The Issue Addressed and Methodological Remarks

In our examination of the role of Transnistria’s government’s strategies and techniques of handling the region’s multi-ethnicity, our intention is to separate strategies and measures taken by the ruling elite for managing ethnic diversity from broader societal factors that might inhibit ethnic strife. For this purpose, we provide a brief description of the Transnistrian normative framework pertinent to ethnic and linguistic issues, briefly outline its implementation, interpret the rationales of the local diversity policy, and assess its effectiveness and efficiency. The ultimate reasons for the smooth ethnic relations and for the general political, economic, and social viability of Transnistria would be too broad and complex a topic for a single article, so we limit ourselves here to placing the ethnicity- and language-related activities of the Transnistrian authorities in a broader political and societal context.

The very survival of Transnistrian independence is not surprising. Most separatist regimes that emerged in the post-Soviet space from the late 1980s to the early 1990s are alive to date, and the reasons for their viability are more or less well explained. Among these factors are internal support from the local population achieved through propaganda; strong defense capabilities vis-à-vis the relative military and economic weaknesses of the parent state; support of a strong patron state; and limited or inconsistent involvement of the international community (Caspersen Reference Cojocari2011; Dunn and Bobick Reference Edelman2014; Kolstø Reference Kolstø2006; Kolstø and Blakkisrud Reference Kolstø and Malgin2008; Osipov and Vasilevich 2017).

To interpret the official treatment of multi-ethnicity, we use three theoretical frameworks. They can be named “nation-building,” “diversity policy” (or “diversity management”), and “regime of ethnicity.” None of the three contradict each other; on the contrary, they partly overlap. Each has its own merits and deficiencies.

The notion of “nation-building” potentially offers the most comprehensive and broad approach. The term became a part of scholarly discourse in the early 1960s, and since then its meaning has been gradually changing (Budryte Reference Burian2005; Connor Reference Connor1972; 2004; Deutsch and Foltz 1966; Hobsbawm and Ranger Reference Hobsbawm and Ranger1983; Kolstø Reference Kolstø2000, Reference Kolstø and Blakkisrud2014; Kuzio Reference Lisenco2002; Rokkan Reference Schedler1975). In theory, the notion encompasses a wide range of practices which go far beyond the treatment of ethnic diversity per se. As Rico Isaacs and Abel Polese (Reference Isaacs and Polese2015, 373) put it, rephrasing Walker Connor, one may say that nation-building means “a process of conjoining the nation with the state.” This implies the shaping of the given society in its entirety via measures aimed at general political and social institutions including disciplinary techniques, common narratives, and regimes of citizenship. Certainly, the definitions of boundaries and membership in the national community include activities targeting ethnic or cultural diversity (whether they mean its maintenance or, in contrast, its marginalization or elimination). The word building, however, means a process with a beginning and end, while diversity-related policies must exist notwithstanding any particular transformation.

Diversity policy, or diversity management, can be defined as policy deliberately aimed at shaping and regulating social relations, for which ethnic, cultural, or racial heterogeneity of the society is essential. The problem with the term is that it is too nebulous and lacks any uniform application; the scope and content of the notion remain a question mark. There is no single or commonly accepted understanding of what diversity management is about and no standard terminology (Marko Reference Mason2008; Rechel Reference Rokkan2009). From the scholarly perspective, the approach is still in the making; in the practical domain, politicians and legal processionals do not necessarily address the regulation of diversity as a single and specific area of human activity. Decisions and practical measures which one conventionally calls “diversity management” may vary in purpose, scope, form, and content; the issues important to one country might be perceived as irrelevant to another one. Diversity management in individual countries may rest on different values and aspirations, which may include or exclude certain areas of social relations and public management.

The third perspective is called “regime of ethnicity”; the notion of regime was first employed with regard to ethnic policies by Şener Aktürk (Reference Aktürk2012, 10). It means systemic activities that “seek to maintain a particular and coherent relationship between ethnicity and nationality” or, more broadly, it defines modes of membership and representation. The concept remains underdeveloped: the menu of regime types that Aktürk offers does not cover the whole range of ethnic policies and the model still remains ill-equipped for handling informal practices or the side effects of certain measures. Nevertheless, we regard the approach based on the notion of “ethnicity regime” as the most relevant in the given context.

General Information about Transnistria

Geographically, Transnistria is a strip of land 200 kilometers long and about 20 kilometers wide located mainly on the left (eastern) bank of the river Nistru (in Romanian/Moldovan), or Dniester (in Russian). While in the eyes of the de facto government, Transnistria is a sovereign albeit still internationally unrecognized state, the Moldovan government and international community regard the Left Bank as an integral part of Moldova illegally captured by the separatist regime backed by Russia and an autonomous region with a special status. The population, according to the 2015 census carried out by the de facto government of Transnistria, constitutes approximately 475,000 people (Tyniaev 2017), compared to approximately 684,000 in 1989 (calculated on the basis of the 1989 census data; see Babilunga, Bomeshko, and Shornikov Reference Babilunga, Nikolai, Bomeshko and Shornikov2007, 87). The official population register provides similar data: by the end of 2016, the population was approximately 470,600 (Statisticheskii yezhegodnik 2017, 20).

Most experts characterize the Transnistrian political system as a centralized and authoritarian presidential republic with façade democratic attributes, a politically loyal and conformist electoral majority with the actual concentration of power in the hands of the security services and affiliated local financial-industrial groups—nowadays, one group, the holding Sheriff (Blakkisrud, Helge, and Kolstø Reference Blakkisrud and Kolstø2011; Bobick Reference Bobick2011; Lisenco Reference Mann2012, 43; Troebst Reference Tyniaev2004). Transnistria remains dependent in many respects on Russia’s political and economic support.

The conflict around Transnistria broke out in 1989, during the period of overall liberalization in the USSR when the newly emerged Moldovan nationalist movement called for the de-Russification of the country and its future accession to Romania. Authorities in the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic started the “nationalization” of the legislation and internal policies (Büscher Reference Caspersen2008; Burian Reference Büscher2012; Järve Reference King2008). Transnistria, a predominantly Russian-speaking region with the largest part of Moldova’s industries employing basically non-Moldovan laborers, was totally alien to the new nationalist trends and demonstrated the fiercest resistance (Büscher Reference Caspersen2008; Roper 2001; Tolkacheva 2004; Troebst Reference Troebst2003).

In September 1990, the Congress of All-Levels Peoples’ Deputies of the Left Bank declared the foundation of the Transnistrian Republic independent of Moldova. Armed clashes sparked in the autumn of 1991; in March 1992, they escalated into full-fledged warfare that continued until July 1992. Police and armed forces loyal to the government of Moldova tried to reestablish control over the Left Bank but failed, partly because the Transnistrian leadership succeeded in mobilizing mass support and partly because of the interference of the Russian army stationed in the region (Burian Reference Büscher2012, 20–28; Mason Reference Munteanu and Munteanu.2009). The cease-fire agreement was drawn in July 1992; to date, it has been guaranteed by the tripartite peacekeeping force which is composed of troops of Russia, Moldova, and Transnistria (Burian Reference Büscher2012, 20–28; Troebst Reference Troebst2003, 438–443). Since then, the process of peaceful settlement has continued and involved international mediators and observers such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and the European Union (Wolff Reference Zubco2011). At present, the peace process is generally at a standstill.

In 2015, 29.1 percent of the population were Russians, 28.6 percent Moldovans, and 22.4 percent Ukrainians, while around 14.0 percent did not specify their ethnicity. The others were mainly Bulgarians, Belarusians, the Gagauz, Germans, Roma, Tatars, and such, and 1.4 percent identified themselves as “Transnistrians” (Tyniaev 2017). The Statistical Yearbook (Statisticheskii yezhegodnik 2017, 19) issued by the de facto authorities of Transnistria, provides somewhat different figures. According to it, Russians (33.8 percent) are followed by Moldovans (33.2 percent), Ukrainians (26.7 percent), and other groups (6.3 percent). The major ethnic groups are spread over the entire territory more or less evenly, although ethnodemographic proportions vary from district to district and many localities have a definite ethnic majority (Transnistria—Ethnic Composition, n.d.).

What Does the Transnistria Diversity Policy Look Like?

Is Multi-ethnicity a Source of Problems?

One may legitimately assume that in Transnistria popular attitude to the government and the very the statehood must be different and quite often critical. The implementation of the laws on languages, education, and culture lags far behind the official promises and is alternately random and selective; the entire population, including the proportion of non-Russian ethnicities, experiences homogenizing policies. Supposedly, critical attitudes might correlate with ethnic affiliation because people belonging to different ethnic and linguistic categories benefit from public policies to unequal degrees.

One may expect cleavages, grievances or claim making on ethnocultural grounds but, in fact, this does not take place. There have been no signs of local separatism in favor of joining mainland Moldova or Ukraine, even at the inception of the Transnistrian independence, although the demographic and geographic composition of Transnistria in theory favored such motions. There is no evidence of mass emigration of ethnic Ukrainians and Moldovans on ethnic grounds, and the ethnic proportions of the population generally remain intact. We note that the references to the data of the 1989 population census made in the literature are often incorrect, since most authors disregard the fact that the current de facto border of Transnistria does not coincide with the previous administrative borders of Soviet districts. In this regard, some references to the share of ethnic Moldovans in Transnistria as 38 percent or 40 percent (Kolstø Reference Kolstø2006, 731) are not accurate either; on the Left Bank it was lower and basically has not changed to date.

Transnistria can be characterized as an “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler Reference Schneider and Ingram2013), “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002), and a “hybrid regime” (Protsyk Reference Rechel2012), which repeatedly proves its high degree of legitimacy. For example, in the referendum held on September 17, 2006, 96.61 percent of Transnistrian voters rejected integration with Moldova while 98.07 percent approved independence and a possible future integration into Russia; the turnout was 78.55 percent (Database and Search Engine for Direct Democracy. n.d.a.; Database and Search Engine for Direct Democracy. n.d.b.). All local ethnicities vote alike at numerous referenda and elections and therefore in fact equally approve of local diversity policies. Sociological surveys repeatedly demonstrate that there are no big differences in attitudes to major political issues between the three major ethnicities (O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal Reference O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Toal2014; O’Loughlin, Toal, and Chamberlain-Creangă Reference O’Loughlin, Toal and Chamberlain-Creangă2013). Manifestations of ethnic and religious enmity occur, but they are very few; for example, the Jewish community used to report several anti-Semitic incidents (Osipov and Vasilevich 2017, 12).

Perhaps, the only visible problem of ethnic relations and language policy in Transnistria is the issue of the so-called Moldovan language schools using the Latin alphabet. A specific feature of Transnistria is that the Moldovan language is recognized only on the basis of the Cyrillic alphabet, but, in 1989, Moldovan lawmakers switched the Moldovan language to the Latin script. In the early 1990s, the administrations of several schools on the Left Bank and the parents of their students chose to conduct the educational process in the Moldovan language based on the Latin alphabet. These schools were cut off from public funding (thus rendering them private institutions in a legal vacuum) and experienced pressure up to police checks, fines, eviction from the premises, cessation of water, electricity, and sewage supplies, and direct threats. Therefore, by the mid-1990s they found themselves on the verge of closure and unable to operate normally (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Reference Osipov2012). At this time, most of these schools came under the jurisdiction of the Moldovan Ministry of Education, and some were forced to move to territory controlled by the authorities of Moldova (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Reference Osipov2012, 13–14). Later on, the official pressure of Transnistrian authorities decreased but never ended, and most Latin-script schools continue to function.

In the academic year 2012–2013, there were eight Latin-script schools, with 1,244 pupils (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Reference Osipov2012, 10–13); there were also 4,688 students in public schools of the TMR where the language of instruction was Moldovan with Cyrillic graphics (Hammarberg Reference Helmke and Levitsky2013, 37). In the academic year 2017–2018, the number of Latin-script schools remained eight, providing education for more than 1,000 pupils (Cojocari Reference Cojocaru2018).

The Effects of General Political and Social Conditions

The first explanation of the Transnistrian ethnopolitical stability lying on the surface is the effectiveness of the violence and coercive power of Transnistria de facto statehood. This argument, although correct, can be hardly considered sufficient.

The Transnistrian regime has definitely been authoritarian and repressive from its very outset, and multiple restrictions of civil and political rights, particularly freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and the right to association, are well documented (Hammarberg Reference Helmke and Levitsky2013; Postica 2012; Protsyk Reference Protsyk2009; Troebst Reference Tyniaev2004; Zubco Reference Zubco2016). Although ethnocultural issues are not welcomed by the ruling elite, they are not taboo and can be raised and discussed in public. For example, even a former chair of the Transnistrian parliament, Grigorii Marakutsa, was explicitly complaining about the extinction of the Moldovan language in Transnistria at the inaugural ceremony of the newly elected President Shevchuk (Dniesterpost Reference Dunn and Bobick2011). There are also numerous opportunities for deputies of the parliament and major ethnic nongovernmental organizations, particularly those that do not belong to political opposition and those represented in the Public Chamber, to raise ethnocultural issues outside of political contexts. However, this does not happen. Then one should not exaggerate the repressive capacity of the Transnistrian regime. It has not been able to fully suppress and close down the so-called Latin-script Moldovan schools, and this case clearly demonstrates that resistance is feasible. There is no doubt that the Transnistrian authorities would be able to cope with any tensions on ethnic grounds, but the puzzling circumstance here is that said tensions (except for the fight over the Latin-script schools) have taken place at all over the years.

Another explanation rests on the view that the region is deeply Russified culturally and linguistically; in fact, the majority rule of the Russian and Russified population marginalizes and diminishes diversity. To a high degree, such an explanation would be correct, but it is also simplistic. Indeed, the Transnistrian authorities portray their statehood as an outpost of Russia and a part of the “Russian World” in cultural terms. There are also many indicators that, in both public and private spheres, the Transnistrian society is to a high degree linguistically and culturally homogeneous. However, the dominance of the Russian language and Soviet (or post-Soviet) pop culture based on Russian in many parts of the former Soviet Union, particularly in such countries as Ukraine, Belarus, or Kazakhstan (Pavlenko 2008), does not predetermine popular ethnic affiliations or attitudes toward national statehood. Besides, ethnic and linguistic pluralism in Transnistria is not imitative since it has stable institutional and financial underpinnings and involves a sizeable segment of the population. Symbolically, Transnistria is an entity with an explicit ethnic—Moldovan, rather than Russian—foundation.

The next also widely spread explanation rests on the idea that Transnistria and its political system rest on an already deeply embedded regional identity (Babilunga, Bomeshko, and Shornikov Reference Babilunga, Nikolai, Bomeshko and Shornikov2007, 142–143; Kolstø Reference Kolstø2006, 731; Kolstø and Malgin 1998; Troebst Reference Tyniaev2004). A few authors also point out that the population’s self-perception and self-representation remain basically Soviet and rest on the Soviet nostalgia (Munteanu and Munteanu Reference Munteanu and Munteanu.2007, 57–58; Tolkacheva 2004, 87–88). We believe that such approaches build on shaky assumptions.

The case of Transnistria differs from other post-Soviet conflicts by the absence of tensions and popular conflictual narratives before 1989 (O’Loughlin, Toal, and Chamberlain-Creangă Reference O’Loughlin, Toal and Chamberlain-Creangă2013). Prior to the conflict of 1990–1992, there had been no evidence of a Left Bank “identity” or even an idea of the Transnistrian region (Cojocaru Reference Comai and Venturi2006, 262). Specific regional identity-based claims were not the main factor which determined the emergence of the conflict and even the notions of “Transnistria” and “Transnistrian people” did not exist until the conflict erupted (Sofransky Reference Sofransky2002). The mass mobilization of activists around the major industrial enterprises and not along ethnic lines or regional affiliations in 1990–1992 is relatively well studied and described (Mason Reference Munteanu and Munteanu.2009).

The approach in question implies that collective “identity” is something that is inevitably translated into human behavior and this looks highly questionable in itself (Brubaker and Cooper Reference Brunsson2000). One can assume that the local elites and population en masse wish for all Transnistrian ethnicities to sideline their ethnic affiliations in favor of regional Transnistrian “identity,” but there is no credible proof of this. What one can only witness is the official rhetoric of Transnistrian patriotism (Bobick Reference Bobick2011), a wide usage of Soviet and Russian imperial symbols and the related mass conformism of the populace.

The listed explanations are correct, but not sufficient; besides, there are other circumstances which can be added to the list but are rarely mentioned in the given context. In most Eurasian states, the population demonstrates conformism and, in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian environments where political competition is absent or restricted, vote for the incumbents. These societies can be described as basically depoliticized in the meaning that people prefer individual strategies of survival to collective action (Brown Reference Brubaker and Cooper2003). Besides, the institutional framework of neo-patrimonial relations (see Erdmann and Engel Reference Fisun2007; Fisun Reference Giuliano and Gorenburg2012; Hale Reference Hammarberg2007) also serves as a stabilizing force. In the case of Transnistria, most inhabitants of the region are employees in the public sector or directly dependent on the government or affiliated corporations in another way (Bobick Reference Bobick2011). This also explains the common conformism and opportunism. The system of patronage and clientele networks ensures that potential spokespersons of ethnic communities are incorporated into the officialdom, either directly or indirectly through controlled nongovernmental organizations and advisory bodies (such as Public Chambers).

Second, all post-Soviet polities are partly based on flexible informal mechanisms of governance (Polese and Morris Reference Postica2015). This opens up multiple opportunities for social adaptation to the given circumstances, since formal rules can be circumvented, renegotiated, reinterpreted in different ways, or ignored (Polese Reference Polese and Morris2011, 40).

Is There a Room for Diversity Policy?

How can one assess and measure the impact of deliberate strategies and techniques of governance aimed at ethnic diversity in Transnistria beyond the general stabilizing factors? The answer can be found if diversity policies are understood widely as the entirety of official discourses and practical activities somehow concerning multilingualism and multi-ethnicity. Assuming this, one can notice that Transnistria has built up a system of recurrent symbolic, discursive, and organizational practices which effectively shape and channel public mindsets and behavior in regard to the region’s ethnic and linguistic pluralism.

At first glance, the official approach to ethnic diversity in Transnistria, as in most other post-Soviet polities, looks inconsistent. However, it turns out that the system’s effectiveness is achieved in part because of its eclecticism and flexibility. One should approach its functioning in three areas: the production of narratives, elite mobility, and daily life. In all three, the system’s efficacy can be hardly grasped if one perceives ethnicities or “identities” as entities and agencies rather than practices of social categorization and adaptation to categorizations.

As Elizabeth Dunn and Michael S. Bobick conclude, unity and cohesion of such statehoods as Transnistria are basically secured not through suppression but rather through dominant discourses and the framing of debates (2014, 409). What at first glance looks inconsistent functions as an all-embracing approach acknowledging and accommodating a variety of views and expectations, including wishes to maintain and revive the Moldovan culture, fears of a new violent confrontation, negative expectations of any changes leading to discrimination, Soviet nostalgia, desires not to be cut off from Russia, and so forth. Notably, the mainstream narrative of Transnistria—as is the Soviet Union in its last years (when ethnic issues became a part of public debates)—is a non-conflictual one. Unlike discourse based on the notions of “minority” and “nondiscrimination,” it does not imply or generate images of dominant and subordinate groups. The symbolic adversary is placed outside the given society and, in the case of Transnistria, this is Romania with its imagined expansion (King Reference King1999, Reference Kolstø2003).

Part and parcel of this dominant narrative in Transnistria is a “siege mentality,” or the image of a “besieged fortress” (Caspersen Reference Cojocari2011, 85). The conflict around Transnistria from its very outset was aggravated on both banks of the Dniester with a popular mythology of Romania as the hostile “other” (Cojocaru Reference Comai and Venturi2006, 264). The local historic narratives in Transnistria emphasize Romania’s role as an ally of Nazi Germany and the occupying force that committed crimes against civilians during World War II. In other words, while one can talk about skepticism toward closer relations or ultimate unification with Romania on the Right Bank, on the Left Bank it escalates to an elite and popular phobia fueled with official propaganda.

On the contrary, numerous official statements and several legal provisions declare Transnistria as a hearth and a guarantor of the “genuine” Moldovan identity and the Moldovan language based on its “original” Cyrillic script. Noteworthy in this respect is a clear parallel between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria. Moldova’s official nationalism rests on the so-called doctrine of Moldovenism, which implies the existence of Moldovan national identity is separate from the Romanian nation, and which is enshrined in Moldova’s Constitution and legislation (Ţîcu Reference Țîcu2016, 55–57). One may say that Transnistria defends the doctrine of Moldovenism in an even more radical and grotesque version than Moldova itself (Munteanu and Munteanu Reference Munteanu and Munteanu.2007, 57).

The local diversity policies are thus affected by the phobias of Moldovan nationalism allegedly backed by Romanian involvement, praise to the Soviet “internationalism” and “people’s friendship,” and loyalty to a combination of selected historic myths which include the “genuine” Moldovan identity, the Soviet victory in World War II, and the Russia/Soviet “civilizing” mission in the region. On top of this, the system of propaganda, education, and collective rituals is combined with common narrative of the regional “nationhood.”

The official narrative offers answers to all potential questions and contains no overt contradictions; it shall be therefore regarded as coherent rather than fragmented. Symbolically, it prevents internal cleavages and conflicts and in the given circumstances leaves no room for alternative explanatory schemes. Thus, one can talk about the effective hegemonic strategy (Gramsci Reference Hale1971) of the local elite (Osipov et al. Reference Osipov and Vasilevich2014).

Institutionally, the Transnistrian system of governance does not in principle obstruct upward mobility of people belonging to different ethnicities; even if the statistic representation of different groups in the local elite was disproportionate, non-Russians serve as role models. Emblematic cases are the former chairs of the Transnistrian parliament Grigorii Marakutsa and Mikhail Burla, who publicly positioned themselves as Moldovan and Romanian respectively, or Vladimir Bodnar, a former deputy chair of the parliament and leading activist of Transnistrian Ukrainians. Concurrently, public institutions are basically not divided along ethnic lines and ethnicity-based civil society organizations are dependent on the government. Therefore, the system does not create an institutional basis for the construction and articulation of separate ethnic interests and demands.

In its daily life, the populace gets messages which discourage any activities contravening the publicly accepted agendas and, on the contrary, create incentives to participate in the mainstream institutions and practices. The Transnistria authorities managed to create and maintain local “banal nationalism” (Billig Reference Birkland1995) as an institutional and discursive routine which binds all the region’s inhabitants. According to the estimates of Moldovan human rights organization Promo-Lex, around 6,000 cultural events were arranged in 2015 alone by public authorities of Transnistria and affiliated organizations (Zubco Reference Zubco2016, 14). Most of these events are either professional concerts or mass celebrations of Transnistria’s alleged unity with Russia or commemorations of certain historic events significant in the light of Transnistrian national ideology. Taking into account the well-functioning educational system and mass media orchestrated by the government, one can conclude that the Transnistrian rulers managed to create and master the “infrastructural power” (Mann Reference Marko1984) of daily routines, rituals, and narratives that glue together the diverse population of the region.

The last point is that the origins of Transnistrian diversity policy can be easily derived from the Soviet nationalities policy of the late 1980s. It also strived to produce consent in the society through sophisticated means (Annus Reference Annus2015, 602) along with coercion. It also combined “crypto-nationalism” (Ikhlov Reference Isaacs and Polese2014) or acknowledgment of ethnonational statehood with rhetoric of “internationalism” and civil equality; symbolic recognition of linguistic and cultural pluralism does not entail respective practical measures. References to multi-ethnicity are not followed by the institutionalization of ethnic communities; cooperation between official authorities and ethnicity-based nongovernmental organizations in fact does not envisage any independent role of the latter but rather compliance with the agendas imposed by the authorities. The legislation related to language and ethnicity remains declarative, vaguely formulated, and open to interpretation; its implementation is done on an ad hoc basis and often depends on informal practices and mechanisms.