The Mythological State and its Empire is a valuable addition to literature on the theory of the state. In this work, David Grant moves beyond his earlier research on the correctional policies of New South Wales and digs deeper to explore the nature of the state. In short, he argues that the modern state is not really modern because its institutional arrangements rest upon a non-rational, mythical foundation. An awareness of this mythology, he suggests, allows us to better understand the barriers to reforming governing institutions like correctional services.
Grant argues that existential anxiety leads humankind to develop mythological magnitudes that are manifest in structural arrangements and practices designed to eliminate individuals' fear and create sympathetic social relations. The state is a key mythological magnitude and individuals submit to the state, both conceptually and practically, in order to escape their fear and, ultimately, to take control of their life situations. There is irony in the fact that, as Grant contends, mythology provides the means for individuals to assume responsibility but will perpetually undermine the development of self-responsible individuals.
This work is divided into four parts: (1) the nature of political mythology, (2) the establishment and refinement of state mythology, (3) the modernization of the state, and (4) the embodiment of mythology within individuals. Throughout the study, Grant describes the causal dynamic within the development of the mythological state as follows: individual existential fear is converted into the artifice of a mythological magnitude, individuals become subject to the artifice in exchange for assurances that fear will be eliminated and sympathetic conditions created, and these outcomes are understood to be attained as state apparatuses are gradually brought into the hands of citizens.
In part I, “The Nature of Political Mythology,” Grant outlines the basic conceptual approach with which he understands the social psychology of state-centric politics. He contends that there is a causal connection between human instinct and the structural arrangements of the modern state and suggests that this connection prevents the realization of enlightened self-responsibility (4). Human instinct is wrapped up in a search for the elimination of fear and the promotion of well being. Mythology develops, then, because humans have a disposition to create fearsome entities toward which this general existential anxiety can be directed with some specificity and, through various strategic maneuvers, can be made sympathetic.
Beginning with Hobbes as the initiator of the modern political myth of the state, part II, “Establishment and Refinement,” briefly outlines the political philosophy of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Kant with an eye to the development of modern political mythology. It is argued that Hobbes initiated the modern political myth with his promotion of “an absolutely empowered artificial entity, a mythological magnitude, to which individuals forgo their individual self-responsibility” (50–51). Conspicuously absent in this section, it should be noted, is any discussion of Hegelian or Marxist conceptions of the state.
In part III, “Modernization,” Grant considers Rawls, Hayek and Pettit as key thinkers who brought the political mythology into the contemporary era. The causal process moving from existential anxiety to subjection, however, remains essentially untouched by these thinkers' efforts to build trust in the governing arrangements by increasingly placing checks and balances upon the state.
Grant briefly discusses Elias and Foucault and the embodiment of state mythology in the everyday lives of individuals in part IV, “Embodiment.” He suggests that the liberal critique and reprogramming has aligned itself with the market as an agent with the potential for producing greater docility and productivity in citizens. Although attention is given to both republican and liberal conceptions of the state throughout this work, liberalism remains the primary focus. Liberalism, for Grant, “guides the repeated repairs and supposed improvements of the idea of the mythological state” and, through the ideals of freedom, autonomy and responsibility for others, provides grounds for the subjection of individuals and, ultimately, for the “embedding of practices that manufacture docile and productive individuals” (243). In other words, liberal critiques of state power and authority do not undermine the essential mythological magnitude of the state but, instead, provide a strategy for creating mythological subjects.
The Mythological State and its Empire develops the broad outlines of a social psychology of political mythology and, as such, is an important contribution to the theory of the state. It would have been interesting to have another chapter outlining the empire of the mythological state. For, as is, this work does not really address the imperialism or state-centric expansionism of political thought and action. Nevertheless, this work provides and interesting and stimulating framework for critical analyses of the state and, specifically, its relation to marginalized communities.
