Any book on the Muslim Brotherhood or political Islam in the Middle East and North Africa should address several issues that have dominated the analysis of political Islam over the past twenty years, whether in the form of the inclusion-moderation debate or Post-Islamism. The basic issue is that the Muslim Brotherhood since its foundation in 1928 has been handicapped by a deep confusion about the role politics should play in the movement. Can salvation be attained through pursuing a religious morality and preaching (daʿwa) in order to build a religious community (jamaʿa) from below, or should it be brought about by gaining political power and if so should the state play a role in “Islamising” society from above? The problem was compounded by the vagueness of classic Islamic political theory, a vagueness that was largely compensated by the Brotherhood in its ideological overreach as expressed in the slogans “Islam, state and religion” and Islam is a “comprehensive system.” The movement was forcefully confronted with this unresolved issue in the 1980s when authoritarian states liberalized politically and Islamist movements had to choose between continuing as social movements, retaining their absolutist claims to religious truth and purity, or establishing a political party—originally condemned as partisanship (hizbiyya). This led to internal debates and divisions, undermining unity and hierarchy. Choosing for the second option would mean building cross-ideological coalitions with other political parties and achieving political consensus. This option, however, was not just a pragmatic choice; it also meant that Islamist political movements would have to bite the bullet and accept modern politics and replace God's sovereignty with popular sovereignty and accept democracy. In the end, these choices determined their relations with the authoritarian states and their subsequent role during the Arab spring. Retaining their traditional ambiguity would leave them a certain leeway to make deals with the autocratic rulers; on the other hand, choosing for modern politics would open a range of options that could bring about revolutionary change by means of what political scientists call a “pacted transition” with their ideological opponents toward a more democratic system. The latter would also have greatly enhanced the chances for gaining political experience.

In her latest work on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Libya and the Ennahda Party in Tunisia after the Arab Spring, Alison Pargeter addresses the issue of the political dimension of the Islamist movements head-on.

Unsurprisingly, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood scores the lowest on all accounts. Ideologically, it remained highly ambiguous until the last moment, confusing moral rectitude with political aptitude (“soul craft” with “statecraft”) and not making a choice between God's or people's sovereignty. During the referendum of March 2011 the Brotherhood equated a “yes” vote for an undemocratic amendment to the 1971 Constitution with Islam, based its parliamentary elections in December 2011 on hollow religious phrases, and in 2012 forgot to give political content to its an-Nahda (Renaissance) program. It furthermore made the crucial mistake of establishing the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) as its political arm and not turning it into an independent political party that could appeal to all conservative religious forces. The Brotherhood's deep suspicion of other political organizations and its incapacity to form a broad coalition government under Morsi fatally weakened its ability to confront its real opponent: the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). The Brotherhood's final undoing was the result of its remarkable political incompetence. Pargeter's verdict on the Egyptian Brotherhood is devastating. As a “reluctant revolutionary” (27) it lacked “self-awareness” and failed to “understand the new [political] reality” (53). “Power hungry,” (16) it pursued a majority strategy that was flawed by a political vision that was “vague” and “contradictory,” (50) resulting in a “reactive policymaking” (39) of a “bumbling” (102) president who acted more as an imam than a politician.

Pargeter is no less critical of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood. Though it was severely weakened when the revolt against Qaddafi started and did not have the clout of its Egyptian branch, it made the same mistakes. It mobilized its followers by slogans, refused to present a viable political program, and undermined the only legitimate government in its bid for power, claiming to represent the people. In the end it was co-responsible for Libya's descent into chaos.

The Tunisian Ennahda Party is criticized as well. It scores low when it comes to political competence, “promising the world” in elections, underestimating the huge economic problems the country faced, taking consensus building with its coalition partners less seriously than it promised, using the state to Islamicize society, and neglecting real problems such as the reform of the Ministry of Interior. But it is by far the most interesting of the three movements when it comes to solving the basic contradictions of political Islam. While it also tried to insert the shariʿa into the constitution, criminalize blasphemy, down-grade the position of women, and keep the Salafis with their utopian claims happy, it did try to explain to its followers that freedom of expression was the basis of Islam. It argued that Islam was bigger than shariʿa. That it, in the end, compromised on all religious issues, demonstrates that it chose to give priority to politics over ideology, recognizing the principle of the sovereignty of the people.

The book suffers from several minor weaknesses. Pargeter is less than fair when it comes to political competence. How were political leaders of Ennahda supposed to have acquired political experience when they never were allowed to practice politics in Tunisia under Ben Ali? She also puts all the blame on the three Islamist protagonists while liberal and left-wing movements were also responsible for the disastrous ending of the Arab Spring. Nonetheless, Pargeter has written an excellent book on politics and Islam that is informed by the academic debates on Islamist movements while remaining accessible to the general reader and providing important comparative insights.