This book is the much anticipated third volume of the most detailed and substantive history of modern Tibet for the period 1913 to 1959, leaving one final volume to come for the years 1957 to 1959. In between these historical accounts, Goldstein has also published books on related subjects such as The Struggle for Modern Tibet: The Autobiography of Tashi Tsering (with William R. Siebenschuh, Tashi Tsering; M. E. Sharpe, 1997), A Tibetan Revolutionary: The Political Life and Times of Bapa Phüntso Wangye (with Dawei Sherap and William R. Siebenschuh, University of California Press, 2004) as well as On the Cultural Revolution in Tibet: The Nyemo Incident of 1969 (with Ben Jiao and Tanzen Lhundrup, University of California Press, 2009). Taken together, these books offer an extraordinarily incisive look at the history of Tibet in the 20th century.
Tibet's fate was radically altered with the advent of the People's Republic of China and the incorporation of Tibet into the Chinese state in 1951 where Goldstein's first volume ended. Given the vast differences in language, culture and history the 1950s were a complex time as both the Chinese leadership and the Dalai Lama's government (as well as ordinary Tibetans) were scrambling to find a way to understand and deal with this new reality. Moreover, on both sides there were sharp disagreements as how to act. Goldstein chronicled the period from 1951 to 1955 in volume two. This book begins with the Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa after a visit to Beijing and ends two years later when the Dalai Lama decided to return to Lhasa from a visit to India.
For the Tibetans, the annexation of Tibet by the PRC created a situation for which they were woefully unprepared. By 1955 the relationship remained unsettled on both sides. Goldstein describes the nature, opinions and strategies of the various factions in the Tibetan government as well as the active non-state actors both inside and outside of the country. There was, with some notable exceptions, universal unanimity about the undesirability of Chinese rule but there was a lack of coordination and a lack of consensus as to how to oppose, or even work with, Beijing.
Goldstein provides the most complete account to date of the events in eastern Tibet (Kham) which led to the armed uprisings against Chinese rule. This includes new details and insights into the struggles in Lithang where the rebellion began. Chinese documents show that Mao Zedong's initial policy was not to force radical changes on Tibetan society and his initial response to the rebellion, which began when local officials on their own instituted those changes, was to avoid retaliation. Negotiations, however, failed; the rebels returned to the struggle and Mao eventually approved socialist reforms which only exacerbated the situation leading to a much larger and widespread revolt.
Another major contribution, based largely on extensive oral histories, is the most detailed portrayal of the various Tibetan groups opposed to Chinese rule, from the plotting among the Dalai Lama's senior officials to the small group of elites and non-elites in India, to the ordinary people in Kham and central Tibet. The volume ends just as the involvement of the US Central Intelligence Agency begins although this participation, at the time, was limited to the training of six Tibetans to prepare for intelligence gathering.
On the Chinese side, thanks to an impressive collection of documents, we have a detailed history of the struggle that ensued among Chinese officials between the leadership in Beijing and the local authorities in both central and eastern Tibet over how and when to bring socialist reform to Tibet.
These Chinese documents are full of revelations which allow a far more nuanced understanding of this history than we have ever had. One interesting find was an internal Chinese document which acknowledges Tibet's de facto independence: “Although Tibet became an inseparable part of China long ago, it has maintained an independent or semi-independent status in its relations with the motherland” (p. 471).
While Goldstein's historical interpretations are often contested he makes his case forcefully and backs it up with formidable research. One quick example of an analysis which could be questioned has to do with Mao Zedong's motives (a subject of considerable controversy on almost every front) for his gradualist and benign policies in central Tibet. Goldstein argues they were pragmatic: “… Mao's main motivation … [was the] … realization that China's national interests were served best, not by replacing Tibet's anachronistic sociopolitical society as soon as possible for reasons of socialist ideological purity, but by political realism” (p. 469).
Goldstein has been collecting historical documents and oral histories of the principal players, both Chinese and Tibetan, for more than 35 years and the result is this tour de force of historical narrative and detailed analysis which solidifies Goldstein's position as the foremost Tibetologist.
Finally, a tip of the hat to the publishers for using footnotes. The documentation in this volume is so weighty that for scholars reading the notes, end notes would have made the book a very difficult read.
