The Bay of Pigs is one of several books published to mark the 50th anniversary of this infamous Cold War debacle and forms part of the ‘Pivotal Moments in American History’ series. The author, Howard Jones, uses many of the most recently declassified documents, in addition to other more well-trawled sources, to analyse flawed White House and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) planning and the disastrous execution of a plan that was destined to flounder.
The book's clear organisation, succinct analysis and engaging writing make it an entertaining read. As well as a prologue and an epilogue, seven single-word chapter titles, from ‘Genesis’ to ‘Inquisition’, cover the background, planning, execution and fallout to this major setback for Washington in its April 1961 attempt to unseat a communist regime in the neighbouring Caribbean. The main features are its analysis of the dual US strategy to assassinate revolutionary leader Fidel Castro and support an amphibious landing of Cuban exiles on the island's southern shore, and President J. F. Kennedy's insistence on ‘plausible deniability’. Washington was fully implicated in the plan but did not want the wider world to know it, and required a credible escape route should the invasion go awry. Hindsight and this book remind us that Kennedy's administration failed to achieve any of its objectives.
Where the book succeeds best is in its methodical analysis of the plan inherited by the Kennedy government from the Eisenhower administration. The book exposes the paranoia at the heart of Washington about the rapid adoption of communism by Castro's revolutionary government. Living with such a regime at close proximity was not deemed an option and, instead, decisive action was demanded. With a clear timeline and utilising the most pertinent and up-to-date US sources, Jones details the dialogue within the Kennedy administration and its reasoning over the invasion plan proposed by the CIA. At the same time, he brings out Kennedy's fears about being implicated in a military invasion that ran counter to international law. While something needed to be done, his government could not be seen supporting illegal action, and it thus adopted a strategy of ‘plausible deniability’. As this book demonstrates, this resulted in political decisions that further compromised an already flawed military plan.
In contrast to many previous analyses of the Bay of Pigs episode, Jones emphasises the relatively recent revelation that the Kennedy government targeted Fidel Castro very directly, and that plans for his assassination ran in tandem with the invasion project. It was hoped that following the liquidation of its figurehead a proxy invasion would consolidate the overthrow of the Cuban Revolution. In fact, Castro's elimination was ‘essential to the plan’ (p. 47). The CIA Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, comes in for particular criticism from Jones. It was Bissell who did not inform the president that his operatives had failed to organise effective resistance within the island. Combined with Castro's arrest of many known counter-revolutionaries prior to the invasion, any chance of a popular insurrection appeared doomed, without Kennedy fully realising it.
Jones also makes a forensic examination of the dilemma about choosing an invasion landing site and the reasoning behind the decision to opt for the Zapata peninsula as opposed to the coastline near Trinidad. There is also excellent analysis on the timeline of Kennedy's decision to withhold US air cover for the operation, and how it affected the success of the invading forces. And, of course, there is fascinating detail on the military debacle itself as it played out on Cuba's southern coast in April 1961. Above all, the author brings out the ironies of this Cold War misadventure, which might appear comical had it not been so tragic and costly to human life.
Shortcomings are the book's overview of intimate US–Cuban relations prior to the Revolution. This only stretches to two pages, far too cursory considering the subject in hand. Jones's analysis of the Cold War backdrop to this epochal event is also brief. If the Bay of Pigs is to be considered a ‘pivotal moment’ in US history, more of this background was needed. It would, for example, have provided the reader with a greater understanding of why the Cuban public rallied to the defence of their island against invading exiles rather than turning against Castro's regime as the CIA wrongly assumed they would do. Jones also cites two blueprints for the CIA plan to overthrow Castro, its successful 1954 ousting of the Arbenz government in Guatemala and the covert overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953, but there is no analysis of these two precursors here. This is a significant omission, because many of the CIA planners who organised the Guatemala campaign were also implicated in the Bay of Pigs operation.
This book very much highlights Washington's position on the Bay of Pigs invasion from inception to post-mortem, and Cuban views are hard to find. In a particularly interesting passage though, Jones highlights Fidel Castro's judgement of the invasion plan, ‘a good plan, poorly executed’ (p. 125). While the landing site was inhospitable, it was also difficult for Castro's defending forces to reach, and therefore a good place to form a bridgehead. Unfortunately for the CIA the exile brigades never got enough men and equipment onshore to consolidate their invasion. Where he does relate other Cuban views, Jones relies too heavily on one text by a Cuban historian, Juan Carlos Rodríguez.
Yet this is still one of the best synopses of the Bay of Pigs and certainly the most up-to-date. But half a century after the event, a complete analysis that embraces views of this Cold War calamity from both sides of the shark-infested Florida Straits still remains to be written.
