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The ideomotor recycling theory for language

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 June 2016

Arnaud Badets*
Affiliation:
CNRS, Institut de Neurosciences Cognitives et Intégratives d'Aquitaine (UMR 5287), Université de Bordeaux, France. arnaud.badets@u-bordeaux.frhttp://www.incia.u-bordeaux1.fr/spip.php?article255

Abstract

For language acquisition and processing, the ideomotor theory predicts that the comprehension and the production of language are functionally based on their expected perceptual effects (i.e., linguistic events). This anticipative mechanism is central for action–perception behaviors in human and nonhuman animals, but a recent ideomotor recycling theory has emphasized a language account throughout an evolutionary perspective.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

The Now-or-Never bottleneck, according to Christiansen & Chater (C&C), is, in a broad-spectrum view, a convincing constraint in language acquisition and processing. From general action–perception principles, this bottleneck deals with a myriad of linguistic inputs to recode them by chunks as rapidly as possible. Accordingly, language processing involves a prediction (or anticipation) mechanism that encodes new linguistic feature very rapidly. I agree with this general position, but the described predictive mechanism in charge of such anticipation does not seem theoretically conclusive in regard to a recent ideomotor recycling theory (Badets et al. Reference Badets, Koch and Philipp2016).

Sensorimotor and predictive mechanisms have been clearly theorized in the last 40 years (Adams Reference Adams1971; Shin et al. Reference Shin, Proctor and Capaldi2010; Wolpert et al. Reference Wolpert, Diedrichsen and Flanagan2011). For example, as suggested in the Now-or-Never bottleneck framework, the computational modeling approaches of motor control assume that two kinds of internal models are in charge of producing goal-directed behaviors (e.g., Wolpert et al. Reference Wolpert, Ghahramani and Flanagan2001). The first is the forward model, which predicts the expected sensory consequences as a function of the motor command. The second is the inverse model, a mechanism that transforms the expected sensory consequences into motor commands. Basically, the inverse model is related to a motor plan to reach the expected goal, and the forward model is in charge of monitoring an action by comparing the expected sensory consequences to the actual sensory consequences. Differences can cause an adaptation to the motor mechanism in order to attain the goal. For efficient regulations of goal-directed actions, the forward and inverse models are equally central. However, this theoretical framework assumes an equivalent weight for the representation underlying the expected perceptual effects and the representation of the behavior to achieve these effects. In contrast, the ideomotor theory does not deny the involvement of a movement system but assumes a primary role for expected perceptual events, which could be central in language production and comprehension (Badets et al. Reference Badets, Koch and Philipp2016 see also Kashima et al. Reference Kashima, Bekkering and Kashima2013).

Ideomotor theory predicts that behaviors are functionally linked to their sensory consequences (Greenwald Reference Greenwald1970; Hommel et al. Reference Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben and Prinz2001). The core mechanism is that actions are represented mainly by the expected perceptual consequences (or effects) they aim to produce in the environment. From an evolutionary account, it is obvious that such an action–perception mechanism dedicated to situated interaction is present for millions of years, since ancestral animals (Cisek & Kalaska Reference Cisek and Kalaska2001). Moreover, Badets et al. (Reference Badets, Koch and Philipp2016 have recently suggested “we can easily assume that there is a reuse of cognitive function from mechanisms of simple motor control to more elaborated communication and language processing” (p. 11). In this theory based on the concept of exaptation (Gould & Vrba Reference Gould and Vrba1982), the ideomotor mechanism is recycled (i.e., exapted) during evolution or normal development in order to manage new world interaction like the human language (see Anderson Reference Anderson2010 for a neuronal reuse perspective).

According to the ideomotor recycling theory, the expected consequences of abstract meanings are simulated in an anticipative way in order to retrieve the appropriate and concrete words and sentences during the production (≈ action) and the comprehension (≈ perception) of language. Importantly, and as suggested by Greenwald (Reference Greenwald1972), “it ought to be possible to select a response very directly, perhaps totally bypassing any limited-capacity process, by presenting a stimulus that closely resembles the response's sensory feedback” (p. 52). Consequently, we can easily clarify the close alignment of linguistic meanings during a dialogue between two persons (see also Pickering & Garrod Reference Pickering and Garrod2013a). In this context, an utterance is represented by the expected consequences of abstract meanings for speaker, which can be processed (≈ stimulus processing) very rapidly, as expected meanings for the subsequent utterance in listener (≈ sensory feedback). For the ideomotor recycling theory, there are common representational formats between shared abstract meanings during a dialogue.

Finally, there is another piece, but indirect, of evolutionary evidence for an ideomotor account in language processing. Indeed, for Gärdenfors (Reference Gärdenfors, Oller and Griebel2004) “there has been a co-evolution of cooperation about future goals and symbolic communications” (p. 243). Corballis (Reference Corballis2009) suggested the same mutual mechanism between the capacity to envision the far future and language processing. Consequently, if the ideomotor recycling theory can explain some parts of human language (Badets et al. Reference Badets, Koch and Philipp2016), it could be argued that the same recycled mechanism can also be in charge for the representation of the future (see also Badets & Rensonnet Reference Badets and Rensonnet2015). In this view, Badets and Osiurak (Reference Badets and Osiurak2015) have recently suggested that such an anticipative mechanism could be central for the representation of future scenarios. From different paradigms and domains like tool use, action memory, prospective memory, or motor skill learning, compelling evidence highlights that the ideomotor mechanism can predict far-future-situated events to adapt different and efficient behaviors. For Corballis (Reference Corballis2009), language has the capacity to improve the representation of such future scenarios. For instance, in telling a person what will happen next week (associated with predicted storm weather) if he or she practices sailing, it is possible to form a coherent accident representation that can be avoided in the future. This mutual ideomotor mechanism between language and the capacity to envision the future gives an evident evolutionary advantage for humans.

To conclude, it seems that, from an evolutionary perspective, the ideomotor mechanism has been recycled in order to spread its influence on human behavior beyond simple motor acts. The ideomotor recycling theory can apply to language processing and other higher cognitive functions as foresight. For language, common representational formats between shared and expected abstract meanings during a dialogue can explain very rapid and efficient language skills.

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