Re-imagining the League of Nations

After the cataclysm of the First World War, many hoped that the creation of the League of Nations would produce a new, more peaceful, international order. The ‘Old Diplomacy’ of secret bilateral treaties and power politics, which were seen to have caused the war, had to make way for the ‘New Diplomacy’: multilateral, democratic, and proceeding in public view. The much-debated merits, and alleged novelty, of the ‘New Diplomacy’ are less relevant for our purposes than the fact that civil society networks surrounding the League explicitly conceived of themselves in relation to it.Footnote 13 Moreover, the League itself was often portrayed as the incarnation of the New Diplomacy and as such thought to safeguard the peace. However, in its actual shape the League did not correspond to the hopes and aspirations that had been pinned on it.

Despite its universal pretensions, the League was a predominantly European affair. While Asian countries such as Japan and China, and even colonial India, had been founding members, many aspects of the lives of colonized peoples remained outside the realm of the League, which focused on mandates and the technical sphere.Footnote 14 Among independent states, the United States had not joined, while Germany, the Soviet Union, and Mexico were not even invited to become members. Germany only joined in 1926, leading to scepticism regarding this ‘victor’ League, in Germany and elsewhere.Footnote 15 Moreover, a number of countries, particularly from Latin America, withdrew from the League more or less formally.Footnote 16

The deficit in universality was further expressed through a lack of attention paid to certain areas of the world, notably Latin America. This was an area where regionalism played a significant role, offering a point of comparison with Europe. There was a tendency in League circles to see Latin America as a bloc, and its conflicts as being of secondary importance to world peace. Moreover, given the Monroe Doctrine of the United States, European powers hesitated to become involved in thorny border disputes, such as those between Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, preferring to leave these matters to the United States.Footnote 17

There was also disappointment regarding the capabilities of the League, which did not become ‘a substitute for great-power politics, as Woodrow Wilson had intended, but an adjunct to it’.Footnote 18 The failure of the Geneva Protocol of 1924, on collective security, arbitration, and disarmament, intended to fill the ‘gaps’ in the Covenant, did not dispel these concerns.Footnote 19 Some activists regarded the Locarno Treaty of 1925 as a more tangible approach to safeguarding peace, on a regional rather than a global basis. The treaty, which guaranteed Germany's western borders and brought the country into the League, was negotiated in the context of the League but not by the League. Described as a revived ‘Concert of Europe’, it was a regional arrangement between France, Belgium, Germany, Britain, and Italy. Indeed, the success of the treaty was in part attributed to it being a limited arrangement.Footnote 20 Wilhelm Heile, a central figure in the German internationalist movement, suggested in the title of one of his articles, ‘From Versailles via Locarno to – Europe’, that such an approach could be the way to proceed to a more stable future. Once other regional organizations had been founded, it would be ‘a first step on the long way to the United States of mankind’.Footnote 21

Not everyone shared the enthusiasm for Locarno, however. For some, it signified the return to power politics, moving away from the multilateral model of the League. In the aftermath of the controversy over the accession of Germany to the League and the Council, Brazil and Spain withdrew from the League. Together with Germany, four small powers were admitted to the Council, thus diluting its significance and stimulating Great Power tête-à-têtes. Some people therefore wondered whether a European organization might better be able to safeguard truly multilateral relations.Footnote 22

Decentralization

Decentralization was one of the paths suggested to address these limitations of the League. The principal idea was that in organizing discussion, coordination, and perhaps even cooperation on a regional level, all areas would receive the attention that they deserved, and conflict could be mediated more effectively. Since this would take place within the framework of the universal League, the danger of conflict between regions was minimal.

Europeanism was only one of a number of regional movements. Pan-Americanism was perhaps the most significant other movement among League members, while pan-Asianism, under Japanese leadership, gained strength during the 1930s.Footnote 23 Although they featured less prominently in discussions on decentralization, pan-Africanism and pan-Islamism also experienced a ‘golden age’ during the interwar years.Footnote 24 The British Commonwealth was sometimes held up as a blueprint for European union.Footnote 25 Indeed, the Commonwealth was perhaps the only limited arrangement that did not arouse severe criticism, but was, instead, seen as a model for the League.Footnote 26

‘Open’ regionalism was conceived of in the framework of the League and seen as but a step in the process from nation-building to world federation.Footnote 27 However, League supporters did not automatically welcome regional schemes, even those that conceived of themselves as being in accordance with the League. While advocates of pan-Americanism argued that the League was an extension of the Pan-American Union on a global scale, the League was reluctant openly to encourage a pan-American arrangement within its organization. The same went for pan-Asianism and pan-Europeanism, which were regarded even more sceptically in League circles. Perhaps revealing his Foreign Office background, Secretary-General Sir Eric Drummond voiced the fear that, if power were to be devolved to regional organizations, ‘the League would be reduced to a purely European machine’.Footnote 28 Conversely, if a European organization was created, the fear was that little would be left of the League. Both these consequences would be highly problematic for the British Commonwealth, spread across all continents.Footnote 29

Article 21 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was often referred to as the legal basis for regional projects within the League. With its reference to ‘regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine’, it was inserted to appease American criticism of Article 10, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of member states. However, the French representative Léon Bourgeois ‘feared that the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine might prevent action by non-American members of the League on the American continent and, still more important, might give the United States a ground for declining to intervene on the European continent, even for the purpose of carrying out the Covenant’.Footnote 30 If the United States could use this article to disengage from Europe, there was little point in convincing Americans to join the League.

The League of Nations and pan-Americanism

Most Latin Americans also disliked the Covenant's reference to the Monroe Doctrine. To them, the doctrine did not just mean protection from European interference in the western hemisphere, because it also justified unilateral intervention by the United States south of the Rio Bravo (or Grande).Footnote 31 The doctrine's characterization as a ‘regional understanding’, suggesting a multilateral relationship, was ambiguous.Footnote 32 The appeal of the League was that it provided these self-styled ‘weak states’ with recourse to a multilateral framework containing several Great Powers, in which they could negotiate their relations with the United States.Footnote 33 If the League placed the western hemisphere outside its framework, and the United States did not join the League, the relevance of the League to Latin America greatly diminished. After the inclusion of Article 21, a number of Latin Americans aimed to reformulate the Monroe Doctrine into a multilateral policy of equal states, along the lines of traditional pan-Americanism.Footnote 34 Indeed, the relationship between the United States and Latin America changed in this direction with the Good Neighbor Policy from 1933.Footnote 35

The League ameliorated its relations with Latin America somewhat in 1928, when the Council responded to a Costa Rican call to clarify the meaning of Article 21. The Council posited that the Monroe Doctrine could not trump the League, and that a regional arrangement outside, or in contradiction with, the League could not be based on this article. This statement buttressed the position of the Latin American countries vis-à-vis the United States in two ways: it gave a boost to multilateral pan-American reform movements, and it confirmed that the League had a task to fulfil in Latin America, despite the existence of a certain regional framework.Footnote 36

Indeed, the significance of this regional framework was still very much in flux at the time. Pan-American conferences had been meeting since the nineteenth century, and cooperation in the legal field, in particular, was progressing.Footnote 37 Numerous activists on both sides of the Atlantic lobbied for further developments, and referred to pan-Americanism as a model for European cooperation. An example of the former was the Uruguayan president Baltasar Brum, who argued for a regional organization on a confederate model, including Latin America and the United States, to address the lack of attention paid to the affairs of the New World. The ‘Association of all Countries of the New World’ would complement the League, with the subsidiarity principle regulating the competences between the regional and the global level.Footnote 38

The Chilean international lawyer and pan-American activist Alejandro Álvarez was an advocate of regionalism more broadly, also drawing up a project for European union.Footnote 39 One of Álvarez's proposals was very similar to Brum's subsidiarity idea. Álvarez argued that the League should become ‘a universal organisation, that not only does not oppose a continental or regional one, but actually presupposes it’.Footnote 40 Another of his suggestions took the European focus of the League to its logical conclusion, by proposing that the League of Nations continue as a European society. This European league would establish an association with the Pan-American Union ‘so that they work in the interests of the world, and they should call for collective action against any state that threatens world peace’.Footnote 41 Betraying an Atlantic bias, he argued that, for now at least, the European and American unions would be the only ones, since Asia and Africa were ‘politically dependent on Europe’.Footnote 42

Attention to cooperation in the western hemisphere also came from Europe. The influential German pacifist and Nobel Peace Prize winner Alfred Fried devoted a whole book to the pan-American movement. Discerning a less belligerent attitude, and drawing on the experience of the Pan-American Conferences, he argued that Europe should follow the American model and cooperate to their own and the world's benefit.Footnote 43 Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, the Austrian leader of the prominent Paneuropa movement, drew heavily on Fried's analysis. To Coudenhove, the pan-American system was attractive because it was different from previous federations: Pan-America was not aimed against another state system but instead aimed at eradicating war and stimulating the communal progress of civilization. Paneuropa should follow this example: it ‘should be a step on the way from nation-state to World Federation, from world anarchy to world peace’.Footnote 44

Despite these and other projects for pan-American cooperation and the hesitant coordination in the framework of the Union of American Republics, regionalism was still regarded sceptically within the League. Critics argued that, if Latin America formed its own organization, the League had little universal application left. Moreover, if the League could not try to solve issues in Latin America, what point was there in having a worldwide organization? In practice, however, other concerns resulted in a more lenient approach to pan-Americanism. These countries were peripheral, their conflicts would probably not have global repercussions, and the League did not want to upset its delicate relationship with the United States.

The League thus wavered in its approach to Latin America as a region. The Latin American Bureau, founded in 1922, was another example of this. The purpose of the Bureau was to increase understanding of the League in Latin America and to improve contacts, but it was dissolved in 1926 because it could not be the aim of the League to stimulate ‘internal administrative regionalization’.Footnote 45 Tensions between universalism in principle and regionalism in practice also surfaced during the Chaco incident of December 1928. After an initial reluctance to react, the League Council intervened by sending telegrams to the Bolivian and Paraguayan governments, calling on them to cease hostilities and to refer their conflict to the Inter-American Conference on Conciliation and Arbitration. By intervening in the western hemisphere, the League confirmed its relevance outside Europe. However, by leaving the mediation of the conflict to a regional body and to the United States, it showed that the universal level and the regional level were not mutually exclusive, but could reinforce each other, not unlike the subsidiarity scheme proposed by Brum.Footnote 46

The Briand plan for European cooperation, 1929–30

The French foreign minister, Aristide Briand, had played a crucial role in the League's intervention in the Chaco incident, asserting the League's relevance by sending telegrams, while leaving the practical mediation to a regional organization and a Great Power. This approach was in line with his vision for Europe.Footnote 47 There were a number of realpolitik reasons why Briand proposed European cooperation in 1929, centring on concerns about the changing power balance between Germany and France and the lack of a British or American guarantee. However, his conviction that, within a universal framework, certain questions were better elaborated by regional organizations, was crucial.Footnote 48 Numerous individuals and organizations had been arguing along these lines since the early 1920s, with support from the Quai d'Orsay.Footnote 49

This reciprocal relationship culminated in the Briand plan of 1929–30, which in turn led to a surge in civil society initiatives. In a speech to the tenth General Assembly of the League, Briand argued that: ‘Among peoples grouped geographically like the peoples of Europe there should exist a sort of federal bond; such peoples should at all times be able to get in touch, discuss their interests, take joint resolutions, and establish among themselves a bond of solidarity which would enable them, if need be, to meet any grave emergency that might arise.’ He further proposed that the association would be first and foremost active in the economic field, where action was most urgent.Footnote 50

Reactions by non-European governments to the proposal were mixed. Latin American representatives stated that it could only be welcomed if the Europeans followed the model of the Pan-American Union. Delegations from the British Commonwealth and Asia were far from enthusiastic, arguing that Europe already occupied a privileged position, which this plan would only perpetuate.Footnote 51

If initial reactions by European delegations to Briand's appeal were not unwelcoming, official reactions were much more critical by the time that the Quai d'Orsay had transformed Briand's idea into a memorandum in May 1930. The project had significantly changed in character. While most governments were expecting a memorandum containing general remarks, emphasizing economic cooperation, they were given a fairly detailed project for political cooperation. While this change was probably aimed to assuage the impression that the plan retaliated against the American Smoot–Hawley tariff, or British plans for imperial free trade, the political project was far too encompassing to elicit positive reactions.Footnote 52 Moreover, circumstances had changed, both personally and structurally. The statesmen with whom Briand had fostered the ‘Locarno spirit’– Gustav Stresemann, Austen Chamberlain, and Raymond Poincaré – had left office. The world situation had also taken a turn for the worse, following the disappointing outcome of the Tariff Truce Conference and the Wall Street crash.

Of the twenty-seven governments that replied to the French Memorandum, only six supported the proposal.Footnote 53 Notwithstanding numerous references to the difficult economic situation that called for coordination, most replies were politely dismissive of the proposed political union, referring to state sovereignty, the shift from economics to politics, relations with other continents, and the League. In terms of the relationship with other continents, the most general critique was that a European Union ‘might create tendencies to inter-continental rivalries and hostilities’.Footnote 54 Countries with a large diaspora, such as Ireland, argued that extensive emigration created ‘a bond of moral union in no degree less binding [with extra-European countries] than that which [existed] between this country and the other European states’.Footnote 55

Although Italy and France herself did not, other colonial powers raised concerns about their colonial possessions. These responses reflected where empires were predominantly located. Those with colonies mainly in Asia were concerned that creating a European union might trigger an Asian organization, threatening empire. The Dutch government thus replied that it ‘must always bear in mind that the Kingdom does not consist of its European territory alone’.Footnote 56 Given the perceived state of development in Africa, this was less of a concern there. Moreover, the contiguous situation of Europe and Africa offered opportunities for Eurafrican cooperation. So, while European cooperation could benefit countries with empires predominantly in Africa, the purportedly universal League was better suited to European ‘imperial nation-states’ with empires in Asia.Footnote 57

The final theme in government replies to the French Memorandum was the threat to the League. Neither references to Article 21 nor French efforts to situate the proposal within the League framework silenced concerns over the compatibility of a European organization with the League.Footnote 58 The British reply pointed out that since ‘the League [had] already begun work on virtually the whole of the programme …, it [was] difficult to see how these new European institutions would operate without creating confusion, and perhaps also rivalry. … It could hardly fail to diminish both the efficiency and authority … of the League.’Footnote 59 Britain, with its worldwide empire and Commonwealth, was apprehensive. Regardless of whether Britain itself participated, Lord Robert Cecil, Foreign Office advisor and president of the League of Nations Union (LNU), saw European regionalism as a centrifugal force that would add to ‘the pan-American movement [and] the Asiatic feeling which already exist’, and remarked ‘Even if we can keep out of a European group, could Canada hold aloof from an American or India from an Asiatic group? It seems doubtful.’ The component parts of the empire would ultimately be driven into separate geographical blocs.Footnote 60

Within the League Secretariat, apprehensions about the impact of a European regional union were considerable. As Drummond had already pointed out in 1921, given the importance of Europe in the League, what would be left if Europe founded a separate organization?Footnote 61 In 1930, the Secretariat asked in practical terms ‘which questions could the organisation deal with, only 100% European questions’? And who would define such questions?Footnote 62 In addition to these potentially divisive effects, a separate organization was also superfluous because a European forum already ‘existed’. Sir Arthur Salter, the British Director of the Economic and Financial Section, advocated economic cooperation in Europe.Footnote 63 He was, however, strongly against French political plans. Salter pointed to the Tariff Truce Conference, where ‘by a process of self-selection the Conference became European’.Footnote 64 Although this particular reference was contentious, given British insistence on an unconditional most-favoured-nation clause, which had hampered success, Salter voiced an argument that was not uncommon.Footnote 65 While regionalism in the political sphere was highly contested, it was much more easily acceptable in the economic sphere.

Despite negative government reactions and scepticism among League officials, the idea was not dropped altogether on the official level. A League of Nations committee was set up, the Commission of Enquiry for European Union. This Committee met several times to explore the terrain, and contributed usefully to technical debates. However, the Depression, rising nationalism, and British opposition turned the Committee primarily into a means of shelving the idea without causing France, and Briand, to lose too much face. In existence until 1938, the Committee stopped convening after Briand's death in 1932.

The comparison of League attitudes to regionalism in Latin America with Briand's proposal reveals significant differences. In the Latin American case, decentralization was presented as a remedy to the lack of attention given to the area. The League wavered between principled concern for universalism and pragmatic considerations regarding the position of the United States, distance, and the likelihood of escalating conflict. There was less room for manoeuvre regarding Europe, partly because there was a concrete proposal in the European case, rather than ad hoc arrangements. Furthermore, the proposal was probably too far-reaching. The reaction to Briand's speech by Latin American countries was not unsurprising, given their own steps on the road to regional cooperation. Neither was the reaction by governments that welcomed the Briand memorandum, which were by and large clients of France. Most states, however, were not overly enthusiastic, and the negative British attitude proved decisive. While Britain expressed concern about the effects of centrifugal forces on the League, the underlying concern was for the effects on its empire. For the League Secretariat, Europe's central role in the League was the fundamental reason to caution against a European project. The only room for manoeuvre was in the economic sphere, where, by 1929–30, the situation was pressing, and where repercussions for the universality of the League were less obvious.

Although nothing ultimately came of the French proposals during the interwar period, they succeeded in generating attention for the cause of European cooperation, spurring Europeanist civil society activities, but also compelling organizations with a different (primary) focus, such as League of Nations societies, to address the issue. The recurring themes in the reactions described above were also at the forefront of discussions in the civil society field, with the British again playing a pivotal role.

The IFLNS as the ‘avant-garde’ of the League

Théodore Ruyssen, French philosopher, secretary general of the IFLNS, and president of the French Association Paix par le Droit (Association of Peace through Justice), pointed out in 1925 that the League could only function if it could rely on moral power stronger than national egoisms. To this end, the role of public opinion was crucial: it was essential in order to spread knowledge about the League, to defend it against attack, and to act as a critical voice, stimulating it to fulfil the high aspirations for which it had been created. The national societies for the League of Nations, which existed in over thirty countries across the globe, were instrumental in fostering this programme of public engagement and education.

In turn, the IFLNS was created to facilitate cooperation between national societies, to make their work more effective, and, perhaps most importantly, to spur them into action. It was explicitly made up of national organizations; although national egoisms had to be overcome, ‘love of the fatherland was as honourable as love of humanity’.Footnote 66 On a more general level, the objective of the IFLNS was also to bring members of the various national organizations together, and so contribute to the ‘development of a wider realisation of international interdependence’ and the creation of what, retrospectively, might be called a global civil society.Footnote 67

Despite the declared universalism of the IFLNS, most League societies were European.Footnote 68 This was a concern for the Federation. There were some non-European countries represented, such as the United States, Argentina, and India, but the emphasis was on European activities. It was hoped to address this problem through the distribution of the quarterly IFLNS Bulletin, by entertaining a worldwide correspondence with influential personalities, and by sending envoys to promote the League.Footnote 69 Most of the non-European societies relied on compatriots in Europe to represent them at the IFLNS.Footnote 70 Another means to address the issue was bringing the Federation itself outside Europe. After initial discussions in 1925, the Chinese society offered to hold the assembly in China in the late 1930s. This was part of a more general offensive by the Chinese to use international forums such as the IFLNS to strengthen their position in the face of Japanese aggression.Footnote 71 Given the volatile situation in China, the 1939 assembly was finally scheduled for New York. Owing to the outbreak of war, it never took place.

Of the members of the IFLNS, the LNU was the only organization that could truly boast a grassroots membership. Most other organizations had an ‘elite’ membership, including journalists, academics, politicians, and foreign office representatives, facilitating close ties between national organizations and states. Until 1934, when it moved to Geneva, the IFLNS secretariat was based in Brussels.Footnote 72 There were four standing committees, modelled on the League. A fifth committee, the special study committee for the Briand project for European cooperation, was created in 1930. The aim of this committee was to integrate a European organization into the League framework, while avoiding repetition and competition.Footnote 73

The IFLNS regarded itself as an ‘avant-garde’ of the League in a number of ways.Footnote 74 It functioned as a channel of contact with countries that were not yet, or were no longer, members of the League, such as the United States, Argentina, or Japan, whose League of Nations Association remained an increasingly beleaguered member of the IFLNS until 1938. While Germany did not join the League until 1926, the Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund (German League of Nations Society) was a member from the start. In actively lobbying for the admission of Germany to the League, the Deutsche Liga deliberately adopted a different policy from the Wilhelmstrasse. While German public opinion was still quite hostile because of the Diktat of Versailles, the Deutsche Liga was to fulfil a pioneering role in facilitating German accession to the League. In 1920, the foreign minister, Walter Simons, put it as follows: ‘The Liga should as a matter of course pursue a different policy from the government and work more actively for the accession of Germany to the League, otherwise she would not have a right to exist. … We want the League to come to us.’Footnote 75 This episode showcases the role that the IFLNS played as a channel of contact with non-League member states, as well as the pursuit of national goals through internationalist civil society means.Footnote 76

The idea of ‘avant-garde’ also related to the topics that the IFLNS investigated. The League Secretariat closely followed the assemblies of the Federation, with a representative reporting on the debates. The IFLNS in turn sent projects of resolutions to various League bodies, conceiving of its activities as preparation for League discussions.Footnote 77 On balance, the Secretariat was positive about the work done by the IFLNS; the more sceptical evaluation by Donald Birn seems to reflect LNU opinion.Footnote 78 Although the Secretariat acknowledged that ‘a lot of irresponsible and useless discussion’ took place, ‘much useful work was done at these meetings’ too.Footnote 79 Ludvig Krabbe, a Danish member of the League of Nations Information Section, ‘was impressed by the importance of the debates in which men of great value took part and who succeeded in shedding light on many problems’. As he remarked about the IFLNS assembly in Geneva in 1930

Civil society therefore also offered politicians another forum to debate the questions of the times, away from the pressure of official representations, thus facilitating discussion.

As referred to above, the question of decentralization of the League, and in particular of European cooperation, was discussed by the IFLNS in 1927. It did this at the instigation of the Fédération Française. Alphonse Aulard, its delegate, stressed that the aim was to strengthen the League. Most delegates were unconvinced. While the idea of a European union, albeit within the framework of the League, was considered inopportune, since it did ‘not correspond to the political and economic organization of the world’, the dismissive political committee of the IFLNS nonetheless acknowledged that ‘regional groups formed for the purposes of economic co-operation or regional committees of the League itself may prove useful, provided that the League itself never gives up the last word’.Footnote 81 The less sceptical IFLNS assembly added that regional groupings were in certain cases ‘necessary as a transition from national political regimes to the entire universality of the League’.Footnote 82 Moreover, the economic committee was less vehemently opposed to regional (European) cooperation, the advantages of which were recognized explicitly.Footnote 83 While the IFLNS officially rejected the idea of decentralization and European cooperation in 1927, this rejection was not unequivocal. Those in favour did not give up, and the debate continued.

From 1929, when Briand introduced his project, attention to the question of European cooperation grew considerably within the IFLNS. In the intervening years, Europeanist organizations across Europe had been pushing the issue. They were convinced that the main threat to world peace was war in Europe, and in particular war between France and Germany. European cooperation was the best way to prevent this and simultaneously strengthen Europe in the face of the rise of other centres of power. With his proposal, Briand then gave official backing to this idea. After the IFLNS statutes had been changed to allow organizations not specifically devoted to League propaganda to join, the Comité Fédéral became a member of the IFLNS in 1930.Footnote 84 The annual meetings of the Comité Fédéral and the IFLNS were held consecutively, so that delegates would only have to travel once.Footnote 85 Given that, from this date, the debate on European cooperation was very much a mutual discussion, it is worth sketching the creation of the Comité Fédéral, which according to the Quai d'Orsay, ‘seemed to be one of the most serious among institutions working for European cooperation’.Footnote 86

The Comité Fédéral de Coopération Européenne

Before the Comité Fédéral was founded in 1928, the main protagonists had been involved in organizing like-minded spirits since the early 1920s.Footnote 87 Members of the Reichstag and the French Chamber had come together to promote their belief that peace and unity in Europe were preconditions for the realization of League ideals across the world. Wilhelm Heile was the central figure in the German network. Active in numerous organizations, Heile was an example of those internationalists who pursued several routes simultaneously to further the cause of peace.Footnote 88 Together with his French counterpart, Émile Borel, he set up a number of organizations, among which was the Fédération pour l'Entente Européenne (Federation for European Entente).Footnote 89 Initially, however, these initiatives did not come to fruition, owing to the lack of activity on the British side and a paralysing rivalry in Germany with the well-known Paneuropa Union of Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi.Footnote 90 The active participation of the British was a crucial point for the Fédération. First, the Fédération believed that British participation was essential for any European project. Second, since Paneuropa excluded Britain, on the grounds that she already constituted a federation with the Commonwealth, including her was a prominent means for the Fédération to distinguish itself.Footnote 91

In order to reinvigorate the campaign, Borel returned to the national level and founded the Comité Français de Coopération Européenne in early 1927. The aim of the Comité Français was ‘to further the cooperation of the European peoples in the framework and spirit of the League of Nations’.Footnote 92 Its members considered themselves to be ‘convinced partisans’ of the League.Footnote 93 While the importance of conceiving of Europe within the framework of the League was emphasized throughout, the prominence of Europe in the world was no less obvious. As Paul Doumer, the president of the French Senate, put it:

While fear of ‘European decline’, both in geopolitical and civilizational terms, was widespread during the interwar period, and contributed to the perceived necessity of European cooperation, Europe was simultaneously conceived as the bearer of civilization and as indispensable for the wellbeing of the world.

The members of the Comité Français were predominantly radicals and politicians of the centre: in 1927, more than half were députés or sénateurs. Other members included academics, (international) civil servants, representatives of employers’ organizations and trade unions, journalists, and artists.Footnote 95 As such, the Comité Français was representative of the upper- and middle-class milieus that were interested in cooperation across Europe. At the same time, the membership highlighted the interwoven character of political and civil life. This was reinforced by the fact that the funding of the Comité Français came from various sources, including (as for most European societies) the Quai d'Orsay.Footnote 96 The committee continued to exist until the late 1930s.

The Comité Français explicitly referred to its foundation as a national committee, conscious that it emanated from a particular political milieu, with means and responsibilities specific to that milieu. Its members argued, perhaps as a means of distinguishing themselves from communist internationalisms, that this consciousness of particular circumstances would facilitate cooperation with other national committees and thus international understanding.Footnote 97 So, while the aims were transnational, it was a transnationalism that emanated and derived its strength from national organizations.Footnote 98 In this the Comité Français was not alone. The IFLNS, for example, operated on the same basis.Footnote 99

The efforts of the Comité Français at creating a Europe-wide movement were more successful than previous attempts. In November 1928, the Comité Fédéral de Coopération Européenne was founded, uniting around twenty national organizations, with varying levels of activity, and including a British LNU committee. Again, many of those involved in the Comité Fédéral were also prominent in the IFLNS and were often part of national delegations to the League Assembly. The aims of the Comité Fédéral developed from those of the Comité Français. Like the latter, it worked in the first instance towards European understanding, in the hope that this would facilitate its ultimate goal of worldwide cooperation and peace. It worked at both national and international levels to unite all forces that sought ‘on the political, economic, cultural and moral plane to unite Europe’. This broad aim meant that it only proposed a minimal programme. With an eye to keeping Britain within the project, Borel argued that ‘it [was] better to construct Europe on a modest basis in order to start a large Europe, than to content oneself to organize a small Europe’.Footnote 100

In its practice, the Comité Fédéral situated itself within the ‘New Diplomacy’. Borel was convinced of the virtues of unofficial diplomacy by private organizations and individuals, who were not bound by the same constraints as government representatives. With this in mind, the Comité Fédéral decided to set up an information bureau in Geneva, run by the Spaniard Alfonso Albeniz. The aim was to intensify contacts with the League and the IFLNS, to report on developments in Geneva, and, if possible, to influence them. Albeniz sought official recognition from the League, and in particular from the Commission of Inquiry for European Union. The League, however, was not very forthcoming. Despite the familiar network from which the bureau emanated, the Secretariat was of the opinion that ‘although it is possible that this organisation may be of some use, we know very little about it and I think that in this stage we should adopt an attitude of great reserve’.Footnote 101 The International Labour Organization (ILO) was more receptive to the ideas of the Comité Fédéral, with Director-General Albert Thomas supporting its work.Footnote 102

Europe and the League: competition or complementarity?

At the 1930 general assemblies of the Comité Fédéral and the IFLNS, held consecutively in Geneva, the question of European cooperation was extensively debated. This question remained on the agenda throughout 1931 and 1932, with the joint Committee for European Cooperation meeting regularly.Footnote 103 In 1933, attention started to wane. In that year, the Rumanian Federation of League of Nations Societies argued that the League, lacking sanctions, was but a feeble barrier against war. Every state still defended its absolute sovereignty. According to the Rumanian Federation the only solution was a new ‘organisation … in the form of a confederation of states’.Footnote 104 However, the Rumanian call fell on deaf ears, and the issue remained unresolved.Footnote 105 The downturn in 1933 was largely due to the changes in the international situation and to the fact that the Deutsches Comitee ceased to exist after Hitler came to power.

It is to the intervening years, between 1929 and 1932, that we now turn. When Briand held his speech at the League Assembly, the Comité Fédéral decided to draft a questionnaire on European cooperation, in order to facilitate the League discussions. Addressed to the national committees of the Comité Fédéral, it was drawn up by the Comité Français, the Deutsches Comitee, and the LNU.Footnote 106 It was published in several periodicals, and also by the former French prime minister Edouard Herriot in his book, Europe.Footnote 107

The first question inquired into the preferred form of European cooperation, whether it could extend to the political sphere, and, if so, what form this should take: a union, a federation, or an organization similar to the League or the Commonwealth. Rejecting a union, most committees thought a federation was something to aspire to, while an organization similar to the League was seen as the most immediate aim. The committees envisaged a regular meeting of foreign ministers, supported by a secretariat. Over time, this political framework could be expanded.Footnote 108 While political cooperation was widely understood to be more intrusive than economic cooperation, the committees nonetheless supported it. The very restrained nature of the proposals made this step possible. The Comité Français explained the necessity of combining economics with politics by pointing out that it was highly unlikely that any people would be willing to ‘make economic sacrifices’ unless there existed some form of European solidarity. Other questions referred to the position of colonies, which topics would fall within the scope of a European organization, and whether a study centre would be useful to examine these questions.Footnote 109

The fourth general assembly of the Comité Fédéral took place in June 1930, while official reactions to the French Memorandum were coming in. Secretary-General Jules Rais presented his report on the questionnaire here, stressing the level of agreement between the committees, the Comité Fédéral, and the French Memorandum. This had the happy consequence of ‘parallelism between the work undertaken by the Federation and the current official negotiations’. However, in their response, the British expressed reservations regarding the consequences of a European project for the League. They tended to see it as a threat to the League and to the British empire.Footnote 110 The latter concern was more serious, but it was left more implicit. In particular, the creation of a permanent committee or secretariat was regarded as compromising the League and the empire. Instead, British delegate Hudson referred to Sir Arthur Salter's thoughts (without mentioning him) on the Europeanization of the Tariff Truce Conference. This formula had the advantage that all states – including those outside Europe – could comment on resolutions, whereas if a separate European body was set up, this body could make decisions without taking serious account of objections from non-members.Footnote 111 These discussions led to the paradoxical situation that the assembly discussed numerous measures to facilitate British participation, whereas British suggestions were all geared toward ensuring influence for non-members.

The debates continued, in a slightly more sceptical fashion, at the fourteenth general assembly of the IFLNS, which immediately followed the assembly of the Comité Fédéral. Most delegates expressed their agreement with the idea of European cooperation in general terms, mentioned concerns about intercontinental rivalry and cooperation within the framework of the League, and then expressed their more specific support for cooperation in the economic field. The Dutch and the British rejected a resolution containing the expression ‘federal connection between States’.Footnote 112 In the end a compromise declaration was adopted, which stated that:

At the next IFLNS council meeting, held in Danzig in October 1930, the creation of a ‘Committee for the study of the problem of European cooperation’ was discussed. The majority of the IFLNS bureau had proposed to compose this committee, half from IFLNS and half from Comité Fédéral delegates. The British delegation, however, renewed its objections made in the bureau. The LNU was of the strong opinion that the committee should be a uniquely IFLNS creation, active within the IFLNS and responsible to the general assembly of the Federation. This had the added advantage of conforming to the procedure that the League had followed in the creation of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union. A compromise was suggested, in order officially to recognize the position of the Comité Fédéral, while giving the last word to the IFLNS. Again, Lord Dickinson of the LNU objected to this interpretation, insisting that the committee should be an exclusively IFLNS body. Stanislaw Stronski, the Polish delegate, suggested that, if the IFLNS council approved the suggestions by both presidents, the committee could be regarded as an IFLNS body. Émile Borel, a member of the IFLNS but attending in his capacity as president of the Comité Fédéral, conceded the point.Footnote 114

This episode reveals the emotions that the question of European cooperation raised, especially for the British. In practice, the constitution or influence of the committee would not have been very different either way, given the large overlap in membership between the two organizations. Although the Comité Fédéral went to great lengths to accommodate the British and to secure their participation, for the British it remained easier to defend a reluctant position in the IFLNS than in the Comité Fédéral.

In the end, both a committee and a sub-committee ‘of investigation of the problem of European co-operation within the framework of the League of Nations’ were formed. The sub-committee met for the first time in Copenhagen. Since the Danish foreign minister, Peter Munch, was a member, the meetings took place in the Foreign Ministry, giving them an official touch.Footnote 115 On the agenda was a report by Jules Rais, on the question of ‘how a close collaboration between European governments in all spheres of international activity [could] be exercised in complete harmony with the League of Nations and in observance of all the principles inscribed in the Covenant’.

Rais started his report by asserting that ‘Europe [existed]’ and that no one would ‘dispute the moral values of European civilisation’. Nor would anyone dispute that Europe was in crisis, economically and perhaps also morally; therefore ‘Europe must have her confidence restored.’Footnote 116 Like many interwar liberal internationalists, Rais and his colleagues were convinced of the centrality of Europe for the wellbeing of humanity.Footnote 117 As Rais put it: ‘The maintenance of the peace of the world [constituted] only the first of the indispensable conditions for the progress of European civilisation which itself is a condition for the progress of humanity.’Footnote 118

Having thus emphasized the importance of the project at hand, the main aim of the report was to convince sceptics of the unthreatening nature of European cooperation. Referring to previous discussions in the Comité Fédéral and the IFLNS, Rais stated that it was accepted that cooperation between the states of Europe was ‘of capital importance for the maintenance of peace’. Close collaboration should be pursued within the framework of the League and conceived of as a regional entente, which implied respect of national independence and equality of states. This close collaboration extended to all spheres of international activity, meaning that not only would specifically European problems be addressed but also European aspects of more general questions. Taking up an important British concern, Rais explained that non-European and non-member states could participate in the discussions, which meant that no state would be compelled to enter a European federation, and that the federation would remain open to all who wished to join. Duplication would be avoided, since the League Secretariat would act as European Secretariat.

Rais stressed that if these principles were accepted, there would be no reason to fear that a European federation would harm the League or its universality. Nor would there be problems for states on the outskirts of Europe, or for those with possessions outside of Europe. Further trying to placate the sceptics, Rais stressed that:

Rais even built on Salter's argument that European cooperation would come about through self-selection and by means of a conference of European foreign ministers. He argued that conferences of European foreign ministers had served as a precedent for the work for European federation. They had been regarded as ‘a matter of course’ and had never hampered the work of the League, nor been superfluous or exclusive; instead, ‘they had contributed to the appeasement of dissent and conflict’.Footnote 120

The discussion of Rais's report in the full committee suggested that the numerous accommodating remarks had overshot their mark. While the British delegation kept attempting, unsuccessfully, to diminish the influence of the European committee, several delegates observed that the resolutions proposed at Copenhagen were too non-committal.Footnote 121 As the Swiss professor Ernest Bovet remarked, they did not add anything to the League Study Committee, and, if they were aimed at public opinion, the resolutions were too long and too vague.Footnote 122 Borel, however, insisted on the adoption of the Copenhagen programme. It was a minimal programme, which could be expanded when the time was ripe.Footnote 123 In Budapest in May 1931, the committee observed that the ideas put forward were in accordance with those proposed by the League Committee of Inquiry. Given the fate of the League Committee, the self-congratulation by the IFLNS ‘on having usefully played its role of avant-garde’ seems a little premature.Footnote 124

The constitutional question proved nearly impossible to solve. On the one hand, British participation was necessary; on the other, it would deprive the project of most of its substance. Despite all the facilitating measures, British opposition remained too strong. Whereas most measures aimed at synchronizing a regional project in the universal League, the real issue was the British Commonwealth and the ties that Britain had to all continents. Cooperation initiatives in the practical field were more successful, even if they suffered from a turn for the worse in world affairs.