst others. Like these works, it reflects rising interest in international and diplomatic history, while pushing the boundaries of these fields beyond traditional state-to-state relations.
Despite frequent references to Edward Said and concepts of knowledge and power, commonly associated with various strands of postmodernism, there is little theory in this work, which will cause some readers to rejoice and others to feel that an opportunity was missed. Instead, Khalil probes secondary literature and archives in search of specific ways that the US government influenced the knowledge producers discussed above, and vice versa.
A major theme throughout the book is the US government's perceived need for the training and development of experts in particular areas of the world, which gave rise to the area studies phenomenon, including Middle Eastern studies. Area studies predate the Cold War, but competition with the Soviet Union provided the impetus for the growth of federally funded centers of expertise on particular geographic areas. This development was a long time in the making. The idea of government support for area studies began to be taken seriously around the time of the Korean War, when direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union seemed possible. Khalil highlights the role of the External Research Staff, a small office in the State Department jointly operated with the CIA, in advancing cooperation with academia during this period. However, it was not until the aftermath of the Sputnik launch in 1958 that the US Congress passed the National Defense Education Act, which contained the first funding for area studies programs. According to Khalil, this had the “unintentional consequence of diversifying Middle East studies,” including in ways not complimentary to US policy goals.
Although the author makes the case for a strong connection between US foreign policy and Middle East studies, much of the book's evidence leaves the reader with the impression that the government–academia nexus was of relatively little import for policy, particularly during the first half of the 20th century. In the early 20th century, this may have been the case because, unlike in Great Britain, there was relatively little Middle East expertise in the United States. In his account of “The Inquiry,” a research group organized by “Colonel” Edward M. House to prepare for the negotiations at Versailles in the aftermath of World War I, Khalil discerns clear patterns of Orientalist stereotypes, but little evidence that the group's work had an impact on Wilson or other US delegates to the conference. Similarly, during World War II, the Office of Strategic Services created a Research and Analysis Branch staffed in part by civilians from academia, but many of its reports had minimal impact or were ignored.
By the 1950s, however, there was more of a convergence between trends in foreign policy and academia. Modernization theory was developed by social science scholars with strong links to government and explicit policy goals. Khalil argues that the intellectual origins of modernization theory were partially rooted in Middle East studies through the work of Daniel Lerner at Columbia University's Bureau of Applied Social Research. Lerner's research was originally done for the State Department and Voice of America, which sought to understand so-called “traditional societies” in the region and beyond. One example of this modernization theory in action was US government support for American universities abroad, the subject of a chapter. Some American policymakers believed that these institutions could play a role in developing the region and bringing Western-style modernization there. Including an entire chapter on government support for American universities abroad in a book on “Middle East expertise” seems to take a step outside the framework of the study, since the goal of this support was never to create expertise, but rather to produce Western-oriented allies. Still, this section will be useful for those interested in the history of these institutions.
From the 1970s onwards, as area studies programs were increasingly populated by scholars mistrustful of the US government's influence on the Middle East, think tanks became a new source of “privatized” expertise. Khalil examines the pioneering role of the Brookings Institution, including its 1975 report Toward Peace in the Middle East, which went some way towards providing a road map for the Carter administration's policy. Other think tanks, including conservative ones such as Heritage and AEI, sought to replicate Brookings’ impact and perceived successes. In the aftermath of 9/11, Middle East experts as a whole were often criticized for failing to anticipate the attacks. However, a small number of privileged thinkers retained access to authority and provided legitimation for the Bush administration's wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, even if their views were far from representative of the academy. In these more recent stories, most of which are familiar, we are reminded that when policymakers do not find the desired knowledge in academia, they will seek it elsewhere.
Khalil's engaging writing style makes the book a pleasure to read, but most scholars with a familiarity with the literature are unlikely to be surprised by its claims. Due to the breadth and scope of the study, there are inevitable lacunae, including regarding the role of business and foreign and domestic lobby groups in the production of knowledge. Additionally, as the author himself notes, many of the files related to cooperation between government and knowledge producers (especially academics) remain classified or otherwise inaccessible. All of this suggests that there are many more wrinkles in this story left to unfold.
Despite these minor caveats, America's Dream Palace is an important contribution to the histories of Middle East studies and of US relations with the region. It is the best existing starting point for scholars interested in the connections between these fields, as well as for the general reader, who will be grateful for frequent appearance of sections that provide contextualizing summaries of US Middle East policy of the era.
