In what sense is a work of commentary on a well-established figure in the history of philosophy itself a piece of philosophy? On the surface the formula which lies behind such a work may not seem too original. A primary object of such writing has of course to be to provide as accurate an account as possible of the ideas of the classical figure on the chosen topic of study. In this respect Robert B. Louden's book of essays succeeds admirably: we are given a very clear and well authenticated view of Kant's understanding of the human being culled from a wide variety of writings. The book forms an excellent introduction to Kant's anthropology in all its many facets. However, doing philosophy arguably requires a great deal more than repeating and summarizing the main ideas of another philosopher – no matter how major that philosopher might be. The kind of work that Louden presents is deceptively simple. Of course accurately conveying Kant's ideas is a priority for him but Louden does a good deal more than that. And that is where the original philosophy comes in.

Louden in these essays – all published for the second time – provides a very engaging picture of Kant's reasoning about the human individual's nature and potential. Louden demonstrates conclusively how central is thinking about human nature – both historically as Kant's philosophical thinking develops and systematically as Kant attempts to bring his philosophical system to a close. Louden commands our attention as he shows the many fascinating theories Kant evolves in studying human nature. Very little of what Kant says about human nature is overlooked. But of course there is not only the question of what Kant says directly about this vexed question – there is also the problem raised by what Kant does not say. Kant's penetrating ideas about human nature have very important implications for matters Kant does not directly expound upon. And, as the focus of our concerns about human nature changes over time, this issue often raises the most interesting questions. This is where Louden is original and engages in important new and constructive philosophical work. Many of these essays draw together Kant's ideas on key topics that are of particular interest to us now, such as the nature of evil, the role of education in human development, the role of examples in ethics, and the nature of humility, cosmopolitan citizenship and moral strength. And Louden does so in a way that raises penetrating issues on how Kant's thinking can be directed to dealing with problems that press upon us anew.

Two major philosophical skills are involved here. First the author has to establish the philosophical nexus of ideas to which Kant's thoughts belong; in other words the author has to develop a clear idea of the philosophical system to which Kant's reasoning belongs. I would suggest that what pertains to Kant's philosophical system is not necessarily everything that Kant wrote, but rather what can be rationally reconstructed from his writings. So every work of interpretation of Kant involves (or should involve) putting together a picture of a philosophical system. In this way all useful commentators on Kant are engaged in doing original philosophy. But they may also be involved in doing original philosophy in a second way. And here the role is more imaginative and creative: this is the aspect of the work (and Louden does this very well) which presents an account on the implications of the philosophical system for topics which are not touched upon or only touched upon lightly by the major figure being studied. And here I would say the most valuable dimensions of Louden's stimulating essays are the aspects which seek to bring to light what a Kantian view might be on important philosophical matters that still trouble us now.

Kant, for example, does not provide one definitive account of how national character might impact on the behaviour of different peoples. He makes many stimulating and often controversial comments on the matter. But we are rightly concerned to know what these comments might mean for a broader ‘Kantian’ understanding of national character. In his chapter on the topic Louden cleverly marshalls the evidence in Kant's Observations of the Beautiful and Sublime to suggest a way forward in bringing together such a Kantian understanding. According to this view national character is not to be regarded as a determining factor in understanding the behaviour of peoples but is to be seen as a significant factor, and so valuable knowledge, in our seeking to become better citizens of the world. Although a cosmopolitan Kant does not want to see this proceed by removing differences of national character but rather by enhancing them because, as Louden emphasizes, Kant sees great virtue in ‘preserving the peculiarity of a people and its language’ (163).

Louden also demonstrates his philosophical skill in his essay on the role of examples in Kant's moral philosophy. He argues that examples still play a role in the formulation of Kant's ethics despite the harsh criticism their use receives in the Groundwork. Kant is very firmly of the view that morality cannot be derived from examples and even the life of Christ cannot serve as a wholly reliable representation of good behaviour (91). Louden explains that for Kant it is not the example that is vitally important but the principle or rule which it embodies. Louden notes that in everyday life it is very easy to confuse the example for the rule. But the Kantian approach is not wedded to examples. In acting morally we should not primarily be aiming at being like other people but rather at ensuring that we behave in ways that are consistent with the moral law. As Louden puts it, the prime role of the example in moral teaching is to make the law visible. The emulation of good actions earns Kant's approval but not copying them. We have first and foremost to evaluate our actions through principles inferred from the categorical imperative, and not unthinkingly imitate the actions of others. The positive role that an example can play is that it can show that such acts of morality are possible so that we then have fewer excuses for not following the moral law. The true origin of ethics lies in ‘an ideal of reason created by rational agents’ (100). Although it may be intuitively easier to follow a pattern of behaviour impressed upon us by a person we regard to be good, genuine goodness arises from thinking through for ourselves our circumstances and gauging our actions by rules of action that all rational beings can affirm. Thus acting virtuously is from the Kantian perspective a highly creative (not to say demanding) process.

A slight qualm that is raised by Louden's emphasis on the importance of anthropology in Kant's philosophy – an emphasis that seems to be entirely justified by a close reading of the texts – is that if anthropology is so crucial, and an element of the study of practical philosophy has always to be empirical, it may seem that the capacity to act morally is dependent upon the growth of our knowledge. As our knowledge of human nature increases so we are better equipped to deal with others ethically. But this may hint at relativism: a radical change in our understanding of human nature may make us more able to act well in the future. But this relativism cannot have been part of Kant's intention. One supposes that the appropriate Kantian answer is to say that the underlying framework of a moral action never changes, only the manner in which we seek to implement that action: its timing, its mode of execution and its prioritization in relation to other ethical goals should all be coloured by our knowledge of human propensities. There is a skill to acting ethically which can always be improved by better knowledge of human circumstances and behaviour. The fact that this knowledge can always be modified and extended provides no justification for refraining from acting ethically. It is simply that we should try to act on the most informed basis possible.

As Louden aptly puts it, ‘morality is not easy for human beings. But anthropology also teaches us that there are things we can do, given human nature, to promote the development of moral character’ (71). Acting morally arises against a background of struggle within us between moral and non-moral motives. Self-knowledge is an important dimension of practising morality. In seeking to oppose our non-moral and anti-moral motives and strengthen those that are compatible with morality we need to know about our character.

‘The opportunity to practice goodness in small matters through civilized behaviour is a mundane feature of daily life, but it has the cumulative effect on character’ (72). No action which affects others is too mundane for us to ignore its moral dimensions. So doing the right thing always requires some anthropological reflection. We need always to be assured that our natural incentives for action are not determining what we do. Thus, instead of regarding our incomplete knowledge of the human individual as a barrier to developing our ethical conduct Kant regards it as an incentive. We know from pure moral philosophy the quality of an action that makes it good; what we learn from reflection on ourselves and others are the best possible steps (given our present information) in overcoming our reluctance to carry it out.