According to Knobe, moral considerations are an integral part of the way we make sense of and reason about our social world. The problem is that Knobe requires an account of the nature of human thought explaining its moral nature, which, we argue, must be developmental (Carpendale & Lewis Reference Carpendale and Lewis2004). We take over where Knobe stops short of such a proposal, and sketch in an account of the development of thinking, showing how this is rooted in social interaction, which is moral in nature.
We propose a socially based view of the evolution and development of thinking. From this perspective, human cognition involves “moral considerations” because it originates as a social process that is gradually mastered by individuals. This social process has moral preconditions. We make sense of our social world in moral terms because this is a fundamental aspect of our human form of life, involving coordinating our actions and interests with others.
Knobe's comparison of the person as scientist versus moralist constructs a straw man (Gellatly Reference Gellatly1997), which does not explain how moral thinking is possible, let alone how “scientific” thinking and moral thinking fit together. For us, the problem is how the person as moralist could come into being. We draw on Mead's (Reference Mead1934) account of the social origin of thinking and mind, according to which meaning arises interpersonally as persons come to realize the significance of their actions for others. Thus, meaning is necessarily social because it requires experiencing others' attitudes to one's actions.
The view that reflective thought originates as a social process has many implications for the role of morality in thought. At the most basic level, social interaction involves moral preconditions of responsiveness, of give-and-take, and of turn-taking (Turnbull Reference Turnbull2003). Although we often think of morality at a grand scale, in terms of life-and-death issues, morality is also embedded in various aspects of everyday interaction with others and the way we treat one another. There is a level of morality even at the level of interpersonal interaction; it is built into the foundations of what makes our interaction possible. This social process is based on responding to one another and it is therefore moral in its roots, because we treat each other as persons, not things. We respond to one another; not to do so is to be morally accountable. At another level, human forms of communication function through assuming cooperation because we infer meaning from what others say based on the assumption that they are cooperating with us and they want us to understand them (Grice Reference Grice, Cole and Morgan1975a).
Another aspect of the moral preconditions of social interaction is Winch's (1972) point that, “the social conditions of language and rationality must also carry with them certain fundamental moral conceptions,” and “a norm of truth-telling is a moral condition of language” (Winch Reference Winch1972, pp. 60–63, emphasis in original). Holiday (Reference Holiday1988) also argued that the fabric of human communication is built on the assumption that we tell the truth. Of course, lying is possible, but it is only possible because truth-telling is the default expected pattern. We develop communication in parent-child interaction in relationships of trust. It is within such relationships that communication arises and this is mastered as a form of thought.
Piaget's seminal work focused on the origins of morality in children's practical interaction with each other, and how young children instantiate reciprocity in their play (Piaget Reference Piaget1932/1965). Children then gradually become aware of this level of morality on which their interaction is based, and this becomes available for reflective thought; but, for Piaget, this moral understanding is rooted in earlier, practical understanding developed with social interaction.
We have outlined how the social process, which is the cradle for human forms of reflective thought, has moral foundations. Moral considerations are part of the way we make sense of our social world because thinking is rooted in, and built on, the social process, which has moral preconditions. Knobe disregards a whole tradition according to which thinking is rooted in a system of socially embedded processes of which morality is an integral part. Drawing on this tradition would enable Knobe to dispense with the view of the person as a scientist and instead consider thinking as embedded in and emerging from social interaction, which has moral preconditions at a number of levels.
According to Knobe, moral considerations are an integral part of the way we make sense of and reason about our social world. The problem is that Knobe requires an account of the nature of human thought explaining its moral nature, which, we argue, must be developmental (Carpendale & Lewis Reference Carpendale and Lewis2004). We take over where Knobe stops short of such a proposal, and sketch in an account of the development of thinking, showing how this is rooted in social interaction, which is moral in nature.
We propose a socially based view of the evolution and development of thinking. From this perspective, human cognition involves “moral considerations” because it originates as a social process that is gradually mastered by individuals. This social process has moral preconditions. We make sense of our social world in moral terms because this is a fundamental aspect of our human form of life, involving coordinating our actions and interests with others.
Knobe's comparison of the person as scientist versus moralist constructs a straw man (Gellatly Reference Gellatly1997), which does not explain how moral thinking is possible, let alone how “scientific” thinking and moral thinking fit together. For us, the problem is how the person as moralist could come into being. We draw on Mead's (Reference Mead1934) account of the social origin of thinking and mind, according to which meaning arises interpersonally as persons come to realize the significance of their actions for others. Thus, meaning is necessarily social because it requires experiencing others' attitudes to one's actions.
The view that reflective thought originates as a social process has many implications for the role of morality in thought. At the most basic level, social interaction involves moral preconditions of responsiveness, of give-and-take, and of turn-taking (Turnbull Reference Turnbull2003). Although we often think of morality at a grand scale, in terms of life-and-death issues, morality is also embedded in various aspects of everyday interaction with others and the way we treat one another. There is a level of morality even at the level of interpersonal interaction; it is built into the foundations of what makes our interaction possible. This social process is based on responding to one another and it is therefore moral in its roots, because we treat each other as persons, not things. We respond to one another; not to do so is to be morally accountable. At another level, human forms of communication function through assuming cooperation because we infer meaning from what others say based on the assumption that they are cooperating with us and they want us to understand them (Grice Reference Grice, Cole and Morgan1975a).
Another aspect of the moral preconditions of social interaction is Winch's (1972) point that, “the social conditions of language and rationality must also carry with them certain fundamental moral conceptions,” and “a norm of truth-telling is a moral condition of language” (Winch Reference Winch1972, pp. 60–63, emphasis in original). Holiday (Reference Holiday1988) also argued that the fabric of human communication is built on the assumption that we tell the truth. Of course, lying is possible, but it is only possible because truth-telling is the default expected pattern. We develop communication in parent-child interaction in relationships of trust. It is within such relationships that communication arises and this is mastered as a form of thought.
Piaget's seminal work focused on the origins of morality in children's practical interaction with each other, and how young children instantiate reciprocity in their play (Piaget Reference Piaget1932/1965). Children then gradually become aware of this level of morality on which their interaction is based, and this becomes available for reflective thought; but, for Piaget, this moral understanding is rooted in earlier, practical understanding developed with social interaction.
We have outlined how the social process, which is the cradle for human forms of reflective thought, has moral foundations. Moral considerations are part of the way we make sense of our social world because thinking is rooted in, and built on, the social process, which has moral preconditions. Knobe disregards a whole tradition according to which thinking is rooted in a system of socially embedded processes of which morality is an integral part. Drawing on this tradition would enable Knobe to dispense with the view of the person as a scientist and instead consider thinking as embedded in and emerging from social interaction, which has moral preconditions at a number of levels.