It is truly unfortunate that Hegel never saw the extent to which political theory has become fixated upon his idea of “mutual recognition.” Given that Hegel himself argued that such philosophical insights generally come too late in any case, this misfortune is probably deserved. Yet he certainly would have been impressed with contemporary output on the subject of recognition: “It seems,” notes Thompson, “as if every form of political action which is not exclusively economic or redistributive in character, and which involves issues of identity and difference in however indirect a manner, is considered to be a struggle for recognition” (160). Thompson's project is critically to assess three prominent theories of recognition (those of Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser, and Axel Honneth) “in order to determine which one of them—or which combination of elements from different theories—is the most coherent and convincing” (196). True to the style of critical theory, this is not a debate as much as it is a discussion. Thompson presents quite penetrating criticisms of all three theories, which ought to make the authors grateful that he is actually sympathetic to their cause and not intent on destroying it. The analysis is in the hermeneutical tradition (“If my reading of Honneth is right …”), and Thompson is scrupulously fair not only in his criticisms but also in his attempts to “reinterpret” their arguments in order to save them from their critics (including each other).

This is not a book for beginners. It is a clear articulation of complex ideas and complicated writings, but one should have a good grasp of the basics (Hegel would be helpful) before opening the cover. The structure and procedure are intricate: Thompson does not dispatch each theorist in turn (as one might find in a PhD thesis) but rather extracts certain ideas or themes from each theorist and uncurls them to see how well they hold up to his probing. A lesser theorist could not have succeeded with this line of inquiry, but the clarity of argument and the lucidity of the writing allow this approach to work. The niceties of “interpretation” may cause some frustration and impatience on the part of certain readers; the discussion over the fine distinctions between “critical” and “deconstructive” (100) may be teeth-grindingly pedantic to some. The same audience may become exhausted by the discursive approach (is Fraser's criticism of Honneth accurate? Is Honneth's portrayal of Fraser fair? And what of Butler's and Olson's critiques of Fraser, or Honneth's account of Habermas or Dewey on representation?) It can begin to feel like a Russian novel with a cast of thousands. Yet (especially for those who are inclined to such an approach) Thompson's treatment of these commentaries is vastly informative. There are those of us who would favour a more direct approach (“I argue x”) rather than a discursive one (“How should we evaluate what Fraser has to say about Honneth's view of x?”), but there is nonetheless much to say for enjoying the scenery at times rather than simply cutting to the chase. In this case, Thompson's investigation of the relationship between recognition and redistribution (chapter 5) and recognition and democracy (chapter 6) are particularly good and worth making the journey through the long discussion of “recognition as respect” versus “recognition as esteem” (which seems to depend a great deal upon an arbitrary distinction between what one means by “respect” and “esteem”).

Thompson's incisive analysis of the claim by Taylor, Fraser, and Honneth that “a non-sectarian justification for their particular model of democracy can be provided” (151–58) is particularly worthy of a close and careful reading, especially as this claim—that democracy can incorporate different groups which hold distinct values, without depending upon “liberal” principles—is the most demanding and perplexing problem facing those who tout “deep diversity”.

This is, then, an edifying read for patient people. It does exactly what the author intends: to spell out the strengths and weakness of three exceptional theories of recognition. But where, in the end, does this leave us? Do these theories of recognition really give us enough to make radical changes to concrete political institutions or do their weaknesses make them too inconclusive? Thompson addresses this almost begrudgingly in a concluding chapter that is a verbose page-and-a-half long. It seems this is something we must determine for ourselves. But he gives us some very good tools for doing so.