1. Historical introduction

Australian ideas of the Asia Pacific region are historically deep-rooted. The first attempts to see Australia in the regional context can be traced back to around the time of the First World War. In 1917, a Pacific Branch within the Prime Minister's Department was established. The ‘Pacific’ was the favoured terminology in the 1930s largely because the United States was part of the Pacific and this made Australia appear less vulnerable to Asia. The idea of the Pacific did not aim to promote Asian regional integration but rather offered protection from Asia (Walker, Reference Walker1999).

Australia has been a part of the English-speaking world and has developed and maintained relations mainly with the United Kingdom. Yet those ties have diminished within the last two decades. The end of the Cold War ‘marked the emergence of a more fluid environment in the Asia-Pacific’ (Mediansky, Reference Mediansky and Mediansky1997), and thus ‘a gradual shift in the orientation of Australia's external policy, from a global to a regional approach’ (Thayer, Reference Thayer and Mediansky1997).

In the early 1970s, Gough Whitlam raised the idea of a comprehensive regional organization. In January 1989, Bob Hawke proposed an Asia Pacific economic grouping. Australian commitment to engagement with Asia has been reflected in the Fitzgerald (Reference FitzGerald1988) Report on immigration, the Garnaut (Reference FitzGerald1989) Report on Australian relations with Northeast Asia, and the Foreign Minister's Statement on Australia's Regional Security in 1989. In the 1980s, Australia inaugurated the process that led to the formation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation organization (APEC) in 1989.

The 1990s witnessed great effort by Australia to engage with the Asian region. Paul Keating (Reference Keating2000) made ground-breaking inroads in developing, promoting, and building an Asian Pacific Community in the 1990s. He devoted one whole book chapter to the idea of an Asian Pacific Community. According to Greg Sheridan's interpretation, Keating made a never previously matched comprehensive commitment to ‘the Asianization of Australian life’ (Milner, Reference Milner, Cotton and Ravenhill1997). In 1995, Gareth Evans urged Australians to begin to think of themselves as living in ‘an East Asian hemisphere nation’. In 1998, Stephen FitzGerald, the former ambassador to China, and Michael Wesley, now the director of the Lowy Institute think tank, proposed the creation of an Asian Community in North and Southeast Asia and Australasia. They envisioned a political association of East Asian nations by the 2020s, with Australia playing an active role. FitzGerald and Wesley (Reference FitzGerald and Wesley1998) suggested the creation of an ‘Energy and Environment Community’ in the region.

Australia has been a facilitator and driver of regional integration. Australia has played a key role in moving APEC towards the creative formula that allowed for the inclusion of the three Chinese entities (China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) in the organization from 1991. APEC has come to symbolize Australia's regional vision. It is an Australian initiative based on trade and investment liberalization, business facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation. Apart from being the originator of APEC, Australia has had a reputation as an honest broker, bringing together broad coalitions (e.g. APEC and the Cairns Group). Australia has been a promoter and supporter of peace-building in the region (e.g. in East Timor and the Solomon Islands) and an active participant in the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit (EAS).

Despite Australia's attempts to punch above its weight in regional forums and to become more entrenched in its region in terms of its trade and investment links, it is still not regarded as a full member or as quite fitting into the region. Australia has experienced difficulties with engaging in Asia-Pacific regional integration. Using Stephen George's term (Reference George1990), Australia is an ‘awkward partner’ in the Asian context, and, in the words of Higgott and Nossal (Reference Higgott and Nossal1997), has experienced the ‘liminality’ of being neither here nor there.

Kevin Rudd, the former Australian Prime Minister, called for the establishment of an Asia Pacific Community (APC) in his speech to the Asia Society, AustralAsia Centre on 4 June 2008 (Rudd, Reference Rudd2008a). His proposal for an APC by the year 2020 is a substantive initiative in Australia's ongoing engagement with Asia. Rudd's APC proposal reflects a long-standing Australian preference for the Pacific idea over the Asian idea of regionalism. It is Pacific-centric, holding a broad view of a geographic Asian region. Rudd's concept of Pacificism closely follows and expands the core idea of APEC. It can be seen as a deliberative design to serve the historical function of reassuring Australians that they are not alone in an Asian world, and as a wise strategy to avoid dealing with the question of whether or not Australia is an Asian country.

The APC proposal has, however, attracted a high level of criticism both at home and abroad. The main critical analysis of the proposal has focused on institutional building or architecture, or its relationship with existing regional institutions, but overlooks a host of often fraught questions about culture, norms, identities, and international power relations. The APC concept needs to be scrutinized in terms of these questions. This paper takes the Rudd initiative as a case study within a larger, long-standing and path-dependent Australian regionalist idea and approach. It examines the cultural, cognitive, and normative dimensions of Rudd's proposal. It analyses four dilemmas or awkward problems that the APC faces. These dilemmas are critical issues for Australian engagement with Asia, and must be dealt with if any attempt to revive or revise the idea of the APC is to be successful.

2. Rudd's proposal for an Asia Pacific Community

3. The Dilemma in Power relations

Asian regionalism has thus far been middle-power driven. ASEAN has centred upon the small and medium powers and drawn the great powers into a framework of voluntary restraint. ASEAN creatively used the tension between China and Japan to develop the ASEAN plus Three model later on, by inviting India, Australia, and New Zealand to balance the influence of China. Achayra argues that weaker actors acquire a voice through regionalism that they would otherwise lack if they were unilateral or aligned with major powers (Acharya, Reference Acharya2005).

The regional context, in which smaller and middle powers have been more suspicious of the big powers’ agendas, provided a golden opportunity for Australia to put forward new ideas for the region. Despite this, the Australian idea of regionalism has been constrained by Australia's position in relation to the great powers in the region. Australia lacks resources and capacity to shape regional norms. In the context of a balance between great powers being a precondition of effective regionalism, Australia is caught between greater powers in the region. It favours Pacificism, which is a concept that includes the US in the region, but in doing so it creates a problem for developing closer relations with China. In short, the structure of international relations, regional hierarchy, and power relations in Asia impacted the way in which the APC proposal was initiated and received. As White (Reference White2009) points out, a new set of relations between the major powers needs to be established before Rudd's APC can be achieved.

4. The dilemma of pacificism

The above regional hierarchy of power relations is a geopolitical condition under which Australia has always preferred a broad, ocean-centered conception of the Asia-Pacific region. Pacificism acknowledges the important role of the US, but avoids the sensitive question of Australia's identity in the region. This gives rise to another awkward situation in which Australia prefers to promote Pacificism, despite being geographically part of Asia, and therefore inevitably confronts the question of how to deal with the various persistent indigenous ideas of Asianism.

‘Asia-Pacific’ and ‘East Asia’ are the two core terms around which different regional identities are constructed. Conceptualized as ‘Pacificism’ and ‘Asianism’, they offer different ideas of regional order and vary in scope, boundaries, and directions (Wesley, Reference Wesley2009). The idea of Pacific-centric regionalism was invented and promoted by the US and adopted by Australia. Originally, the idea of the Pacific Rim was geological, and then began to be used in the security context in the 1960s. Pacific-centric regionalism came into being in the mid-1970s driven by US capitalism and was adopted in Australia and New Zealand in the later 1970s (Leon, Reference Leon, Wilson and Dirlik1995; Connery, Reference Connery, Wilson and Dirlik1995). It was later materialized in the form of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

Australia is geographically located both in the Asia and the Pacific. It has to build regional groups with Asia and the US. This is the fate of Australia. It is the reason why the Rudd government favours the idea of an Asia-Pacific community that engages both America and Oceania. Defining the region in Pacific terms has a dual effect: whilst the United States remains engaged, the Asian economies are taken advantage of. Its aim to form a large community rules out the difficult question of having to choose between Asia and the US because all are a part of an Asia-Pacific community.

Different versions of Pacificism have been held by many leaders and scholars in Asian countries such as Japan, Korea, and Singapore. Nevertheless, most Asians implicitly hold a continental notion of regionalism. In the early nineteenth century, Japan, India, and China developed different versions of Pan-Asianism (He, Reference He2004). In the 1980s and 1990s, Mahathir's EAEC offered an Asian version of the regional project, excluding the United States (Hook, Reference Hook, Gamble and Payne1996). In 1997, Kim Dae-jung proposed and established the East Asia Version Group and built a foundation for the ASEAN plus Three (Hundt and Kim, Reference Hundt and Kim2011). Hatoyama's proposal of an East Asian Community in 2009 was geographically narrowed to include Japan, China, South Korea, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In all cases, Asia is defined as a continental, geographic vicinity and cultural specificity. For most Asians, this notion of an East Asian Community is indigenous, growing from Asia and advocated by Asians. It has historical origins and is supported by some contemporary cultural and economic dynamism.

Pacificism and Asianism are at odds, especially where Asianism is perceived as ‘Asian for Asia and by Asians’ (He, Reference He2004). They do overlap, however, with many countries belonging in both categories. This is where regionalism is a dramatic departure from the more exclusive nature of nationalism. Herein lies a great opportunity for Australia to be part of an inclusive East Asian community. FitzGerald has long advocated for an East Asian community. It has considerably more merit than the model Rudd has in mind, for it promotes closer regional cooperation and linkages without asserting the empty idea of ‘Pacific’. No doubt, promoting particular visions of regionalism involves ideational battles; the challenging question is how to combine Pacificism and Asianism successfully. Maybe a watered-down version of Pacificism – that is, Pacific Asia, not Asia-Pacific – can be developed further (Wesley, Reference Wesley2009). To do so, we must examine the flaws of the APC critically. (Of course Asianism is also seriously flawed, see He, Reference He2004.)

First, although a geographical determinism is problematic (Katzenstein, Reference Katzenstein2000), a region must be a group of states in geographical proximity to each other. Territorial proximity enhances the likelihood that states will have common security concerns or have a common interest in reducing perceptions of threat from their neighbours. Cultural interaction, shared history, tourism, and migration between countries are more likely when states are geographically close. Neighbouring states will have deeper trade ties or more shared concerns over natural resources, environmental problems, access to fisheries etc. Of course, there are many exceptions where geographically distant states still share these kinds of concerns, but geographical proximity increases the chances of these factors bringing states together. A tangible territory is a physical basis for any region. The European Union (EU) is still territorially bounded, not based on any kind of notion of an ocean. We have never heard of a concept of a European Atlantic Community. The short physical distance between Perth and any capital city in Southeast Asia renders Australia a part of Asia geographically. By contrast, we can hardly claim that the US is geographically a part of Asia.

Of course, regionalism does not rely on geography alone. Regions and regionalism are products of collective political imagination. There are non-territorial organizations like NATO and the Commonwealth of Nations. But strictly speaking they are not regional organizations, but international ones. To conceptualize them as a sort of regionalism is in fact to stretch the concept of region.

Australia has succeeded in its efforts to initiate and institutionalize APEC. Modern technology, communication and transport systems, and the interaction of geo-politics and economic integration have made an ocean-based concept of regionalism possible and acceptable. However, APEC has experienced difficulties in deepening free trade and suffered relative decay in recent year when its membership has expanded. Moreover, the APC is about a political community; this is the heart of the problem. A political community is more sensible if it involves a group of countries in geographical proximity to each other. It is more difficult to build an Asia-Pacific political community on the basis of an ocean. Heseltine (Reference Heseltine2009) has rightly observed that the APC lacks geographical consistency, which inevitably erodes the sense of community.

Two, the APC attempts to accommodate the US by pointing to a broader notion of Pacificism, but it does not deal with the tough issue concerning the role of the US. The US has played and ought to play a significant role in building Asian regionalism. The essential question for Asian regionalism, however, is whether the US should be excluded from definitions of the region. The US has played a critical role in establishing and maintaining the security community of NATO, but has accepted the reality that the US is not a part of the European Union. The same logic applies to the role of the US in East Asia. The US must accept the same reality that it is not a part of the Asian region (Hawke, Reference Hawke2009). The US ought to play a critical and even a dominant role in maintaining security in Asia through bilateral alliances and/or multilateral arrangements. Any Australia idea of regionalism should deal with this question and persuade American realists to accept such a fate, and, at the same time, convince China to openly accept that the US should play a dominant role in regional security.

It is important for the US to recognize and accommodate the legitimate interests of Asian regionalism and to envisage a future in which the US is not a member of the Asian regional community. Simon Tay argued the same point in 2005 when he said that US must accept and understand its exclusion from the first EAS. It should neither ignore nor seek to ‘veto’ the EAS and the underlying sense of East Asian regionalism (Cossa et al., Reference Cossa, Simon and Lee2005).

The US occupies a critical position in relation to Asian regionalism and its future. History shows that the exclusion of the US from the Asian groupings actually benefits the US in a number of ways. Since ASEAN displaced the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (of which the USA, UK, and Australia were members), order has been maintained and conflicts avoided between member states. This has saved the US greatly in terms of dedicating energy and resources to issues of a potentially volatile nature. If a South Asia community had been built to maintain order and deal with security and terrorism effectively, it would have saved the US a great deal of trouble in Afghanistan and Pakistan today.

Third, although the APC will help Australia gain benefits from both Asia and the US, it will not help to resolve the persistent question of Australia's identity in the Asian community. While Rudd says that all Asian countries including Australia belong to the Asia-Pacific community, it avoids the tough question of whether Australia is a part of Asia. FitzGerald sees the notion of Asia-Pacific as ‘a Clayton's Asia’, pointing out the problem associated with the term: ‘we have done too little to belong in human terms or to make the necessary cultural and intellectual adjustment’ (FitzGerald, Reference FitzGerald1997). He sharply points out: ‘APEC provided a comfort, an escape into the idea that the world had not changed, need not change . . . We had Asia-Pacific, not Asia. For Asia-Pacific, you might not have to change at all’ (FitzGerald, Reference FitzGerald1997). The above remark made by FitzGerald was made a long time ago, but is still applicable to a major flaw in Rudd's idea: namely, that it is too broad and too ambiguous. It is bound to repeat many of the problems of existing regional institutions in Asia. In addition, the idea of the APC deflects the most-needed attention away from what has already occurred in ‘regulative regionalism’ (Jayasuriya, Reference Jayasuriya2009). Too much debate on an Asia-Pacific community will only slow down the process of substantive regionalism in Asia.

5. Cultural and identity awkwardness

One of the merits of the APC is to point out the possibility of the co-existence of dual Asian and Pacific identities. It does not address the tough question of whether Australia is a part of Asia, however. Australia is in an awkward position in that when it moves towards Asia it faces a cultural identity problem. The APC, however, attempts to avoid this problem rather than tackling it.

There is no need for Australia to change its cultural tradition and adopt cultural features common to Asia for the sake of promoting regionalism. Australians don't need to be a part of Asia culturally in order to remain engaged with Asia. There are sufficient reasons for Australia to maintain its allegiance to Western culture. First, higher education in Australia has earned billons of dollars from Asian students. It was the maintenance of Western culture, not the dilution of it, that made the export of Australian education successful. Australia, as a part of and product of Western culture, is often seen to reflect better conditions of civilization.

Second, some Asian leaders tend to deemphasize their own culture and identity in the process of regional identity formation. In doing so, great powers like Japan and China have developed a complex attitude toward Asia. Japan has been both a part of Asia and the West, and Beijing likes to think that China is seen as a part of the world and that China should be more global than Asian. An overemphasis on Asian identity undermines China's global ambition.

Third, Asianism itself is not based on a clearly defined regional identity, as Asia is inherently multicultural and experiences its own cultural and identity problems. Asian identities are problematic. As Anwar argues, ‘Asia has not a settled identity at present. It is in the process of coming into being’ (cited in Milner and Johnson, Reference Milner, Johnson and Ingelson1997: 16). Interestingly, weak regional identities are beneficial for regional cooperation in reducing suspicion and opposition from outsiders. A strong identity is suspicious to outsiders. In drafting statements for Asia, for example, scholars have hesitated to even mention the term ‘Asian identity’.Footnote ¹ Asia has its own serious problem with Asian identification (He and Inoguchi, Reference He and Inoguchi2011).

Fourth, when Paul Keating termed Australia an ‘Asian’ country, emphasizing the double identities of Australia, it invited backlash from Australian society, evidenced by the rise of the One Nation Party. The Asianization of Australia is dangerous and divisive, but it is politically safe to emphasize the need for an increase in Asian literacy levels in Australia and to phrase it as a ‘national skill’ issue, not an identity issue (Rudd, Reference Rudd and Sheridan1995). Keating lost the argument when he stressed that Australia must become a part of Asia. One fundamental flaw of the Asianization of Australia is that it fails to deal with normative issues. In the process of any Asianization, Australia definitely does not want to sacrifice its democracy. Australians would reject Asianization completely if it brings more crime, the various forms of corruption, and the increased house price pushed by Asian business immigrants. Asianization is to be accepted if Asia is to a certain degree ‘Australianized’, that is if Australian democracy and clean government spread to Asia.

Learning lesson from Keating, Rudd has avoided the question of Australian identity and adopted a strategy of silence on this sensitive issue. Rudd's APC proposal failed to discuss the fundamental issue of Australian identity at home and aboard.

The above strong reasons seem to make Australians more complacent about their culture and identity. Australia is not seen as needing an Asian identity to fully participate in the region. Still, however, the APC proposal experienced cultural resistance from Asia. Australia is not perceived as an Asian country, but a White country, belonging to an English-speaking world and a middle power player within the global North. Australia was largely seen as a branch office of the British Empire in the past and is now seen as a deputy-sheriff of the US Empire in Asia (Higgott, Reference Higgott1994). Indeed, the strongest force that has shaped the idea of an Asian region, Asian identity, and Asian unity was Western imperialism. Through the British Empire, Australia historically established a colonial connection with Asia; that is, Australia represents a colonial power from an Asian perspective.

This results in an awkward situation. Australia is viewed by some Asians as behaving like a strange outsider: how can Australia lack a sense of being part of an Asian community but advocate strongly for an Asia Pacific Community? Australia is part of Asia in some ways but does not really belong to Asia. Australia acknowledges some of its Asian culture, but its interest is more in economic interaction rather than in Asian values. It is more Pacific, but less Asian. Mahathir once remarked that Australia is not a part of Asia. While many Asian leaders and intellectuals do not say this openly, they do take this for granted. Australia is not a part of the popular culture phenomenon in Asian society. With its own sports codes like AFL and cricket taking precedence, Australia does not participate in the Asian Games, although the Australian soccer team is now part of the Asian Football Federation and competes in the Asian Cup soccer tournament.

The APC avoids cultural identity issue. In contrast, the idea of Asianism is supported by Asian affinitive cultures. Asian religions and cultures underline their perceptions of an Asia region. Confucian civilization underlines the narrowly defined Northeast Asian region. Buddhism has heavily influenced both Southeast and Northeast Asia. Islam is another defining culture in Southeast and South Asia. Indeed, as Leifer (Reference Leifer1996: 11–12) says, cultural heritage is the basis of both regional interactions and conflict resolution mechanisms.

Despite the fact that the Australian younger generation of voters are moderately supportive of Australia's engagement with Asia (He et al., Reference He, Pietsch and Clark2010), Australia has serious problems with Asian cultures and languages. Only a few Australians acquire Asian languages. Of the more than 66,000 year 12 students in New South Wales, only 250 studied Indonesian. That is only about a third of 1% of all graduates. In New South Wales, only one in 52, or 2%, of year 12 students studied Chinese (Roberts, Reference Roberts2006). According to the Business Alliance for Asia Literacy, half of this country's schools teach very little about Asia, and while just 6% of year 12 students study an Asian language, the proportion drops to just 3% in universities (Colvin, Reference Colvin2009). By contrast, the Straits Times survey of a 1,000 residents of the ASEAN region in 2005 found that regional identities had been enhanced. More than half of those polled believed they shared a common identity and wanted the pace of integration speeded up. Just over half said they could speak the language of another ASEAN country. Five in ten of those surveyed were willing to invest in another country (Fernandez and Rekhi, Reference Fernandez and Rekhi2006).

Asian regional identity has been and is still being constructed. In the ideational battle over different versions of regionalism, culture and identity are often used against Australia. Some Asian countries do not see the design of a new regional architecture as a cooperative venture, rather simply a competitive one. Some view Australia as a potential rival and not an ally. In this regard, as Mahathir said, ‘If you want to become Asian, you should say we are Asian because we have an Asian culture, an Asian mentality’ (cited in Milner, Reference Milner, Cotton and Ravenhill1997: 39). In this context, Australian efforts to join the Asian region face cultural barriers abroad just like Turkey did when it faced resistance from EU member countries and people (Wesley, Reference Wesley1997). Indeed, Rudd's proposal for the APC is seen by some as if Turkey was proposing a grand vision for the European Union. While just how many Asian countries and people hold such a view needs to be investigated empirically, the question itself highlights the importance of the cognitive and normative elements of regionalism.

It is also problematic that Australians in general do not think that Australia should be, or is, a part of Asia. Some members of Australian society even feel insulted if it is deemed a part of Asia; they are proud of being identified with British descendents and as a part of Western culture generally. In 1993, Graeme Campbell, Member of Parliament for Kalgoorlie, asserted: ‘it needs to be stressed again and again that Australia is not a part of Asia. It is a separate and distinct nation-continent. We are unique and should be proud of our uniqueness.’ Footnote ² Geoffrey Blainey's immigration debate and the rejection of Japan's Multi-Function Polis, for fear that Australia will become ‘a colony of Japan’ (a term coined by Blainey) posed difficulties in developing fully regional integration between Australia and Asia. Another example is the different attitude towards the Dalai Lama. South Korea rejected the Dalai Lama's visa three times, while Australia issued a visa to both the Dalai Lama and Rebiya Kadeer. While power relations are main factors, cultural norms and practices certainly play different roles. It is imperative for Australia to maintain and defend a free society and tradition by allowing the Dalai Lama and Kadeer to visit and speak out in Australia. By contrast, the South Korean decision was not only based on political and security considerations, but also its cultural awareness and shared history between China and South Korea.

In summary, Australia faces a dilemma in being able to develop a fully integrated approach toward Asian regionalism. It is difficult for Australia to become a part of Asia in cultural terms. If it fails to engage Asia in substantive cultural terms, it lacks cultural legitimacy for a greater role in Asia. If Australia moves away from the West and toward Asia, this alienates Australians as well as the US. The Australian public is not ready to accept the necessity of identity change for a greater role in the process of Asian regionalism. Australian nation-building now must take on a regional outlook, and it must successfully integrate its national identity into a broader regional identity.

6. The awkward role of democracy

Australia faces another awkward condition that hampers Canberra's ability to develop a pragmatic approach towards regional development in Asia. On the one hand, Australia must not let the issue of democracy hijack efforts to enhance regionalism, but on the other hand it cannot get around the issue of democracy and human rights when dealing with China. Here we come to the challenge of China, the most powerful authoritarian state in the world. China has adopted unorthodox policy-making strategies in developing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The exclusion of China in any economic regionalism is impossible; and the place of China must be considered in any regional architecture. However, region building will be unsuccessful if China stresses the advantages of its political system and Australia insists on promoting democracy.

With regards to the role of democracy in the process of regionalization, Paul Keating, John Howard, and Kevin Rudd have been cautious. Rudd's idea of the APC plays down democracy, but likely faces criticism from the US for failing to mention democracy and strong criticism at home when it seemed to be weak in defending human rights in dealing with China. In contrast, FitzGerald sees democracy as an important feature of Australian society and as a basis for regional organization (FitzGerald and Wesley, Reference FitzGerald and Wesley1998).

Democracy is a precondition for EU membership. The expansion of the EU has been a process of spreading democracy in Europe. Turkey's entry into the EU has been delayed largely due to its regime style and to some degree its Islamic culture. When it comes to the expansion of ASEAN, Western commentators expect that ASEAN will treat democracy as a precondition. Many have criticized the inclusion of Myanmar by ASEAN without greater pressure being put on its military regime. Despite strong opposition and criticism, ASEAN admitted a military-dominated Myanmar as a member in 1997. ASEAN was formed when most states in the region were authoritarian; and it has developed close regional cooperation with the authoritarian state of China.

Operative norms in Asia are not necessarily liberal. The norm of pragmatism prevails in the development of regionalism in Asia, while human rights and democracy have been downplayed. The reality is that there are a diversity of political systems, including both democracy and authoritarianism in Asia. China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Myanmar have not democratized. Singapore, Malaysia, and Cambodia only have an electoral form of democracy. This uneven political development has ruled out a democracy requirement for East Asian regionalism.

If democracy was imposed as a necessary condition, such a normative requirement would inhibit the development of East Asian regionalism. The issue of democracy and human rights has caused a schism between Australia and China, which does not promote a favourable condition for regional integration. In the eyes of Beijing, Rudd's proposal of the APC to accommodate the rise of China in 2008 was undermined by his government's decision to issue a visa to Rebiya Kadeer in 2009. The controversy over the screening of The Ten Conditions of Love at the Melbourne International Film Festival (MIFF), along with Rebiya Kadeer's visit to Australia, showed an example of how different conceptions of governance and human rights put Australia in an awkward position in developing and promoting its vision of regionalism. At home, the Howard government in the wake of the 1996 election shifted slightly in emphasis on Asia (Shi, Reference Shi1997). When a portion of voters did not like the idea of ‘Asianization of Australian life’, the Howard government slowed down the process of engagement with Asia. Moreover, Japan and South Korea are both democracies, but their conflict over history textbooks inhibits the development of regionalism in northeast Asia (He and Hundt, Reference He and Hundt2011).

The above analysis does not suggest that democracy is incompatible with Asian regionalism. Kim (Reference Kim2006: 10) argues strongly that ‘Without strengthening democracy and eradicating poverty, we cannot expect to have peace.’ Increasingly, East Asian regionalism has incorporated the idea of democracy and human rights to a certain degree. The year 2005 was a watershed in the history of East Asian regionalism. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter embodies the first written requirement for the promotion of democracy, of human rights, for transparency and good governance, and for strengthening democratic institutions. In addition, under pressure of threats to boycott any regional meeting to be chaired by Myanmar, the military regime in Myanmar decided to relinquish its turn at ASEAN's chairmanship in 2006. In 2009, a regional human rights court was established in ASEAN.

If Asia continues to be democratized, a more democratic Asia may indeed praise Australian democratic institutions that provide a basis for regional cooperation. This is the future Australia would like to see, but it is far from the current reality.

About the author

Baogang He (BA, Zhejiang Uni, 1981; MA, People's University of China, Beijing, 1986; Ph.D, ANU, Australia, 1993), Chair in International Studies at the School of Politics and International Studies, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia. Professor He is the author of four single-authored books and three edited books, and 50 international refereed journal articles. His research interests cover deliberative democracy, Chinese democratization, Chinese politics, comparative politics, political theory, Asian regionalism, and federalism in Asia.