Throughout the colonial period in Kenya, chiefs were appointed by the colonial government, and they worked under the direct supervision of local British District Commissioners. In Kikuyuland, chiefs took advantage of their position to accumulate land at the expense of their subjects. Indeed, land scarcity was a major driver of the Mau Mau peasant revolt of the 1950s.
This book by Evanston Wamagatta has as its focus one such colonial chief, Waurhiu Wa Kung'u. In it, Wamagatta does not deny that chiefs abused their power for personal gain. As he states, ‘there was little official control exercised over chiefs because the District Commissioners were busy and they rarely toured the locations. Consequently, in order to legitimize and preserve their unnatural positions, many chiefs became a law unto themselves’ (5). Chiefs commonly resorted to brutal force to levy taxes from the population, as well as to recruit men to labor for settler farms and public works projects. Chiefs also routinely employed force to facilitate land alienation and impose colonial directives. While encouraged and often demanded by the colonial government, these actions, unsurprisingly, did little to endear these chiefs to their own people. Chiefs became the despised local representatives of the hated colonial regime. Among the most resented chiefs in Kikuyuland after 1920 was Waruhiu. He was appointed as chief in 1922, together with other well-known Kikuyu chiefs, including Koinange, Karanja, and Njonjo
Wamagatta pursues a divided agenda in this book, and as a result there is an inherent contradiction in both his analysis and conclusion. On the one hand, Wamagatta argues that Waruhiu was ‘a wealthy and powerful chief when he died’ and that he had acquired this wealth and power by ‘exploiting the colonial system for his own social and economic advancement’ (x). On the other hand, Wamagatta holds the position that Waruhiu did not ‘sell his country to the British colonizers for money since his wealth was lawfully acquired’. But Waruhiu was one of the major collaborators in central Kenya. As Wamagatta himself notes, Waruhiu ‘believed his own white superior's authority was God-given and to disobey them was tantamount to disobeying God himself’ (x). In his duties, Waruhiu obeyed and rarely, if ever, contradicted official pronouncements. He was furthermore quite notorious for his corruption, as Marshall Clough discusses in his book, Fighting Two Sides. Clough makes clear in that study that Waruhiu's actions on behalf of white settlers extended beyond what was expected of him: Waruhiu was an efficient and ruthless labor recruiter ‘on behalf of the coffee farmers’ who sometimes closed ‘schools at harvest time to provide pickers for the estates’.Footnote 7
Throughout this book, Wamagatta does not provide any evidence to contradict the generally established position that Waruhiu was anything but a notorious anti-nationalist collaborator. By Wamagatta's own account, Waruhiu was especially close to the colonial government, and this ‘alienated many of his people who considered him a stooge, and a stooge of the white man’ (67). Waruhiu campaigned against all of the nationalist movements and especially against Mau Mau, conducting the githai (anti-Mau Mau) oath ceremonies ‘in Kikuyuland and beyond’ (130). This chief had also been an enthusiastic supporter of the Kikuyu Home Guard, whose avowed aim was to combat Mau Mau. Thus, by 1952, Waruhiu had established himself as a prominent public enemy of Mau Mau.
Most other scholars concur that Waruhiu's support of the British accounts for his subsequent murder at the hands of Mau Mau. But Wamagatta disagrees, contending that Waruhiu was not murdered by members of Mau Mau, but rather by ‘some leaders of the white settlers, working together with some government officials’ (xii). This claim is the weakest part of this book. In making it, Wamagatta relies upon speculation, and also on shaky and unsourced data. There is no proof that the colonial government together with white settlers conspired to murder one of their most ardent supporters in order to force the Colonial Office to declare a State of Emergency in the colony. Here, Wamagatta would have greatly benefited from looking at recent scholarly books on Kenya that deal with this political moment. Explanations for the delay in the declaration of the State of Emergency can be found in the misguided attitude (and analysis) of Sir Philip Mitchell (the departing governor), as well as in the delay of the colonial government in communicating with the Colonial Office. If indeed Wamagatta seriously wanted to prove Waruhiu was murdered by settlers working in cahoots with the colonial government, he could have strengthened his argument by exploring this episode in more depth and providing real evidence.
In a similar vein, Wamagatta contends that the Mau Mau could not have murdered Waruhiu because he was killed during the day, before witnesses, which is contrary to the established Mau Mau practice of killing at night and leaving behind no witnesses. This claim is also unconvincing. By 1952, the original Mau Mau central committee (Muhimu) had essentially lost control of the movement. From then on, actions that Mau Mau fighters took did not necessarily have or need authorization from Muhimu. Also, there is no indication that Muhimu had ever issued directives that stipulated the time and method for eliminating adversaries. As Wamagatta himself concedes, at that time ‘there was unprecedented lawlessness, violence, terrorism and insecurity on the eve of Waruhiu's assassination. Murders, arson, burglary, thefts, cattle maiming, crop destruction and oath taking were very common’ (121). After the declaration of the emergency and the establishment of the Home Guard patrols, chiefs became much more difficult to target. They were protected by the Home Guard and often lived behind fortifications. Even then, a number of them were killed by Mau Mau fighters.
Wamagatta's book, while well written and easy to follow, unfortunately promises more than it delivers. It is not accurate to state that Waruhiu came to be considered a collaborator ‘simply because he was brutally murdered’ (xi). For members of Mau Mau, evidence abounded of Waruhiu's traitorous partnership with the British long before 1952.
